SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

, - for the county of los angeles

DEPARTMENT NO. 106

HON. RAYMOND CHOATE, JUDGE

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

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
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BRUCE MCGREGOR DAVIS.

Defendant.



NO. A-26786

235

REPORTERS' DAILY TRANSCRIPT

Wednesday, February 2, 1972

VOLUME 35

APPEARANCES:

For the People:

JOSEPH P. BUSCH, JR., District Attorney

BY: ANTHONY MANZELLA

and

STEPHEN R. KAY,

Deputies District Attorney

For Defendant Davis:

KAUFMANN SWARTZ

GEÖRGE V. DENNY, III

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COPY

MARY LOU BRIANDI, CSR ROGER K. WILLIAMS, CSR Official Court Reporters

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1		IND	EX			voir
2	PEOPLE'S WITNESSES:	DIRECT	CROSS	REDIRECT	RECROSS	DIRE
3	KAUFMANN, William John, III	5291 K 5325 K				5316D 5317K
4	(Continued)					
5	SWARTZ, John, Jr.	E200 M	5301	5408		
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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1972 9:49 AM

THE COURT: Gentlemen, we are going to proceed without you some morning.

MR. KAY: We were looking for a grease pencil.

MR. DENNY: It took two lawyers to get it, your Honor, but we got it.

MR. KAY: Dr. Kaufmann, I wonder if you could --

THE COURT: Excuse me. Just for the record --

MR. KAY: Oh, excuse me.

THE COURT: For the record, all the jurors are present.

The defendant is present with his counsel, Mr. Denny. And

Mr. Kay for the People.

WILLIAM JOHN KAUFMANN, III

called as a witness by and on behalf of the People, having been previously duly sworn, resumed the stand and testified further as follows:

## DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

## BY MR. KAY:

On the witness stand to the court blackboard there, and on that piece of paper -- which, after you get finished drawing it, I'll ask to have it marked as the People's next in order -- I wonder if you could describe the different phases of the moon, making a diagram, so that you can explain

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it to the jurors.

A Okay. What I am about to talk about is found in any standard astronomy text --

MR. DENNY: Sir, I wonder if we could have you use the hand microphone that's in front of the witness stand?

THE WITNESS: Okay. How does this sound? Now, I don't have enough hands.

(Laughter.)

THE WITNESS: What I am about to talk about is found in any standard astronomy text, and is just simply: Why do we have the various phases of the moon.

As you know from your personal experience, the moon looks different from night to night.

This thing is squeaking.

MR. KAY: If you stand directly underneath the -THE WITNESS: I'll have problems.

MR. KAY: -- speaker, it will squeak.

THE WITNESS: Suppose this is the earth. We'll draw it green, for any old good reason.

And as you know, the earth goes around the sun; but while the earth is going around the sun, the moon is going around the earth.

Let's indicate by these red arrows the direction of sunlight. In other words, the sun is off to the left of this diagram, and the light is streaming in this fashion.

As a result, the right-hand side of the earth is in darkness. And I'll indicate that by shading it black.

And in red again, I will -- I shall draw, crudely, the

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moon's orbit about the earth. It's approximately circular.

And suppose we were to draw the moon at various positions -- let's take this position, this position, this position and this position.

Now, again, since the light from the sun is coming from the left towards the right, the right-hand side of the moon is in darkness.

Now, think about standing on the earth, and observing the moon in these various configurations. For an example, if you look at the moon when it's out here, you will be seeing the entirely lighted side of the moon --

THE COURT: Excuse me. There are some jurors who can't see.

THE WITNESS: Oh, excuse me.

THE COURT: There's a pointer behind the --

THE WITNESS: That's a very good idea. I still don't have enough hands.

(Laughter.)

THE WITNESS: Suppose you are on the earth, looking at the moon in this location. Clearly, you are going to see the lighted side of the moon, and none of the dark side of the moon.

As a result, you will see a completely illuminated circle, and that's called new -- a full moon.

On the other hand, imagine that you are looking at the moon when it is in this location of its orbit. You are going to see one half lighted; and the other half in darkness, so you will see something like this (indicating).

In this location, you are going to be able to see 1 only the dark side of the moon, but not the lighted side of 2 the moon, so you would see something in total darkness. 3. And in this location, you would see, again, onehalf of the moon lighted and one-half in darkness. 5 And as the moon goes around in this direction, this (indicating) is called the first quarter. 7 THE COURT: Again, we can't see back here. Would you--8 As fls. no, go shead. Finish writing. 10 11 12 13 14. 15 16 17 18 19 24 25 27 28

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THE WITNESS: This (indicating) is called last quarter. And this is called new moon.

And this is why we have the phases of the moon. It takes approximately 28 days for the moon to go all the way around the earth? and as a result, there is approximately 28 days from new moon to the next new moon, or 28 days from full moon to the next full moon.

In other words, there's about one week between each of the various phases of the moon.

At points in between these phases, what you can do is sort of use your imagination -- or, again, go to this diagram -- and realize that when you have the situation in here (indicating), you are going to be seeing a crescent moon. A crescent moon -- also, you would be seeing a crescent moon in here, and what we call a gibbous moon out here, where instead of being perfectly round, it has only a little bit in shadow. This is called a gibbous moon, g-i-b-b-o-u-s.

And these are the various phases of the moon.

MR. KAY: Your Honor, I wonder if, at this point, we could have this diagram that Dr. Kaufmann has drawn marked as the People's next in order?

THE COURT: What is it, 102?

MR. DEMNY: 103, I believe, your Honor,

THE COURT: Yes, it is 103.

MR. KAY: 103. I'll mark it in the lower right-hand corner here.

MR. DENNY: For identification, I take it, only?
THE COURT: Yes. It's 103 for identification.

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MR. KAY: Thank you.

Now, Dr. Kaufmann, I wonder if you could describe to the jury the relative intensity of illumination on the earth of the four phases of the moon, the new moon, the full moon, the first quarter and the last quarter.

A By far, the full moon is the brightest of any of these phases. And if we indicate the brightness of the full moon by, say, 100 per cent, then in the first and last quarter, you're down to about 20 per cent of illumination; and you virtually have no illumination when you are around new moon.

Obviously, at the time of new moon, the moon will be in the same direction as the sun, and you really can't see it at all, because the sun is so blinding. So you don't see the moon at all, and you get zero illumination from it around the time of new moon.

And you get greater brilliance at the time of the full moon.

1-1 Q I wonder if you could now resume the witness stand. 1 A Yes. Q Dr. Kaufmann, did you determine whether or not there was a full moon between August 26th, 1969, and August 30, 1969, which would have illuminated the Chatsworth area? 5 Yes, I did. 'n Q And on what day did you determine there was a 7 full moon? 8 There was a full --9 MR. DENNY: Just a minute, I'll object to the form of 10 the question as no foundation, calling for hearsay. 11 12 The question was, did it illuminate Chatsworth. 13 I think he can testify as to from Chatsworth, et cetera, 14 whether there was at that time, a phase of the moon, but 15 not what the illumination was in Chatsworth. 16 THE COURT: Sustained. 17 BY MR. KAY: Well, did you determine whether or not 18 there was a full moon which -- a full moon which would have 19 illuminated the Chatsworth area, barring such things as 20 maybe cloud covering? 21 Yes, I did. 22 All right. And on what day did you determine there was a full moon? The full moon occurred on August 27, 1969. \* 25° All right, And, Doctor, what is a moonrise? 26 On that date -- in general? 27 Yes, in general. 28 It is -- there are a number of varieties of

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defining moonrise. It depends on which astronomer you're talking to.

I define moonrise as that time when the entire disk of the moon just rises above the geometrical horizon.

By that we mean, as you know, we have trees and hills and buildings and people wandering around the earth. And if you assume, however, you have a perfectly flat horizon, the type of horizon out at sea, that's what we mean by the astronomical horizon.

And moonrise is defined as the time when the moon has just completely risen above this geometrical astronomical horizon.

- Q What do you mean by moonset?
- A On moonset, we mean, on the other hand, when the moon has just completely disappeared below the horizon.
- Q Now, does the moon appear to be larger as it is rising?
  - A Yes, it does. It appears --
  - Q And what causes that?
- A This is a very curious thing. Perhaps if you were to go out and look at the moon rising, this is especially true of the full moon or the moon setting in the west, it looks much larger than it normally does. And this is entirely an optical illusion, a very curious optical illusion.

If you had a camera and you went out and you took a picture of the moon rising, it usually looks big and orange, particularly the harvest moon, for example.

And then, if you took a picture several hours later, when it

was up in the sky and compared the two photographs, you find the size of the moon and the images on the photographs are perfectly identical. It is entirely an optical illusion.

Other ways of removing this optical illusion is to make a tiny hole (indicating) and look between the chink between your fingers and you notice the moon, in fact, looks small.

Another way is simply to turn around with your back from the moon and then down with your head between your legs and you look up at the moon upside down, you will also see the illusion disappears. It is a very curious illusion which, in my opinion, there's no real accurate explanation for. I've never come across an explanation which satisfied me. It just must be that the fact that the familiar objects, the buildings and the trees and the mountains -- you know how far away they are -- the moon looks much, much larger when it is near the horizon.

Very curious illusion, indeed.

THE COURT: Doctor, we're all interested. It is very interesting to hear you talk about this.

THE WITNESS: But it is not relevant.

THE COURT: Just listen to the question and don't get carried away.

THE WITNESS: Oh, sorry.

Q BY MR. KAY: Doctor, on the night of the full moon, does the moon appear to have the same amount of brightness from the moment it rises until the moment it sets?

A No.

	1	Q Could you explain that?			
	2	A Yes. I could best explain it with another			
r	3 _	diagram.			
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	4	However, in words, briefly			
*	; , i	Q Well, if you want to do it by another diagram,			
à	6	Lill why don't you step down here and we'll remove this			
	7	diagram.			
	8	THE BAILIFF: You can just flip it.			
	9	(Whereupon, unrelated matters were called and			
	10	heard before the Court.)			
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THE COURT: Sorry, go shead.

Q BY MR. KAY: All right, Dr. Kaufmann, --

Your Honor, Dr. Kaufmann has made a diagram which I would like to have marked as People's next in order for identification.

THE COURT: All right, 104.

MR. KAY: All right. I have so marked it in the lower right-hand corner.

THE WITNESS: To reca- -- reca- --

Q BY MR. KAY: Recapitulate the question --

appear to have the same illumination, the same amount of light falling on the earth from the time of moonrise to moonset, and the answer is no. The answer is no.

And the reason for this is, if this green circle represents the surface of the earth, and by this red circle we mean --

Q BY MR. KAY: Doctor, excuse me, would you use the pointer? I don't think Mrs. Sandberg can see.

A Oh, certainly.

By this red circle, it represents the thickness of the earth's atmosphere. Then, you see when the moon is near the horizon, you're looking through a very great deal of atmosphere. While it is higher in the sky you're looking through much, much less atmosphere.

I could go on as to why this causes the moonrise to be red and the sunrise to be red --

THE COURT: No.

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THE WITNESS: -- but I won't.

(Laughter.)

Q BY MR. KAY: Okay. Doctor, could you take the stand again?

A Yes.

Q Doctor, have you found that there's any difference in illumination of the moon once it has risen in the sky to 30 degrees or more above the horizon?

A No. For all practical purposes, if you wanted to pick an angle above which you would say from when it rises to this angle (indicating), to when it sets to this angle (indicating), the amount of illumination is essentially constant. That angle would be, in my opinion, about 30 degrees.

Q Now, other than with sensitive electronic equipment, could you tell the difference in illumination when the moon is 30 degrees above the horizon to 40 degrees, 30 or 40 degrees?

A No, to the human eye, in my opinion, you would have the same total amount of illumination.

Now, directing your attention to August 27, 1969.

At what time did the moon -- what time did the moonrise occur in the Chatsworth area on August 27th, 1969?

MR. DENNY: Again, I'll object to the form of the question. He cannot state unless there is more of a foundation on hearsay at what time the moon rose, if it rose at all in the Chatsworth area on that date. He can say what time the moon arose in the sky, astronomically, but not moonrise.

THE COURT: If it rose anywhere on that date, it must have

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arisen in the Chatsworth area, that's what he means, what he's referring to, not whether it can be seen.

You may answer.

THE WITNESS: Yes, our calculations tell us that moon-rise occurred on August -- on the evening of August 27, at 7:51 P. M., Pacific daylight time.

In the Chatsworth area at the longitude and latitude for Chatsworth.

- Q In other words, the calculations you've made that you are going to testify in court today to are specifically for the Chatsworth area; is that correct?
  - A That is correct.
- Now, what time on August 27, 1969, did the moon rise to 30 degrees above the horizon?
- A Approximately 10:30. After 10:30, the moon was above 30 degrees.
- Now, in the early morning hours of August 28, 1969, at what time did the moon fall to 30 degrees above the horizon?
- A Okay, now, that's the same night, and that, of course, is the morning of August 28. And at approximately a quarter after 4:00, 4:16, the moon fell to 30 degrees.
- Q So, in other words, between 10:30 P. M. on August 27, 1969, and 4:16 A. M. on August 28, 1969, the moon was between 30 degrees above the horizon?
  - A Yes.

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Now, between 10:30 p.m. on August 27th, 1969, when the moon had risen to 30 degrees above the horizon, and 4:16 a.m. on August 28th, 1969, when the moon had fallen to 30 degrees above the horizon, did the moon cast approximately the same brilliance?

A Approximately.

MR. DENNY: Just a moment. I'll object to that as calling for opinion, hearsay; no foundation.

THE COURT: Sustained. You may rephrase the question.

Q BY MR. KAY: Well, I'm talking about the moon itself.

Did the moon itself cast approximately the same brilliance between that time?

MR. DENNY: Well, again --

THE COURT: Well, the moon always casts the same brilliance, doesn't it, if you're out somewhere in space, where you could see it shining all the time; isn't that right?

THE WITNESS: Yes. The lumina --

Q BY MR. KAY: All right. Well, in Chatsworth, assuming that there was no cloud covering of any type, between 10:30 p.m. on August the 27th and 4:16 s.m. on August the 28th, 1969, did the moon cast the same brilliance?

MR. DENNY: Just a moment, Doctor.

I'll object to that as an improper hypothetical question.

THE COURT: Sustained.

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Q.	BY MR. KAY:	Well, in other wor	ds, Doctor, when
the moon is	above 30 degr	ees, 30 degrees ab	ove the horizon,
when it rise	es, until wher	it falls 30 degre	es to 30
degrees abov	ve the horizon	i, in your opinion,	does it cast
the same bri	illiance?		•

A Yes. From my own personal experience, for carrying out various operations out of doors, in the middle of the night, I do find that I personally cannot detect with my own eyes any difference in illumination during that period.

Now, to the non-expert observer, would there have appeared to be a full moon at any other time between the period of August 26th, 1969, and August 30th, 1969?

MR. DENNY: I'll object to that as calling for a non-expert opinion.

MR. KAY: Well, he --

THE COURT: All right. Sustained. You may rephrase your question.

Q BY MR. KAY: Doctor, even with your -- well, even -- can you yourself detect any difference -- well, okay. Let me ask this:

Even to yourself, would there have appeared to be a full moon at any other time between the period of August 26th, 1969, and August 30th, 1969?

A · Well ---

MR. DENNY: Object to that as irrelevant; not calling for expert opinion.

THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MR. KAY: Doctor, on August 26th, 1969, and 1 on August 28, 1969, would there have appeared to have been 2 a full moon in the Chatsworth area, excluding any cloud 3 covering? I'll object to that as calling for a MR. DENNY: 5 non-expert opinion. б THE COURT: Overruled. 7 THE WITNESS: Yes. Я In my expert opinion, I personally cannot 9 detect a difference. If I don't consult tables and data 10 between -- or make very careful observations myself. --11 MR. DENNY: I'11 --12 THE WITNESS: -- I cannot --13 MR. DENNY: Just a moment. I'm sorry. Doctor. 14 I will move that the answer be stricken as 15. non-responsive. 16 THE COURT: I'll strike it. 17 BY MR. KAY: Well, on August 26th, 1969, and 18 August 28th, 1969, the day before and the day after the 10 full moon, how would the moon have appeared in the sky to 20 an observer here on earth? 21 MR. DENNY: I'll object to that. He says "to an 22 observer." If he's talking about his own personal experience, 23 24 versus expert opinion --BY MR. KAY: Well, in your expert opinion? 25 26 In my expert opinion, it would have appeared to be a full moon. 27 And can you explain that, Doctor? 28 : Q

A Yes. The differences in the shadowing of the moon is 'so slight, the day before and the day after, it's very difficult to distinguish just from looking up in the sky as to whether or not you're right on the day offull moon or the day before or the day after.

2a-1 Ö All right. Now, directing your attention to 1 2 August 26th, 1969, the day before the actual full moon, at what 3 time was the moonrise in the Chatsworth area? The moon rose at 7:20 P. M., Pacific daylight time. 6 All right. And at what time did the moon rise 7 to 30 degrees above the horizon? Ŕ At approximately 10:00 o'clock. 9 And at what time in the early morning of August 1Ó 27th, 1969 -- the same night -- did the moon fall to 30 degrees 11 above the horizon? 12 At approximately a quarter to 4:00, or 3:45 A. M. 13 All right. Now, directing your attention to August 14 28th, 1969, the day after the full moon, at what time did you 15 determine the moon rose in the Chatsworth area? 16 At 8:20 P. M., Pacific daylight time. A 17 Q All right. And at what time did you determine 18 that the moon rose to 30 degrees above the horizon? 19 A At approximately 11:00 o'clock, that same evening. 20 And at what time did you determine that the moon 21 fell to 30 degrees above the horizon? 22 Okay. Now, this is on the morning of August 23 That's the same night. And I determined that time to be ť 24 a quarter to 5:00, or 4:45 A. M. 25 All right. Now, assuming that the cloud 26 conditions were the same, in your expert opinion, would there 27 be a discernible difference in the brilliance of the moon on 28 August 29th, 1969 -- that's the night of August 29th, not the

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 early morning hours -- on the night of August 29th from what it was on August 26th, 27th and 28th, 1969?

MR. DENNY: I'll object to that as an improper hypothetical question.

THE COURT: Sustained.

MR. KAY: May we approach the bench on that, your Honor? THE COURT: No, you may not. You may restate it.

Q BY MR. KAY: Well, in your expert opinion, what would be the difference in illumination on August 29th, 1969, if there would be any, from August 26th, August 27th and August 28th?

MR. DENNY: Again, your Honor, this is -- I think this is an improper hypothetical question. I think he can ask: What would be the difference in illumination the day before a full moon and three days after a full moon?

That is a hypothetical question in general. But not taking these dates in particular.

THE COURT: Sustained.

Q BY MR. KAY: Well, I am taking these dates in general, your Honor, because he figured it out for the Chatsworth area on these particular dates. I think he has already testified to that.

THE COURT: Well, all right. Let's approach the bench.

(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had at the bench among Court and counsel, outside the hearing of the jury:)

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. DENNY: My objection is that in attempting to use

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these dates, and in attempting to tie that in with the amount of illumination that would be falling on Chatsworth -- or, a person looking from Chatsworth on these dates -- he can't say, and therefore --

THE COURT: He was not at Chatsworth, and he doesn't know what the weather conditions were at Chatsworth.

MR. DENNY: No. no.

THE COURT: Even posing your -- in the form in which you pose your question.

MR. DENNY: All you have to do is ask him -- since you've got four days here, they're the same as any four days, when there's a full moon. And the day preceding and two days thereafter, you can ask him if there is a discernable difference in the amount of moonlight appearing two days after a full moon, versus one day before and one day after.

MR. KAY: Well, certainly, I understand that.

However, he has testified that he has figured it out specifically for the Chatsworth area; that these calculations are specifically for the Chatsworth area. In other words, the moonrise at 7:20. Well, maybe it rose at 7:30 here in the Los Angeles area -- or 7:21. But he's figured all --

MR. DENNY: You still don't understand.

with the word "illumination," because --

MR. DENNY: You don't know what the illumination was in Chatsworth, and neither does he.

THE COURT: Unless he was there.

MR. KAY: Well, I said: Assuming that the cloud 23-conditions were the same on the --THE COURT: Well, keep your voice down. MR. DENNY: You can't assume that, because that's an improper hypothetical question. You don't have the foundation to assume that. 2b fol 28

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THE COURT: Oh, I think --

MR. DENNY: You are asking that as a hypothetical question.

THE COURT: I think he can assume that.

MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, you can't assume that the cloud condition is the same on these four days, because there's no evidence, no evidence to show that.

If he's asking a hypothetical question, you have to establish the facts in the hypothetical question. They have to be independently established, and they're not.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. DENNY: I have no objection to his asking a hypothetical question in general, about the amount of illumination from the moon the day before a full moon, the day after full moon or two days after full moon, because I know what his answer's going to be.

His answer is going to be: Yes, there is a discernible difference two days after full moon. And I have no objection to that getting in.

I don't want the jury to get the impression that on these particular days, in Chatsworth, anybody can tell, because unless that foundation is established, that on these four days there were no clouds, or the cloud conditions were the same -- and this is why we were not allowed to go out there and make a view --

MR. KAY: Well, I would ask to -- I believe that the witness, Barbara Hoyt, will testify that it was -- the weather was clear; and we know that Mr. Denny's already called

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Mr. Aldrich. If the Court wants --

MR. DENNY: And the Judge would not let us go out, because he said we didn't know what the conditions were.

MR. KAY: Well --

THE COURT: I didn't know what the conditions would be.

If they had been prognosticated, I might have known. I didn't know what they would be when we got there.

MR. KAY: Yes.

THE COURT: And I wasn't sure, judging from what had been produced, as to what the conditions actually were.

MR. KAY: Um-hom.

THE COURT: So Mr. Denny is correct in that respect.

Do you anticipate being able to establish, by
Barbara Hoyt, that the weather on each one of these nights

MR. KAY: No, I can't represent that,

THE COURT: You can't represent that.

MR. KAY: On the night she heard the screens, that it was clear; but I can't represent to the Court that she can testify that on each night --

MR. DEWNY: It's just --

THE COURT: Well, I think for the purpose of your question, that you can assume -- you can tell him to make the assumption, solely for the purpose ofmeasuring moonlight, and not for any other purpose, that -- you can have him assume that the sky was absolutely clear.

MR. DENNY: Not on these nights, your Honor. Not on these nights.

I strongly object to that. As I say, there is 1 absolutely no objection to his taking any "in general" in 2 a hypothetical situation, any four nights, where there is --3 THE COURT: That's right. MR. DENNY: -- the day before the full moon, the full 5 moon, the day after, and two days after. 6 THE COURT: Well, assume that the sky was at 30 degrees, 7 and that the -- I mean, assume that the moon was at 30 degrees, 8 and that the weather is absolutely clear in the Chatsworth 9 10 eres. 11 MR. KAY: Um-home. 12 Not in the Chatsworth area, your Honor. MR. DENNY: 13 THE COURT: Without specifying the days. 14 MR. DENNY: In any area. 15 THE COURT: In any area. 16 MR. DENNY: In any area. 17 THE COURT: That --- 18 • MR. DENNY: And without specifying the days. - 19 hypothetical --2Ô · THE COURT: In any area, that's true. You are correct, 21 Mr. Denny. 22 Thank you, your Honor. MR. DENNY: 23 MR. KAY: Okay. 24 (Whereupon, the following proceedings were had 25 in open court, within the presence and hearing of the 26 jury:) 27 BY MR. KAY: Now, Doctor, two days after there Q 28 was a full moon, what percentage of brilliance would the moon

cast on earth? What percentage -- you said that on the full 1 moon, it would be 100 percent. Two days after the full moon, 2 what percentage would there be? 3 Approximately 80 to 85 percent. You're down 4 between 15 and 20 percent of the maximum. .5 All right. And then, say, three days after the 6 full moon, what percentage of brilliance would be cast? 7 A It's beginning to fall quite rapidly the third, 8 fourth and fifth days. The third day, it would be approxi-9 mately 60 to 75 percent. 10. 11 Now, Doctor, did you yourself perform certain experiments to determine how well you could see during the light of the full moon, the day before the full moon, the 13 14 day of the full moon, and the day after the full moon? 15 Α Yes. 2c fls. 16 17 18 19 20 21 26 27 28

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VOIR DIRE KAY

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A No.

Q Have you had any training in psychology?

MR. KAY: Objection. That's irrelevant, your Honor.

THE COURT: Sustained.

Q BY MR. DEMNY: Have you had any training in the psychology of sight?

MR. KAY: That's irrelevant also, your Honor -- assuming there is such a thing.

THE COURT: Sustained.

MR. DEMNY: There is such a thing.

Q Sir, the experiments you made in this particular case, that you are about to tell us about, are they things that I could do, just as you did?

A Yes.

Q so that it does not take any expertise to do them; is that right?

A No.

MR. DENNY: All right. I'll object to any evidence of any experiments that are so-called experiments by an expert, since they are not the subject of expert testimony.

MR. KAY: Doctor --

May I inquire, just a few questions, your Honor?
THE COURT: All right. Still on voir dire.

## VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION

BY MR. KAY:

Q All right. Doctor, did you -- you are Director of

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the Griffith Park Observatory; is that correct?

A Yes.

. And did you perform these experiments as part of your -- as part of your job, as part of your learning process in the field of astronomy and astrophysics?

MR. DENNY: Irrelevant and immaterial.

THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer.

THE WITNESS: Yes, it's very important for an astronomer -

MR. DENNY: Well, I'll object --

THE COURT: You've answered when you said "yes."

Right. THE WITNESS:

MR. KAY: Your Honor, I would submit that the doctor should be able to describe the experiments and testify to them. were part of his foundation and his expertise, his testifying to the amount of illumination cast from the moon.

MR. DENNY: Your Honor, may we approach the bench on this? THE COURT: Is it something that any one of us could not have done? Anyone of the jury or anyone here in the courtroom?

Well, let me hear what this experiment was. Will you approach the bench?

MR. KAY: Sure.

(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had at the bench among Court and counsel, outside the hearing of the jury:)

THE COURT: Off the record.

(Whereupon, proceedings were had among Court and counsel, which were not reported.)

THE COURT: All right. What was the experiment the doctor

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did?

MR. KAY: Okay. He performed several different experiments. Number one, he determined that on the day before the full moon, the day after the full moon, and the day of the full moon, he could very easily read a newspaper by the light of the full moon.

MR. DEMNY: Now, that --

MR. KAY: Number two --

MR. DEWNY: I'm sorry. Go shead.

MR. KAY: Number two, he determined, on the day before, the day of, and the day after the full moon, that he could drive his car without using his headlights, without any difficulty, in areas where there was absolutely no artificial illumination.

He could see the road signs and the street signs and the stop signs without any artificial illumination at all.

He also -- the third part was that he determined on the day before, the day of the full moon, and the day after the full moon, that he could see and recognize people that he knew at distances exceeding 100 feet.

Basically, those would be the three --

THE COURT: What impels you to say that this is something which is a matter of expert opinion?

MR. KAY: Well, we are -- whereas the layman might be able to perform these same experiments, a layman doesn't do them. I mean, this is an expert who is doing this as part of his profession and as part of his learning process, to do this, to determine the amount of illumination cast from the moon.

Now, I ---

MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, he has just testified that these things, any of us could do. Therefore, it is not -- MR. KAY: Yeah, but --

MR. DENNY: Well, look at Section 801 of the Evidence Code.

"Related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact."

And that's based on the old case law, that expert opinion means just that. It's something that a layman can't do, that anybody can't do.

MR. KAY: Well, I think it is beyond common experience.

MR. DENNY: Anybody can go out and they can --

MR. KAY: Yeah. But has anybody done this? I mean, do you think any one of those jurors has done that?

MR. DENNY: Yes.

MR. KAY: Do you?

MR. DENNY: Yes.

MR. KAY: I don't think so.

MR. DENNY: I think they've probably driven in the moonlight without car lights. I have done it. I used to do it out on the desert all the time.

THE COURT: Just a second.

(Pause in the proceedings while the Court perused the Evidence Code.)

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27 28 THE COURT: Now, what do you think this means, 800, if he is not testifying as an expert -- testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion -- in other words it -- if he were to express an opinion about whether or not he could see such things, give certain conditions of the moon.

He's limited to such an opinion as is permitted by the law. It says: including but not limited to an opinion as rationally based on the perception of the witness and be helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony.

Let me ask you this, included in this experiment, were any -- were any angles of the moon considered?

MR. KAY: I'm sure they were.

THE COURT: I mean, was it 30 degrees and so forth? That would require, I think, an expert to testify to.

MR. KAY: Yes.

MR. DENNY: Sure.

THE COURT: And I think that goes out of the realm of lay abilities.

MR. DENNY: All right, your Honor, that goes out of the realm of lay opinion, and he's then --

, THE COURT: Lay sbilities to testify.

MR. DENNY: All right.

Well, if it goes out of that, then, if he is going to testify that he made identifications of persons, then, if it is going to be relevant to this proceeding, you've got to show that the tests were comparable. And I would cite to the Court --

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THE COURT: Comparable to what?

MR. DENNY: Comparable to the conditions involved here. Otherwise, it is irrelevant. Otherwise, it is irrelevant.

And I would cite to the Court --

THE COURT: Well, I think that's true.

MR. DENNY: Uh --

THE COURT: I don't think you need any citation for that. There's no point, whatever, in setting up an experiment and having anybody testify to it unless --

MR. DENNY: All right, that's essentially what --

THE COURT: Unless it is probative.

MR. DENNY: -- attempting to get in here an experiment
he did under noncomparable conditions and we haven't been
able to get in certain evidence that we sought that way
and we haven't been able to get a jury view because you
were not able to show they were comparable. So he should
not be able to get in testimony of an experiment that he
conducted if they can't show it was under comparable conditions.

THE COURT: What's your view with respect to 800, Mr. Key?

MR. KAY: Well, it seems that the witness has complied with all these sections. It is obviously based on his own rationale -- ration based on the perception of the witness. I mean, he performed experiments. I don't think we have any problem with Subsection (a), and I think it is helpful to an understanding of his testimony. He's been testifying all morning about the illumination of the moon and how it appears to somebody here on earth and the different angles

of the moon. And I think that it would be very helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony.

MR. DENNY: I think his testimony has been admirably lucid up to this point. I don't think you have to have further testimony to help the jury or anyone else understand what he's testified to thus far. His testimony has been clear and explicit.

But if he's going to get into testifying about experiments, an experiment that anyone can do, then, he's going to have to establish that those experiments were conducted under the same conditions that prevail in this case. Otherwise, it is irrelevant and its prejudicial aspects certainly outweighs its probative value. It is as if I were to go out on the ranch and attempt experiments or testify to experiments that I have made out there, as to whether I could see or not. And I could testify I couldn't recognize people.

MR. KAY: I think certainly we can't determine what the actual conditions were at Spahn Ranch.

MR. DENNY: Exactly.

MR. KAY: At the end of August, 1969, as your Honor knows from the meteorologist that Mr. Denny called, I think it would be unfair to have such a requirement since there's absolutely no way --

THE COURT: Well, it would be unfair --

MR. DENNY: Unfair to comply with the law?

THE COURT: It would be unfair to present such an opinion unless you knew.

All right, I'll sustain the objection, MR. DENNY: Thank you. MR. KAY: Thank you. .3 (Whereupon, the following proceedings were had in open court within the presence and hearing of the jury:) THE COURT: The Court will sustain the objection. 3a fls. 1ġ 

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27 28 Q BY MR. KAY: We won't have to use your contacts, Doctor.

Now, Doctor, do you have any knowledge of the meteorological conditions in Chatsworth between August 26th, 1969 and August 30, 1969?

A No.

Q Doctor, does an observer here on earth have to face in the precise direction in which the moon is situated in the sky from the earth in order to gain the benefit of all its illumination?

A No.

August 26th through August 30 of 1969, at what location in the sky was the moon; north, east, south, west?

approximately east and go high in the sky over the south and set in the west. So it is what time of the night you have to --

Q Well, say on August 26th, 27 and 28, when the moon appeared to be full, between 30 degrees above the horizon to when it fell to 30 degrees below the horizon?

MR. DENNY: I'll object to that as assuming facts not in evidence, "when it appeared to be full."

MR. KAY: He's already testified --

MR. DENNY: He has testified by calculations it would have been full if you could see it.

THE COURT: The objection is sustained.

Q BY MR. KAY: All right, by your calculations, when you stated August 26th, August 27, August 28, that the moon

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appeared to be full on those three nights, when it was between 30 degrees above the horizon, when it had risen to that point, to when it fell to 30 degrees above the horizon, where would the moon have been in the sky?

MR. DENNY: I'll object to the question again on the same basis, it assumes facts not in evidence. This witness has not stated it appeared to be full at any time. He stated what his calculations showed what it would have been in the sky.

THE COURT: The objection is overruled. You may answer.

Do you understand the question?

THE WITNESS: Uh, yes, but I'll object to the question.

THE COURT: All right, if you don't --

THE WITNESS: The moon --

restate it.

MR! KAY: I'm not sure what the objection is.

THE WITNESS: The moon is moving, for Bere's sake.

THE COURT: Just a minute, Doctor.

Go ahead and restate it.

Q BY MR. KAY: All right.

On those three days, August 26th, 27 and 28, by your calculations, can you explain the different places in the sky that it was when it was between 30 degrees above the horizon to when it fell to 30 degrees below the horizon?

- A Yes.
- Q Would you do so?
- A Yes.
- Q Okay.

A At the highest point in the sky -- the moon obviously rises somewhere around the East and give me a date at a time, I'll tell you precisely how it rises -- and it sets somewhere in the West.

At its highest point, it is in the South and on the table, if I can refer to that, I have the maximum altitude in degrees off the southern horizon listed.

In other words, on the night of the 26th, 27, at the highest point in the sky the moon reached, it was 44 degrees above the southern horizon.

On the following night, it was a little bit higher at its maximum altitude, namely, 50 degrees.

On the following night, the night of the 28th-29th, it was still yet higher, at 57 degrees. And on the 29th-30th, on that night it was up at 64 degrees.

MR. KAY: Thank you, Doctor, I have no further questions.

MR. DENNY: I have no questions at all. Thank you,

Doctor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Doctor,

MR. KAY: Would this be a good time for a recess, your Honor?

THE COURT: Any time is a good time for a recess.

The Court will advise you not to converse amongst yourselves, nor with anyone else, her permit anyone to converse with you on any subject connected with the matter, nor form nor express any opinion on it until it is finally submitted to you.

We'll be in recess until 11:00 o'clock, ladies and

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               gentlemen.
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                              (Whereupon, the morning recess was taken, to
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               reconvene at 11:00 o'clock A. M. of the same day.)
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THE COURT: All the jurors are present. The defendant 3b-1 1 is present with counsel. 2 MR. MANZELLA: The People's next witness is John Swarts, 3 your Honor: 43 THE COURT: Mr. Swarts. THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 6 you may give in the cause now panding before this court shall 7 be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 8 so help you God? 9 I do. THE WITNESS: 10 THE CLERK: Please take the stand and be seated. 11 Please state and spell your full name. 12 THE WITNESS: John Swartz, Jr., S-w-a-r-t-z. 13 14 JOHN SWARTZ, JR., 15 called as a witness by and on behalf of the People, having 16 been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as 17 follows: 18 19 DIRECT EXAMINATION 20 21 BY MR. MANZELLA: Mr. Swartz, did you know a man by the name of 22 Q 23 Shorty Shea? 24 Yes. A 25 Is that how you knew him, by the nickname 26 Shorty? 27 A Yes. 28 And when had you first met Shorty? Q

3b-2	1	A 1963.	
	2	Q And where was it that you met him?	
	3	A At the Spahn Ranch.	
	4	Were you employed as a cowboy at the Spahn	
<i>♣</i>	5	Ranch?	
	6	A Yes.	
1	7	Now, in how long did you work at Spahn Ranch	17
	8	A Off and on, since 1963.	
	9.	Q Were you there in August of 1969?	
	10	A Yes.	
	11	Q And were you aware of a raid on Spahn Ranch mad	le:
	12	in August 16, of 1969?	
	13	À Yes.	
<b>.</b>	14	Q Were you arrested in that raid?	,
•	15	A Yes, I was.	
	16	Q And did you were you in custody for some hou	lr:s
	17	after the raid, after you were arrested in that raid?	
	18	A We were in custody two days.	
	19	Q And after you were released from custody, did	
	you see Shorty?		
	21	A Yes, I did.	
	22	Q And under what was the circumstances?	
	23	A We were released, I called the ranch to see if	
į	24	there was any transportation back. He was the only one	
ŧ	25	there, so he came and got me.	
	<b>26</b>	Q And did Shorty drive you back to the ranch?	
	27	A Yes, he did.	
-	28	Q Did he take anybody else back to the ranch?	

3b-3	1	A	Larry Craven and Larry Jones with us, also.
	2	Q	And those two had been in custody as well?
	3	<b>A</b>	Yes.
	4	Q	Now, after you returned strike that.
*	5		How long after your arrest did Shorty bring you
₹'	6	back to Spal	
	7	-	Two days.
, 4 ;	8 ,		And did you begin were you living at Spahn
1	9	Ranch at the	<del>-</del>
- 1	10	A	Yes
	11		And do you know where Shorty was living after
	12	<b>1</b>	to the ranch?
•	13	A - * ( )	Yes, I do.
* .	14		Where was that?
<b>,</b>	15	A	Staying in his car.
	16	Q	And where
	17	À	In his car.
	18	Q	At the ranch?
	19	A	At the ranch.
	20	Q	Now, after you returned to the ranch, did you
	21	see Shorty e	every day at the ranch during the last half of
	22	August?	
	23	A	No.
æ	24	Q	Did you see him for some period of time after
ŧ	25	you after	he brought you back to the ranch?
	26	A	It was three or four days.
	27	Q	And during that period of time, did you have
_	28	conversation	ns with Shorty?

offered.

1 THE COURT: If the jury so determines, then, it is 2 admissible to show state of mind. 3 BY MR. MANZELLA: Would you tell us what Shorty said in that regard? 5 In the conversation with Shorty, he told me that 6 Mr. Spahn had been trying to get him a job with Frank Retz 7 as a night watchmen on the adjoining property and that he 8 was going to go see Frank that night. 9 ٥ Now --10 THE COURT: That instruction might have been confusing 11 It is not the statement, the statements of Mr. Shea 12 have not been admitted to prove the truth of what was uttered. 13 but to show his state of mind, if in your opinion, as jurors, <u> 1</u>4 . it does so show to explain Mr. Shea's conduct. 15 ; BY MR. MANZELLA: Now, sometime thereafter, 16 did you stop seeing Shorty at the ranch? 17 A Yes. 18 And do you recall the car in which Shorty picked 19 you up at -- and brought you back to the ranch? 20 Yes, I did. A .21 0 Was that Shorty's car? A Yes. 23 Was that the car he began living out of when you returned to the ranch? 25 Yes, it is. A 26 Q Well, what kind of car was it, do you recall? 27 A Mercury Comet, a white one. 28 Now, at some time after the conversation with Q

Shorty, some time after he got back to the ranch, did you 1 notice that the car wasn't on the ranch? 2 Yes, I did, too -- after the conversation with A 3 Shorty, it wasn't too long that I started missing him. All right. 5 And do you recall when that was in relation to 6 the -- when you got out of jail, when Shorty brought you back 7 to Spahn Ranch? 8 Do you recall how much time passed before you 9 neticed that Shorty was gone and his car was gone? 10 Well, it was about three, three days after we 11 got out, I guess, I had the conversation with him. And then, 12 after that, I don't really remember seeing him. 13 Now, after you noticed that Shorty was not at 14 the ranch any more and that his car was gone, did you have 15 a conversation with anyone? Did you make any inquiries to 16 anyone about where Shorty was? 17 A ... Well, after a little time passed --18 19 1 2 1 20 21 Company of the second 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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MR. DENNY: Just a moment. I'll object to that answer and move that it be stricken as not responsive. That's a yes or no question.

THE COURT: Sustained.

Do you want to state the question again, please, Mr. Manzella?

MR. MANZELLA: Yes, your Honor.

Q After you noticed that Shorty was gone and his car was gone, did you have a conversation with anyone with regard to Shorty's whereabouts?

- A Yes.
- Q And with whom did you have the conversation?
- A Charlie.
- Q And you are referring to Charles Manson?
- A Yes,
- Q And what did you ask Mr. Manson?

MR. DEMNY: I'll object to that as calling for -- it's irrelevant as to what he asked him. It would be hearsay as to what any answer might be.

MR. MANZELLA: May we approach the bench for argument, your Honor?

THE COURT: The objection is sustained.

MR. MANZELLA: May we approach the bench for argument? THE COURT: Yes.

(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had at the bench among Court and counsel, outside the hearing of the jury:)

THE COURT: This is a conversation which is alleged to

 have taken place after Mr. Shea disappeared; correct?

MR. MANZELLA: Right. It's after this witness missed Shea at the ranch.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MANZELLA: And he asked Manson if he had seen Shorty, and Manson replied, yeah; that Manson had had a friend in San Francisco who had a job for Shorty -- or, who needed somebody -- and that Manson gave him, Shorty, a few dollars, and Shorty left for San Francisco to take this job.

THE COURT: And the defendant was not present at the time, or --

MR. MANZELLA: The defendant was not present at the time. However, we are offering this as a -- under Section 1223 as a statement of a co-conspirator, in furtherance of the conspiracy.

And the case that I cite for the proposition is

People versus Tinnin. Now, the Court's already read that

case, in relation to -- that's T-i-n-n-i-n -- I don't have the

citation with me. It's been cited in the briefs that have

already been submitted to the Court with regard to the co
conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule.

conspiracy in this case continued after the death of Shea, to include the -- to include a conspiracy to conceal the body and conceal the crime itself.

In the Tinnin case, the evidence of the coconspirators to make the death of the female victim, the deceased in that case, the efforts to make her death look like

an accident, an automobile accident, were held to be part of the conspiracy; in other words, that the conspiracy continued beyond her actual death, to include the -- include their efforts to make her death look like an accident.

The People are submitting that in this case the co-conspirators -- the conspiracy continued beyond the death of Shea, to include the efforts to conceal this body, and to make it look like no crime at all had occurred.

In other words, the burial of his body and the attempts to make others believe that Shea had left Spahn Ranch of his own free will, had gone to San Francisco.

Now, Manson, we are alleging, was an actual participant in the murder of Shea; and that his part in the conspiracy continued beyond that point, to include the hiding of the body and attempts to divert attention from Shea's disappearance by having people think that he had gone to San Francisco, voluntarily.

THE COURT: I'll re-read the Tinnin case, but -
MR. MANZELLA: I'm sorry. I don't have the citation
with me.

THE COURT: I have it, I am sure. I have some notes on it.

Before a statement of a co-conspirator is admissible, there must be some evidence of the conspiracy itself. How would you solve that?

MR. KAY: Ruby Pearl --

MR. MANZELLA: Well, first of all, I want to make the distinction clear: We are not offering this as an admission.

4-4 1 THE COURT: I understand that. 2 MR. MANZELLA: In other words, we are not offering it 3. for the truth of the matter contained in the statement. We 4 are offering ---5 THE COURT: Well, you're --6 MR. MANZELLA: -- it as an act of a co-conspirator; 7 in other words, the attempt to divert attention from Shea's 8 disappearance, and --9 THE COURT: Well, how would you distinguish that from 10. the cases that hold that acts of concealment of a -- of the 11 original conspiracy cannot, in effect, go on forever? 12 Conceivably, something that Manson said now, 13 if we were to follow your theory, --4 14 MR. MANZELLA: Um-hmmm. 15 THE COURT: -- could be utilized against him -- against 16. the defendant, --17 MR. MANZELLA: Well, the People --18 THE COURT: -- because it's still an attempt -- could 19 4a fol possibly still be construed as a conspiracy to conceal. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26. 27 28

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MR. MANZELLA: Well, we are not attempting to offer Manson's confession or Manson's admission of the killing of Shea into evidence. We are offering a statement that he made, that we are going to argue is not true.

In other words, I want to make that part clear, that we are not offering it for the truth of the matter, as a confession as to the --

THE COURT: You are offering it as a --

MR. MANZELLA: An act of a co-conspirator.

THE COURT: -- a substantive part of a conspiracy to conceal?

MR. MANZELLA: That's correct.

Now, the reason we think it's not --

THE COURT: And you are saying because of its proximity to Mr. Shea's disappearance and alleged death that -- that the conspirators were still in the process of trying to dispose of or conceal the body.

MR. MANZELLA: Yes, your Honor. I think the evidence will show, if it doesn't show already, that Manson and most of the members of the Family left the ranch within a day or two after the death of Shea, and that -- so I don't think that the act, this statement by Manson, is remote in time.

We are alleging that one of the reasons they left the ranch, to go to this isolated part in the desert, was to make it less likely that the police would finally catch on that it was them that was committing -- that they had committed the murders of Shea and Hinman.

The statement is by one of the persons who was

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involved in the actual killing, and not someone who was, say, merely involved in the attempt to conceal the body.

THE COURT: Now, in that U. S. vs. Grunewald, and the Krulewitch case -- that's K-r-u-l-e-w-i-t-c-h, I think -- those were fraud cases, wherein there were efforts at concealment.

MR. MANZELLA: But --

THE COURT: And the Federal Courts found that the conspiracy had ended before those efforts --

MR. MANZELLA: Well, in Grunswald -- I remember one of the cases. I remember the fact situation in one of the cases. I don't remember which one it was, but the defendant was in custody at the time he made the statements. He was in custody, under arrest for that -- for the offense -- and I think it was a Mann Act offense.

He was in custody already at the time he made the statements. He had already been detected and apprehended.

There was no detection. There wasn't even -- on the part of the police, at least, there was no --

THE COURT: I don't recognize the factual situation, but go shead.

MR. KAY: On the other hand, you have Dutton vs. Evans.

THE COURT: The Dutton vs. Evans case was the Georgia

case, where the --

MR. KAY: Well, that --

THE COURT: -- Georgia cases had pretty well construed a conspiracy as an on-going thing. The cases had gone much farther than the California cases have gone.

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MR. MANZELLA: But Tinnin has not been overguled, and it hasn't been qualified in any way. And I think Tinnin deals with the kind of situation that we have here, in that it was a -- an attempt to -- not to escape from the scene of a crime, or something that would be incident to any crime, but an actual attempt to conceal the crime itself -- or, to make what was a crime look like an accident, as it was intended.

I mean, this was an active attempt on the part of the killers, the conspirators --

THE COURT: I'11 --

MR. MANZELLA: -- to do that.

THE COURT: I'll take a look at it. Certainly, there was more here than -- if your theory is to be adopted -- than simply verbal efforts at misleading law enforcement authorities.

In the Grunewald and Krulewitch cases, those were income tax fraud cases, and it's difficult to compare the two situations; but nevertheless, I think that the principle of the law is still sound: That efforts at concealment of a conspiracy must and at some time.

MR. MANZELLA: Oh, the People agree with that, your Honor.

One thing I would like to say is that I agree that the Georgia case --

THE COURT: 'In that case, I think --

MR. MANZELLA: -- went much further, because the Georgia statute went much further.

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But in our situation, the California cases don't go that far. Neither does the statute.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MANZELLA: However, the Tinnin case, it would seem, does go that far.

And what Dutton vs. Evans does is tell us that it's not unconstitutional to go that far.

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27 28 THE COURT: All right. At the time of your opening statement, the Court permitted you to proceed to make a statement about what Charles Manson said about disposition of the body with --

MR. KAY: On the day of the murder, to Barbara Hoyt.

THE COURT: -- to Barbara Hoyt, yes. And we argued the question of whether or not -- argued at that time whether or not 1223 would permit that to come in, or whether it should be excluded.

And I think I asked both sides to present me with any points and authorities that --

MR. MANZELLA: I have some points and authorities, as

THE COURT: That you might discover.

MR. MANZELLA: -- if the Court would like them. They're down in my office, and I can get them.

I have a copy for Mr. Denny, too.

THE COURT: Mr. Denny, have you worked up anything?

MR. DENNY: Your Honor, I haven't had time to work up a brief. I have the points and authorities, but --

THE COURT: Well, you needn't work up a brief. That's all right. The Court --

MR. DENNY: I have made copies of the Gruenwald case, the Krulewitch case, the Lutwak -- that's L-u-t-w-a-k -- case; and of course, the California cases that have followed, followed those cases in -- specifically in People versus Smith.

THE COURT: Of course, in a robbery, you have a situation where efforts to escape with the loot are --

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MR. DENNY: That's still --

THE COURT: Efforts to get away, just to escape, can still be construed as being part of the conspiracy.

MR. KAY: Sure.

MR. DENNY: Yes.

THE COURT: But in a murder case, I'm not sure that it would be still an ongoing thing, once you have the objective achieved -- that is, the death of the victim.

MR. KAY: Well, I think it would have to depend on the facts of the case.

MR. MANZELLA: The People agree, generally, your Honor, that a conspiracy doesn't --

THE COURT: Well, aren't you --

MR. MANZELLA: — include what necessarily follows the ordinary commission of a crime. But what we are suggesting is that in this case, there were active efforts; there were active efforts beyond the ordinary efforts of a killer to leave the scene of a crime and to throw away the gun or something like that.

There were active efforts on the part of these people to conceal the fact that a crime -- or, that a death had occurred.

(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had in open court, within the presence and hearing of the jury:)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, the Court's going to take a short time in chambers with these gentlemen, so -- and you may step down, sir -- and we will be in recess.

Don't converse amongst yourselves nor with anyone

else about this case, nor form nor express any opinion on the matter during the recess.

We will be in recess for perhaps ten minutes.

So, you can stay in the courtroom, move around, do whatever you wish.

(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had at the bench, outside the hearing of the jury:)

MR. MANZELLA: Your Honor, perhaps I can go down and get my brief and bring it up.

THE COURT: All right. Run right up with it, will you?

MR. MANZELLA: Sure.

(Recess, following which proceedings were had in chambers among Court and counsel, which were not reported, following which an adjournment was taken until 1:30 P. M. Of the same day.)

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1972 2:35 PM

(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had in the chambers of the Court, out of the presence and hearing of the jury:)

THE COURT: All right, the record will show we're in chambers. We've consumed, oh, an hour or so arguing on various matters, mostly involving the question of the admissibility of the statement of the witness who is now on the stand; and the purported statement that you wish to offer again?

MR. MANZELLA: Is that Swartz asked Manson if he had seen Shorty, and Manson said that Shorty had left and gone to San Francisco.

THE COURT: The defendant, except for the last 20 minutes of this argument, was present in chambers. The last half hour.

And you didn't wish to have the defendant present in this last half hour?

MR. DENNY: That is correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: He didn't request to be present?

MR. DENNY: That is correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Now, the Court has heard argument on the law from both sides as to admissibility of this question. The Court has read a number of citations concerning the point, including rereading, in part, of the Grunewald and Krulewitch case.

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Do you need those citations? The Krulewitch citation is Alvin Krulewitch, K-r-u-1-e-w-i-t-c-h, 336 U. S. 440.

And Grunewald, G-r-u-n-e-w-a-1-d vs. United States, 353 U. S. 391.

And the other case that we talked about at the bench, I'll give you that citation, A. L. Dutton vs. Alex S. Evens, 400 U. S. 74. The Court has read that. And the Court has read the memorandum submitted by the People which the Court will cause to be filed.

And the Court has read part of the cases, part of each of the cases that have been cited therein, People vs. Tinnin, People vs. Davis.

Let's hear the People's offer in respect to this statement again. Why are you offering it and are you expecting the Court, if it is received, to place any limitations on it?

MR. MANZELLA: We are offering it under Section 1223 of the Evidence Code, as the statement of co-conspirators, made in furtherance and during the course of the conspiracy.

In this case, we are alleging that the concealment of Shea's body and the attempt to conceal the fact that Shea was dead, and on Spahn Ranch, was part of the conspiracy in which Manson, Davis, Watson and Grogan had joined.

THE COURT: Very briefly, do you want to give me, for the record, your argument?

MR. MANZELLA: I don't really need it for the record, your Honor. I think under the cases, Tinnin and the cases that I have cited in the brief to the Court, that we have established sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding, if it was to so find, that this conspiracy was in existence at the time, and that Manson's statement that Shea had gone to San Francisco was part of that conspiracy; and that Davis was a part of that conspiracy; and that therefore, the statement is admissible.

Furthermore, we are not offering it for the truth of the matter asserted, but we are offering it to show that the statement was made as an act of a co-conspirator.

THE COURT: Do you think, therefore, in view of the fact that it's offered as an act toward the furtherance of the conspiracy, that Grunewald and Krulewitch do not apply? And you have argued to me here, in the course of this session, that they would not in your opinion apply to -- at any rate?

MR. MANZELLA: Yes, your Honor, because the language in

Dutton versus Evans, that -- of the Supreme Court itself, who decided Grunewald and Krulewitch, that those cases were not a product of the Sixth Amendment, the hearsay rule; but rather, were a product of the Court's disfavor with federal prosecutions for conspiracy, rather than for the underlying substantive offenses.

And in this case, of course, we are not prosecuting Bruce Davis for conspiracy, but for the murder itself; and that therefore, Grunewald and Krulewitch would not apply in a state prosecution, for a substantive offense, because they're the products of the Court's disfavor with conspiracy prosecutions, not with prosecutions for substantive offenses.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Denny? Do you have any further comment?

You had set out for the Court, when you were arguing, the case of People versus Smith, 63 Cal 2d. And you and Mr. Manzella were arguing that case, and you put forth certain argument which was rather appealing to the Court, and we had been discussing that. People versus Smith, 63 Cal 2d 779.

MR. DENNY: Well, my point is several-fold, your Honor. First of all, although I am unable to cite the case -- it comes to my mind as People versus Harmon; why that citation, I don't know -- it's one citation I just left out of my notebook here, because I did not think it would be relevant.

It is obviously relevant, when we are talking about the Dutton versus Evans case and the Court's disfavor

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with it. The Court's -- the reference was there made by the Court of Appeal -- it was not a Supreme Court, but by the Court of Appeal -- that the California courts do look with disfavor on the use of conspiracy charges to attempt to make the substantive count, and the dual filing of conspiracy and the substantive chart.

And I -- I will represent to the Court that that language is in the cases, the Court of Appeal case, and I think has been cited other times thereafter. It's not that old a case; it's a 1960-some odd case, I believe.

At any rate, my point is: Under People versus

Lynd, 131 Cal Ap, and other cases following, that you cannot

establish a conspiracy by -- I think I can get the --

THE COURT: I have it.

MR. DENNY: You cannot establish a conspiracy by the act or declaration of an alleged co-conspirator; that it must be -- and citing specifically in Witkin, Evidence, Page 493 -- "Existence of a conspiracy cannot be proved by declarations of an alleged co-conspirator out of the presence of the others." And citing People versus Lynd, 131 Cal Ap 12 at Page 19.

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Until you have independent evidence of the particular conspiracy -- in this case, the People allege they have independent evidence of a conspiracy to commit murder, which as yet I do not concede -- but assuming for the sake of argument that they --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DENNY: -- feel they have established such, --

THE COURT: Yes.

We have been assuming that the People will be able, according to their opening statement, to prove that there was a homicide here by criminal means.

Go shead.

MR. DENNY: All right. Then, up to this point -- and from their offer of proof, it does not appear that they will be able to, in any other later time, under the Court's discretionary powers under 1223, to admit it subject to being connected up -- they have not yet -- and as I say, will not be able to establish by any independent evidence, other than the statement of Manson -- which, in itself does not establish a conspiracy, but merely an independent act of his -- they have not in any way, and will not be able to establish the conspiracy which they are at this point apparently alleging; namely: not only a conspiracy to murder Shorty Shea, but as part of -- part and parcel of that one conspiracy, the total conspiracy, to murder and hide the murder of Shorty Shea.

And I submit that without some independent evidence of that, they cannot create that second conspiracy,

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or that -- as they would have it -- continuing conspiracy, by the statement of Manson;

That under the case law, particularly the Grunewald and the -- the Lutwak and the other case -- I've forgotten the citation now, the U. S. Supreme Court case -- which have expressed Federal policy, under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which rules are consistent with and have been interpreted the same under California State law, that they cannot get this in because there is no conspiracy shown, other than perhaps if they can show that -- a second conspiracy to conceal.

And even there, all they have -- and apparently all they will show -- are statements by Manson. And I guess if they're going to try to get Juan Flynn's testimony in, that Clem Grogan said, on a trip of some sort, to say that Shorty was in San Francisco, they may have a conspiracy between Manson and Grogan.

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 MR. KAY: Don't forget Davis' reaction to Grogan.

That's the important thing. He agreed with it when Grogan said to Juan Flynn, "If anyone asks you about Shorty, tell them that he went to San Francisco." At which point Davis said, "Yeah, yeah."

THE COURT: Go shead, Mr. Denny.

MR. DENNY: You may have evidence of a second conspiracy to conceal, but separate and apart from those statements, and assuming you get the Juan Flynn statement in, that would be binding on Davis not by virtue of the fact that it was said in the course and scope of the conspiracy, but under the Osuna doctrine as an adoptive admission. So let's leave that out for a minute. Here, we're in a class where there is no adoptive admissions and we're seeking solely by virtue of the conspiracy doctrine that there is nothing other than the statement itself. And that statement itself does not show a conspiracy. So there's no independent evidence of the conspiracy. Manson's statement doesn't even show a conspiracy.

If Manson were to say, for instance, "Well, all of us have agreed that Shorty's up in San Francisco," or something like that, that might show some sort of concerted effort. But thus far, even by the statement itself, it only shows one person's statement. And the mere fact you're going to say, well, this is not a statement -- we're not offering it for the truth of the statement, we're offering it simply as a verbal act or an act, it is clear the purpose for which they're offering it and it is still, under the Lynd

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case, and under the citation I've given here, which is just a quote, essentially, from the Lynd case in Witkin, an attempt to establish that conspiracy by the statement.

THE COURT: People.

And I would like to make just one more MR. DENNY: observation, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, very quickly.

This is a key determinative point in this MR. DENNY: case as far as the defendant is concerned.

MR. KAY: As far as the People are concerned, too.

MR. DENNY: It may be as far as the People are concerned, but the ruling of the Court here is critical.

MR. KAY: Agreed.

MR. DENNY: And I think thus far, and we have gone now some two months in this case, plus the amount of time before that, over a year in this case, that this is a place where I think the Court itself has expressed, and quite properly so, reservations about the admissibility of this evidence, reservations about the fact whether the People have really shown any kind of continuing conspiracy by independent evidence. All sort of reservations which the Court should show. And I think in an area of this kind where the damage that can be done to the defense is obviously going to be of great magnitude, so that if error is committed, it will be reversible error that this Court should, where those reservations have been expressed by the Court, certainly tend to, if there's going to be error here, error on the side that there will not be a reversal on clearly reversible

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27 28 where it is so finely balanced. And I don't think it is that finely balanced. I think just clearly evidence should be inadmissible. But even where the Court, then, may not go that far, but feels that it is finely balanced, that to create error at this point is, I think, going to be a very, very -- well, bad thing, and leave it at that.

MR. KAY: Of course, if we don't get evidence like this in, we might not get a conviction and the People don't have any tribunal to appeal to.

THE COURT: I don't think that's a proper argument or relevant.

MR. MANZELLA: All right, I agree.

Your Honor, briefly, Mr. Denny has stated a statement of a co-conspirator cannot be used to prove the existence of a conspiracy. The statement he's referring to, however, is the statement which admits the existence of a conspiracy.

MR. DENNY: No, any statement, any statement. It is not just an admission. It is any statement made in the course and scope of the conspiracy. That's under 1223.

THE COURT: That can't possibly be true.

MR. MANZELLA: That can't possibly be true.

THE COURT: Because some statements made in the course of, say, fraud, fraud cases, are part of the --

MR. MANZELLA: Conspiracy itself.

THE COURT: -- conspiracy itself.

MR. MANZELLA: Exactly. The statement cannot be

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admitted until the conspiracy has been proved. This is a statement which admits the existence of a conspiracy.

In other words, it is, in a sense, an admission against the co-conspirator making the statement. That's the kind of statement that must be excluded until there's independent proof of the conspiracy.

What I have been saying all along, that this statement of Manson's is not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. That under Dutton vs. Evans there is, because of that no hearsay problem, and that statement is itself a part of the conspiracy, that's why I referred to it as an act instead of a statement. That statement itself is part of the conspiracy.

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There is no way one can prove the conspiracy without proving the acts of a conspiracy. This is not a statement
again by Manson -- and Mr. Denny made the suggestion that I'm
not sure if he was saying this -- that it might somehow be
admissible if Manson had said to Swartz, "We have all agreed,
Davis, Watson, Grogan, have agreed if anybody asked about
Shorty, he is in San Francisco."

It is my opinion that statement would not be admissible because that's not a statement of a conspiracy. That's an admission which cannot be admitted until there's independent evidence of a conspiracy. That kind of statement is the kind of statement that is being talked about when I say you must prove the conspiracy independently of that kind of statement.

We're not using Manson's statement to prove, as an admission, that there was a conspiracy, but as an act of the conspiracy itself. That's what we're using Manson's statement for. We're not offering it for the truth thereof.

All right, the reliance on Gruenwald and Krulewitch is not, I don't think, well taken because of the language I read from Dutton versus Evans.

Now, Mr. Denny cites a case, and he doesn't have the citation for it and I don't know the case, so we can't read the case. It is not an expression of opinion by the California Supreme Court. And Mr. Denny was wrong about the facts of the Krulewitch case and he was wrong about my reading of the Smith case. And I don't think he's read about the reading of this case with regard to how the California courts

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look at this rule. Even if they agree with the U.S. Supreme Court that they don't like conspiracy prosecutions, we don't have that here. We're not trying to get Davis for conspiracy because we can't get him for murder.

MR. DEMNY: You're trying to get in evidence by virtue of conspiracy that you can't otherwise.

MR. MANZELLA: What we are trying to do is prosecute him for murder. We're not prosecuting him for the substantive offense of conspiracy in the Shea case. So the Grunewald and Krulewitch cases don't apply.

And the best support of that interpretation is the language I read from Dutton versus Evans, where the court, although they agreed the membership is changed, but the court decided Krulewitch and Grunewald are saying they didn't base those decisions on the Sixth Amendment or hearsay rule but, rather, on the -- their disfavor with federal -- and they use that term "federal" conspiracy prosecutions.

Now, there's one thing I thought Dutton versus

Evans says, the hearsay rule is not of constitutional

dimension, and that's the objection to this testimony. It is

hearsay and we're saying under 1223 it comes in as an

exception to the hearsay rule. And what Dutton says, the

hearsay rule is not of constitutional dimensions and they

leave that. They say the right of confrontation is, but that

the hearsay rule is not --

THE COURT: Yes, they state as long as the declarant is -- strike that -- as long as the person is available for cross examination, who overheard the statement, and there's

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no such objection constitutionally.

Excuse me a minute.

(Whereupon, there was a pause in the proceedings.)

MR. DENNY: Your Honor, may I make one observation during this pause.

THE COURT: I'll give you a shot at it in just a moment.

MR. DENNY: All right.

MR. MANZELLA: Finally, what I wanted to say was that in -- I don't think that just the Smith case has to be cited for the proposition. The final question of whether or not something is in the furtherance of the conspiracy is up to the jury.

What I am saying is, that Davis's prior association, his many months of association with the Family, his participation in welding dune buggies — in other words, in the broad sense, assisting Manson and the Family in getting ready to move, and his participation in the murder of Shea;

The fact that the evidence we have so far that while Vance and DeCarlo disobeyed Manson, that Davis has not been mentioned as one that disobeyed Manson;

That all of these things put together supply the evidence from which a jury could find that this statement was made in the furtherance of the conspiracy and that Davis was part of that conspiracy. That the jury could so find even if another interpretation was reasonable. That the jury could find from this evidence that my interpretation is reasonable and that, therefore, the Court, with the limiting instruction, should allow the evidence in.

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THE COURT: And your suggestion is, in respect to the limiting instruction, is that it be what?

MR. MANZELLA: That the jury be instructed that the testimony is not being offered for the truth -- that Manson's statement is not being offered for the truth of the matter. That the statement is admitted, that the jury may consider the statement only if they find at the time the statement was made a conspiracy to conceal the death of Shea -- well, you can't say it that way, but there was a conspiracy to conceal the fact that a crime had been committed and that this statement was made in furtherance of that conspiracy. And that Davis was a part of that conspiracy at the time the statement was made.

THE COURT: I'll let you reply, Mr. Denny.

MR. DENNY: Your Honor, again, I will state that I have sought from the beginning of this, perhaps not from the beginning of this case, but at least from the time I filed the motion to require the People to charge what conspiracy they were talking about, I sought to get them to charge what conspiracy.

Now, all of a sudden, at this juncture of the case, they say we're not charging a conspiracy simply to murder or we're not relying on a conspiracy to murder, which would seem to have been any conspiracy under which they had yet gotten in evidence, they're saying no, now, we are charging not only a conspiracy to murder, but a conspiracy to murder and to conceal and to hide. And that is an unusual thing. This is not the normal type of thing

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that happens in a murder. So that they are not saying, look, in any murder where there are multiple defendants it is normal, reasonable. like in any robbery where there is a conspiracy to commit robbery or any burglary that there is a continuing conspiracy until the spoils are divided or whatever, but they're saying that, no, we admit in the normal case where there is a conspiracy to murder it stops at the time of the murder. Look at the Hinman murder, look at the Tate murders, look at the La Bianca murders. They're saying here, look, because we can't find a body, they're saying in that case there must have been. You can just sort of grab it out of the sky, because we can't find the body, there must have been a conspiracy to conceal. And, thus, in this particular murder, because we want to get some evidence in now of statements made after we allege the murder was committed, we are going to say that, yeah, here there was a conspiracy to conceal as part of the original conspiracy and although we don't have any independent proof of it, this is what we're charging and this is what the jury could so find if they wanted to and if we can get this evidence in.

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Now, the jury -- well, let me step back. I submit that it's a denial of due process, a denial of equal protection, a denial of notice at this point, a denial of the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel for them to come up at this point and allege this new type of conspiracy here, in order for them to get in evidence.

Furthermore, I would like to talk to the point that they're seeking not to introduce this by way of an admission. In the Miranda case, the Miranda case made it very clear that it doesn't matter if a statement is one of admission or one that's exculpatory. If the People are going to use it, they're going to use it for one purpose and one purpose only; and that is: To try to convict a guy; because it hurts him.

Now, it may hurt him because he admitted something; it may hurt him because he's saying something that was untrue at the time, and that they can show now by the rest of their testimony was untrue; it may hurt him because he's testifying to something different now than he said then.

But whatever it is, whether it's incriminatory or exculpatory, they're not going to let the People use it under the Miranda circumstances.

So -- now, Mr. Manzella says, "Well, we are not using it for the truth of the matter asserted. In fact, we are attempting to show that it wasn't true at all, but merely for the fact that it was said."

The effect is the same. The People are trying to get in this statement by a single person, to bind Bruce Davis

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THE COURT: 175?

MR. DENMY: Cal Ap 2d, Page 8. And if I may just run it

to what they contend was this highly unusual -- and which they have to admit -- highly unusual continuing conspiracy.

And I submit that, other than that statement, they don't have any independent proof of it as they should have; and that for all the other reasons that I have given, that the Court should not permit it.

THE COURT: Well, the Court is aware of the established rule that admitting statements in furtherance of the objective of a conspiracy, under 1223, shouldn't be expanded to make admissible any declarations made in the course of an uncharged conspiracy to prevent detection or punishment.

But in spite of that rule -- which is most strongly put by Krulewitch and -- by the Krulewitch and the Grunewald cases -- these citations that have been presented to me by the People are persuasive.

There's no doubt that the cover-up activities can be part of a conspiracy to commit those crimes; and that the rules are clear in California with regard to that.

MR. DENNY: Your Honor, I'm sorry to interrupt the Court.

I have not cited to the Court one case, and it is a key case in California.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DEMMY: I'm sorry to do it at this point. And that is Davis versus Superior Court, 175 Cal Ap 2d.

MR. KAY: You cited that, didn't you, Tony?

MR. MANZELLA: No.

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down briefly? I don't want to take too much of the Court's time, but it is a key case.

This was the case in which George Davis was charged with having conspired with Caryl Chessman and with a publishing company to smuggle Chessman's book out of San Quentin.

And they used — they attempted to use the book; they attempted to use certain correspondence; they attempted to use a forward and a post logue or something in the book — all of which were statements by the publisher or by George Davis or whatever — to show that he was guilty of the conspiracy.

Now, this was on a writ of prohibition that was taken up after -- I'm not sure whether it was a preliminary hearing or an indictment; possibly an indictment had been returned on it -- so that it was just a question of a matter of law at this point.

And they said: "All of these things that you are trying to get in --" and they sought to show the fact that Davis was, of course, associated with Chessman; and they bring out the fact that mere association is not evidence; that the post logue in the book, you can't use as hearsay, unless you establish independently the evidence of the conspiracy. There must be some independent evidence of the conspiracy.

 And it says:

"Considering, first, the correspondence and the 'afterward' these are hearsay statements not admissible against Davis in the absence of independent proof tending to establish the conspiracy."

And they cite Taylor vs. Bernheim, B-e-r-n-h-a-i-m.

"The fact of conspiracy cannot be proved by evidence of extrajudicial declarations of an alleged co-conspirator. Only after and upon the proof of the conspiracy itself can such declarations be admitted. Indeed, the very danger of admitting such hearsay testimony is that it might be accepted by the jury as proof of the existence of the conspiracy itself.

of the conspiracy in the instant case cannot be overcome by the device of introduction of alleged hearsay statements of co-conspirators, because conspiracy cannot be built upon imposed vicarious responsibility for other persons' declarations to whom a defendant has not been related by some showing of common action."

And then they go on here:

"The third fact upon which the prosecution relies as proof of petitioner's participation in the conspiracy rested in certain statements in the book itself. While the language on page 22 of the book could conceivably be

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"interpreted to indicate that Davis planned with Chessman wrongfully to withdraw the manuscript in disregard of the warden's prohibition of Chessman's writing, the text likewise may be read to mean that Davis contemplated a legal procedure to test the legality of the warden's order. We need not resolve the ambiguity because the book, too, is hearsay which cannot be used to prove the existence of the conspiracy itself."

THE COURT: I think that your point -- is that your main point in connection with it? That there must be independent proof of a conspiracy?

MR. DENNY: That's right. And here, they were alleging several conspiracies.

MR. MANZELLA: Can I just make a couple of brief statements about the case? I just had a chance to read it as Mr. Denny was talking. What Mr. Denny left out was the fact that these were offered as admissions by the co-conspirators of the conspiracy. And this is exactly the point I was making.

There's a distinction between using the coconspirator's admission that a conspiracy existed, and
using an act of a co-conspirator which is not being offered
for the truth of the matter asserted.

And I think that distinction is clear in this case. These were statements of admissions of the existence of a conspiracy, not acts of co-conspirators.

MR. DENNY: But again, in -- well, if the Court wants to read it, then I won't --

THE COURT: Yes. What were you saying, Mr. Denny?

MR. DENNY: Again, there was this thing from the

book itself that I read -- page 22 of the book -- which is

possibly indicative of conspiracy; possibly not. And they

say: "You can't look to that --" and this was by Davis

himself, supposedly -- "You can't look to that. You can't

look to those things, until that conspiracy is independently

shown."

Your Honor, in this case, if I may, again, if -- well, let's take -- here, I've got it!

Let's suppose Johnny Swartz says, "I saw Manson cutting up (indicating) and burying Shorty Shea."

Now, this is just as if Manson had made a statement, a verbal act. Here he sees the act itself.

"I saw him cutting him up and burying him."

Is that admissible against Bruce Davis?

MR. MANZELLA: (Laughing) Not admissible, to show that Shea's dead?

MR. DENNY: Is that admissible against Bruce Davis, as part of a conspiracy?

MR. MANZELLA: How about as part of a murder?

MR. DENNY: All right. But it wouldn't -- it wouldn't be under the conspiracy doctrine.

MR. MANZELLA: How about part of a murder? We couldn't show that Swartz saw Shea's body being cut up and buried?

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MR. DENNY: If you saw that - if you saw that and you --

MR. MANZELLA: We'd still be trying a "no body" case --

MR. DENNY: No, no indeed.

MR. MANZELLA: -- because Davis wasn't there at the time Shea was cut up.

THE COURT: Let him finish.

MR. DENNY: All right. This is exactly what they're doing. This is an independent act now, done after the conspiracy.

Now, if you are trying to get that evidence in, under the conspiracy doctrine, you don't get it in under the conspiracy doctrine. This is an act of Manson, and you -- there is nothing up to this point to show that it was anybody's idea to cut up that body and bury it.

Manson is doing this himself. Now, suppose there were an additional --

THE COURT: Well, is the inference there --

MR. DENNY: -- an additional penalty, an additional penalty for cutting up and burying bodies.

THE COURT: Well, there probably is, somewhere in the --

MR. DENNY: In the Great Beyond.

THE COURT: No, probably right in one of the California codes.

MR. DENNY: Well, there probably is. Desecrating a . Corpse or something.

MR. KAY: Sure.

THE COURT: Well, probably some sort of a -- if we were to look at it, it probably is a misdemeanor to do something like

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that, --

MR. DENNY: All right.

THE COURT: -- to dispose of a body without following the sections of the Health and Safety Code.

MR. DENNY: All right. Let's say that under the Health and Safety Code, there's a separate offense of cutting up bodies.

Could the People, by virtue of having evidence that they saw Manson cutting up this body, convict Bruce Davis of that?

No. Because they don't have any independent proof that Bruce Davis conspired with or agreed with Charlie Manson to cut up that body.

If Manson did it, he did it on his own hook -- or, that's all the evidence they've got. They have just that act.

And it's no different than a verbal act of Charlie Manson alone.

Unless they have some other evidence that there was a conspiracy, they could not convict Bruce of a Health and Safety Code violation, an additional offense.

He cannot be bound by Manson's act of cutting up that body. No more can he be bound by Manson's statement, without some other independent evidence to show that that was part of the conspiracy.

THE COURT: And Mr. Manzella, the People contend that the evidence they have produced -- or will produce -- that evidence, together, is sufficient to establish that disposition of the body was part of the conspiracy?

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1	MR. MANZELLA: Exactly. Yes, your Honor,
2	THE COURT: What things do you point to?
3	MR. MANZELLA: I've already named some of them for the
4	Court:
5	Davis's many months of association with Manson;
6	His participation in the Manson plan to gather
7	together money and supplies and getting the dune buggies to-
8	gether to go to the desert;
9	His the evidence of his participation in the
10	Shea murder itself; and that includes well, actually, that
11	is the broad the broad encompassing category: The evidence
12	of his participation in the murder itself.
13	THE COURT: In other words, if Ruby Pearl were to be
14	believed, that he was one of those who approached Manson, or
15	MR. KAY: Shea.
16	MR, MANZELLA: Shea.
17	THE COURT: Shea, on the night before Shea
18	disappeared
19	MR. MANZELLA: Right. That's one piece of evidence that
20	comes in that category.
21	Further, he made statements to to I believe he
22	made statements to Flynn; and he made statements to Watkins
23	about disposing of the body.
24	And Watkins didn't he say to Watkins that the
26	body was buried at the ranch?
27	MR. KAY: It was either Watkins or Springer.
	MR. MANZELLA: He said something to Watkins, I'm sure.
28	THE COURT: Well, now, that

MR. MANZELLA: And --THE COURT: -- doesn't come in as part of the conspiracy. That's not --MR. MANZELLA: No. I'm talking about the evidence, the circumstantial evidence that concealment was part of the conspiracy. That's what I am talking about. MR. DENNY: That's not circumstantial evidence. That's an admission made of --MR, KAY: Well, an admission's circumstantial evidence. MR. MANZELLA: That's circumstantial evidence. MR. DENNY: Well, I --8c fol ; ; 

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THE COURT: The Court believes that it would be admissible under the theory that you have presented to me.

The Court believes that since cover-up activities can be part of a conspiracy to commit the crime, that under the cases, the cases cited, that -- the Genser case, 250 Cal Ap 2d 351, and the Tinnin case, 136 Cal Ap, and other cases which you've argued to me -- that this would be a matter for the jury.

The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence in the record at this time to warrant the presentation to the jury of this evidence, with the admonition that has been suggested.

MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, may I just offer this one further objection? And that is --

THE COURT: We have been arguing this now for --

MR. DENNY: I understand that. But I want to -- I certainly hope to protect the record in this case, because I think the Court is committing grave prejudicial error here.

And that is that there is not sufficient evidence thus far in the record to establish a prima facie case yet of either murder or conspiracy to commit murder.

THE COURT: Well, since --

MR. DENNY: And there's no corpus delicti yet established.

THE COURT: We have said somewhere along the line here -and I hope that it's clear in the record -- that the Court is
assuming that, for the purpose of this argument, we have been -all of us have been assuming --

MR. DENNY: I have not been assuming it, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Well, the Court is assuming that the People will be able to establish that there is a -- there has been a homicide committed; and that it was committed by criminal means.

MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, I think at this point, with this testimony, as dangerous as it is, that until the People do that, under 1223, if the Court's admitting it under 1223, that the Court should not allow this to be admitted at this time.

Because when it's once in, you're never going to unring this bell, no matter what the Court does. So that it should not --

THE COURT: Well, if --

MR. DENNY: -- should not be admitted until the People have established the corpus delicti. And as yet, I don't believe they have established the corpus delicti of murder, --

THE COURT: Well, haven't they --

MR. DENNY: -- nor have they established the corpus delicti of conspiracy to commit murder.

MR. MANZELLA: I might point out that there's only one witness left to testify strictly on the corpus. And when that witness testifies, there will have been all of the witnesses who testified to the satisfaction of the jury in both the Grogan case and the Manson case.

MR. DENNY: Well --

MR. MANZELLA: Which is some indication that we have come pretty close to establishing the corpus, if we haven't already done so.

MR. DENNY: It's no indication to me.

THE COURT: No, it's no indication to me. It's different defense counsel and different issues. The trial of this case has gone considerably different than the Manson case.

MR. DENNY: And your Honor, I --

THE COURT: But I am making an assumption, for the purpose of admitting -- and altering the order of proof, as I have a right to do under Section 1223 --

MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, I -- with all due respect, I don't know where Mr. -- what's the name of this witness?

THE COURT: Swartz.

MR. KAY: Swartz.

MR. DENNY: Swartz. -- where Mr. Swartz comes from, from what distance he comes. Barbara Hoyt does not come all that great a distance.

But I submit that at this point, the Court should not alter the order of proof, because -- unless this Court is going to make a finding now, over my objection, that the corpus delicti has been established.

THE COURT: Well, if the corpus delicti is not established --MR. MANZELLA: Then there's no case.

THE COURT: . -- do you believe that the case will go any further, over your motion under 1118?

MR. DENNY: Your Honor, I don't know. I -- I don't know.

But if the Court is of the opinion that it has not
as yet been established, then I don't think we should get this
testimony in.

THE COURT: Well --

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MR. DENNY: Because we've still got -- we've still got -your Honor, we've still got another case here, where there
obviously has been a corpus. And I think it's going to be
prejudicial to this defendant in the extreme, if certain
evidence is --

THE COURT: The Court does not believe that it would be prejudicial whatever to the defendant, in the Hinman case.

I think the jury is fully capable of separating the two cases. And this obviously pertains to the -- these statements obviously pertain to Shea.

And if the People are unable to establish the corpus in the Shea case, this whole thing will --

All right. Basically, the People have brought me to the opinion that this is a matter for the jury to determine, and the Court does find that the evidence is sufficient to permit the People to present the statement.

So, let's proceed.

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(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had in open court within the presence and hearing of the jury:)

THE COURT: The record will show the jurors are present.

Off the record.

(Whereupon, a discussion was had off the record.)
THE COURT: On the record.

All right, the record will show that all the jurors are present. The defendant is present with his counsel, Mr. Denny. And Mr. Manzella for the People.

There was a question pending. Do you wish to repeat it?

MR. MANZELLA: I'm not sure how far we had gotten, your Honor. Yes, I will.

Q BY MR. MANZELLA: Mr. Swartz, will you tell us in this conversation that you had with Charles Manson, would you tell us what you said and what Mr. Manson said?

THE COURT: All right, an objection has been raised, ladies and gentlemen. The Court overrules the objection, but the Court admonishes you that the --

MR. DENNY: Your Honor, I wonder if the Court could bring the microphone up. I'm having a little difficulty hearing and I wonder if some of the jurors are.

THE COURT: Of course.

The Court admonishes you that the statement is not admitted by the Court to prove the truth of what was stated, and you are not to accept it to prove the truth of what was stated. Any evidence of a statement made by Mr.

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Manson shall not be considered by you against Mr. Davis unless you shall first determine, from other independent evidence, that at the time the statement was made a conspiracy to commit a crime existed and unless you shall further determine that the statement was made while Mr. Manson was participating in the conspiracy and before or during the time that Mr. Davis was participating in the conspiracy.

And, finally, that such statement was made in furtherance of the objective of that conspiracy.

I'11 read that once again to you.

Any evidence of a statement made by Mr. Manson shall not be considered by you against Mr. Davis unless you shall first determine from other independent evidence that at the time the statement was made a conspiracy to commit a crime existed. And unless you shall further determine that the statement was made while Mr. Manson was participating in the conspiracy and before or during the time Mr. Davis was participating in the conspiracy, and, finally, that such statement was made in furtherance of the objectives of the conspiracy.

You may proceed.

Q BY MR. MANZELLA: All right, Mr. Swartz, would you tell us what you said and what Mr. Manson said in that conversation?

A In a passing conversation with Charlie, which took a very short time, I asked him if he had seen Shorty.

And he said, yes, that a friend of Charlie's had a friend in San Francisco, and needed someone to work and that Charlie

told Shorty		· -	•			
Charlie said	d he gave	him som	e money and	that Sho	rty had w	ent
to San Franc						

- Q Sometime after that conversation did Mr. Manson and other members of the Family leave the ranch?
  - A Yes, they did.
- Q And approximately within what period of time after the conversation did they leave?
  - A The last of August, as far as I can remember.
- Q Well, within, if you can recall -- within what period of time after the conversation did they leave the ranch?
  - A Ten days.
- Q Now, sometime after the conversation with Mr. Manson -- strike that.

Your Honor, excuse me, I thought the exhibits were out here.

May I have a moment?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

(Whereupon, Mr. Manzella exited the courtroom, returning shortly, and the following proceedings were had:)

BY MR. MANZELLA: Mr. Swartz, had you ever seen Shorty with a set of revolvers?

A Yes.

- And if you recall, had you seen Shorty with those revolvers on one occasion or more than one occasion?
  - A More than one occasion.
  - Q Can you describe those revolvers for us, please?

9-4	1	A	.45 caliber Colt-type pistols.
	2	Q	And did the revolvers appear similar to each
	3	other?	
	4	A	Yes, they were twin a set.
ŝ	5	, ସ	All right. Did you ever see Shorty carrying
•	6	those revol	evers in any kind of container?
	7	A	In a brown attache case.
	8	Q	All right.
	9		Now, at some time after you had this conversation
	10	with Charle	es Manson, did you see Bill Vance and Danny DeCarlo
	11	at the rand	ch?
	12	A A	Yes.
	13	Q.	All right. And within what period of time after
. *	14	the convers	sation with Manson did you see them at the ranch?
<b>)</b>	15	<b>A</b> -	A few days. I can't remember exactly how many
•	16	days it was	14
	17	Q	Would you say a few days?
	18	A	Yes.
	19	Q	Now, when you saw Vance and DeCarlo at the ranch,
	20	was this at	ter Mr. Manson and other members of the Family
,		had left th	ne ranch?
	22 * :	A	Yes.
	23	Q	All right.
•	<b>24</b>		I want to direct your attention to the two
£	25	revolvers v	hich have been marked People's 53-A and 53-B for
•	26	identificat	ion.
	27		Do those two revolvers appear familiar to you?
fie	28	Α.	Yes.

9a-21 You said you saw them with the pistols and the 2 case. What pistols and case are you referring to? The pistols lying right in front of me and the 3 A 4 brown case laying on the table over there. 5 Referring to People's 54, which is the case in 6 People's 53, which is the guns? 7 Right. À 8 All right. What did they do after they walked 9 in with the guns and the case? 10 Well, after they came into the room, they each 11 took one of the pistols and started breaking it down and 12 cleaning it. 13 0 And did you know Bill Vance before that occasion? 14 A Yes. 15 Where did you know him from? Q. \$ 16 Well, the first time I met him was after I got A 17 out of the Army, up at the ranch. 18 All right. So you knew him from Spahn Ranch, is 19 that correct? 20 A Correct. 21 Q How about DeCarlo? Had you seen him before that 22 occasion? Yes. And you knew him from around the ranch as well **25** or did you know him from --.... ( A ) Not for a very long length of time, no. 27 Well, when you did know him, did you know him 28 from around the ranch?

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A Yes.

Q All right.

May I have just a moment, your Honor? I'm sorry, I need two other exhibits.

THE COURT: Yes.

(Whereupon, Mr. Manzella exited the courtroom, returning shortly, and the following proceedings were had:)

Q BY MR. MANZELLA: All right, Mr. Springer, directing your attention to the photograph which has been marked People's 77 for identification.

Do you recognize the person shown in that photograph?

A It is Bill Vance.

MR. DENNY: I think you may have misspoken. You called him Mr. Springer.

MR. MANZELLA: I called --

MR. DENNY: You called Mr. Swartz Mr. Springer.

MR. MANZELLA: I'm sorry.

Q BY MR. MANZELLA: Mr. Swartz, directing your attention to People's:77-E.

Do you recognize who is shown in that photograph?

- A It's Bill Vance.
- And directing your attention to People's 73.

  Do you recognize who is shown in that photograph?
- A It is Danny DeCarlo.
- Q Now, sometime after that, did DeCarlo or Vance leave Spahn Ranch, if you recall?

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MR. DENNY: Well, I'll object to that as compound, DeCarlo or Vance. THE COURT: Sustained. BY MR. MANZELLA: All right. Sometime efter that did Danny DeCarlo leave the ranch, if you recall? À Yes. Do you recall within what period of time after you saw him with one of Shorty's guns, within what period of time that he left the ranch? Well, it was either -- last -- the real latter part of October or the first part of September sometime. I can't remember exactly. You mean the latter part of August? Q August, right. Right, excuse me. And do you recall whether or not sometime thereafter Bill Vance left the ranch? I think he did, yes. I don't remember seeing him A around much. All right. And after that, the last time that you saw Shorty at the ranch, when you had the conversation with him, have you ever seen Shorty again? No. A Q Have you ever heard from Shorty again? A No.

MR. MANZELLA: All right, thank you. I have no further questions, your Honor.

THE COURT: Cross.

MR. DENNY: Yes, your Honor.

9b-1		Q Doing what?
30-T	1	A Oh, spent most of our time cleaning the barn out.
	2	Q And what did Shorty do?
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*	4	
	<b>5</b> .	Q Which wasn't very often?
•	6	A He came and he went.
	7	. Q He came and he went?
	8.	A Yeah.
	. g	Q During August he came and he went, August of '69?
	10	A Right, right.
	11	Q Some days he was there, some days he wasn't?
	12	A Absolutely.
	13	Q And after the August raid, after he came to
	14	pick you up, after your two days in jail there, he still
	15	came and he went, right?
3	16	A I guess he did.
	17	Q All right. And when he wasn't there, you did
	18	the work with some of the other guys there, too, right?
	19	A Right.
	<b>20</b> .	Q When he was there he helped with the work?
	21	A Absolutely.
	22	Q All right. And how long had you been at the
	23	Spahn Ranch, say, in August of 1969?
3	24	A How long?
-	25	Q Yeah.
. <u>,5</u>	<b>26</b>	A Two, three months, I guess, four.
	27	Q Ever worked there before?
	28	A Off and on since 1963.
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1	Q All right. And you came and went?
2	A Right.
3	Q Off and on?
4	A Right.
5	Q You didn't tell Shorty when you were cutting out,
6	did you?
7	MR, MANZELLA: Objection, it is beyond the scope of
8	direct. It doesn't appear to be relevant.
9	THE COURT: Sustained.
_¦10 <sup>,</sup>	Q BY MR. DENNY: Shorty didn't tell you when he
ָּנְג'. ינג'	was cutting out, did he?
12	A He had no reason to.
13	Q That's right. So the enswer is he didn't?
14	A. Right.
15	Q All right. Each of you were your own boss?
16	A Absolutely.
17	Q Both pretty independent souls?
18	MR. MANZELLA: Objection, it is beyond the scope of
19	direct. It doesn't appear to be relevant.
20 .	THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer.
21	THE WITNESS: The question again, please?
22	Q BY MR. DENNY: Both independent souls, you and
23	Shorty?
24	MR. MANZELLA: Objection, calls for a conclusion on
25	the part of the witness without foundation.
26	THE COURT: Sustained.
27	Q BY MR. DENNY: All right, sir.
28	Now, this conversation you had with Shorty about

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1	A Yes, he did.
2	Q By way of money?
3	A Yes, he did.
4	Q What did he say?
5	A He said he had been offered \$80 a week.
6	Q \$80 a week?
7	A Right.
8	Q Anything else?
9	A Well, it was to be a watchman on the adjoining
10	property for that, \$80 a week.
n	Q Well, what was he going to get? Anything else
12	besides this \$80 a week?
13	A Nothing I know of, no.
14	And is it your statement or your testimony now
. 15	that after that conversation you didn't see him again or
16	would you say that you might have seen him around a time or
17	two after that, and then didn't see him again?
18	A Well, I might have seen him a time or two that
<b>19</b>	day, but the next day and the day after that, and the day
20.	after that, I don't remember seeing him.
21	Q 'You don't remember seeing him?
22	A No.
23	Q But you're not sure about what particular day it
24	was that you had this conversation with him?
<b>25</b>	A It was about three days after we got out of jail.
26	Q About three days after you got out of jail?
27	A Approximately, yes.
28	Q All right. And you were arrested the 16th,
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the ranch, it looked pretty good to me.
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                              (Laughter.)
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                              BY MR. DENNY: How about your car, sir?
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                        Q
                              Well, that's one that looked a little better
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Q What kind of car did you have?

MR. MANZELLA: Objection. It doesn't appear to be relevant.

MR. DENNY: Well, it is very relevant. I'll connect it up in just a moment.

THE COURT: It appears to be outside the scope of direct. Sustained.

MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, may we reserve this point, to take him as my own witness here at the conclusion, for just a moment?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

Danny DeCarlo and Bill Vance, these two fellows that you say you saw with Shorty's guns sometime after Mr. Manson and most of the other members of the Manson Family, if you will, left; is that right?

A Yes.

Q And that was after Mr. Davis had also left the ranch, huh?

A (No response.)

Q Well, let me ask you this, sir. Do you remember Mr. Davis being at the ranch at about the time you say that you had this last conversation with Shorty? Say around the 21st or so of August?

Was Mr. Davis even there?

A Well, I can't -- he wasn't -- I can't remember his being around when I had the conversation. But I think he was on the ranch.

Q Mr. Davis came and went, too, didn't he?

A Everybody did.

Q Everybody did.

A Right.

Q All right. And Mr. Davis left and was gone for several days, and then he'd come back; right?

A Quite possible.

Q All right. And you didn't keep particular track of Mr. Davis's comings or goings, did you?

MR. MANZELLA: Objection. It's beyond the scope of direct.

THE COURT: Sustained.

Q BY MR. DENNY: All right. Well, let's get back to your direct testimony, then, about these two characters, Vance and Decarlo.

And you say you --

Excuse me, your Honor. I wonder if I may get an exhibit out, just for a moment?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

(Pause in the proceedings while Mr. Denny repaired to the exhibit room, returning shortly, whereupon the following proceedings were had:)

Q BY MR, DENNY: Well, sir, I wonder if you'd come down here, and grab that hand-mike a moment, in front of the witness stand?

Can the jurors see that, at the end there?

Maybe if you'll take this pointer and -- first of all, let me just show it to you here, so you can familiarize

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yourself with the layout.

This is People's 29, and we are looking at the aerial photograph.

Do you recognize the corral and the yard area, George Spahn's house (indicating), the boardwalk, the barns?

> A Yes

All right. Now, so the jury -- well, why don't you just, to me, at this point, point out this room where you saw Bill Vance and Danny DeCarlo with those guns?

I saw them right here (indicating) at the extreme east end of the boardwalk.

All right. Now, if you would, I'll put this in Q front of the jury, and with the pointer here -- I'll ask you to move over a little, so that all of the jurors can see -- would you point that out to those jurors?

- It's the last room, right there (indicating). À
- All right. And what room did you call that? Q
- Well, I called it the prop room. A
- Did DeCarlo sometimes call that the gun room? Q
- A Yes.
- That's where he had his guns, all laid out? Q
- Yes, sir. A
- And this is where he made bullets for the guns, 0 reloads?
  - A Yes.

All right. And when you went in there on this Q particular occasion, were there guns -- other than these that you've talked about -- were there guns there in the gun room? I think there were. But I wouldn't swear to it.

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10a-1 All right. Now, sir, I'll show you a picture 1 that's been marked 80-C, and I'll just show it to you at this 2 point. 3 Do you recognize that? A Yes. I do. And what is that? What does that depict? Q б A This is the gun room door right here (indicating). 7 THE COURT: The building below which it shows "gun" and 8 the initials "J. S. "? 9 THE WITNESS: Yes. 10 MR. DENNY: All right. And I will place that here so 11 again the jurors can see it. 12 And would you point to the gun room? 13 Q This building right here (indicating). Ά 14 And do you know if there were sleeping facilities 15 Q there, as well as gun loading equipment and stuff? 16 A Yes, there was. 17 18 Ø How many? For how many people? I've got no idea. 19 A 20 0 More than one? 21 Yes. Α 22 All right. And do you know if more than one Q 23 person slept in there? 24 I -- I don't believe I've ever been in there. A 25 All right. You have been around late at night, 26 though, while people were in there; is that right? 27 Well, I assumed there were, yes. A 28 All right. Do you want to retake the stand, sir? Q

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Thank you. Now, sir, you say they brought these guns in. Did they bring them in in the case (indicating)?

A (Pause) I think they did, yes.

I'm positive they did.

Q You don't by any chance have such a vivid recollection of this that you can remember who was carrying the case, do you?

A I seem to remember Bill Vance was carrying it.

Q All right. And then, when they got in there, they opened up the case, took out these guns, and started breaking them down and cleaning them; is that right?

A Yes.

Q All right. You don't happen to remember the conversation that was going on, then, do you?

A Yes, I do.

Q I see. And did the conversation involve Mr. Shea?

MR. MANZELLA: Objection. Calls for hearsay.

THE COURT: Sustained.

MR. DENNY: All right. Your Honor, may I approach the bench?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had at the bench among Court and counsel, outside the hearing of the jury:)

MR. DENNY: Your H.nor, I would like to make an offer of proof that the witness would state that he overheard Vance and DeCarlo, and Vance and DeCarlo were talking and stated, "Well, we finally got Shorty's ego." That Vance said they

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bought the guns from Shorty.

THE COURT: Vance said --?

MR. DENNY: They bought -- "We bought them."

All I've got here in the statement -- and again, this is one of the statements purportedly made in front of Mr. Katz and Mr. Whiteley, on December 1, 1970, at 3:00 P. M. -- that "Vance said they bought the guns from Shorty,"

Now, I would admit that this is -- I would submit that this is admissible under People versus Spriggs. People versus Spriggs is a California Supreme Court case that says where another person admits a crime -- a person other than the defendant who has been charged with it -- that is admissible in evidence.

And I submit that this statement, "We finally got Shorty's ego" --

THE COURT: Not the statement, "We bought the guns from Shorty"?

MR. DENNY: I would submit that under Miranda, that even if it's exculpatory, it still constitutes an admission; that if it were used by the People, they would use it as an admission; that it's up to the jury to determine whether they were making a false statement or not.

But that this conversation, along with, "Well, we finally got Shorty's ego," is admissible; and if the Court holds that "Well, we bought the guns from Shorty," is inadmissible, for some reason, then certainly the statement, "Well, we finally got Shorty's ego," I submit, is admissible as an admission, an admission against penal interest.

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THE COURT: Well, under Miranda, how does the --

MR. DENNY: Well, Miranda says any statement taken from a defendant will not be admissible without the required Miranda admonition, whether it is incriminatory or exculpatory, because if the People are seeking to admit it, obviously, they are seeking to admit it in some kind of incriminatory way.

and I submit the same is true here. We are seeking to admit this conversation, these statements, in evidence as admissions against penal interest, which, even though part of it might be exculpatory, nevertheless, I can argue -- just as the prosecutor would be able to argue -- that this was simply a dodge that they were making in front of Swartz, to try to throw him off the track -- the same as Manson was trying to throw, supposedly, Swartz off the track, when he said Shorty went up to San Francisco.

I can make the same argument that the prosecutor could make in the use of these statements.

THE COURT: The People?

MR. MANZELLA: Two points. First of all, this doesn't apply under the Spriggs, because it's not an admission that Vance or DeCarlo killed Shea.

MR. DENNY: Oh, yes. It -- it's an admission that could be used against them, if they were charged with it.

MR. MANZEILA: It's not an admission that Vance and DeCarlo killed Shea, so therefore it's not admissible under the Spriggs doctrine, because it's not an admission that the declarant or declarants -- against the penal interests of

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\*  the declarant or declarants.

Secondly, that the evidence would -- the probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect on the jury. And I have got some cases I would like to cite on this.

This is an attempt on the part of the defense to show that there are -- that other persons committed the crime. And we have already argued this one, but I have got some cases I would like to cite to the Court, which say that there has to be a certain amount of evidence that other persons were guilty of the crime before the defense can argue it.

MR. DENNY: We have got it.

MR. MANZELLA: And the reason is that -- that it prejudices the People's case and tends to confuse the jury.

MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, strangely and interestingly enough, their own witness, Ruby Pearl, testified that she thought it was Bill Vance involved. So that's one thing from their own witness.

Secondly, their own evidence shows that the suitcase, the gray suitcase here -- which is in evidence -- and the bag, the attache case, the gun case, contained a number of items of identification, driver's licenses, a number of checks, all made out to either Dwayne Schwarm or another of Bill Vance's aliases -- and these were recovered up in the Ballarat-Goler Wash area -- all of which tends to show that Bill Vance was responsible for the death of Shorty Shea.

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It certainly shows it as much as any evidence that they have produced that Bruce Davis or Charlie Manson were responsible, and --

THE COURT: Well, now, who purportedly says these statements? Is it Bill Vance or -- who says --

MR. DENNY: Your Honor, I --

THE COURT: Does the statement show it?

MR. DENNY: I don't know. We can have an en camera hearing to determine what the witness would testify as to who said what. All I have are the typed notes of the interview had by Mr. Katz -- and presumably Sergeant Whiteley -- on December 1 with this witness.

And it's just set out that Vance and DeCarlo were talking and stated, "Well, we finally got Shorty's ego." Smirking. And the "smirking" is in parentheses.

THE COURT: It seems to me as though --

MR. DENNY: Now, whether either one of them said it as far as that goes, doesn't really matter.

THE COURT: It seems to me insufficient -- well, what do you contend shows that DeCarlo might have been the --

MR. DENNY: Because DeCarlo is Richard Alan Smith, and DeCarlo is the one who got the guns out of hock.

DeCarlo is the one who went to the pawnshop and initially signed the name of Donald J. Shea.

MR. KAY: No, that's wrong. The evidence shows -the only evidence we have on the point is from the Manson
trial, and it shows that it was -- it wasn't DeCarlo who
did that; it was Grogan who went to Sam Launer and

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signed the name "Shea."

And in fact, he testified to it at the Manson trial, and then on redirect examination, that the reason he remembered that it wasn't Shea who signed the name was that it was some tall guy.

And it was later discovered that it was Grogan who signed, who went in to get the guns and signed Shea's name.

MR. DENNY: Well, at any rate, the guy who finally did get the guns out of hock was Richard Alan Smith.

And they have established by the testimony of either Wachsmuth or -- well, I think it was Wachsmuth who identified Richard Alan Smith as Danny DeCarlo.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. DENNY: Danny DeCarlo then was the one who supposedly got the fruits of the murder -- which, presumably, he could only have gotten by getting the pawn tickets off the dead body of Shorty.

So, whether either one says it, one or both, it's admissible against the penal interests of the declarant. And if the other adopts it, it would seem to be, under the Osuna doctrine, a declaration against penal interests as to the other to whom he is talking, to whom he adopts it.

THE COURT: Well, it seems to me as though it might be very well admissible against Vance, because of the evidence that has been produced concerning Vance, and his possible connection with Mr. Shea's demise.

MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, you don't even have to

establish -- you don't even have to establish prima facie --MR. MANZELLA: Yes, you do. And I would like to get those cases before the Court rules. You have to -- you do have to establish that. THE COURT: I think under Spriggs, you do. But we have gone through that before, haven't we? · 7 MR. DENNY: No, not in this case. THE COURT: Not in this case? All right. All right. I'll recess the jury, and let's find out from Mr. Vance after the jury's gone what he would testify. MR. DENNY: Mrt Swartz. 11 fls. THE COURT: Mr. Swartz, yes. 

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(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had in open court within the presence and hearing of the jury:)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we're going to excuse you for the evening and continue to work here alone without you. I'm sorry you've been deprived of having us present all day, but --

(Laughter.)

THE COURT: -- but perhaps tomorrow you'll be in on something more often.

During the recess, you are obliged not to converse amongst yourselves nor with anyone else, nor permit anyone to converse with you on any subject connected with this matter, nor form or express any opinion on the matter until it is finally submitted to you.

Mr. Swartz, you remain where you are, if you will, please.

And, ladies and gentlemen, you are excused until tomorrow morning at 9:30.

(Whereupon, at 4:11 P. M., the jury retired from the courtroom, and the following proceedings were had:)

THE COURT: Excuse me just a moment.

MR. DENNY: Your Honor -- well, that's all right.

(Whereupon, the Court left the bench, returning shortly and the following proceedings were had:)

MR. DENNY: Your Honor, I wonder if I may proceed now with examination to determine --

THE COURT: Yes.

The record will show that the jurors have all left

11-2 the courtroom. CROSS EXAMINATION 4 BY MR. DENNY: 5 O Mr. Swartz, after they brought in the guns or at 6 the time they brought in the guns, did Bill Vance say anything? 7 Yes, they did. A 8 Q What did he say? 9 Α He came in the room and he made the remark that 10 they had finally gotten Shorty's ego --14 Q And what did that --12 A From him. 13 Excuse me. 14 I'm sorry. Q 15 Did --16 MR. MANZELLA: Excuse me, I think you interrupted the 17 answer. 18 MR. DENNY: Yes, I did. 19 Q. Was there more? 20 A No. 21 And did Danny Decarlo make any response to that? 22 MR. MANZELLA: Your Honor, excuse me, Mr. Denny started 23 talking when Mr. Swartz said "from him," I thought. "Finally 24 got Shorty's ego from him." 25 THE WITNESS: That's what I said, yes. 26 MR. MANZELLA: All right. 27 THE COURT: The phrase that Bill Vance said was, "Well, 28 we finally got Shorty's ego from him" or "I"?

11-3	1	THE WITNESS: We or I, I don't remember exactly.
	2	THE COURT: All right.
	3	Q BY MR. DENNY: And did Danny DeCarlo make any
	4	response?
₹	5	A I can't remember, no.
ș <b>a</b>	6	Q All right. And when Bill Vance said this, could
	7	you do you recall what his demeanor was, what is facial
	8	expression was?
	9	A Well, they were happy. They weren't sad, is the
	10	only way I can
	11	Q Smirking would be a proper or improper way to
	12	characterize it?
	13	A Smirking?
· *	14	Q Vance, when he said this?
3	15	A A smirking.
	16	Q All right.
	17	A They weren't grinning, like they were laughing,
	18	you know. They weren't laughing.
	19	Q All right. And was there any other conversation
	20	that you can recall between them?
	21	A No.
	22	Q Concerning how they had gotten the guns or when
	23	they had gotten them or where they had gotten them or any-
È	24	thing, or any other kind
ž	25	A I can't remember.
ÿ	26	Q well, is there anything that would refresh your
	27	recollection?
	28	THE COURT: How can he know that?

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MR. DENNY: Well, I don't want him to come in tomorrow morning and say, yeah, all of a sudden I remember, I refreshed my recollection from a report or something.

THE WITNESS: Well, I might possibly remember something tomorrow morning, I don't know.

Q BY MR. DENNY: That's what I am worried about, and I want to know what it would be that would refresh your recollection, if you know? Did you make some sort of a report?

MR. MANZELLA: Objection, assumes a fact not in evidence.

- Q BY MR. DENNY: Did you talk to somebody?
- A No.

If I sit down and think about it -THE COURT: Overruled.

- Q BY MR. DENNY: You didn't make any report about it or you don't have any notes on it?
  - A No, sir.
- Q Has anyone interviewed you and taken down statements from you concerning this particular conversation?
  - A Yes, they have.
  - Q Who?

MR. MANZELLA: Objection, doesn't appear to be relevant.

MR. DENNY: Well, it is relevant, your Honor, to his -- refreshing his recollection.

THE COURT: Sustained.

MR. DENNY: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: No, overruled. You can answer that.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

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Well, the District Attorney's Office, I believe
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                   I've talked to them about it.
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11a-11 BY MR. DENNY: Well, I've got a report here that Q 2 was supposedly concerning a conversation held between you and 3 Mr. Katz on December 1st, 1970. May I approach the witness, your Honor? 5 THE COURT: You may ask --6 MR. MANZELLA: I object to showing this to the witness 7 on the grounds it is leading and suggestive. 8 THE COURT: Overruled. You may ask him about it. 9 BY MR. DENNY: Do you remember being interviewed Q 10 by Mr. Katz on December 1st, 1970, about 3:00 o'clock, 11 Mr. Katz and Sergeant Whiteley? A Oh, I think they came out to my house, I think, 13 All right. Q 14 A I don't know. 15 Q You do remember that? 16 Α Yes. 17 All right. And at that time you told them about 18 this conversation? 19 I believe I did, yes. 20 All right. Now, were you interviewed at any other 21 time by any other representative of the District Attorney's 22 Office? 23 I've been interviewed so many times I can't À 24 remember exactly when, where and how. 25. All right. And have you seen any reports of those 26 interviews you had? 27 A No. 28 You didn't sign any reports? Q

1 11a-2 A I don't believe I did. If I did, I can't 2 remember signing any. 3 Do you remember ever telling any representative 4 of the District Attorney's Office or the police any more about 5 this conversation than what you have just told the judge and 6 us right now? Ź I don't believe that I did. 8 MR. DENNY: All right. I have no further questions. 9 THE COURT: So that the best you can remember, the entire 10 conversation was a remark by Bill Vance that we or I finally 11 got Shorty's ego from him? 12 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 13 MR. MANZELLA: May I ask just a couple of questions, your 14 Ŀ Honor? 15 THE COURT: Go ahead. 16 17 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 18 BY MR. MANZELLA: 19 Mr. Swartz, when you first answered the question, 20. you said that Vance said "We finally got Shorty's ego from 21 him." You didn't say "I." You said "We've." 22 We've -- we, I. 23 Q We ve? 24 Was he referring to the guns? 25 A Yes, he was. 26 THE COURT: How do you know that? 27 Q BY MR. MANZELLA: And --28 THE COURT: How do you know that?

11a-3	1	THE WITNESS: He was in love with these pistols. That
ن جهیر	2	was his
	3	Q BY MR, MANZELLA: Vance or Shorty?
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7.	5	A Shorty.
	_	Q Yes.
*		THE COURT: How do you know that Vance was referring to
	7	the guns? He had the guns in hand or some way refer to them or
	8	what?
	9	THE WITNESS: He came in and he took the guns out of the
	10	case, uh, he showed them to me and he said, "We've finally got
	11	Shorty's ego."
	12	THE COURT: All right.
	13	MR. MANZELLA: Okay.
, F	14	THE COURT: Anybody?
	15	Q BY MR. DENNY: That is, in fact, what he said? Not
5	16	from "him," but just those words, "Well, we've finally got
	17	Shorty's ego"; is that right?
	18	A Yes, "We've finally got Shorty's ego."
	19	Q Period?
	20	A Period.
	21	
	22	
	23	Q BY MR. MANZELLA: He didn't say from "him"?
	24	If you don't recall, just say so.
Ş.	25	A From Shorty?
*		Q No, from "him," Did he use the words "from him"?
•3	26	A No, I don't believe so.
	27	Q He just said, "We've finally got Shorty's ego"?
•	28	A "We've finally got Shorty's ego."

1 11a-4 THE COURT: Any more questions? 2 MR. MANZELLA: No more questions. MR. DENNY: Nothing. 3 Is the jury gone for the day? MR. MANZELLA: 5 THE COURT: Yes, I excused them. 6 Do you want to go ahead at this moment? 7 MR. MANZELLA: I thought maybe we could. 8 THE COURT: That was kind of remarkably short, and we've 9 got six minutes left. It seems like a huge waste of time to 10 give the jury six minutes. Unfortunately, it is already done. 11 They're not due back until tomorrow morning at 9:30. 12 It appears to the Court, after having heard this 13 and considering the evidence that heretofore has been Ē, presented --15 MR. MANZELLA: We withdraw our objection to the 16 evidence. 17 THE COURT: Well, it is lucky you did, because I was just 18 about to rule that the statement was admissible. 19 MR. MANZELLA: Well, it hurts my feelings when you rule 20 against me, so I thought --21 (Laughter.) 22 THE COURT: You wanted to be with me, I see. 23 Good night, gentlemen. 24 MR. KAY: Good night, your Honor. 25 MR. MANZELLA: Good night. MR. DENNY: Good night, your Honor. 27 (Whereupon, at 4:24 P. M., an adjournment was 28 taken in this matter.)