SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 2 HON. RAYMOND CHOATE, JUDGE DEPARTMENT NO. 106 3 4 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 5 Plaintiff, 6 A-267861 NO. 7 -vs-BRUCE McGREGOR DAVIS, 8 9 Defendant. 10 11 REPORTERS' DAILY TRANSCRIPT 13 Monday, February 14, 1972 14 15 VOLUME 43 16 17 APPEARANCES: 18 JOSEPH P. BUSCH, JR., District Attorney, For the People: BY: ANTHONY MANZELLA 19 and STEPHEN R. KAY, Deputies District 20 Attorney 21 For Defendant Davis: GEORGE V. DENNY, III 22 23 24 25 26 MARY LOU BRIANDI, CSR ROGER K. WILLIAMS, CSR 27 Official Court Reporters 28

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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1972 10:00 AM 1 2 3 THE COURT: Mr. Denny, did you meet Mr. Johnson? MR. DENNY: Oh, yes, I did. THE COURT: Mr. Kay? 6 MR. DENNY: Mr. Kay has also met Mr. Johnson. 7 MR. KAY: We have agreed that Mr. Johnson may take R the stuff and go over and examine it, but Mr. Denny reminded 9 me supposedly a clerk is supposed to accompany, the 10 exhibits or something. 11 (Whereupon, Mr. Denny conferred with the clerk.) 12 MR. DENNY: Joyce said she will get one just as 13 quickly as possible. I believe that's standard operating 14 procedure now. 15 I believe that would have to be the case. THE COURT: 16 You gentlemen can accompany him, if you wish, 17 and arrange the time. Let's see what we can do about that. 18 You may talk to him and if you wish to --19 MR. KAY: We've already talked to him for quite a 20 period of time. 21 MR. DENNY: I would like, if possible, to do it this 22 way, I know it sometimes takes a good deal of time to 23 determine whether there is anything significant, but if Mr. 24 Johnson does find anything that appears to him to be a 25 land impression or a land and two groove impressions on that 26 bullet, I would appreciate the opportunity to be called here 27 in court, and then have the opportunity to go and see it 28

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over at the lab myself, personally. I think it would be a better expenditure of time that we don't all traipse over there and wait around, because there are some matters that we can take care of now by way of taking care of the receipt into evidence, et cetera --

THE COURT: Well, the Court will not say that it will do that, because it will depend largely upon what the progess of the case is today, and whether, in the Court's discretion it should be to allow that.

But if Mr. Johnson would communicate with the Court after he's had an opportunity to examine the bullets, and if he lets the Court know via telephone that he's ready to have counsel view any of the -- either of the exhibits, then, perhaps, I can arrange it.

(Whereupon, unrelated matters were called and heard before the Court.)

2-1 THE COURT: The record will show the defendant to be 1 present with his counsel. 2 Where is everybody? 3 (Pause in the proceedings while a discussion off the record ensued at the bench between the Court and the clerk.) б 7 THE COURT: Mr. Kay, do the People have any further witnesses? MR. KAY: No further witnesses, although I assume that 9 if Mr. Johnson's opinion is favorable, that the Court will 10 11 let us put him on -- reopen our case and put him on as a --12 THE COURT: Either side may put Mr. Johnson on, 13 depending on --14 MR. KAY: All right. 15 THE COURT: -- what his view may be. 16 And --17 MR. KAY: Well, he would be the only --18 THE COURT: -- after he has --19 MR. KAY: -- other possible witness. Other than that, 20 we have no witness. 21 THE COURT: After Mr. Johnson has examined the bullets, 22 either side may use him. 23 Very well, is there an offer to receive those 24 items which have heretofore been marked for identification? MR. KAY: Yes, there is, your Honor. Mr. Manzella has 26 the exhibit list. If I --27 THE COURT: Very well. 28 MR. KAY: -- can just --

1 THE COURT: I will excuse you to find him. MR. KAY: Okay. He's right outside, talking to a 2 witness. I will have to get that. Thank you. ٠3 (Pause in the proceedings.) THE COURT: The People are offering into evidence 5 exhibits heretofore marked and yet unreceived? 6 7 MR. MANZELLA: Yes, your Honor. 8 I think the first exhibit that hasn't been 9 received in evidence is 3-A. 10 THE COURT: I think that's true. That's a copy of 11 the driver's license. 12 MR. MANZELLA: Right. The People would offer that into evidence. 14 THE COURT: That's admitted. 15 MR. DENNY: Yes, no objection. 16 MR. MANZELLA: I believe the next exhibit is People's 17 13 for identification. 18 The People would offer that into evidence. 19 THE COURT: The checkbook? 20 MR. MANZELLA: Yes, your Honor. 21 MR. DENNY: No objection. 22 13 ev. THE COURT: So ordered. 23 MR. MANZELLA: The next exhibit is People's 18, the 24 knife. 25 The People would offer that into evidence. 26 MR. DENNY: Which? 27 THE COURT: Is that the knife with a sheath? 28 MR. KAY: Right.

MR. DENNY: Well, the sheath is 18-A. 1 THE COURT: 18-A? 2 MR. MANZELLA: Right. MR. DENNY: Yes. I have no objection. 4 18&18-A Ev. 5 THE COURT: All right. Received. MR. MANZELLA: The next exhibit is 19. mannequin. 7 19 Ev. MR. DENNY: No objection. MR. MANZELLA: 20. People's 20 for identification is 9 the sword in two pieces. 10 MR. DENNY: I have no objection to that. 11 20 Ev. 12 THE COURT: All right, Received. 13 MR, MANZELLA: People's 21-A, -B and -C are three 14 photographs of the kitchen of the Hinman home. 15 MR. DENNY: Could I see those, Mr. Kay, just a moment? 16 (Pause in the proceedings while Mr. Denny 17 examined the exhibits.) 21ABC ev. 18 THE COURT: 21-A, -B and -C. 19 MR. KAY: Excuse me, your Honor. I don't believe I 20 heard the Court's ruling on 18 and 18-A, the knife and the 21 sheath. 22 MR. MANZELLA: They were admitted. 23 THE COURT: If I haven't heretofore mentioned it, they 24 are admitted into evidence. 25 MR. KAY: Okay. Thank you. 26 MR. DENNY: Yeah. No objection on 21A, -B, and -C. 27 MR. MANZELLA: 22 and 23 are the black T-shirt and 28 Levis. 22 is the black T-shirt; 23 is the Levis.

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MR. DENNY: Were those identified at all? I don't think they have been, by any witness.

No, they have not.

MR. MANZELLA: They may not have been.

MR. DENNY: I'd object to their introduction. There has been no testimony concerning them at all.

THE COURT: Well, they were talked about --

MR. DENNY: I don't think there was any identification of them.

THE COURT: Sergeant Whiteley was questioned about them on --

MR. DENNY: There was no foundation established for them, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- on cross-examination.

MR. MANZELLA: The People will withdraw the offer as to 22 and 23. I believe that's correct. I think we --

THE COURT: Very well. The other items have thus far been admitted, but 22 and 23 are withdrawn.

All right. Proceed.

MR. MANZELLA: I believe the next exhibit is People's 30 for identification, the pistol, the Radom pistol.

MR. DENNY: Your heave, I'd object to the introduction of that, in that there's insufficient evidence to establish that this was in fact the pistol that was used; and it's highly prejudicial to have that pistol received into evidence now.

And I'd cite to the Court People vs. Lo Cigno,
L-o C-i-g-n-o, a case not too dissimilar on its facts, where

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although there was evidence to show that one of the parties-this was the famous, "Now, Sam, now!" case tried in Judge
Drucker's court some years back, in which Mickey Cohen and
a group were at a restaurant, and supposedly Sam Lo Cigno
was the hit man to hit the victim, who was called The
Enforcer, Jack Whalen.

And after the crime had been committed, Whalen had been killed, they discovered three guns found in the trash can, wrapped in a plastic container, the trash can behind the restaurant.

And those guns were introduced into evidence, although there was no showing that any one of those guns was actually the gun that fired the fatal bullet.

And the guns were used by the prosecution, in effect, simply to show that these were men who had guns, because there was some evidence to show that the guns did belong to one of the parties sitting at the table, and that he had had them -- although he said, on examination, that he had sold them sometime earlier.

And then they sought to show the presence of these guns, in a way to impeach him. And the Court said, "You may not do that; that it was prejudicial in the extreme to do so," and that --

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THE COURT: What's the analogy here?

MR. DENNY: Unless there is some showing that this gun was in any way connected with the offense in this case, the Hinman offense, then it is extremely prejudicial and its prejudicial effects certainly outweigh any of its probative value in attempting to use it to connect Mr. Davis with the crime.

And thus far, the most evidence that we have on that subject is the ballistics evidence which simply says from Sergeant Christansen, well, that gun as well as any number of guns, up to some 60 nine-millimeter guns with six land and groove impressions with right-hand twists might have fired that bullet that was recovered in the house.

THE COURT: Aside from that expert opinion, however, you're saying that it makes no difference that Mr. Davis may have had the Radom in his possession and it is prejudicial to show that he did have?

MR. DENNY: That's correct.

THE COURT: People.

MR. MANZELLA: Your Honor, the People have -- I believe there's four pieces of evidence that tend to establish that this weapon was the weapon that was at the Hinman home in the possession of Mr. Davis and others.

THE COURT: Aside from that.

MR. MANZELLA: If we assume ---

THE COURT: All right, go ahead.

MR. MANZELLA: Nat Stanoff's testimony that on July

14 --

MR. DENNY: We stipulate for the purpose of this argument that that is so testified to.

MR. MANZELLA: The testimony of Ella Bailey that she saw Mr. Davis with this gun or a gun that looked identical to it on Friday, July 25, before Beausoleil, Atkins and Brunner and a fourth person left for the Hinman residence;

And on Monday, July 28th, the day after -- well, the day after the weekend that Hinman was killed, Davis admitting -- admitted holding a gun on Hinman at the time that Manson slashed him with the sword;

And that -- and Sergeant Christansen's testimony that the bullet found at the Hinman home was a 9-millimeter bullet which fits -- which is the caliber of bullet used by the -- this pistol;

All that evidence would tend to establish, would make it reasonable for the jury to believe this, indeed, was the gun.

And if it would be reasonable for the jury to believe, as one of the reasonable inferences, then it is admissible.

THE COURT: Mr. Denny argues that even though that may be the case, it can be traced to Mr. Davis's hand by the evidence, that it is immaterial and prejudicial.

MR. MANZELLA: Well, it is not immaterial because a person -- if a person could -- if Mr. Davis got up on the witness stand and admitted that the gun -- that was the gunthat was at the Hinman house, it certainly would be relevant.

I mean, an objection on the grounds of irrelevancy

would not be well taken. So the fact the weapon was at the Hinman home would be relevant. It is evidence that tends to prove -- what distinguishes this case from the case Mr. Denny cites, if I am not incorrect, is that there was no evidence that these guns were used in the perpetration of the offense. And here we've got the testimony of the ballistic's expert and the testimony of Ella Jo Bailey and the admission by Mr. Davis that the gun was used in the offense.

MR. DENNY: Your Honor, let me clarify that.

One, we do not have any admission by Mr. Davis that the gun was used in the offense.

If the Court recalls the testimony of Ella Bailey, all she said was that Bruce said he held a gun on Hinman when Manson slashed him. He in no way identified this gun, the Radom, the 9-millimeter Radom as the gun which he held. First point.

Second point, her testimony was that Davis had a gun at the time she says she saw him, Manson, and Beausoleil standing together. And she says it appeared to be the gun, People's 30 or 31 -- which is it here?

MR. MANZELLA: 30.

MR. DENNY: People's 30, all right.

Now, whether she's impeached by showing that she couldn't see that distance or not, is irrelevant. She did not say that she saw that gun go anywhere with Beausoleil in her testimony. All she says was she saw him with this gun at about the time when they were talking.

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Now, we go to Sergeant Christansen's testimony and Sergeant Whiteley's testimony.

They don't even know when the bullet that they recovered in January was fired. And, in fact, Sergeant Whiteley's testimony is the only testimony we have on that subject at all. And certainly the People are bound by that testimony, and that is at the time he made out his report concerning his observations on August 1st, 1969, he said that the bullet hole did not appear to be of recent origin.

Therefore, even assuming Christansen's testimony that this bullet could have been fired from the Radom, among any number of a million guns, the only testimony that there is before this court as to when it could have been fired, because there was no -- there has been no testimony that a gun was fired in this case.

Now, the Court, I'm sure, is not going to harken back to the Manson case where there was such testimony. But in this case there was no evidence from any person that a gun, this gun, any gun was fired at the Hinman home on the weekend of July 25th through the 27th.

Under the circumstances, then, I will advert again to the Lo Cigno case and state, all of these factors being taken into account, the mere fact that Bruce Davis bought a gun on July 14th, the mere fact that he may have been seen with a gun at the time or shortly around the time that this crime occurred, in and of itself is insufficient to admit that gun and it would be prejudicial to do so. The prejudicial aspect clearly outweighs the probative value of admitting that

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gun under the Lo Cigno doctrine.

THE COURT: The Court believes that the evidence is such that the jury may take the inference that Mr. Davis had that gun at the Hinman home and that he did utilize it in the course of the events there at the Hinman home. It is a matter, the Court believes, that the jury will determine, may determine, and the Court believes that the probative value of this piece of evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect it may have upon the jury.

The Court will admit People's 30.

MR. MANZELLA: People's 36 for identification is offered into evidence, your Honor. It consists of eight photographs of Spahn Ranch.

THE COURT: All right, they're admitted.

MR. MANZELLA: People's 37 is offered into evidence, which consists of five black-and-white photographs of Manson, Davis, Beausoleil, Brunner and Atkins.

MR. DENNY: Your Honor, I have objected to the use of those previously, I think, at the beginning of this case, based on the prejudicial aspect of having all five photographs on one board. I still object to the use. It is a little late since they've been used time and again, so I just restate my objection for the record that it has, I believe, had a prejudicial affect on the jury, them seeing that.

THE COURT: The Court notes both sides have used 37 before the jury. The Court doesn't find that it is prejudicial to the defendant. The Court admits 37.

MR. DENNY: Well, may the record reflect that after it

has once been shown to the jury two or three times by the prosecution, I am powerless to change the affect that it has, obviously. Then, I am in a position having to use those pictures, which I sought to have them severed one from the other so I could use them separately.

MR. MANZELLA: People's 38 for identification is offered into evidence. That's the firearms transaction record.

THE COURT: Mr. Stanoff's record?

MR. MANZELLA: That is correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, 38 is admitted.

MR. MANZELLA: People's 39 is a certified copy of -- no, I believe that's a photocopy of a temporary driver's license in the name of Jack McMillian, which was identified as -- appeared to be a copy of the license which was presented to Mr. Stanoff. That's offered.

THE COURT: All right, it is admitted.

MR. MANZELLA: People's 40 was not offered by the People -- I'm sorry, an exhibit previously marked People's 40 has -- was not offered or marked for identification at this time, so there will be a gap there.

People's 41 for identification was a photograph of the defendant.

THE COURT: It is received.

MR. DENNY: Well, could we see that particular photograph, your Honor, I'm not --

Oh, yes, fine.

3b-1 (Whereupon, unrelated matters were called 1 and heard before the Court.) 2 THE COURT: All right, 41 is admitted. 42. 41 ev. MR. MANZELLA: 42, I believe, was admitted on 1-14. THE COURT: Yes, it was previously admitted. MR. MANZELLA: People's 43 is offered into evidence, 6 two photographs of the trunk of the Fiat stationwagon. 7 43 ev. THE COURT: That's admitted. MR. MANZELLA: People's 44 for identification is a 9 certified copy of a certificate of ownership of one of the 10 vehicles. I'm not sure which. 11 44 ev. The VW microbus. That's admitted. 12 THE COURT: 13 MR. MANZELLA: People's 45 for identification is -consists of two photographs of a dune buggy. People would 14 offer People's 45 for identification into evidence. 15 16 MR. DENNY: No objection. 45 ev. 17 THE COURT: So ordered. 18 MR. MANZELLA: People's 46 and 47 were received. 19 THE COURT: Yes. 20 MR. MANZELLA: People's 48 for identification was a 21 certified copy of a marriage certificate. 22 MR. DENNY: No objection. 23 THE COURT: All right, 48-A and -B, that is, certain 24 photos --25 MR. MANZELLA: 48-A is a black and white photograph of 26 two persons, 48-B is a black and white of four persons. 27 The wedding photographs of Shea and Magdalene. 28 MR. DENNY: No objection.

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3b-2	1	THE COURT: Those heretofore mentioned are admitted
<b>48A&amp;Bey</b> 2		into evidence.
	3	MR. MANZELLA: 49 is another photograph of Shea, I
4	4	believe.
	5	THE COURT: Well, it is a picture of Mr. Manson,
<b>3</b> .	6	according to what I have.
	7	MR. DENNY: Can we hold on a moment, your Honor? We
	8	don't seem to have that here in order.
	9	THE COURT: What do you have listed for that, Mrs. Holt?
	10	THE CLERK: It is a picture of Charles Manson.
	11	THE COURT: A picture of Charles Manson. I think I
,	12	recall it.
<b>A</b>	13	Is there any objection to that?
	14	MR. DENNY: No, no objection.
	15	THE COURT: It is admitted.
49 ev.	16	50.
	17	MR. MANZELLA: People's 50 has not been offered by the
	18	People.
	19	THE COURT: That's the way my record looks, too.
	20	51.
	21 ·	MR. MANZELLA: 51 and 52 were received on January 17th.
	22	THE COURT: Yes:
	23	MR. MANZELLA: People's 53-A and 53-B are the two
÷	24	the matched revolvers.
3A&B ev.	25	MR. DENNY: No objection.
₩.	26	THE COURT: All right.
	27	51 through 53-B are received, then.
	28	MR. MANZELLA: People's 54 is the brown attache case and

	1	its contents.
	2	MR. DENNY: No objection.
54 ev.	3	THE COURT: All right, received.
<b>\$</b> :	4	MR. MANZELLA: People's 55-A, -B and -C are pawn
	5	tickets.
<i>ই</i>	6	THE COURT: Pawn tickets.
	7	MR. DENNY: No objection.
	8	THE COURT: I believe they have heretofore been received
55ABC ev,	9	If not, they are now.
	10	56.
	11	MR. MANZELLA: 56-A, -B and -C were also pawn tickets.
	12	MR. DENNY: No objection.
56-ABC ev.	13	THE COURT: Received.
	14	57, pawn tickets.
*	15	MR. MANZELLA: 57-A, -B, -C and -D are all offered.
57-ABCD ev.	16	They're pawn tickets.
	17	THE COURT: I think they have heretofore been received.
	18	If they aren't, they are now received.
	19	MR. DENNY: No objection.
	20	MR. MANZELLA: People's 58 was already received.
	21	THE COURT: I think so, a birth certificate.
	22	MR. MANZELLA: Right.
	23	People's 69 for identification
•	24	THE COURT: Which heretofore has been received, the
¥.	25	pawn tickets.
*	26	MR. MANZELLA: Right.
	27	THE COURT: If not, the record does not so show,
•	28	they are received now.

60-A and -B are pawn tickets. MR. KAY: We didn't offer 60-A and -B. THE COURT: Didn't you? MR. KAY: No. No, I don't think so. I think this was with the witness we didn't call. THE CLERK: I have them 60-A and -B on January 20. THE COURT: I have them received in evidence, 60-A and 3c fls. -B. 

3c-1 MR. KAY: No, I don't think so. No, we didn't offer 1 60-A and B. MR. DENNY: They were marked for identification, I think, 3 your Honor, as far as the testimony of Magdalene Shea. Just that she could identify the signature, but we didn't offer them and we don't offer them. THE COURT: You do not offer them, all right. The Court is incorrect, then. Apparently they had been received, but if 8 9 they re not offered --MR. KAY: No, they re not offered. 10 THE COURT: Then, the Court will retract its order 11 12 receiving them into evidence. MR. DENNY: Well, may I have just a moment, your Honor? 13 14 THE COURT: Yes. 15 MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, I will move they be received 16 into evidence either as a defense exhibit or under the same 17 number, as these were a part of the --18 THE COURT: They were referred to and identified. 19 MR. DENNY: That's right. THE COURT: All right, the Court will receive them as 20 60-A and B respectively. 60a, b 22 61, photos of an automobile, A through J. 23 MR. MANZELLA: That's --24 THE COURT: Any objection? 25 MR. DENNY: No objection, your Honor. 26 THE COURT: Received. through J 27 62. six keys and a key ring. 28 MR. DENNY: No objection.

THE COURT: Received. 62 1 63, what is that? 2 MR. MANZELLA: 63, I don't believe was offered, your 3 Honor. 4 MR. DENNY: I don't think there is any. 5 I don't think it was marked either. MR. MANZELLA: 6 THE COURT: I don't either. 7 MR. MANZELLA: People's 64. 8 THE COURT: A yellow paper with writing found in the 9 automobile. 10 MR. MANZELLA: People's 64 was received. THE COURT: Yes, it was received. If the record does not 12 13 so show, it is received now. 14 65 is --15 MR. MANZELLA: 65 --16 THE COURT: -- the footlockers? MR. MANZELLA: People's 65-A through E are five photo-17 graphs. They re offered into evidence. 18 THE COURT: All right, they're received, pictures of 19 footlockers and clothing. 65a-e 66. 22 MR. MANZELLA: People's 65-F and 65-G are the foot-23 lockers. Did you already receive them? 24 THE COURT: I believe they have been. If they are not, they are received now. 65f,g 26 MR. DENNY: I don't believe they were, but there is no 27 objection. MR. MANZELLA: 65-H is a blue suitcase found by the 28

young boy up in the desert. ŀ MR. DENNY: No objection. 2 THE COURT: 65-F and I have -- is it G and H? 3 MR. DENNY: H. 65H All right, that's received. THE COURT: 5 MR. MANZELLA: People's 66. I don't believe we 6 7 identified an exhibit as 66, your Honor. THE COURT: I don't think so, either. 8 MR. MANZELLA: People's 67-A through N are black-and-9 white photographs of documentaries testified to by --10 THE COURT: Bickston. 11 MR. MANZELLA: -- Bickston. 13 MR. KAY: And Lance Victor. 14 MR. MANZELLA: And I believe they were received on 15 January 24. 16 THE COURT: If not, they are received now. 17 MR. MANZELLA: People's 68 is the large photograph of 18 Shea. 19 MR. DENNY: No objection. 20 68 THE COURT: All right, received. 21 MR. MANZELLA: I don't believe we marked an exhibit as 22 People's 69. 23 THE COURT: That's the Court's records. 24 MR. MANZELLA: People's 70 for identification is a 25 photograph of Stephanie Schram, used by the Deputy Wachsmuth 26 to identify her as the person arrested on August 24th. 27 would be offered in evidence. 28 MR. DENNY: No objection.

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THE COURT: Received.
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                       MR. MANZELLA: People's 71 was received on February 7.
             2
                       THE COURT: That was a check dated July 10?
             3
                       MR. MANZELLA: Yes, your Honor.
                       THE COURT: All right, received.
             5
                       MR. MANZELLA: People's 72 is offered into evidence.
             6
                 is a -- People's 72 is a gun purchase record.
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1 THE COURT: Buy book, a page from a buy book of 2 Mr. Baker? 3 MR. MANZELLA: Right. 4 THE COURT: I think it's been heretofore received. Ιf 5 not, it is received now. 6 MR. MANZELLA: Is that People's 72? 7 THE COURT: 72. 8 73 is the picture of Danny DeCarlo. 9 MR. MANZELLA: That was received on January 17, I 10 believe. 11 THE COURT: So my sheet shows, and if the record 12 doesn't show that, it is received now. 13 74-A was a -- 74, a booking slip of Danny DeCarlo? 14 MR. KAY: Yes. 15 MR. MANZELLA: Right. That's right, your Honor. 16 MR. KAY: We'd offer that. 17 THE COURT: People offering that? 18 MR. MANZELLA: Yes, your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Any objection? 20 MR. DENNY: No objection on 74. There is an objection 21 to 74-A in that there's -- well, let me see just a minute 22 about 74-A. 23 No, I am not going to object to 74-A either. THE COURT: Are the People offering 74-A? 25 MR. MANZELLA: We'll offer both of them, your Honor. 26 THE COURT: What is that? 27 MR. KAY: Another booking slip. 28 THE COURT: All right, received.

72

74

74a

MR. MANZELLA: I don't believe People's 75 -- we haven't marked an exhibit as People's 75, your Honor.

MR. MANZELLA: 76 is a --

THE COURT: A contour map of the Barker-Meyers Ranches?

MR. MANZELLA: That's correct. People offer that.

THE COURT: It is received. If not before, it is

77-A through AA, the photographs.

MR. MANZELLA: Yes, your Honor. The People would offer

THE COURT: Any objection?

MR. DENNY: No objection.

THE COURT: All right, received.

78.

78, two slips of negatives.

MR. MANZELLA: May I inquire of Mrs. Holt, your Honor, some of the 77 series of photographs were not marked with a date in the evidence column in the Superior Court exhibit list. Were they all admitted on January 17?

THE CLERK: No, this is when they were identified.

MR. MANZELLA: In other words, some of them were already

THE CLERK: And some are not.

MR. MANZELLA: Oh, all right.

THE COURT: 78, gentlemen?

MR. MANZELLA: People's 78 was negatives found in the --

either in the vehicle some place or perhaps in one of the foot-1 lockers, perhaps. I don't recall, at the time that Shea's 2 car was found. MR. KAY: I think it was in the trunk in a white envelope, 4 Sergeant Whiteley testified. 5 THE COURT: Objection? б MR. DENNY: No objection, your Honor. 7 78 THE COURT: Received. 8 79, a knife case ---MR. MANZELLA: 79 is a knife and a handle. They re in 10 two separate pieces. I don't recall that that was used during 11 12 the course of the trial at all. 13 MR. DENNY: Well, it was, your Honor. I used it one time 14 with Dr. Katsuyama indicating what weapon might have caused 15 the stab wounds, and I think it should be received in evidence 16 for that purpose. 17 THE COURT: All right, I'll receive it as 79, then. 79 18 MR. MANZELLA: People's 80-A through H, 8 colored 19 I believe they're at Spahn Ranch. photographs. 20 MR. KAY: Yes, they are. 21 MR. MANZELLA: No, I'm sorry, People's 80-A through I. 22 That's with the additional one we added to MR. DENNY: 23 it. It is A through I. 24 THE COURT: So the Court's record shows, and they are 25 received. 26 MR. MANZELLA: All right. 27 THE COURT: 81-A, B, two photos, a black-and-white aerial 28 photograph.

MR. MANZELLA: People offer those in -- they're photographs of the area -- aerial photographs of the area I believe in which Shea's car was found.

THE COURT: Yes, they are received.

MR. MANZELLA: People's 82.

THE COURT: A through F.

MR. MANZELLA: A through F are colored photographs taken from ground level, the same level the car was found.

THE COURT: That's received.

MR. MANZELLA: People's 73 for identification is a diagram showing the relative positions of the location where the car was found at Spahn Ranch and the streets and roads in between.

THE COURT: All right, it is received, if it has not heretofore been received.

84 is seven magazines.

MR. MANZELLA: Both were vehicles -- those were magazines found in the vehicle at the time the vehicle was found by Sergeant Whiteley.

THE COURT: Any objection?

MR. DENNY: I have no objection to that, your Honor.

THE COURT: 85, latent fingerprint.

MR. KAY: That was the one on the trunk that Deputy Chamousis testified to.

THE COURT: All right, admitted.

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86a,b,c and d

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THE COURT: All right. That would be 86-A, -B and -C and -D, exemplar cards.

MR. DENNY: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes?

MR. DENNY: Just a minute. I'm going to object to the introduction of -A and -D on the grounds that there was no foundation established that this was a business record.

Chamousis testified that he rolled 86-B, and -C being the top part of that. But there was no testimony what-soever as to the preparation -- the manner of preparation, or anything else, concerning -A and -D.

MR. MANZELLA: We weren't seeking to offer it, I don't believe, as a business record; but rather, as an inked impression of the defendant in this case -- not as business records. They don't contain any information which we are seeking to get into evidence.

What we are seeking to get into evidence are the prints, the fingerprints, not the writing contained on the exhibits.

So it's not hearsay, and we are not offering them as business records.

THE COURT: All right. They will be received.

87 was a blowup of two prints.

MR. KAY: Yes. We'll offer that. Deputy Chamousis testified from that.

MR. DENNY: Well, again, I'll object to that, your

Honor, on the basis of the fact that it uses, as the exemplar on
the right-hand side, a blowup of --

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THE COURT:

MR. DENNY: 86 --

MR. KAY: -A.

MR. DENNY: -- 86-A and -D.

86?

MR. KAY: No. Just 86-A.

THE COURT: -A, the print.

MR. DENNY: Yes, the foundation for which was not established.

MR. KAY: Deputy Chamousis testified that he compared the two fingerprint cards, and you'll remember that he said that in his opinion the same person made both of them.

But the exhibit board, 87, which he helped prepare, was prepared before Mr. Davis's arrest, and that was why the other one was used.

But I think there has been sufficient foundation for the use of that exhibit board.

And he did testify to it in front of the jury and pointed out points of comparison and everything. So it's pretty -- it's a pretty essential piece of evidence.

THE COURT: The Court thinks that there is sufficient in the record to permit the utilization of the exhibit.

It was talked about by both sides, on direct and cross.

MR. KAY: Right.

MR. MANZELLA: People's 88 --

THE COURT: The Court will admit 87,

MR. MANZELLA: People's 88-A through -I, your Honor, are nine -- I believe they have already been received.

87 xec'd

I THE COURT: Black-and-white photographs of the desert 4 - 32 area. Yes, I believe they have been received. If they have 3 not, they will now be admitted. Now, People's 89? 5 MR. MANZELLA: People's 89 is a contour map. That's 6 another larger contour map of the Death Valley area. The People would offer that into evidence. 89 rec<sup>\*</sup>d THE COURT: So ordered. MR. MANZELLA: I believe People's 90, four black-and-white 9 photographs, eight-by-ten, have already been received. 10 11 THE COURT: The Court's -- my record shows 90 through 94 12 having been received, 90 being the photographs of the Barker 13 Ranch; 91-A and B would be the Leslie Salt Company records; 14 92 would be an aerial photograph, four foot by four foot, 15 approximately; 93, another aerial photograph, four foot by 16 four foot; 94, a photograph of a driver's license. 17 MR. MANZELLA: Has that been received, your Honor? 18 THE COURT: That has not been received. 19 MR. MANZELLA: All right. The People would offer 20 People's 94 into evidence, your Honor. 94 21 THE COURT: All right. It's received. 22 95-A, -B and -C are --23. MR. MANZELLA: Those are certified copies of driver's 24 licenses, all containing the photograph of Bill Vance, --25 THE COURT: Bill Vance, yes. 26 MR. MANZELLA: -- with three different names. 27 We would offer those into evidence. 28 MR. DENNY: No objection.

THE COURT: All right. Received.

96-A, -B, photographs?

MR. MANZELLA: Those were two photographs of some of the girls arrested on October 10th of 1969 by James Pursell and other Highway Patrol officers at Barker Ranch.

THE COURT: All right. They're received.

97? 4a-11 MR. M ANZELLA: I don't believe we marked any exhibits 2 as 97-A, -B or -C, your Honor. 3 THE COURT: I didn't have them marked, either. 98, the driver's license? 5 MR. MANZELLA: The People would offer that into 6 evidence, your Honor. 7 THE COURT: All right. It's received. 98 99? 9 I believe 99 was received. MR. MANZELLA: 10 It's the test fired bullet. THE COURT: 11 MR. DENNY: Right. 12 MR. MANZELLA: Right. 13 THE COURT: Yes, it has, I believe, been received. 14 not, the Court receives it, 15 100-A through -G are the photomicrographs. 39 ev. 16 MR. DENNY: They have been received, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: And they're received. 18 And 101? 10 MR. MANZELLA: 101 is the -- shows the August 24th 20 arrest of Charles Manson. They're documents from the 21 Sheriff's Office. 22 I believe 101 and 102 have already been received. 23 They're both certified documents of two of Manson's arrests. 24 MR. DENNY: That's correct, your Honor. 25 THE COURT: All right. My record so shows. 26 If the record does not otherwise show, they 27 Regardless of what the record may show, & 102 Ew. are received.

4a-2	1	they are received.
	2	MR. MANZELLA: People's 103
	3	THE COURT: 103.
, <b>•</b>	4	MR. MANZELLA: and 104 for identification, your
•	5	Honor, are both diagrams drawn by Dr. Kaufmann.
ä	6	THE COURT: Moon diagrams.
	7	MR. MANZELLA: Right.
	8	MR, KAY: We'd offer those.
103&104	ev. 9	THE COURT: All right. They're received.
	10	MR, DENNY: Well, your Honor, I may we look at
	11	those just a moment?
•	12	I think they are merely illustrative of his
.54	13	testimony.
	14	THE COURT: I think so.
•	15	He used them before the jury to illustrate his
	16	testimony.
	17	MR. DENNY: And should not be received in evidence.
	18	They merely substitute testimony.
	19	103 shows the phases of the moon, full moon,
•	20	first quarter, second quarter, et cetera.
	21	And 104 shows why the moon may look a little
:	22	bigger on the horizon, or may look like the harvest moon
•	23	on the horizon.
	24	I don't think they're relevant or pertinent or
	25	constitute proper exhibits. They're just illustrative of
•	26	the testimony.
	27	I would object to their receipt in evidence.
	28	THE COURT: They're rather informal scratchings by the

4a-3 expert. 1 MR. MANZELLA: We would ask that at least the diagram 2 showing the positions of the moon and the phases of the moon 3 be in evidence, since --4 THE COURT: Which one is that? 5 MR. DENNY: Well, that's 103, your Honor. But again, 6 it simply constitutes testimony. It's a form of testimony. 7 And you can't take testimony into the jury room. 8 And that's all that 103 is. It's illustrative 9 of its testimony, explaining to them how the phases of the 10 11 moon operate. 12 It's just as if you permitted the jury to take 13 in a transcript of its testimony. 14 THE COURT: Let me see 103. 15 (Whereupon the exhibit was displayed to the 16 Court.) 17 THE COURT: All right. The Court agrees with the 18 defendant. They will remain marked for identification. 19 103 and 104 are not admitted. 20 105 was an aerial photograph. 21 MR. MANZELLA: Yes, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Any objection? A Spahn Ranch aerial 23 photograph? 24 (No response.) 25 105 ev. THE COURT: It's admitted. 26 106-A through -F? 27 That's Meyers Ranch, the photos of Meyers MR. KAY: 28 Ranch, and the inside --

48-4 MR. DENNY: I think they've already been admitted, 1 your Honor. 2 106A-F ev. THE COURT: They're received. 107? Moonrise chart. 4 MR. KAY: I think that's been received already. 5 THE COURT: That may have been, yes. And that's -- if 6 107 ev. not, it's received now. 7 108? Leslie Salt Company file. 8 9 MR. KAY: Your Honor, that's --MR. DENNY: Your Honor, I think if I'm not mistaken. 10 that this is simply duplicative. It is the original --11 12 MR. MANZELLA: Right. 13 MR. DENNY: -- of a prior exhibit. And I think either 14 the prior exhibit -- I think the prior exhibit should be 15 withdrawn. 16 MR. MANZELLA: That's agreeable with the People. 17 MR. KAY: Yeah, it is. This is the original file. 18 and there was a copy --19 MR. MANZELLA: Right. 20 MR. KAY: -- in evidence. So, if the Court will admit 4b fls. 21 People's 108, we will withdraw 91 for this trial. 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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THE COURT: 912

MR. KAY: 91.

THE COURT: All right. So ordered.

108 is admitted, and 91 is withdrawn.

109 is a blowup of 57-A and 57-C.

MR. KAY: We'd offer that.

THE COURT: All right. So ordered.

110's been received. MR. KAY:

MR. DENNY: Your Honor, at this point I would like to be heard on 110 again.

THE COURT: 110 is --

MR. KAY: That's the photograph of Mr. Davis, that Deputy Chamousis identified, and that we had seemingly hours of discussion about.

MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, I would just -- I would like to take just a little further time to discuss that, because I was taken by surprise on Friday, and I have researched the law a little more diligently than I obviously had time to then, and I would like to cite to the Court several cases that are, I believe, right on point.

The first is People versus Burns, B-u-r-n-s, 109 Cal Ap 2nd 524; and the second is People versus Cavanaugh, C-a-v-a-n-a-u-q-h, 44 Cal 2nd 252; and the third is People versus Cruz, C-r-u-z, 264 Cal Ap 2nd 350.

In each of those cases, your Honor, the issue was whether it was proper to have admitted certain photographs over the objection that they were irrelevant, in that their prejudicial effect would outweigh their probative value.

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 And the first case was a somewhat more horrendous case than -- than we have here; but the language is instructive.

And just briefly, I can indicate --

THE COURT: Your problem with this photograph is that it shows Mr. Davis with a full beard and --

MR. DENNY: No, your Honor. It shows him with an X on his forehead.

THE COURT: -- and an X on his forehead?

MR. DENNY: There are photographs in evidence already, which show him with a full beard. There were -- there are no photographs which show him with an X on his forehead.

THE COURT: There's nothing in the testimony, that I can recall, concerning the significance of an X on the forehead.

MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor --

THE COURT: How do you believe that it is prejudicial?

MR. DENNY: Because these jurors are not dummies. They
all have indicated that they have heard about the Tate and
LaBianca cases.

They all have indicated that they have read things about the Manson Family, and the Tate and LaBianca cases.

And in connection therewith, although we did not specifically voir dire them on it -- because I didn't know that this issue would be coming up -- it is to be presumed and assumed that they also were familiar with some of the publicity that occurred when Mr. Manson and others of his followers -- including the girls -- cut X's in their foreheads, to ex themselves out of society.

And for that reason, I think -- and for that sole and only reason -- the People are attempting to get this

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picture in, since there are plenty of other pictures of Mr. Davis.

THE COURT: Well, this is the one, however, that Chamousis -- what was it? Chamousis?

MR. KAY: Chamousis, yes, your Honor. This is the one that he says he identifies as the person whose fingerprints he took.

THE COURT: And he does not recognize Mr. Davis now.

MR. DENNY: All right. That's fine. Let's stipulate to all those facts.

This is also the situation, your Honor, where, as I attempted to get into evidence, the records which have now been received into evidence as to the fingerprint exemplars taken by Chamousis show that the booking number that appears on those records is the same booking number -- and I\*11 represent to the Court, as I am reading it, number 1358-518 -- that Mr. Davis presently has now, showing that they are one and the same person.

I have also further stipulated -- offered to stipulate -- that the fingerprint exemplar card rolled by Chamousis was indeed the card of the prints of Mr. Davis.

Now, if I may read briefly to the Court?

"Over defendant's objection --" this is in the Burns case -- "three photographs of deceased were admitted in evidence. They were pictures of the face, neck, and torso, taken after the autopsy. They were particularly horrible because the head was completely shaved.

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"Bruises and abrasions appear on the face, neck and arms. Most of them are quite faint. No one disputed that the deceased received them. Defendant contended that they came from the falls and striking the objects on the beach. The prosecution claimed that they came from defendant's fists and hands. How looking at the pictures would help the jury understand what caused them or how they would cause death, it is difficult to understand.

"In view of the fact that no question was raised as to these bruises and abrasions, and the fact that a view of them was of no particular value to the jury, it is obvious that the only purpose of exhibiting them was to inflame the jury's emotions against defendant."

And then they go on, citing the fact that the horrible photographs are admissible in evidence, under certain California laws, under certain circumstances. And they say further:

"However, in every case in which they were admitted (with the possible exception of the Burkhart, B-u-r-k-h-a-r-t case, supra, where the 'evidence points positively and unmistakeably to the defendant as the perpetrator of the homicide', there was some necessity for exhibiting the wound or wounds to the jury. In People vs. Elmore, E-1-m-o-r-e, the Court pointed out that photographs

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 "should not be offered or admitted for any purpose other than to help the jury.

"Surely, there is a line between admitting a photograph which is of some help to the jury in solving the facts of the case and one which is of no value other than to inflame the minds of the jurors. That line was crossed in this case.

"There was an abuse of discretion here."

Then, we go to People vs. Cavanaugh --

THE COURT: Well, just without belaboring it, the Court doesn't wish to have you pursue it any farther. I think I get your point. And the Court does not find that that photograph referred to, 110, is prejudicial.

The Court feels that it's -- as I've stated before, that it has probative value, and the People do not have to stipulate. And accordingly, the Court will admit it.

MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, let me again, because I have researched the law, and I think it's an attorney's job to assist the Court, as well as to be an advocate for his side -- and I don't believe the Court is familiar, possibly, with some of the law on this particular subject, because I was not familiar.

And I'm not -- I'm not saying it's purely on the basis of the probative value, and the prejudicial value being outweighed by the probative value of it.

But there are cases right on point, and I think the Court should at least accept the value of my research on

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it, to enlighten the Court, because this, I submit, is going to be prejudicial error, and reversible error, and it has so been held in some cases.

THE COURT: You may cite your cases. Are there any other citations that you --

MR. DENNY: Yes, your Honor. Specifically, let me skip to People vs. Cruz.

"At the outset of the trial defendant made a general --"

THE COURT: Well, without reading, just give me the citation.

MR. DENNY: I have already, your Honor. 264 Cal. App. 2d, 350.

THE COURT: Cal. App. 2d 350?

MR. DENNY: All right. I have got about ten lines to read, if I may, your Honor.

"At the outset of the trial defendant made a general objection to the post-autopsy pictures, on which the Court refused to rule at that time. In connection with his objection defendant offered to stipulate 'that the cause of death were two gunshot wounds which the Coroner has referred to in his autopsy report as gunshot wound 1 and gunshot wound 2.1"

Well, let me refer back to the Cavanaugh case, which I think is more specifically in point here. 44 Cal. 2d, a Supreme Court case.

THE COURT: Mr. Kuczera, would you get the jury in?

MR. DENNY: Your Honor, I have some motions to make, if

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the People have rested, outside the presence of the jury.

THE COURT: All right. Well, would you move it along, please.

MR. MANZELLA: Excuse me, Mr. Denny. Can I interrupt you for just a moment?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DENNY: Your Honor, I believe we have to deal with some defense exhibits.

THE COURT: Well, you won't be offering those until you're through, will you? Or do you want to offer them now?

MR. DENNY: I am going to offer them.

MR. MANZELLA: We want to deal with some defense exhibits. And Mr. Denny will probably have an 1118.1 motion to make.

Would the Court want to put the jury over until 1:30?

THE COURT: All right. Let's put the jury over until 1:30.

THE BAILIFF: Yes, sir,

THE COURT: Tell them they're excused until 1:30.

Your other citation, the Burns citation, did you put that in the record? I didn't get that.

MR. DENNY: Yes, I did. People vs. Cavanaugh, 44 Cal. 2d, your Honor, 252. This was a case where --

THE COURT: Well, the Court will look at it. If I change my mind, I'll strike the photo.

What is the other citation?

MR. DENNY: That's all, your Honor.

The Burns citation? 4d-2THE COURT: 1 109 Cal. App. 2d, 524, at 541. MR. DENNY: 2 THE COURT: Thank you. 3 MR. DENNY: And Cavanaugh is --THE COURT: I have that. 44 Cal. 2d 252. MR DENNY: Yes. The material portion of it is at 6 pages 266 through 268. 7 THE COURT: Do the People have anything more to say on 8 the subject? 9 MR. KAY: No, your Honor. I think we've covered it 10 pretty thoroughly, and -- on Friday. I think your Honor is 11 well aware of --12 THE COURT: All right. I'll admit 110 into evidence. 110 év. 13 MR. KAY: I think you already have. 14 THE COURT: Yes. 15 Well, your Honor, my records on the MR. DENNY: 16 defense exhibits, unfortunately, are not as complete as they 17 might be. 18 Do you want to withhold offering them --THE COURT: 10 MR. DENNY: No, I do not, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: -- until such time as you --21 No, I do not. I want those offered into MR. DENNY: 22 evidence right now. 23 THE COURT: -- until your case is closed? 24 No, I do not. May we run down them? 25 MR. DENNY: 26 THE COURT: Well, you have got A through X, as I see There's a -- A is -- A is a bullet end casing. 27 it. 28 MR. DENNY: We wish to have that admitted.

4d-3 <sub>1</sub>	THE COURT: Let's see. That's
2	MR. DENNY: That's a bullet which was test fired for
3	Mr. Harper by the Sheriffs.
4	MR. KAY: We have no objection to that.
A ev. 5	THE COURT: All right.
¥ 6	B was six negatives. Those were six negatives
7	that the
8	MR. DENNY: Negatives of the photomicrographs.
9	MR. KAY: No objection.
B ev. 10	THE COURT: All right. B is received.
11	C-2 through C-7 were photographs of
12	MR, DENNY: Well, C-1 to -12, your Honor, are the
13	photographs that were shown to Ella Jo Bailey.
14	We wish to have those received.
<b>★</b> 15	THE COURT: C you're correct. C-1 through -12.
16	The People?
17	MR, KAY: No objection.
C-1-C-12eV	. THE COURT: All right. They're received.
19	D is a photostat of a firearms sale. Nat
20	Stanoff testified to that,
21	MR. DENNY: I think that's the Danny DeCarlo yes,
22	would you get the defense exhibits out?
23	(Continuing) the Danny DeCarlo .45 caliber
24	purchase.
25	Move that that be received.
.26	THE COURT: The People?
27	MR, MANZELLA: May we have just a moment, your Honor?
28	THE COURT: Yes, you may.

4d-4	1	(Pause in the proceedings while a discussion
	2	off the record ensued at the counsel table between
	3	Mr. Manzella and Mr. Kay.)
*	4	MR. MANZELLA: Your Honor, the People would object to
	5	Defendant's D, on two grounds:
*	6	One, that it's irrelevant that DeCarlo bought a
	7	weapon on the same date;
	.8	And No. 2, that the best evidence rule would
	9	require the original, in the absence of some showing that the
	10	original is not available.
	11	MR. DENNY: Well, I
4e fls.		THE COURT: It doesn't appear to be material, Mr. Denny.
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 MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, it is very material, in that I also showed, by the testimony of Mr. Stanoff, that a .45 caliber Colt looks almost identical with a 9-millimeter Radom. And Ella Bailey was shown a picture of a .45 caliber Colt and could not distinguish it from the Radom.

And I intend to argue that she could not tell which gun was which.

Danny DeCarlo had the gun at the same time as -THE COURT: What about the second objection?

MR. DENNY: I am taken completely by surprise by the second objection, your Honor. This is an exhibit which had heretofore been used by the People. It had been used in the Grand Jury, and admitted in evidence before the Grand Jury. And I think they are estopped, at this point, certainly, to urge that as an objection.

They did not previously raise the objection at the time -- at a time I could have done anything about it.

And this does show that on April 8, 1970 -- THE COURT: What is it, a photostat?

MR. DENNY: It is a photostat of a firearms transaction record, and it does show that in -- in case No. A-057452, it was marked as People's 20, and it was admitted into evidence on April 6th, 1970.

And I think they re estopped to urge that as an objection.

MR. MANZELLA: Your Honor, I think that it might be relevant if the weapon was shown -- the weapon that DeCarlo bought was shown to have fired 9-millimeter ammunition.

Since that s not shown by the evidence, I don't see 4e-2 that the fact that DeCarlo owned a gun that was similar looking, outwardly, is relevant. 5 fol 

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MR. DENNY: Well, it is relevant in that, your Honor, the People are contending that this bullet was fired at or about the time of July 25 through the 27th, and I have indicated to the Court earlier that the People's own witnesses, Christansen for one, and Whiteley for the other, can't say when that bullet was fired, can't say when the bullet hole was made. And the only evidence that there is, is that of Mr. Whiteley, that the bullet hole appeared not to be of recent origin.

The People have one view of the case, their theory of the case, and the defense has a right to put forth their theory; and that is, if any gun was taken up there, the gun that Ella Jo Bailey saw, based on the gun she could see at this distance, could have been a .45 caliber gun and no bullet was fired through the weekend of the 25th through the 26th of July, because there is no evidence in this case that a bullet was so fired during that time. So we certainly have a right to show that.

MR. MANZELLA: There's no testimony that the weapon bought by DeCarlo fires 9 millimeter ammunition.

MR. DENNY: Doesn't have to.

MR. MANZELLA: And furthermore, there's no photograph of an Argentine Colt available to show the jury. We just have Stanoff's testimony that it is similar in appearance to the 9 millimeter Radom. But there's no photograph of an Argentine Colt which could be shown to the jury. So I don't see the relevance of that exhibit.

MR, DENNY: There is such a photograph, your Honor, and

1 Mr. Stanoff identified it. 2 THE COURT: I think he did. And it was one of those 3 photographs -- let's see, one through 12. MR. DENNY: That's correct, your Honor. I think he identified a photograph that he MR. KAY: said looked similar to the type of gun that DeCarlo bought, but it wasn't the same, you know, the same make or anything. 8 MR. MANZELLA: Right. C-10, I believe, is a photograph. 9 THE COURT: Miss Gipson has an interview at 1:00 10 o'clock. I called the jury for 1:30. 11 She would like to have until 2:00 o'clock. 12 MR. KAY: Fine. 13 MR. MANZELLA: Fine. 14 MR. KENNY: No objection. 15 THE COURT: Sounds reasonable. 16 Tell them 2:00 o'clock. 17 THE BAILIFF: All right, sir. 18 THE COURT: And as to this photostat, over objection, 19 the Court would not admit it on behalf of the People, were they 20 to offer, but you have not yet rested and you could conceivably 21 cause Mr. Stanoff to return. 22 MR. MANZELLA: For what purpose? 28 THE COURT: And establish the background that would 24 be necessary to introduce this firearms' record. 25 MR. MANZELLA: What background? I'm not sure I 26 understand. 27 MR. DENNY: Your Honor --28 THE COURT: As I understand, it is a copy, but it is not

a -- and it -- there has not been a sufficient background to establish that it is a business record and that the original

MR. MANZELLA: Our primary objection is on the grounds that it is not relevant.

THE COURT: Well, I'll overrule the objection and permit it to come into evidence.

MR. DENNY: I think --

THE COURT: E is an immunity agreement, Ella Jo Bailey.

I think that's already received, your Honor.

THE COURT: May have been, yes.

MR. DENNY: Six bullets that were found with the gun. And I move that those be received.

MR. MANZELLA: Was that established they were found with

MR. MANZELLA: I don't see how it could have been. The witness that testified --

THE COURT: The only thing Sergeant Christansen testified, he was given those bullets at the same time he was given the gun, but not that they were in the gun or they had any connection with the gun other than he was given those bullets at the same time he was given the gun. So I think there's an insufficient foundation.

The defendant?

MR. DENNY: Well, I think the foundation as to the bullets is further established by the testimony of Ella Jo

Bailey to whom I presented the exhibits initially, who said that these were bullets similar to the bullets that she loaded as reloads with Danny DeCarlo and showed that they did fit into the gun. And they would be admissible for that purpose, also.

THE COURT: Let's see, they fitted into the clip, didn't they?

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MR. DENNY: That is correct.

And they are shown to be 9-millimeter reloads, and they were so testified as being by Sergeant Christansen. And Sergeant Christansen did say that he was given these at the time he was given the gun, and Ella Bailey has identified those as being the kind of ammunition she reloaded with DeCarlo.

MR. MANZELLA: Well, the fact --

MR. DENNY: So on a number of grounds, I submit, they are admissible, not simply on the grounds they may or may not have been the bullets.

MR. MANZELLA: The fact that Sergeant Christansen was given the bullets with the gun is irrelevant. The -- Ella Bailey testified that the only bullets she loaded with DeCarlo or observed DeCarlo load, were bullets for a machine-gun. And I don't think --

THE COURT: Well, I recall Ella Bailey's testimony as being about what Mr. Denny said.

MR. MANZELLA: Well, she --

THE COURT: I can't see the relevance of the bullets, so without the necessary background to show that they were found with the gun or in the gun -- so I'll sustain the objection to F.

G, an envelope containing test-fired bullet and casing, is that it?

MR. DENNY: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I think that was an additional test-fired bullet.

MR. DENNY: That is correct.

Well done. 1 THE COURT: N, two pages from a book concerning 9-millimeter 2 pistols. 3 The defendant moves to receive that. MR. DENNY: MR. KAY: Well, I'm not familiar with what that is. It is the stuff from Mathew's work. MR. DENNY: THE COURT: A page from a source book used by --8 MR. MANZELLA: Shouldn't that be read to the jury rather than received in evidence? MR. KAY: We're going to object to this receipt in 10 evidence. 11 12 MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, I attempted to read that to the jury and the Court stopped me from reading all of it to the 14 jury. 15 . THE COURT: It is two pages of fine print. 16 If it is all relevant. MR. MANZELLA: 17 It is not all relevant. THE COURT: 18 MR. MANZELLA: Well, then, it shouldn't all go in. 19 THE COURT: But it was the subject of considerable 20 discussion on cross examination concerning measurements of land 21 groove ration, as I remember. 22 That is correct, your Honor. MR. DENNY: 23 And, in fact, all of the 9-millimeter six land and groove right-hand twist guns which were counted out by Sergeant Christansen as numbering 60 are represented on that particular 26 document along with the various specifications involved which 27 were discussed in some detail. 28 MR. KAY: Well, I think that this --

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THE COURT: Not all of it, of course, is relevant as it is laid out there. But it would be difficult because of its composition to eliminate those parts that are not relevant and are not referred to.

MR. DENNY: Well, again --

MR. MANZELLA: 1340 says that evidence of a statement in a list is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule. But it would seem from the language of 1340 it couldn't contemplate a whole list coming in because a part is relevant. Because it says "Evidence of a statement tabulated in a list, directory" --

MR. DENNY: They're talking about a statement. This is not a statement, this is purely a tabulation. 3 THE COURT: I think it is a statement. 4 MR. MANZELLA: Sure. 5 THE COURT: The measurements or characteristics of 6 those various 9-millimeter guns. 7 Is there any way that the parts of it that were not 8 referred to could be eliminated effectively? 9 MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, the only way that could be 10 done -- again, as I say, I tried to read into evidence all the 11 matters here and the Court stopped me. 12 It would have taken you a good half-hour. THE COURT: 13 MR. DENNY: No question about that. And I submit the 14 easier way to do it is this way, to have it admitted as I 15 thought the Court would do. 16 I'll admit it. THE COURT: 17 O is what? 18 MR. DENNY: O is the rough drawing of the gun barrel that 19 was used for illustrative purposes. 20 THE COURT: All right, I don't think that's admissible. 21 It is more like the moon picture presented by the astronomer. 22 MR. DENNY: I think that's true, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Used in the course of a discussion before the jury. 25 P, a chart with some figures on it. 26 I think it was your chart, wasn't it? 27 MR. DENNY: Yes, your Honor, but we did not use that. 28 THE COURT: You're not offering that?

MR. DENNY: No.

THE COURT: Q.

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- What is Q?

An order and a letter, I have down here.

MR. DENNY: Xerox copy of a -- oh, this was the order, your Honor, it was made by the Court for the ballistics -- for the photomicrographs from the Sheriff's ballistics lab.

And the second portion of it was their response showing that they had complied with the order.

And I submit that this is relevant, pertinent and material to show, again, that which I argued or set forth in my opening statement that we will show -- I can almost quote it by heart -- that the experts used by the People are sought to be presented to you as experts, are not experts. That they have done a slipshod, slap-dash job in preparing the evidence to be presented to you until the defense sought to have them prepare reasonable evidence for you. And that, even then, they did not do a decent job of it.

And I think the response here signed by Christansen and Montgomery showing that they complied with the order, and then the evidence showing that they did not comply with the order because there were only four photomicrographs, two of them being — two out of the six being duplicate of each other, and no showing, even, that those four showed the full circumference of the bullet, that this is, again, further evidence to support the defendant's position here that the experts are not expert and that their testimony is not credible or should be believed.

THE COURT: People?

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 MR. KAY: We would --

MR. MANZELLA: Under People versus Teale, 63 Cal. 2d, 178, at 199, the court held, the California Supreme Court held compliance with an order by either side is not a jury question. It is a question for the Court and not a jury question and, therefore, we would say this is not relevant.

MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, may I just say on that point --

THE COURT: The Court believes it would be prejudicial to bring into evidence and before the jury this court order. I think that what the expert was attempting to do and what his result was, is amply brought forth before the jury by you on cross examination. And the order, it would appear to me, would be irrelevant.

So Q, the Court would refuse to admit.

R, what is R?

MR. DENNY: R is the photograph of the pirate gun, your Honor, that Barbara Hoyt said she -- appeared similar to the gun that Danny DeCarlo had with the rounded barrel.

THE COURT: Are you offering that?

MR. DENNY: I'll withdraw the offer of that at this time.

THE COURT: Well, let's see, we have testimony by somebody that Danny DeCarlo had a .45 automatic and there is a picture of that, and now Ella Jo Bailey says that Danny DeCarlo had something that looked like a pirate gun.

MR. KAY: No, it was Barbara Hoyt that testified -MR. DENNY: Barbara Hoyt testified that he had a gun -THE COURT: All right, that's not offered.

Z is a chart. I think that was one of the charts we were using by way of illustration? 5c fol MR. DENNY: Yes, it is, your Honor. 

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THE COURT: You're not offering that, are you?

MR. DENNY: I don't think I can, actually. It is just simply illustrative.

THE COURT: All right, very well.

T. A photograph. I can't recall of what. I can't read my notes.

MR. DENNY: Oh, this is the photograph of Watkins, your Honor, dressed in a cap holding a candle in his hand.

MR. MANZELLA: May I see that? I've never seen that.

MR. KAY: I think the Court already sustained an objection to the admissibility of that exhibit. Mr. Denny offered it at the time Mr. Watkins was on the stand and I objected and the Court sustained the objection.

MR. DENNY: Again, I would like to re-introduce or move to have it re-introduced. He did indicate that this was taken at about the same time that the photographs were taken from the magazine from which he received \$1100. The mere fact that it did not appear in the magazine, I think --

THE COURT: I can't see its relevance, Mr. Denny. The objection will be sustained on that.

U is a list of names.

MR. DENNY: Oh, these were the names of the people that Whiteley interviewed that I did not get any notes from and, obviously, that's still, I think, for identification, your Honor.

THE COURT: V is what?

MR. DENNY: This is also --

THE COURT: I think the chart.

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MR. DENNY: Oh, this is the diagram that appears on the board, and is illustrative of Juan Flynn's testimony used to show the area and used to show where people were sitting. And I think that should be received in evidence.

MR. KAY: All right, no objection.

THE COURT: W is a chart of some dates. I think that was another illustrative diagram that you were using during the course of your examination.

MR. DENNY: Yes, that is correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: X, it is three pages of a police property report, Los Angeles Police Department.

MR. DENNY: Yes, your Honor. At this time I would move to introduce that. The Court, when I sought to do so, following Sergeant Whiteley's testimony, sustained an objection on business records foundation and I thought that I knew what the law was on establishing a business record, so I went back and checked 1271, and as I read 1271, as I've got it here before me, "Evidence of a writing made as a record, of an act, condition, or event is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered to prove the act, condition, or event if:

"(A) The writing was made in the regular course of a business:" so Whiteley testified.

"(B) The writing was made at or near the time of the act, condition or event;" the record itself shows that that is so, having been made up on the 20th and the report having been -- or the matter having been received on the 14th, as discussed by the report itself, and turned over to the parties making up the record, Kamidoi and Brown on the 18th. Within two days the 29 report was made.

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"(c) The custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation;" Sergeant Whiteley is certainly a qualified witness and did testify to what it was and as to how it was made up.

THE COURT: Well, he didn't testify as to how the inventory list was made up, did he?

MR. DENNY: Yes, your Honor, he testified --

THE COURT: He wasn't there at the time the inventory list was made.

MR. DENNY: You don't have to. The custodian of the document can testify as to how it was made out or any other qualified witness, to its identity or the mode of its preparation. And Whiteley testified that this is the same type of inventory that is made out by the Sheriffs or L.A.P.D. What you do is simply take what you find in the thing that you are inventorying and set the numbers down, and so he testified.

And "(d) The sources of information and method and time of preparation were such as to indicate its

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 both parties, by the Sheriff that went up there with the L.A.P.D. officers.

THE COURT: Well, the first page of that report is a narration by somebody of some events that Mr. Whiteley could not possibly have known about.

MR. DENNY: That doesn't matter, your Honor. That doesn't matter. He can still testify to the mode of preparation. It is the same thing on a hospital record, where you get the director or the custodian of records of the hospital to testify as to the method of and mode. She hasn't prepared it. She wasn't there or knows how it was prepared. She doesn't know whether it is true or false, the statements in the document, but the document is admitted.—

MR. MANZELLA: It is 1271 (c). Sergeant Whiteley is not qualified to testify how an L.A.P.D. property report is made up, in that he cannot testify that this narrative at the top of the form was placed on there in the ordinary course of business.

THE COURT: It seemed to have all the defects that most police report offerings have, and it does not appear to the Court to be reliable and the Court did exclude it on the basis of 1271 (c) and (d).

MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, again I am taken completely by surprise by the People stating that their chief investigator in the case doesn't know enough about police practices to know how an inventory --

MR. MANZELLA: He's in the Sheriff's department and this is a Los Angeles Police Department record.

MR. DENNY: But he said it was made up, your Honor, by

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1 THE COURT: The Court doesn't believe you qualified it 2 and the Court would -- the Court would sustain the objection to 3 it. MR. DENNY: Well, I've got the officers subpoenaed. I will qualify it. 6 Again, I am taken completely aback by the People saying their expert in the field of police work doesn't know 8 how to make out an inventory. THE COURT: Anything further? 10 MR. DENNY: Yes, your Honor, I do have -- have the People 11 rested? 12 THE COURT: People rest at this point? 13 MR. MANZELLA: People rest, your Honor. 14 MR. DENNY: All right, I have motions to dismiss and it is 15 going to take some time to argue those motions. 16 THE COURT: All right, you have ten minutes. 17 MR. DENNY: All right. 18 Well, it is going to take longer than that. 19 THE COURT: I'll hear you for ten minutes. 20 MR. DENNY: Okay. 21 Your Honor, at this time I'm making a motion not to **22** dismiss but a motion for acquittal under 1118.1 of the Penal 23 · ` Code as to all Counts, and I would like to take the Counts 24 separately: MR. MANZELLA: Your Honor, could we do this at 2:00 o'clock? 26 THE COURT: Well, we have a few minutes. MR. MANZELLA: Oh, my watch was fast. I'm sorry. 28 MR. DENNY: Possibly come back at 1:30 and hear it all,

because if I am interrupted, your Honor, it is going to make it a little more difficult to present it to the Court. I'd be happy to come back at 1:20 or whatever. 5e fol THE COURT: Let's hear you right now. Go ahead. ļΙ Ì5 

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MR. DENNY: As to Count I, the Hinman murder Count, the corpus delicti: No question. A finding of murder established by finding of the body; wounds apparently not self-inflicted: Death, therefore, by criminal means. And the evidence of who was involved, assuming you believe her testimony and for the purpose of this argument I'll have to present it on the basis that her testimony is at least in some respects credible, Ella Jo Bailey established all of the evidence on who was involved. And all of the evidence including the prior testimony at the Grand Jury hearing of Mary Brunner and prior inconsistent statements, that is the Tacoma conference of May 15 and 16 are admissible for the truth of the facts stated now under California versus Green.

So there is going to be some issue here on credibility, perhaps, but even putting that aside for the purpose of this argument, whether there is a question of credibility or not, that evidence is before the Court to consider.

Now, your Honor, the evidence that we have establishes that Ella Bailey is an accomplice, was an accomplice as a matter of law and, hence, her testimony must have independent corroboration connecting Davis to the murder.

And just briefly, I have certain cases to cite to the Court as far as what constitutes: One, an accomplice.

Obviously, Section 31 of the Penal Code is the starting point there.

But in this particular case, interesting enough, although the People only charge the conspiracy involved with

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great particularity in Count II between the 25th and the 28th of July, 1969, it is clear from the testimony of Ella Bailey that this conspiracy started before that time and that she was a part of it. That she advised and encouraged and counseled the commission of the offenses, both murder and conspiracy to commit murder and robbery. In her own testimony under oath, both before this Court and the Grand Jury, indicates that it was she who suggested the name of Gary Hinman. That she was present at the initial conversation in the Devil's Canyon campground area when the killing or the kidnaping of Gary Hinman and Terry Melcher was mentioned.

Then, we go to the aspect of the notes of Sergeant Whiteley, showing that on May 15 she said that -- at least according to Whiteley's notes -- excuse me, that Manson had told her to go and see Hinman because she liked -- she knew him best and he liked her best and Beausoleil and Mary go with her and get what she could or what she could from him voluntarily and if he did not voluntarily agree, to kill him.

Now, your Honor, this was obviously by way of impeachment. She denied that she had made such statements. There is no proof by Sergeant Whiteley yet to that effect. I bring it up to the Court only insofar as its impeachment value at this point goes or her credibility. But even excluding that particular bit of testimony, the testimony which she gives and which she does acknowledge certain things, establishes that:

One, she was the one who suggested him;
Two, by virtue of her testimony at the Grand Jury

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hearing in the Mary Brunner case she was present when killing and murder were mentioned at that initial conversation.

We then go to the following period when, even taking her testimony now before this Court, she says she got cold feet. Manson came up to her in the presence of Bill Vance and Vance said, "No, she's not going with Bobby Beausoleil and Mary. She's got better things to do around here."

Now, assuming, your Honor, -- and I think we have to assume, because it appears that the People are attempting to establish Bruce Davis's complicity in the conspiracy based on his presence at this Devil's Canyon campground, because they spent a great deal of time trying to establish the fact that at that particular campground meeting Bruce Davis was present. The only purpose for so doing was to establish that he was privy to and aware of the conspiracy which was then being hatched, to rob and perhaps murder Gary Hinman.

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If, in fact, that was the purpose as it can only be for the People's so diligently attempting to put Bruce Davis present, the People have only established his presence, not even any discussion by him, any statements by him at that time, anything contributed, any advising, counseling, encouraging, et cetera.

The only person who their evidence shows did that, other than Charles Manson, was Ella Jo Bailey. Which obviously starts her and establishes her as one of the prime members and prime movers of this conspiracy to rob Gary Hinman.

And as the People will undoubtedly argue, if indeed there was such a conspiracy to rob, then, she is equally guilty for all the reasonable and foreseeable consequences of that conspiracy, namely, the murder which followed.

And it appears from the evidence that there was not just a conspiracy to rob, but to murder. And, of course, that is what the People are contending by their Count II.

So, having been one of the initiators of the conspiracy, one of the prime movers of the conspiracy, she then backs off a little way, not wishing herself to be the one who actually does the dirty deed, but willing enough to let Sadie Atkins go in her place. She does not withdraw from the conspiracy. She does not terminate her relationship. She does not do anything possible to keep the conspiracy from going forward. She knowingly permits the conspiracy to continue to its bitter end, which she has foreseen and which is the reason for her letting somebody go in her place.

The evidence shows that she kept in touch with the

goings on during that week, weekend, and was present when Bill Vance and girls returned driving Gary Hinman's — the now dead Gary Hinman's microbus. But she was at once informed that they had killed him, that they had robbed him and, indeed, she said she went through the proceeds in the purse to determine the exact amount they had taken from him down to the penny. And that thereafter she then helped to wipe down the microbus of the fingerprints.

Now, under the case of People versus Davis, which case has frequently been cited by the People, where in a robbery you have a question as to when the robbery ends, the courts have held and the People have cited this case to the Court in conjunction with the Grunewald hearing that we have had, that the conspiracy continues, that the crime continues through a division of the spoils of a robbery. And that is exactly what occurred.

The robbers brought home, the conspirators brought home the fruits of that crime and Ella Jo helped in the concealment of those fruits. Testified that she had discussed with the girls the possibility of driving the bus up to Santa Barbara and thought better of it because she was advised by Mary Brunner that the police were down the hill so that that was not a good move. And so she hid the fruits of the crime, which is as surely part of that conspiracy as anything that the People have argued here about Mr. Manson attempting to hide the body of Shorty Shea.

THE COURT: Let's stop until 1:30.

MR. DENNY: That's fine, your Honor.

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I'll hear you at 1:30.
                    THE COURT:
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                               I might remind your Honor today was the day that
                    MR. KAY:
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             Mrs. Obradovich wanted to leave early.
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                    THE COURT: She wanted to leave early.
                          The Court will recess at 4:00, then. Thank you,
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             Mr. Kay.
                           (Whereupon, the noon recess was taken at 12:05
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             P. M.)
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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1972 1:37 P.M.

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THE COURT: The record will show Mr. Denny to be present, with his client; Mr. Manzella and Mr. Kay for the People.

Mr. Denny, you were arguing the position of Ella Jo Bailey as an accomplice, as a matter of law.

MR. DENNY: That is correct, your Honor.

And for that proposition, I would cite to the Court as I had -- not by specific citation -- the case of People vs. Davis, 210 Cal. App. 2d 721; also for the proposition that if there is withdrawal from the conspiracy, it must be effectively communicated to all other known members of the conspiracy, and steps taken to effectively thwart the object of the conspiracy.

And I will cite to the Court Loser, L-o-s-e-r, vs. Superior Court, 78 Cal. 2d 30 at page 32;

And People vs. Crosby, 58 Cal. 2d 713 at 731.

Now, your Honor, there's a good deal of law on the subject that can be cited. But unless the Court is of a mind that, for some reason which I could not fathom, she would not be considered an accomplice as a matter of law, I will forego the citation of those authorities.

If the Court is of the opinion that she may not be an accomplice as a matter of law, then I would cite, with some particularity, the authorities to the Court that there are on the subject, which I would submit establish

without any question -- based on her own testimony, and not on any inconsistent statements, but her sworn testimony before this court and before the Grand Jury -- that she is, was, continues to be an accomplice as a matter of law.

THE COURT: The People? Do you wish to be heard on that point?

MR. MANZELLA: Just briefly, your Honor. Miss -according to Miss Bailey's testimony, she -- she suggested
the name Gary Hinman; and at that conversation, there was no
talk about killing or kidnapping; that the talk about killing
and kidnapping came when other names were mentioned -- I
believe Terry Melcher's name was one of them -- but that there
were several conversations in Devil's Canyon.

In any event, in those conversations, there was no specific threat to do anything to any specific person, and it wasn't until later that Manson decided to -- that Hinman would be the one selected to try to get money from.

And Miss Bailey, other than mentioning Hinman's name at the first conversation, in no way participated in the later plans to actually go out and get money from any one of the people mentioned.

Now, the fact that she -- for the purposes of this argument, the fact that she may have been an acc- -- an accessory after the fact does not make her an accomplice.

Under the law of the State of California, an accomplice or, -- or, an accessory after the fact is not an accomplice.

If I may have just a moment?

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## (Pause in the proceedings.)

MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, I don't think Mr.

Manzella need cite authority for that. There is authority

for that. And I will agree that there is authority that an

accessory after the fact is not necessarily an accomplice.

MR. MANZELLA: Well, an accessory after the fact is not an accomplice, under People vs. Viets, 79 Cal. App. 576, at page 591.

And that case has been cited to your Honor through the years for that proposition, that in the State of California, an accessory after the fact is not an accomplice.

In this case, the reason I argue that is because, from the facts brought out, that she did help Brunner wipe the bus down -- for fingerprints off the bus -- that she might be considered an accessory after the fact.

But even if that were true, she might not be considered an accomplice.

And it is the People's position that she at no time participated in the conspiracy. At the time she mentioned Gary Hinman's name, there was talk about people who might come with the Family, and it wasn't until later, after she had mentioned the name, in later conversations that there was talk about killing and kidnapping, in those conversations in which other people were mentioned.

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And I think the clear evidence of that is that the first time she was asked to go to Gary Hinman's house, or the first time she was asked specifically to become involved in this plan to get money, she refused to go.

Now, she did not keep abreast of what was happening through her own participation in the conspiracy, but rather, the -- the events at the Hinman home that weekend were a topic of conversation on the ranch.

The evidence in this case doesn't show how the information was transmitted from the Hinman home to the ranch, but in any event, the evidence does show that on that weekend, July 25th, 26th and 27th of 1969, that the Hinman killing was the topic of conversation.

And being a member of the Family, and living in close proximity with the Family, she could not help but know what was going on.

I imagine there were many people on the ranch, many members of the Family that knew what was going on, that were not members of the conspiracy, or not in any way involved in the murder.

Now, the definition in Penal Code Illl -- or Pénal Code Section Illl says that:

"An accomplice is -- " I quote:

"An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given."

In this case, Ella Bailey would not be liable for

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prosecution on the charges, because she in no way participated in the conspiracy or in the murder. She in no way participated in the planning -- and, as a matter of fact, she was not able to testify as to when the plans to go to Hinman's home were made.

She was not present at any conversations in which the plans to go to the Hinman home were made. She -- she knows that she saw Manson, Davis and Beausoleil outside the -- in the parking lot of the Spahn Ranch, that Friday evening, July 25th; but she couldn't hear what they were talking about; and therefore, she was not -- had she been an accomplice, she would have been able to testify as to when the plans specifically were made to go to Hinman's home.

But not being an accomplice, not being involved in the planning of the crime, or in the crime itself, she had no knowledge of these things.

Furthermore, she -- this would be our second point, more or less in the alternative.

She denied complicity in the commission of this offense, and in -- if I may refer to the case of People versus Santo, 43 Cal 2d 3l9, at Page 326, and People versus Griffin, 98 Cal Ap 2d l, at Page 22, the Court in Griffin -- and it was later quoted with approval in Santo by the California Supreme Court -- said that:

"It is settled law --" and I quote -- "that if there is a disputed question of fact as to whether a witness was or was not an accomplice, the jury must decide."

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As pointed out in People vs. Gibbs, 81 Cal. App. 615, "An accomplice usually comes upon the stand admitting his complicity in the admission of the offense, but where complicity is denied it becomes a question of the jury where facts are disputed or susceptible to different inferences."

And in People vs. King, 30 Cal. App. 2d 185, at page 197, the Court says:

"Where the acts and conduct of the witness are admitted, it becomes a question of law for the Court to say whether or not those acts and facts make the witness an accomplice. Whenever there is any dispute about what a witness did or did not do, which if he did do would make him an accomplice, this issue of fact should be submitted to the jury under proper instructions, and the finding of the jury upon such an issue will not be disturbed on appeal."

involvement in the case, that is her only involvement was a suggestion of Gary Hinman's name of somebody who might come to the Family and give his money to the Family and that thereafter all the conversations which took place and planning were done by other members of the Family and she had no part in those, and, therefore, could not be considered an accomplice to either the conspiracy or to the murder.

MR. KAY: If I might add one thing along that line, Miss Bailey also testified that ever since the Family was living at the Gresham Street house that it was a common

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topic of conversation among members of the Family about how they could get money to go to the desert. This wasn't the first time it was brought up. It was kind of a running conversation in the Family and I think based on the evidence she had no way of knowing that Mr. Manson was going to turn to robbery and murder at this time.

THE COURT: Should the fact that she knew about it and did nothing to stop it prior to the time that Mr. Manson and the defendant left for Hinman's house enter into the judgment as to whether or not she is an accomplice as a matter of law?

MR. MANZELLA: I don't believe it should, your Honor.

THE COURT: What obligation at that point --

MR. MANZELLA: She may have committed a crime by not advising the police about her knowledge of a felony at the time that Manson asked her to go to the Hinman home, and what that section would be, I'm not sure, but she may have -- there may be a Penal Code section which makes it a crime not to report knowledge of a -- of someone's plan to commit a crime.

But, in any event, as under Penal Code Section 1111, an accomplice is one who is charged with the identical offense, and her failure to go to the police immediately when Mr. Manson asked her to go to Hinman's home would not make her an accomplice of murder because she is not charged, she could not be charged with the identical offense based on that evidence.

THE COURT: Mr. Denny.

MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, in the first place, we're

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talking about two crimes here.

The People have proceeded against the defendant on the Shorty Shea case based on the proposition that he is involved not only as a participant, but as a member of an alleged conspiracy.

Now, in this particular case -- and obviously conspiracy is a separate, distinct and separate crime than the murder itself.

Now, in this case, although I'm taking Count I first, let's look at Count II, the conspiracy.

All that is necessary to establish a conspiracy is an agreement to do the unlawful act, some unlawful act and one overt act toward that.

Now, in this particular case, if ever there was a documented beginning of a conspiracy, -- generally they say, you know, a conspiracy can only be established by circumstantial evidence. And you can only show a meeting of the group, et cetera.

Here, Ella Jo Bailey herself spent, at the behest of the prosecution, a good half hour outlining the commencement of this conspiracy. The meeting at the Devil's Canyon campground, the people who were there, the circumstances, what was discussed. And if ever there was a documented case of the beginning of a conspiracy by agreement by mutual understanding, this was it.

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And the People's own evidence established that.

And they established that she was part and parcel of that conspiracy. That she was not just sitting idly by as the evidence shows Bruce Davis was, if indeed he was there. But even assuming he was there and, therefore, by association guilty, there is no evidence that he did anything.

THE COURT: Then, you don't agree with the People's view of the evidence that at the time killing -- or kidnapping was mentioned, she was not participating in the conversation?

MR. DENNY: No, your Honor, because her own testimony in the Mary Brunner case, before the Mary Brunner Grand Jury, which she gave under oath, and I think could certainly be considered in this case, and I can recite that testimony to the Court, but her own testimony showed in response to Mr. Goldsobel's question, "Was killing mentioned?

"Yes.

"Was kidnapping mentioned?

"Yes.

"Was Mary Brunner there?

"Yes."

THE COURT: And they're talking about this particular meeting, this initial meeting?

MR. KAY: I disagree.

THE COURT: Wasn't that in dispute or wasn't there a response to what the People said or what questions were asked her after you brought that Grand Jury testimony to her attention; didn't she respond it was in a later meeting?

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MR. KAY: That's right. It is in dispute.

THE COURT: I'm not sure, but that's the way it strikes me. I have some notes on it.

MR. DENNY: Well, the People, then, on redirect sought to bring out -- interestingly enough, their evidence showed that there was, on direct, and they were very specific about that on direct examination her attention was directed to a meeting that happened at the Devil's Canyon campground a few days before Friday, July 25.

"Who was present?"

She runs down the people who were present.

"All right, what was said?"

And she runs down it was -- well, I think in this case she finally said, "I suggested after there had been some talk about some other things, I suggested Gary Hinman."

THE COURT: There seems to be no doubt that she suggested Gary Himman's name.

, MR. DENNY: All right.

And then, she was asked:

"When was the next time that there was any conversation between you and Mr. Manson about Mr. Hinman?

"On Friday, down by the dump with Bill Vance and me."

So we went from some place earlier in the week to Friday. And Bill Vance said, "No, she's got better things to do," et cetera.

And then, we go to afterwards she saw Bruce and Bobby Beausoleil, et cetera, with the girls and the car leaving and all the rest of that.

Then, when I brought out what she testified to under oath at the Grand Jury hearing, as well as the other things, but specifically that, then we come to the fact, oh, well, it was mentioned a number of different times over that period of time, and that's what I was referring to there.

Well, as I say, the Court can look at the testimony itself.

THE COURT: Now, would everybody who would have participated at those campfires and around the campfire be a part of the conspiracy in your view?

MR. DENNY: No, your Honor, that would not be my view at all.

THE COURT: Then, how do you distinguish Ella Jo Bailey, say, from Squeaky or somebody who --

MR. DENNY: Because she was the one who fingered the victim.

Now, even if you don't look at any of the reports that we used to impeach her, and I'm looking right now at Sergeant Whiteley's report and I can't recall -- and I should have it, but I got two hours sleep last night preparing this and I just didn't have time to look at everything.

But looking at page 288 of the homicide manual and his report, and this is one that I used to impeach her,

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the report itself which doesn't say anything nearly as much as the notes of the May 15th conference say, says "Charles Manson at this time told Ella Bailey, Mary Brunner and Robert Beausoleil to go to the Hinman house the following day and get anything of value, the deed to the house, car titles, stocks, money, et cetera, by any force necessary. Miss Bailey stated she was picked, as victim. Hinman liked her better than anyone else in the Family."

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All right, now, again, I'm sorry I can't cite by chapter and verse the volume and page where I questioned her on that, and what her response to it was. If her response was negative, so be it, and obviously we have to prove that testimony by Mr. Whiteley or Mr. Katz, one or the other. It is Whiteley's report, so it would be by Whiteley to absolutely establish that as contrary evidence.

THE COURT: In substantive evidence.

MR. DENNY: In substantive evidence under California versus Green.

Going to -- going to the evidence at the Grand Jury which she did give, which I did question her on, and I had to read it back as the Court will recall quite a bit later in the testimony -- I don't want to burden the Court too much with it, but starting on Page 57:

"We were in Devil's Canyon and there was some talk about raising money so that we could go to the desert. Gary Hinman was mentioned as someone who possibly had some money, and there was a discussion relating to that.

"Was that discussion relating to the legitimate or illegitimate obtaining of money from Mr. Hinman?

"A Yes, it was.

"Q Now, with relation to Mr. Hinman, did you have any particular discussion or did you hear any particular discussion regarding him?

"A Yes. Later on, Charlie Manson came

"up to me -- Charles Manson came up to me and ຸ 1 asked me to go to Mr. Hinman's house. 2 "Q So that we have some point in time, 3 when was the original mention of the name Hinman 4 made? 5 "A It was within a week of the time when 6 7 Mr. Hinman was killed. ΪQ 8 This, of course, would be prior to his death? 10 "A Yes. 11 uQ. Do you recall where the conversation 12 had taken place? 13 "A One took place at Devil's Canyon at the , 14 camp site; and the other was at the Spahn Ranch." 15. i Two conversations. 16 "Q Where is Devil's Canyon with relation-17 ship to Spahn Ranch?" 18 Then she goes on there. 19 'All right. 20 "Q Was there any discussion of the manner 21 of obtaining money from Gary Hinman? Was that discussed in these two conversations that you 23 mentioned? 24 ľΑ First of all, it was suggested 25 that perhaps he just be approached and he might 26 willingly give his money to the Family and perhaps 27 come with us. 28 "Q Who was it, if you know, who made that

1	"particular suggestion?
2	"A Well, I know Charles Manson mentioned
3	it.
4	"Q Was that at the first conversation?
5	"A Yes.
6	"Q And was that in Devil's Canyon; is that
7	right?
8	"A Yes.
9	"Q Was that after his name had first been
10	brought up as a person who had money?
11	"A Yes.
12	"Q Was there some subsequent conversa-
13	tion about getting money from him in some other
14	way?
15	"A Yes.
16	"Q Was that conversation strictly about
17	Mr. Hinman or were there other names mentioned?
, 18,°,	"A There were other names mentioned, too.
· 19	"Q You told us about a continuation of the
20	first conversation?
21	"A Yes.
22	"Q Was this still in Devil's Canyon?
23. 24	"A Yes.
25	"Q Can you tell us what the conversation
25 26	was and who the speakers were?
27	"A Well, Charles Manson did most of the
28	although there were several other people who also
20	talked at the time. I don't remember exactly who said

"what after the conversation, but both kidnaping, and then later on killing was mentioned at that conversation. 14. 24; 

1	"Q Was it Mr. Manson who made the mention
. 2	of kidnaping and killing?
3	"A Yes, he did."
4	This is all at Page 59 now of the transcript.
5	"Q Was Mary Brunner present at that
6	particular conversation?
7	"A Yes, she was.
8	"Q You have a specific recollection of that?
9	"A Yes, I do.
10	"Q And who were some of the others that
11	were talked about that might have money by Mr. Manson
12	and Miss Brunner?
13	"A Terry Melcher.
14	"Q Was there any subsequent conversation on
15.	another day about going to Hinman's house?
16	"A Before that day?
17	"Q After that day.
18	"A Yes.
19	"Q When was that?
20	"A That was on the Spahn Ranch. It was
21	later that week. It was the night of the date
22	slips my mind right now.
23	"Q Can you tell us when it was in relation
24	to the last week in July?
25	"A It was the night the other people went
26	to Mr. Hinman's house.
27	"Q Do you remember the day of the week? .
. 28	"A It was on the weekend. It was Friday."

All right.

-So there's no question, whatsoever, as to what her testimony was under oath before the Grand Jury, and it was stipulated that that was her testimony before the Grand Jury.

That at the conversation in Devil's Canyon, the kidnaping and killing was mentioned, and she was privy to it and she mentioned Gary Hinman.

Now, if ever a conversation stank of murder and robbery and a knowledge of the people involved that this was the likely result of fingering somebody to get money from, this is that conversation. And this is the one that she reported under oath before the Grand Jury.

So I don't think there's any question, your Honor, but that no matter who else was there, who didn't say anything, and who therefore might not be accomplices as a matter of law because they did not participate in and only were associated with, she did far more than that, she listened, she counseled, she advised, she encouraged.

And even if we don't have a -- substantive evidence at this point, other testimony that she was appointed, at that time, by Manson to go because she knew Gary best and Gary liked her best, and even if we don't have the evidence that the matter was set for the following night, and even if we don't have the other evidence that is in by virtue of the statements of May 15 and Whiteley's report on May 18 that which we do have out of her own lips which she acknowledges and has to acknowledge, and which was testified to under oath, is sufficient to show that she was an accomplice as a matter of

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THE COURT: All right, for the purpose of your argument, then, what does that mean, then? What should that mean to the Court?

MR. DENNY: Well --

THE COURT: It means corroboration.

MR. DENNY: It must be corroborated.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DENNY: All right, let us look, then, to see what corroboration there is.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DENNY: Other than her testimony and her rendition of an alleged admission by Mr. Davis on July 28th, the only other evidence in any way linking Davis to the crime is the bullet which could have been fired from almost any 9-millimeter gun.

And the fact that Davis had purchased a 9-millimeter Radom, two weeks earlier, hardly constitutes sufficient evidence to connect Davis to the offense, for the following reasons:

One, the People's own ballistics expert cannot and will not say that the Davis gun fired the bullet which was found in the Hinman home;

Two, the only evidence on the time -- as I've mentioned -- that the bullet may have been fired came from Sergeant Whiteley, whose report and testimony said the bullet hole does not appear to be recent, as of August 1st, when he examined it;

And three, because there is no evidence to show that Davis himself even had the gun, any time after its purchase, other -- again, that by the testimony of the accomplice, Ella Jo Bailey, who says she saw him with it on the evening that the other three left with some fourth person, to go to the Himman home.

And your Honor, the testimony of Nat Stanoff shows that DeCarlo bought a gun the same day. And Ella Bailey said -- and I do have the quotation here at Volume 22, Pages 3233 to 3336 -- said that DeCarlo kept guns in the gun room and acted as the Family's armorer; and also substantiated somewhat by John Swartz's testimony in Volume 35, Page 5393, regarding the fact that DeCarlo kept guns in the gun room.

So that the mere fact that Bruce Davis purchased a gun is no evidence -- assuming, as you must, when you look to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice, you must remove that testimony from the case entirely and see if -- if what is left will connect the defendant with the crime in any way.

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Well, you remove Ella Bailey's testimony, and what have you got? You've got evidence that Bruce Davis bought a gun, a 9-millimeter Radom, from Nat Stanoff on July 14, 1969. And you have evidence that sometime, somewhere, at an unknown time -- the "where" is known: In Gary Hinman's home -- someone fired a bullet from any 9-millimeter gun, period.

Davis's connection with the murder, so as to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice, Ella Jo Bailey.

And the foregoing reasoning applies, actually, to both Count I and Count II.

The causes to the instigation of the conspiracy to rob and murder Gary Hinman, Ella Bailey's testimony discloses far more definite participation in the initial phases of the conspiracy than is shown as to Davis.

Well, we have gone down most of it here.

THE COURT: Yes. All right. What do the People have to say about her status? And assuming that she is an accomplice, what would be your argument as to what corroboration there is in the record?

MR. MANZELLA: Well, your Honor, I think that that — that analysis ignores a third alternative, and that is that her complicity is in dispute, the question of her complicity is in dispute; and that therefore, it's a question for the jury to decide, with proper instructions from the Court.

THE COURT: Well, at this point -- at this point, it's put to the Court that the Court make a decision, and make a finding acquitting the defendant.

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 And so presumably, at this point, the Court is -has put to it the question which eventually will be put to the
jury, as to whether or not Miss Bailey is an accomplice. And,
if she is, what corroboration there exists in the record.

MR. MANZELLA: Well, your Honor, under Section 1118.1, which I -- which I believe this was the section under which the motion is brought, the Court is not to decide whether or not the defendant is -- the Court believes the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

It is only in that situation that the Court would determine whether or not, as a matter of law, she is an accomplice. Under 1118 -- 1118 provides that the -- that determination; but that's in a court trial.

In a jury trial, under Section 11- -- a motion is brought under Section 1118.1, and under that section, the Court is to determine whether or not, were the jury to convict the defendant, the conviction would be sufficient to sustain that conviction on appeal.

That's entirely a different proposition, and it's our position that that is the section under which this is brought.

MR. DENNY: Your Honor, I was going to cite that to the Court. That's quite so. And we get, then, to the point that it becomes a matter of law, strictly a matter of law here.

It's not a question of credibility of witnesses, et cetera, anything of the kind -- except insofar as the Court has to make a decision at this time, as the appellate court would make.

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Assume, under the basis of this evidence, the appel-
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             late court had before it a conviction on these two Counts, Counts
             I and II.
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The Appellate Court would look at it and say, "Can we say, as a matter of law, that the conviction may be sustained, because there was corroboration of an accomplice? Must we say, as a matter of fact, that Ella Jo Bailey was an accomplice?"

Now, the Court is going to be faced with that at some point here in this case. Either you are going to have to make that determination now, based on the state of the evidence -- which I say you can make and should make now, just as the Appellate Court would make it, if we closed off the case right now -- and if the Court makes a finding, it would be the same finding that the Appellate Court would make, looking at this evidence.

And the Appellate Court, in reviewing the evidence, would have to make the decision as a matter of law: "Was Ella Jo Bailey an accomplice?"

And I submit that, as a matter of law, it shows that she is.

If, then, that is what the Appellate Court would do, this is what this Court would have to do at this time.

THE COURT: I think you've both analyzed 1118.1 correctly.

MR. MANZELLA: Except that we analyzed it completely differently, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. MANZELLA: You see, it's my position that the Appellate Court doesn't say that, as a matter of law, she is an accomplice -- or not an accomplice. What the Appellate

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Court says -- and what I believe this Court should say, what the issue is before this Court under 1118.1 -- and that is: If the jury were to find that she was not an accomplice, can this Court say, as a matter of law, that that finding cannot be sustained on appeal?

In other words, the fact that this Court -- that the jury could find reasonably that she was an accomplice does not prevent the jury from finding reasonably that she was not an accomplice.

In other words, there could be two reasonable interpretations, and all the Appellate Court is saying, even though -- we think, if the jury found that she was not an accomplice, and there was evidence to sustain that finding,

Since the jury finds that she was not an accomplice, we look to see if there is evidence sufficient to sustain that finding, or we have to say as a matter of law that that finding is no good. So I disagree with what Mr. Denny says about the finding of the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court does not find for itself whether or not she is an accomplice. What the Appellate Court does is to see whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury's finding, even though the Appellate Court might disagree with the jury.

THE COURT: Assume, then, for the purpose of explaining Mr. Denny's argument, that she is an accomplice. Do you see that there is corroboration?

MR. KAY: Before Mr. Manzella responds to that, there's one thing I would like to bring up, about Mr. Denny's argument, and that is: I would remind the Court that Ella

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Bailey, on the witness stand, under oath, testified that at the subsequent conversation, where murder and robbery were discussed, that she took absolutely no part in that discussion.

That's undisputed. She testified to that in this court. She said there was a discussion. Mr. Manson was present. He was doing most of the talking, although some of the other people talked, too. But she specifically said that she took no part in that discussion.

So the only thing that she did, was she mentioned Gary Hinman's name at the first discussion.

Of course, not knowing what was going to transpire because of her mentioning of that name.

And further, to be an accomplice, she has to have criminal intent. And there's just no showing whatsoever that when she mentioned his name, that she had criminal intent.

MR. MANZELLA: That's the point I was trying to make, by analysis of 1118.1, your Honor. And that is: If the Court feels that the jury -- where complicity is denied, the cases say that the question of accomplice goes to the jury, with proper instructions from the Court.

So the Court, if there is evidence to sustain the jury's findings, that she had no criminal intent when she mentioned Hinman's name, then the question is up to the jury to decide, if there is that evidence.

If the Court feels that the jury's finding that she had no criminal intent would be supported by the evidence-

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even if the Court feels that the other finding would be supported by the evidence -- if they could choose to believe that at the time she mentioned the name, she had no criminal intent, had no knowledge of what would happen later, then -- and up to now, that appears to be all the evidence there is in the case. It's undisputed that she denies knowing what would happen to Hinman.

Then, the question must go to the jury, with the proper instructions from the Court.

That's the position of the People. I wanted to make that clear to the Court.

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THE COURT: I understand that. The Court understands.

Do you think that if the Court decides that that is the state of the evidence, then that basically is a question for the jury to decide?

MR. MANZELLA: Yes, your Honor. Under the cases I cited.

THE COURT: And the Court therefore -- at least, insofar as this issue is concerned -- should deny the motion?

MR. MANZELLA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And you, Mr. Denny, would you concur in that?

MR. DENNY: No, I don't, your Honor. I don't at all, concur in that.

THE COURT: Do you concur that as to -- as to the method of proceeding, under a motion under Section 1118.1 --

MR. DENNY: No, I do not, your Honor.

Because the Appellate Court does not simply look and say, "Is there sufficient evidence to uphold the finding of the jury here?"

The Appellate Court, in looking at a situation like this, makes a determination, as a matter of law.

This is a question of a -- a mixed question of law and fact on which the Appellate Court makes the decision.

And the Appellate Court, if a case comes up where there isn't an issue involved as to the status of the accomplice, and it has been raised in the lower court, as to whether the party was an accomplice or not, and the Appellate Court is called upon to review the conviction,

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because if the party were an accomplice, then there would be insufficient corroboration, then the Appellate Court makes the decision.

Not just whether the jury decision was correct or incorrect. Because obviously, the jury, in convicting the defendant, would have assumed the non-accomplice status.

But the Appellate Court says:

"Looking at it as a matter of law, we say that there was insufficient --" strike that.

-- "that there was testimony showing that she was-or he was -- an accomplice as a matter of law. And
that being the case, the corroborating evidence was
lacking, was insufficient."

That's what's raised in the issue before us now.

THE COURT: And therefore, the motion should have been granted?

MR. DENNY: Therefore, the motion should have been granted, and the judgment is reversed.

And that's the function of the Appellate Court.

And this is what 1118 -- 1118 -- . . . .

THE COURT: 1118.1.

MR. DENNY: Yes.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DENNY: (Continuing) -- means precisely.

THE COURT: Oh, I think basically you are both saying the same thing; that the Appellate Court, in reviewing it, reviews it to determine whether, at the time that the motion is made, there was sufficient evidence in the record to warrant

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the Court looking at it from the standpoint of Ella Jo Bailey being an accomplice, as a matter of law, or not.

If she is not an accomplice, as a matter of law, the requirement of corroboration is not there, and the People's burden may be met more reasonably.

If, on the other hand, the evidence is such that corroboration --

MR. MANZELLA: Your Honor, excuse me. Again, I think we have ignored, in this last analysis, the third alternative. And this is where the Court does not say that she is or is not an accomplice as a matter of law.

In other words, the Court said that you could find that there is an accomplice as a matter of law, or that she was not an accomplice as a matter of law, just now in the Court's analysis; and I think that the jury --

THE COURT: I think, for the purpose of the Court making the decision under 1118.1, that it's necessary for the Court to decide that.

MR. MANZELLA: But, your Honor, I don't understand why, because Mr. Denny has cited no cases which say that.

And I've cited cases which say that where complicity is denied, the question should be left to the jury.

THE COURT: Well, let me put this to you.

Let's assume that the People's evidence is such that it does establish clearly, as a matter of law, that she is an accomplice.

MR. MANZELLA: Um-hmm.

THE COURT: There's no question in your mind, at this

point, that if there was not sufficient corroboration, that the motion should be granted?

MR. MANZELLA: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, one way or the other, I have to decide --

MR. MANZELLA: Except for this point, your Honor. She has denied being an accomplice. That's -- I think there's a crucial difference in this case. She has denied being an accomplice.

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27<sup>-</sup>  THE COURT: Well, that's another point, really, that I am not asking you to argue at this -- well, yes. I am asking you to argue, and you have argued that: That there is a dispute from her as to the extent of her involvement in the conversations that took place at Spahn Ranch, and at Devil's Canyon.

MR. MANZELLA: Well, she denies knowing what was going to happen to Hinman, and what I am saying is that that's what makes it a question for the jury to decide.

THE COURT: She did make some denial of her knowledge about what was going to happen, until Bill Vance spoke up, and then she did, I think, admit that she suspected that something of that nature, some violence, might --

MR. MANZELLA: Right. After Bill Vance told her what Manson had said.

THE COURT: All right. I see your point, that -- that the evidence is equivocal as to that.

MR. MANZELLA: Right. My point is that since she's denied complicity, the Court cannot find, as a matter of fact, that she is an accomplice. That's what the Santo case says, and this is what the Griffin case says.

Because she's denied complicity, the Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that she is an accomplice. The Court has to let the jury decide that, with proper instructions.

MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, I think that --

THE COURT: I think that ignores the power of the Court at this time to make some judgment as to her credibility, based on all that has been presented.

And I know the credibility is a question before the

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jury. Basically, it lies with the jury to make that determination.

But I think that at this stage, the legislature meant to allow the Court some degree of discretion, to determine the credibility.

Now, let me hear from you. What corroboration is there, should the Court make a determination that she is an accomplice as a matter of law?

MR. MANZELLA: For the purpose of this motion, your Honor, the People will assume, for the sake of argument --THE COURT: That's what I said.

MR. MANZELLA: -- that there is no corroboration.

THE COURT: There was an admission -- wasn't there an admission in the record?

MR. DENNY: Yes, but this is --

MR. MANZELLA: That's from Ella Jo Bailey.

THE COURT: That's from Ella Jo Bailey, yes.

MR. MANZELLA: That's correct, your Honor.

MR. DENNY: That's correct.

THE COURT: All right. What do you have to say about Count II. the motion regarding Count II -- or Count III, rather?

MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, as to Count III, it's rather an extended consideration on that. And if I -- but if I may be permitted?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. DENNY: In my view of Count III, there has still been no corpus delicti established. And if the Court feels

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otherwise, that there is still not sufficient evidence, either of the death by criminal means of Shorty Shea, or the complicity of this defendant in that death.

Now, the Court has permitted various hearsay statements in evidence, out of order, on the basis that they would be connected up by substantive evidence establishing a conspiracy to kill Shea, and evidence of the alleged murder itself.

Now, even assuming such statements made, arguendo, have established a conspiracy to kill Shea, the law is clear that the two crimes of conspiracy to murder and murder itself are subject to much different proof to establish them.

As we just talked about in the Hinman Count, the agreement and one overt act being required in the former; whereas the latter required at least prima facie proof of a death, a death by criminal means, as distinguished from normal means.

And then finally, the relationship of the defendant causally, to that death.

Manson after the date alleged by the People as the time of Shea's supposed death — and admitted, as this Court has admitted them, only by virtue of the unalleged conspiracy—the evidence establishes only the following, before any supposed admissions by Davis, or any admissions by one of the other co-defendants, which would not be admissible against him if the corpus had not been established.

First, Shea had disappeared from Spahn Ranch some-

time between August 17 and September 15th, according to the evidence. September 15, 1969.

Ruby Pearl's cross examination established that she and Randy Starr and George Spahn had been questioned and stated that the last they had seen him was about the middle of September.

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1969.

 Two, of course, his car, which was afflicted with dangerous brakes and steering, was apparently abandoned sometime between August 17 and December 8, 1969, at a location between the house — formerly occupied by Bill Vance and some Manson Family members — and another house, which had been and was then being occupied by Lee Saunooke.

Three, Shea's guns were pawned by him in July,

Four, he loved his guns, but had told Arch Hall, from whom he had gotten them, that he would either shortly finish paying for them or return them to Hall.

Five, Shea thought he had a part in a Bickston movie lined up, but was disenchanted with the prospect, because it was delayed, and he hadn't heard from Bickston about it.

Six, Shea and his wife Magdalene were supposed to get small parts in a forthcoming Maurice Kosloff movie, and he seemed somewhat excited about this.

Seven, however, after having gone with his wife to secure this part, on about August 11th or 12th, he split up with her, and he was much upset and depressed over it, having taken to drinking some and having written a never-sent note to his wife, expressing his anguish and despondency.

Eight, Shea had expressed to Ruby Pearl a desire to get away from the ranch — from the Spahn Ranch, that is — to which he had gone on or about August 16th or 17th, because "funny things were happening." And he was — he was worried.

Nine, Shea had told Lance Victor that he was going

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back to work at the Salt mines in Vallejo, and planned to leave soon.

Then, Shea had discussed with George Spahn a job as watchman for Frank Retz.

Eleven, Shea called Retz on a Monday or Tuesday, around 9:00 A. M., and said he would come to see him that morning. And Retz waited until early afternoon for Shea, who never arrived.

Twelve, Ruby Pearl, after talking with Shea between 11:00 P. M. and midnight on a full-moon night, saw Manson, Davis, Grogan and Watson exit a car, and move in Shea's direction.

Thirteen, the full moon appeared on the night of Wednesday, August 27th, and would have seemed full on the nights of Tuesday and Thursday, on either of those dates.

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Fourteen, on the night of the full moon Barbara

Hoyt heard Shea screaming in pain and fear for what seemed like
a long time but, apparently, no one else on the ranch heard
them.

Fifteen, she didn't see Shorty again, but she,
Manson, Davis, Watson, and other members of the Manson Family
left Spahn Ranch early the following evening, following the
night of the full moon, and traveled through the Goler Wash,
Ballarat area to the Barker Ranch.

Sixteen, Shorty was short of money and had tried to borrow some to go to the salt mines from Lance Victor who said he would try to get him some later in the week. He was not sure of the specific time.

Seventeen, Shea's pawned guns were redeemed by Danny DeCarlo on December 2nd and 3rd, and sold on October 10 by him to the Baker Gun Shop in Culver City.

Eighteen, around that time John Swartz saw

DeCarlo and Bill Vance with the guns and the attache case.

Nineteen, friends and the mother of Shea who had heard from him in person or by phone or telegram at intervals ranging from three weeks to semi-annually hasn't seen or heard from him since the night of the full moon to mid-September, 1969, ranging in that area, or some Monday or Tuesday.

Twenty, when Shea's abandoned car was found on December 8, 1969, his two footlockers and some of his clothes were found in it and Davis's palm print was found on one of the footlockers. Parenthetically, the People's witnesses are unable to say in point of time when that palm print might

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have been placed there.

Also, parenthetically, and as a part of that, both John Swartz and Barbara Hoyt testified -- John Swartz particularly, Shea's footlockers he had seen in the storage room where various items, including certain old wagons and things were sorted at Spahn Ranch.

And Barbara Hoyt testified that she had also been in that storage room and it was accessible to anyone by the back door.

Twenty-one, Shea's attache case and a blue suitcase as ever having belonged to him were found abandoned in the Goler Wash area in mid-February and they contain documents and things connected to Vance and DeCarlo.

Twenty-two, another suitcase and other clothes owned by Shea have disappeared along with Shea.

Twenty-three, Shea was a drifter, who frequently changed jobs and locations, generally without notifying anybody until at least he had arrived there.

Now, without the statements which were admitted to establish a conspiracy, the purported conspiracy which was not even charged, but as to which if charged the statements would only be admissible, and not admissible on the charge of murder until a corpus delicti of prima facie had been shown — without the statements, that's all the evidence that we have.

Those 23 items that I mentioned.

And I submit that they do not establish a corpus delicti. They do not establish the death of Shorty Shea. They do not establish that he died by criminal means. And that the

1 the corpus. 2 Now, your Honor, it requires a little bit of arithmetic here, if I may have the Court's indulgence. 3 The dates are all important at this juncture. far we have heard from the People's witnesses -- this is their 5 evidence. 7 All right. 8 MR. KAY: Excuse me, your Honor, I think that Mr. Denny has a couple of defense witnesses in the back of the court. I 10 would object to him going over dates if these witnesses are ʻ11 present. 12 Are they? 13 MR. DENNY: No. 14 MR. KAY: They re not? 15 MR. DENNY: They re not my witnesses. 16 MR. KAY: Okay, I'm sorry. 17 THE COURT: Since you've been interrupted, let me interrupt , 18 again. 19 (Whereupon, unrelated matters were called and 20 heard before the Court.). 21 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Denny, go ahead. Sorry to 22 9a fol interrupt. 23 24 25 26 27 28

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MR. DENNY: Oh, it was all right, your Honor.

Again, your Honor, going back to the fact that apart from the statements which were admitted under the conspiracy theory, and statements which would not be admissible because made after the alleged murder if, in fact, a corpus delicti had been established, and I submit that at this point the evidence shows no corpus, all that was shown was a mysterious disappearance, the abandonment of some property, the redemption of Shea's guns by DeCarlo, Davis' palm print on a footlocker, a print which could have innocently been placed there outside the car in a Spahn Ranch storeroom, and the fact that Mr. Shea has not been heard from by people who would normally have heard from him over a period of time.

Now, the People may say, well, in addition to that, we have some evidence of motive. There is evidence that Charlie Manson didn't like Shea and wanted to get rid of him because he threatened their position, that is the Manson Family's position on the Spahn Ranch or that Shea is supposed to have been ratting to the police.

First of all, that statement that he was ratting to the police or whatever, and all of these other statements, are statements that come in by way of these conspiracy statements or admissions after a corpus has been established.

There was -- and so I submit at this point, at least, when I'm arguing that there is no corpus, that those can't be considered.

Now, there was, in addition, some testimony from

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Dawn Quant that Manson threw a knife in front of Shea. And I think the cross-examination disclosed that there was apparently nothing so evil in that as originally portrayed by the People.

There was evidence that Manson, as well as everyone else on the ranch, knew of Retz' job offer to Shorty. And if that is thought to be twisted into a motive for killing, the contrary evidence is, to -- and this was brought out by the People, witness after witness, starting from Ella Jo Bailey, that there had been the plan, the end and the goal, right from the end of early January, 1969, to move to the desert and, indeed, supposedly the Hinman killing was in order to get money to move to the desert and, indeed, the final move to the desert followed a succession of moves up there during the week or so preceding the latter part of August, when they finally all did move or a large number of them moved up to the Barker-Meyers Ranch.

The testimony that Barbara Hoyt had gone up there, that Bruce Davis had gone up there, that Tex Watson had gone up there taking dune buggies, et cetera, et cetera.

So that, again, motive cannot establish the corpus if there is no independent showing of a dead body, and of a dead body killed by criminal means.

Now, we have, your Honor, the interesting picture of the testimony of the People. And, again, these are the People's witnesses testifying, leaving the matter in such a

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contradicted state that it cannot be said that Shorty Shears death is shown by their evidence.

And I point to this chart that I made up as

Defendant's S in connection with Barbara Hoyt's testimony,

and I'm only using it now for the same illustrative purposes.

The People's evidence showed -- shows that Charles Manson was arrested on Sunday, August the 24th, and that he was released Tuesday night at approximately 11:50 August 26th.

The People's evidence also shows that approximately the night after the full moon, Manson, Davis, Watson, Barbara Hoyt and others, left to go to the Barker-Meyers Ranch and at least those people stayed there, although DeCarlo stayed -- came back. But those people, all of whom are charged except Clem Grogan did not go up there.

But Manson, Davis and Watson, along with DeCarlo and Barbara Hoyt and others, went up the night following the night of the full moon. Giving the benefit, as Dr. Kaufmann said we must, to the human eye not knowing precisely which night of those on either side of the full moon would appear to be the night of the full moon, it could have been as early as the 28th or as late as the 30th of August.

So that when Manson, Davis, Watson, Hoyt, et cetera, left, and the testimony is that they remained at the Barker-Meyers Ranch area for at least a period of up through the 5th or so of September.

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 The testimony of Frank Retz, again a People's witness, showed that he had a phone call -- well, that he spoke with George Spahn on Sunday, and he remembers it was a Sunday because his wife was brought up there with him on Sunday and they were talking about how they were going to feed Shorty. She figured they'd feed him from the delicatessen. And the only day his wife was up there with him was on a Sunday. And he had a conversation with George Spahn on a Sunday and told Spahn to have Shorty get in touch with him and Shorty called him the following Monday or Tuesday. That was his testimony.

His memory was refreshed by me on cross examination from what he had testified to at the Grand Jury hearing. And he says yes, that's true, it was either Monday or Tuesday.

All right. And he spoke with Shorty Shea at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning on Monday or Tuesday.

Now, if it was Monday or Tuesday, the 25th or 26th of August, Charles Manson was in jail at that time.

He also said that Shorty didn't show up and he had not seen Shorty since then.

If Manson was supposed to have killed him on a Monday, he couldn't have. He was in jail.

And we have the documented certified records to show that. He was supposed to have killed him Tuesday and he disappeared Tuesday sometime in the morning. He couldn't.

Manson was in jail until 11:50 that night and the certified records show it.

So it would appear, then, that the conversation could not have been the Monday or Tuesday of August 25th and

26th.

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If, on the other hand, it was the Monday or Tuesday, September 1st 2nd, September 1st -- and the Court can take judicial notice of it, was Labor Day. So if Retz recalls, and he seems to recall that he was going to go to the bank and waited to go to the bank, then, it would have to be September 2nd that he had the conversation with Shorty, because he says it was Monday or Tuesday. And he waited to go to the bank. And Shorty never called. And he called George Spahn and George Spahn said, "Well, Shorty has left."

All right.

September 2nd, Manson, Davis, Watson, the People supposedly charged, and certainly this defendant charged with his murder were up at the Barker-Meyers Ranch.

Now, your Honor, what do we have? We have this testimony in here that Barbara Hoyt heard screams and she was perhaps impeached, perhaps not, perhaps the Court doesn't look at that in determining whether a corpus has been established, but I think the Court does in determining whether a corpus has been established, whether she actually heard the screams of Shorty Shea or not. And we have the reports of the officers and the reports, too, of the conversation with Mr. Katz in which all she stated was she heard male screams and, strangely enough, no other evidence has been brought in by the People of all the people that stayed at the ranch of anybody that heard screams then.

We have the testimony of the -- I think, essentially honest, but perhaps somewhat misguided and melodramatic, Ruby

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Pearl, who puts on to what she sees as reasonably normal conduct, that is people getting out of the car and going over toward the bunkhouse where Danny DeCarlo has his digs, and it happens that Shorty Shea is there and they're moving in his direction. She makes a connotation of evil there, that they're about to do him in. And she does not remember when — oh, in seeing Shorty thereafter.

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She also admits, on cross-examination, that she was pumped and pumped and pumped, in order to get her to remember that it was the night of the full moon.

Prior thereto, she had never testified that it was the night of the full moon, and her testimony is replete with instances of failing to know what day it was, what week it was, even.

So that all we have got is a series of circumstances here, which are mutually self-contradictory (indicating).

Was he supposed to have been killed on a Monday or Tuesday? During one period of which Manson's in jail and couldn't have killed him; and during the other period of which, Manson's up at the Barker-Meyers Ranch and couldn't have killed him, when he disappeared after talking with Frank Retz and George Spahn.

Was he supposed to have been killed on the night of the full moon? How, then, did he disappear Monday, the 25th, or Tuesday, the 26th? That was not the night of the full moon.

And if he was supposed to have been killed these nights -- the 27th, 28th or 29th -- how, then, did he have the conversation possibly on Monday or Tuesday (indicating) with Frank Retz?

The People's own evidence is so self-contradictory that I do not think this Court can say, looking at it, that the Court is certain that he was killed on any of these dates, without looking at the statements. And the Court can't look

at the statements to determine a corpus delicti.

All you have is a mysterious disappearance.

Now, your Honor, the evidence also shows -- and I left this out, as Item 24 -- that the last time he went to Vallejo salt mines, he went in Lance Victor's car, because his old '59 Cadillac was in what apparently was the same kind of shape as the '62 Comet, and that is: bad brakes and bad steering -- although I think the Cadillac only had bad brakes.

But there was testimony from Lance Victor that they took Lance Victor's car, because Shorty's car at that time had bad brakes.

The testimony here shows Shorty wanted to get away from the Manson group. He told Pearl he was scared; that things were going on -- the last time she had a conversation with him -- that he didn't like what was going on, and wanted to cut out.

He told Lance Victor that he wanted to go to the salt mines in Vallejo.

And this is not even to say that the evidence is equally as consistent with his disappearing, in a normal, natural way, as criminally. It's simply to say: There is no substantial, significant, even prima facie evidence that this man was killed.

We don't even know, based on the evidence that is admissible to establish the corpus -- and not by way of statements thereafter -- we don't know whether he's alive or dead.

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So I submit, your Honor, that as to Count III, the Court should make a finding at this time -- and this is a matter of law -- that the People simply have not established a corpus.

And I would move, then, to make a finding of acquittal on that ground.

THE COURT: The People?

MR. KAY: Well, I am really not sure how much the Court wants me to argue at this time, because the Court already has made a finding that there is a corpus, and I think that that finding of the Court is overwhelmingly supported by the evidence in this case.

There's just no other reasonable inference to take from the evidence.

So, unless the Court really wants to hear an argument, I will just submit it, because I think the Court already -- I think the Court's already made a finding on that point.

THE COURT: All right. The Court doesn't particularly need argument on that point.

Is there anything further in connection with your motion under 1118.1 --

MR. DENNY: Yes, there is, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- on either count?

MR. DENNY: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Or any of the counts?

MR. DENNY: Yes. Assuming the Court feels that there

has been no --

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THE COURT: The Court believes, for your guidance, that insofar as Count III is concerned, that the disappearance of Mr. Shea, the screams that were heard by the witness Barbara Hoyt, the confrontation observed by Ruby Pearl, the motive that was established, the throwing of the knife, the guns eventually coming to Mr. DeCarlo's possession, and the leaving of Spahn Ranch by the Manson group shortly after the night when the screams were heard, the failure of Mr. Shea to contact friends -- there are a number of other elements -- all of which the Court believes serve to establish the corpus delicti.

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And the Court sees no reason why its earlier finding should be disturbed, after it's heard all of the testimony on the part of the People.

The Court does believe that they have established the corpus delicti of the crime of murder.

MR. DENNY: All right, your Honor. Then to go one step further -- and it is a step by step process -- I submit that, again, under 1118.1, even assuming the Court has found that there is a corpus, that the evidence is insufficient in and of itself to convict this defendant, and that if this case were submitted to an Appellate Court, on the finding of guilt by -- by a jury, that the Appellate Court would be forced to reverse it, on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence.

If the evidence discloses anything, it disposes if it disposes a murder at all, the testimony points far
more convincingly toward murder by Danny DeCarlo and Bill
Vance than it does -- and possibly Clem Grogan -- than it
does to this defendant and Charles Manson.

Now, the Court has to, if it assumes the death occurred here at this time of the full moon, then the Court has to say, "Oh, all this evidence on either side, by Frank Retz --" and he remembers specifically, because of his business practice -- "all of that evidence (indicating) is just excluded.

"If it happened on the 25th or 26th, well, I -I don't know what I am going to do about that, if that
conversation happened.

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"If he disappeared on the 25th and didn't show up, maybe he just disappeared for a while, and came back to the Spahn Ranch, and then was murdered on the 27th or 28th or 29th, on a moonlight night."

That's the only way you can possibly imagine that. Frank Retz says he was there day in and day out, and he never saw Shorty after that.

If, on the other hand, you look at Frank Retz' testimony, and you say, "Well, this phone call with Shorty must have happened on Monday or Tuesday, the 1st or 2nd of September," then you have got to say, "Well, Shorty then couldn't have been dead on September 28th or 29th."

So somehow, you are going to have to assume that the testimony -- the conversation with Frank Retz took place on maybe Monday the 25th, and Shorty just didn't show, and stayed over until he could get killed by Manson, Davis, Watson and Grogan here on the 27th (indicating), 28th or 29th some time.

THE COURT: Let's see. Manson returned on the 26th to

MR. DENNY: Tuesday the 26th, at approximately 11:50 p.m.

MR. MANZELLA: Excuse me, Mr. Denny.

Your Honor, Mr. Johnson's in the courtroom. We have no objection if he remains.

MR. DENNY: I have no objection.

MR, MANZELLA: All right.

BY MR. DENNY: All right. Now, if you are going

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to -- if you are going to say that, if you are going to say that Shorty just didn't show up, this was another one of his unfortunate lapses in social graces, and he just failed to show for an appointment that apparently he so desperately wanted, and remained around in order to be killed, then you have to assume that Ruby Pearl's sighting of Manson, Davis, Watson and Grogan -- and of a shadow with a hat, or Bill Vance, depending on when she talks about it -- is sufficient evidence -- coupled with Barbara Hoyt's statement that she heard screams, which statements were also impeached -constitute sufficient evidence to connect this defendant with the purported murder.

Because if not, then the only other thing you have got are the following:

First of all, Mr. Davis is never seen with the guns -- oh, one time, at dinner, when supposedly this bronze or gold-barreled gun is passed around, which may or may not have been Shorty's gun, according to Juan Flynn.

But other than that, even assuming that might have been Shorty's gun, he's never seen with the guns; he's never in any other way connected, except by statements --Barbara Hoyt's statement that Charlie was making some statements at this supposed Meyers Ranch dinner.

And we went through it at some length. Barbara's recollection brought to light, in May of 1971, some almost two years later, that during three points in Manson's conversation, describing the killing of Shorty, Davis said, "Yeah. Yeah." And something -- "That was far -- that was

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                  far --"
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                         MR. MANZELLA: "Far out."
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                         MR. DENNY: -- "fer out."
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                                Thank you, Mr. Manzella.
                                "Yeah, yeah," and, "That was far out,"
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 And those hardly constitute admissions on his part that he was involved in it, because she acknowledged that the statements, "Yeah, that's far out," was a common expression used among that group -- as well as others -- merely acknowledging, "Hey! That's really something!"

And by no means indicated his complicity.

And her statements purporting to alleged conversation by Manson as to the death of Shorty Shea did not in any way include any references by Manson to the fact that Davis was involved.

The other evidence you've got connecting Davis to the case is the statement of Alan Springer, supposedly taken from -- or, secured from or gotten from Mr. Davis, at 28 Clubhouse Drive, on November 26, 1969, which purports to say -- to have Springer say, "I don't like the way DeCarlo is testifying against the group."

And Davis saying, in effect, "I don't either.

But we have ways of taking care of guys like that. We took care of a guy, and cut off his head."

And somebody says -- I think Mark Ross -- "Do you mean Shorty?"

And Davis saying, "Yeah."

Now, what does that mean? At most, it's equivocal. "We," the Family -- and this is testified to by Ella Jo Bailey, by Barbara Hoyt, by other members of the Family -- Paul Watkins -- they all referred to themselves as "we." You say, "We, the Family." The collective was constantly used in reference to the group.

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And the mere fact that you say "we" did such and such does not in any way mean, "I personally took part."

Any more than when Bruce Davis would say, "Well, we bought some dune buggies."

Did it necessarily mean, "I went out and bought the dune buggies"? It means the Family is now possessed of some dune buggies that someone bought -- "That we bought."

So that the only statements that you have got in evidence now connecting Davis with the offense, are these two statements, one by Barbara Hoyt -- which, again, I submit to the Court, at this point, at this stage, under a motion under 1118.1, the Court does have the prerogative and the obligation to look somewhat at the credibility of a witness.

I submit Barbara Hoyt's testimony there is incredible. But even giving it credence, all you have simply is two "Yeahs" and a "That was far out," which hardly constitutes an admission.

And then, the testimony of Alan Springer -- again, which hardly constitutes an admission of complicity in the crime itself.

I submit that at this posture, your Honor, even assuming a death, that the greatest likelihood that the Court has of -- or the jury has of convicting anyone, is convicting the people who most nearly in point of time have the property of Shorty Shea.

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And again, to go back to this chart, let us presume, arguendo, that Pearl did see Watson, Davis, and Grogan, Manson and some shadow with a hat on on the night of the full moon going towards Shorty, but that Shorty was not killed that night. Let us assume that Frank Retz's testimony, specific testimony that he heard from Shorty on Monday or Tuesday, shows that it was the Tuesday, September 2nd, and Shorty was supposed to go to see him on Tuesday, September 2nd and never made it.

Who was in the most immediate possession of anything having to do with Shorty on September 2nd? Danny DeCarlo, who has Shorty's pawn slip and redeems one of the guns on September 2nd, comes in the next day on the 3rd and redeems the other gun and the briefcase, the attache case, and with Bill Vance is seen shortly thereafter, perhaps on the same day by Johnny Swartz in the gun room with the guns in the gun case, one saying to the other, "Well, we finally got Shorty's ego."

And the evidence reflects that at that same time Clem Grogan was still down with them on the Spahn Ranch.

Now, is it possible that they waylaid Shorty Shea and killed him and got the pawn slips?

And is it possible that Clem Grogan did cut off his head?

And is it possible that Manson, in talking about it when he says "We killed him and Clem cut off his head," was stating exactly what did occur, using the "we," that everybody did use, referring to members of the Family? "We killed him and Clem cut off his head."

And I submit, your Honor, that that is the most

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likely explanation for what has happened to Shorty Shea.

And if I were prosecuting the case, those are the people I would look to, because that's where the evidence points.

And the references thereafter to "We did," and "We did," and "We did," are thoroughly reconcilable with that view of the evidence and it is the evidence presented by the People's case. The defense hasn't put on any evidence yet.

So that, your Honor, where the People discloses the facts as we've shown them here, and where the connection with the death of Shorty Shea, assuming such a death, is so equivocal as to this defendant, I submit that if a jury came in now on the state of the record, and that's where this Court sits, as an appellate court reviewing a jury verdict, that the appellate court has seen the infinite testable evidence connecting Davis with any murder, would have to and would reverse that conviction for insufficiency of evidence as a matter of law and, therefore, I feel that this Court, at this time, should do just exactly what the appellate court would do, which would be -- which this Court is empowered to do under 1118.1 and acquit the defendant.

THE COURT: People.

MR. KAY: Well, of course, in looking at evidence you can't take any one particular piece of evidence and look at it apart from the other evidence.

The Court has to look at each fact in relation to other facts, and I think if the Court does that, there's no doubt that Mr. Davis is beyond any reasonable doubt tied into

the murder of Shorty Shea.

Number one, you have Ruby Pearl seeing Mr. Davis. Mr. Manson, Mr. Watson and Mr. Grogan approaching Mr. Shea on towards the -- towards the boardwalk area, uh, the four of them together.

That same evening Barbara Hoyt heard either Squeaky or Brenda say that Shorty was -- that he would be taken care of.

Barbara Hoyt on this night of the full moon heard Shorty screaming.

She and Ruby Pearl agreed that the Manson Family left the next day.

And, of course, the reason that Mr. Manson gave was somewhat incredulous to Barbara Hoyt that the reason that they were going to the desert at that time was because Mr. Manson wanted to get the girls under 18 away from the police.

Then, we have the statements made by Mr. Davis.

Now, at the Meyers Ranch dinner, the statement made by Mr. Davis when Mr. Manson said, "When Shorty got to now, Clem cut his head off," Mr. Davis said, "Yeah, that was far out."

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Now, the only inference you can take from that statement was that Mr. Davis was present.

"Yeah, that was far out."

He didn't say, "Hey, that sounds like you guys had a great time" or "Yeah, uh, boy, that must have been neat" or something. He said, "Yeah, that was far out."

when the act took place.

Then, during that same conversation Barbara
Hoyt overheard Mr. Davis say at a point where Mr. Manson was
saying that "We were stabbing him and stabbing him," and
Davis said, "Yesh," agreeing to that point.

Now, the next point Paul Watkins testified that when he and Bill Vance and Mr. Davis were walking down Goler Wash, he overheard Mr. Davis tell Mr. Vance -- he picked up part of the conversation when Mr. Davis said, "That's why we killed Shorty."

Now, obviously if Mr. Vance was involved in the murder, Mr. Davis wouldn't make any statement to him, "Yeah, that's why we killed Shorty," because if Mr. Vance was involved there would be no reason for Davis to say that's why Shorty was killed, because Mr. Vance would know.

And certainly "we" includes "I," and there's no evidence in here that members of the Manson Family only said "we" unless they had some reason to.

And certainly Mr. Davis had a reason to say, "That's why we killed Shorty," at this point, because he was one of the ones that killed Shorty.

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Then, going down to Los Angeles from Barker Ranch to Spahn Ranch, when Mr. Grogan ordered Juan Flynn in a very commanding and threatening manner to say that if anyone asked him where Shorty was, he said you tell them -- you tell them that he went to San Francisco, which Mr. Davis said, "Yeah, yeah, you know."

Well, Mr. Flynn knew. That's why he kept a shotgun by his side up at Barker's Ranch all the time.

And then, Mr. Springer's testimony, where Mr. Davis and -- came and told him about what they did to informants. He said that he had a way of taking care of snitchers. And he said, "We cut them up, their arms, their legs and head off and buried them on the ranch some place."

And Mark Ross at that point said, "You mean Shorty?"

And Davis said, "Yeah."

And then, on top of that, when Mr. Shea's car was found abandoned and his property in the back in the form of two footlockers, lo and behold, whose palm print is on the footlocker, the only print in the whole car, Mr. Bruce Davis, the defendant.

I think that certainly beyond any reasonable doubt Mr. Davis has been tied in through all of these different pieces of evidence to the murder of Donald Jerome Shea.

MR. DENNY: Your Honor, if I may respond on the last point.

There are two cases --

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THE COURT: If you would, very quickly.

MR. DENNY: Yes.

There are two cases specifically on point on fingerprints. One is People vs. Redmond, 71 Cal. 2d, that's 745.

THE COURT: 71 Cal. 2d --

MR. DENNY: 71 Cal. 2d 745.

And the language is there, it is very much appropriate to this case, on page 755, "Evidence which merely raises a strong suspicion of the defendant's guilt is not sufficient to support a conviction. Suspicion is not evidence. It merely raises a possibility. And this is not a sufficient basis for an inference of fact."

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And then it goes on, "The appellate court is required to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."

And they go on further, "The prosecution's burden is a heavy one: 'To justify a criminal conviction, the trier of fact must be reasonably persuaded to a near certainty. The trier must therefore have reasonably rejected all that undermines confidence."

And then, they go on to show that in this particular case, the fingerprints that were found in a burglarized home could have been placed there innocently as well as by the alleged burglar, the person accused, having been a TV repairman who admittedly had been there earlier the day that the burglary occurred.

And they go on in that case to simply hold that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law because those fingerprints which could have been placed there innocently as well as in a guilty way, if there is that circumstantial evidence, and there are the two reasonable interpretations, one pointing to innocence and one guilt, you must take that pointing to innocence.

Now, the same in People versus Robinson, 61 Cal.

2d 373. There were fingerprints found inside a car, a car
which was used in a robbery.

And as the Court points out there:

"The fingerprints showed no more than that drivers had been present in or about the Ford on some recent

"date. The fingerprint expert produced by the prosecution testified that he could not place the date on which the prints were put on the car, but that he believed them to be relatively recent because of the fact that the car was out-of-doors. He was of the opinion that prints on such a surface disappear sooner when exposed to the elements, but was still unable to state that they had been placed on the car within the last day or two prior to the date of the crime. As opposed to this, the evidence" --

THE COURT: Were these cases involving a motion under

MR. DENNY: No, these were cases, your Honor, after a conviction. And in this particular case, in the People versus Robinson, the conviction of Mr. Drivers was reversed. The appellate court holding as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient because of --

THE COURT: I see.

MR. DENNY: -- because the only thing connecting him were these fingerprints --

THE COURT: I see.

MR. DENNY: -- and some evidence which had been admitted as far as statements which were inadmissible.

He said, "Thus, driver's fingerprints on the Ford are as equally susceptible to an inference that they came there innocently, as they are to any inference that their presence connects defendant with the commission of the crime.

"The important feature is that the explanation (evidently accepted by the police) shows that driver's finger-

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"prints could have been placed on the Ford in a manner entirely unconnected with the crime. To hold that the presence of those prints connects him with the commission of the crime is tantamount to saying that the fingerprints of any relative of a person known to have committed a crime, found on the automobile of such person, tend to connect the relative with the crime, even though it is known that the relative has had the opportunity to be in and out of that car on various occasions other than during the commission of the crime. theory is unsound. Certainly association with a criminal is not to be equated with connection with the crime. Moreover. such a contention asks the jury to speculate on how and why the fingerprints appeared, with no evidence at all on that question Even if the fact of the fingerprints be deemed to cast suspicion, even grave suspicion, on Drivers, such is It is necessary that the evidence corroborating insufficient. an accomplice shall connect or tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. Corroborative evidence is insufficient where it merely casts a grave suspicion upon the It must not only show the commission of the offense accused. and the circumstances thereof, but must also implicate the accused in it."

And it says, "At best, the fingerprints merely placed Drivers in the car at some time prior to the time the car was discovered. This merely proves association."

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THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Denny.

As to Count I, there are inconsistencies in Ella
Jo Bailey's testimony. It's certainly true, in her testimony
before this Court, there are a number of strong inconsistencies
-- and there certainly exist inconsistencies between her prior
testimony and her testimony here.

But this Court does not believe that -- and does not find that she is an accomplice as a matter of law. And in this state of the evidence, as the People have presented it, the Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to warrant the denial of the motion under 1118.1.

The same is true as to Count II, which rests largely upon the testimony of Ella Jo Bailey.

As to Count III, the Court believes that a number of the points that you have mentioned, Mr. Denny, are arguable points. But in the Court's view of the evidence, there is sufficient to withstand the motion under 1118.1, and the Court denies the motion as to Count III.

I see Mr. Johnson is in the rear of the court.

Mr. Johnson, have you completed your work today?

MR. JOHNSON: Yes. I think I've done as much as can be done on the examination of that.

THE COURT: It's 3:30 now. Do you have a witness that -- do you have a witness problem, Mr. Denny?

MR. DENNY: I don't know, your Honor, whether I have got a witness problem or not. I -- I have placed calls to certain of the officers who were to be here -- are they here?

MR. DENNY'S SECRETARY: They ve been called. I don't

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know if they're here yet.

Where do they come?

THE COURT: I did tell Mrs. Obradovich I would terminate those proceedings at 4:00 o'clock, and I am inclined to do that, so perhaps we can begin tomorrow morning with the presentation of your evidence.

MR. KAY: At 9:30, your Honor?

THE COURT: 9:30. And I will try to begin promptly.

Our calendar is -- what is it tomorrow? Very long?

THE CLERK: Yes.

THE COURT: It's quite long. But I'll begin promptly at 9:00 o'clock. Perhaps you could tell the deputies, the Public Defender and the District Attorney to be here, so that we can start promptly at 9:00.

And gentlemen, the Court has appointed Mr. Johnson under 730 to examine the test bullet and the evidence.

He has used, as I understand it, the facilities of the Los Angeles Police Department to accomplish that today, and he is available for -- for you to talk to.

So, I'll take a short recess, and you can talk to Mr. Johnson.

(Short recess.)

MR. DENNY: Your Honor, we have some witnesses who, perhaps, could identify themselves. I know one is Sergeant Kienast.

> Will the rest of you identify yourselves, please? DEPUTY WINTER: Deputy Winter.

LIEUTENANT NIELSEN: Lieutenant Nielsen.

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OFFICER ST. JOHN: Officer St. John.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, gentlemen, that we've spent the entire day in listening to argument and handling other parts of the case -- other than taking testimony, that is.

And consequently, we won't be able to proceed today. I had promised one of the jurors who has a doctor's appointment that we would terminate at 4:00 o'clock. Otherwise, we would work you in today.

Would anyone be greatly inconvenienced at coming back tomorrow?

OFFICER ST. JOHN: I have an extradition, your Honor, that I have to go to Vegas and pick up a suspect, at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning.

THE COURT: How long would his testimony take? We could put -- there's a half hour left. Perhaps we could put the jury in the box and take the testimony.

MR. DENNY: Well, may I have just a moment, your Honor, to check?

Is Hamm off tomorrow?

OFFICER ST. JOHN: He's off today.

THE COURT: Who's the lady?

SERGEANT KIENAST: I'm Sergeant Kienast, from the Sheriff's department.

THE COURT: Oh, I see. When I said "gentlemen," I didn't know that one of you gentlemen was a lady.

How about tomorrow, Sergeant Kienast, and you other two gentlemen? Would that be --

SERGEANT KIENAST: No, we could come back tomorrow,

MR. DENNY: And you will be back Wednesday?

OFFICER ST. JOHN: Yeah, I will be gone most of tomorrow, but I'm sure I will be back Wednesday, especially in the afternoon.

MR. DENNY: Well, your Honor, let's let him go at this point, then, with the understanding you are on call for Wednesday.

12d-1 MR. KAY: He said he would be back Wednesday. I heard 1 the conversation between Mr. Denny and the witness. 2 THE COURT: Very well. Then in that case, you may all be 3 excused until tomorrow morning, except for this gentleman, who 5 is Officer St. John. б And you keep yourself on call for Wednesday, please. 7 MR. DENNY: Your Honor, perhaps the others could be 8 ordered back for 10:00 o'clock, rather than 9:30, because I will 9 have another witness to put on at 9:30. 10 All right. That's --THE COURT: 11 So that apparently that wouldn't discommode MR. DENNY: 12 them too much. 13 THE COURT: Sergeant Kienast and you other two gentlemen, 14 10:00 o'closk. 15 SERGEANT KIENAST: Yes, sir 16 LIEUTENANT NIELSEN: Yes, sir. 17 All right. I think we have our witnesses MR. DENNY: 18 squared away, your Honor. 19 THE COURT: All right. Fine. How long do you anticipate? 20 MR. DENNY: About three days: 21 THE COURT: Good. We will be through this week. 22 (Short recess.) 23 THE COURT: Mr. Jeffery, you may stand. And Mr. Timothy, 24 don't get comfortable in that seat. I'm going to let you go. 25 (Laughter.) 26 THE COURT: Good morning, everybody. 27 (Laughter.) 28 THE COURT: Well, I'm sorry. I couldn't put you to work

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today. We have been clearing up some matters outside of your presence, all day. And because I told Mrs. Obradovich that I'd let her go at 4:00 o'clock -- and we don't want to keep the rest of you if she leaves -- therefore, I'll let you all go now.

Remember that you are still operating under the admonition, that you are not to converse amongst yourselves nor with anyone else, nor permit anyone to converse with you on any subject connected with the matter, nor to form or express any opinion on it until it is finally submitted to you.

I anticipate that tomorrow morning at 9:30, come what may on my calendar or otherwise, I'll begin this matter.

So, I'll see you tomorrow morning at 9:30. Good night.

(Whereupon, murmurs of "Good night" were heard from members of the jury.)

(Whereupon, at 3:36 P. M., an adjournment was taken in this matter until 9:30 A. M. the following morning, Tuesday, February 15, 1972.)