

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, FRIDAY, JULY 2, 1971

9:35 A.M.

THE COURT: Now, gentlemen, we will go ahead.

We have a new panel of jurors here. In People against Steve Grogan. The defendant is here in the courtroom. Defendant's counsel is here. People's counsel is here.

May we stipulate our jurors are in the jury box, all are back again plus the new gentleman whose name was called just before I recessed last night.

MR. WEEDMAN: So stipulated, your Honor.

MR. KATZ: So stipulated.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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Now, Mr. Winn, you are one of the new jurors that came in last night. And we have all of the seats filled with new prospective jurors. So I am going over the full scheme or panorama, procedurally only, of the lawsuit we are in the process of picking the jury for. And I would say I will take a reasonable time to explain the procedural structure to you but feel, ladies and gentlemen, I am talking to every one of you folks that are seated in the courtroom so that if one of the ladies and gentlemen in the jury is excused and your name is called and you take the place then I won't have to individually go through all of the instructions or procedures or information that I am giving to the gentleman in the jury box because you can listen carefully to me, if you will, please, bear with me as I go along here.

I will try to stay right on the point. It is not

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27 28 a lecture, it is not a talk in law, it is just enough of what I have to give and must give in the statement of the principles here. So that the court will know and the lawyers will know and the defendant will know and the People will know, frankly, whether they are satisfied to have you as a juror or not.

To a great extent and to an absolute extent, to the certain number of jurors, that right is absolute, whether the People or the defendant want a juror, that is an absolute right up to a certain number with each of the two parties, the plaintiff or the defendant,

CHARLES R. WINN

BY THE COURT:

Now, let's start at scratch, Mr. Winn, if we can.

First, this is a criminal case we are starting to try or picking the jury for. The name of the case is the People of the State of California, the plaintiff, against Steve Grogan.

Now, Mr. Grogan, would you first stand up, please, so everybody can see you, then turn around.

(Defendant stands.)

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Grogan.

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- Number one, do you know Mr. Grogan at all?
- A No.
- Q The defendant's lawyer or attorney is Mr. Weedman, the gentleman right here. Thank you.

And the People's counsel, the deputy district attorney is Mr. Katz, this gentleman right here. Thank-you, Mr. Katz.

Now, do you, Mr. Winn, know either of these two attorneys at all?

- No, your Honor.
- Q Thank you.

Now, the next step is that I am going to read to you the charge that has been filed against the defendant. I am going to read it word for word.

The charge is set forth in what is called the indictment that was rendered or what the law calls found; that means decided on by the Grand Jury. It reads as follows:

"The said Steve Grogan" -- that's the defendant -"is accused by the Grand Jury of the County of
Los Angeles, State of California, by this
indictment of the crime of murder in violation
of Section 187, Penal Code of California, a
felony, committed prior to the filing of this
indictment and as follows, that between the
16th day of August, 1969, and the first day
of September 1969 at and in the County of
Los Angeles, State of California, the said
Steve Grogan did wilfully, unlawfully and

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feloniously and with malice aforethought murder Donald Jerome (Shorty) Shea, a human being."

Now, that is the charge and that is set forth in the indictment that was rendered by the Grand Jury, and the indictment was then filed after being rendered by the Grand Jury. It was filed in the Superior Court on or about December 29, 1970; and on the indictment being filed in court the defendant was thereafter arraigned — advised of the charges against him — at that time; appeared with counsel and the case automatically, as is every criminal case in the State of California, it is set for jury trial, because the jury trial — and the defendant pleaded not guilty — and on a plea of not guilty, which every defendant has an absolute right to make, no matter what the charges are, or not, everybody has the absolute right to pleading not guilty.

The moment that a plea of not guilty is rendered the case receives a jury trial; that just follows, like one, two, three. The jury trial follows,

In other words, it is an absolute matter of right, everybody to receive a jury trial when the plea -- or, if the case is put to trial by the plea of not guilty.

A court trial can be had, but that has nothing to do with this situation; so there is no need for me to go into it. The jury trial is a matter of right and that's what we are at this time; so, therefore, skipping over a period of time because it wouldn't serve any purpose to go into procedural matters that have taken place or may not have taken

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place, we are up to the point where we are picking the jury to go to trial on these charges.

Now, in this case there will be a number of principles of law, many principles of law that will be read to the jury, discussed with the jury in a fashion that the court will tell the jury what the law is, and there are almost invariably, but not always, the statements of law follow and will follow in this case what is commonly known as instructions after the case has been fully tried and argued to the jury; then the court states the law to the jury, then the jury goes to the jury room for the decision of guilty or not guilty.

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However, there are some principles of law that I am going to state to you at this time because it can well be that some questions either the court or the attorneys will ask you about the principles of law that I am going to give you could be stated something like this.

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After I read the law to you one of the counsel may ask you, "Well, you have heard the law the court has just read to you. Will you follow that law or will you not follow it?" Because if you say, "Well, I don't want to follow that law" then causes would exist to excuse you or any other juror.

If you say, "Yes, I will follow the law" then the counsel know you will follow the law.

Incidentally, as a juror, while we are passing along on that subject, let me say that the juror is the sole judge of the facts. So don't confuse the thinking that because I tell you what the law is that I am trying to tell you what the facts are. Remember that. I am merely stating this is the law. It is against the law or the law says certain things constitute the law. But I don't tell, I have no business, I have no right to tell you or to suggest to you what the facts are. You and the other 11 jurors have the sole and exclusive right, duty, to find on the credibility, that is, the truthfulness of witnesses.

And to spell it out, to literalize it, if a witness takes the stand, or any number of witnesses take the stand, and then in the case for the People and for the defendant, then when the jurors go to the jury room the jurors will say -the individual jurors will say "Well, I think" to yourselves

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in the jury room at that time, "I think that Mrs. Smith was telling the truth. I am inclined to believe Mrs. Smith."

Or, "I don't think Mrs. Smith was telling the truth I don't believe what she said."

Or, you may say, "I think part of what she said is true" or, "I don't think the rest is true."

And some other juror may say, "Well, I believe everything she said."

Another juror may say, "Well, I don't believe her."

And that is the time the jury will settle on what are the
facts. They will pass on the facts. It is the jury that
decides what the facts are.

In other words, remember that I have nothing to do with it. I don't go in the jury room and say, "Well, I think so and so." That is out. I don't do it. I have no right to. I don't attempt to go near you and I constantly will admonish you throughout the trial because I will be called on to make certain rulings of law, that because I make a ruling of law that the witness may answer a question or may not answer a question has nothing to do with my feeling in the case. I am doing it because the law prescribes a certain legal procedure that must be followed.

The counsel's question may be a good question or not good. Let us put it that way. Or not proper is a better word. May be a proper question or not proper. If it isn't proper, an objection is made by the other counsel, in effect I say, "Well, the question is not a proper question." I rule on it by saying, "Objection sustained" or I might say "Objection

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overruled."

Now, the confusion sometimes in the minds of jurors is that because I make a ruling I tell a witness "Answer the question" or "Don't answer it," that I have some feeling in the matter or I am trying to advance some thinking of the witness or pass on the facts. My rulings don't pass on facts at all. I pass only on the question, is the question good or bad. That simplifies it down. If it is bad or not proper, then I say, "Objection sustained." If it is a proper question I say to the witness in effect, "You go ahead and answer the question." And that is where the ruling comes in. It has no reflection of my thinking because my thinking has no business in the case. You understand that. I have no right to inject myself in the factual situation, what are the facts, to the jury. That is your business.

Now, let's at this point go into this matter. As I have said, this is a criminal case. In a criminal case before we even get to the case as everyone of us are in this courtroom right here, you, me, you and everybody else, the defendant and the lawyers, everybody here in this courtroom right now is presumed to be innocent of the commission of any kind of a crime at all. Everybody here carries with him, is clothed with a presumption, what the law calls a presumption. Everybody here is presumed to be innocent.

As you go down the street and go out the door you may not be talking about it but it is there. I am presumed to be innocent. You are presumed to be innocent. Anybody in the courtroom who walks out or stands here or sits here is not

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presumed to be guilty of anything. The law says the presumption is a presumption of innocence. Presumed to be innocent until you may be confronted with a criminal case or charge and the presumption of innocence still carries along.

with murder as I just read to you. He is presumed to be innocent right now as you see him. He is presumed to be innocent just as I am or you are or anybody here. He is presumed to be innocent. And the doctrine of the presumption of innocence carries along with any defendant right straight through the trial as he sits there, as the testimony is received that presumption doesn't stop because he has been arrested. That doesn't affect the presumption. Because he is in trial and witnesses may testify doesn't change the presumption. He is presumed to be innocent. All through the trial as he sits there he is presumed to be innocent.

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and the presumption of innocence does not change until such a time that -- and here's your question mark -- that the jury, when the case is finally given to the jury, the jury, if it should vote guilty, then the presumption stops and the defendant is found guilty.

Is that clear to you?

- A Yes, sir.
- Now, on the other hand, if the jury goes in the jury room and finds not guilty, then the presumptions never stopped going on, nothing has ever interrupted that presumption of innocence, the defendant is presumed to be innocent.

You go to the jury room, he is presumed to be not guilty; you vote not guilty, the presumption of innocence has never been interrupted.

Is that clear to you?

- A Yes.
- The only thing that stops it is if the jury says,
 "We find the defendant guilty as charged"; then the presumption
 stops and he's found guilty of the crime.

Now, procedurally -- I am only talking from procedure, what you find in the law books and trying to put it to you in as simple a fashion as I can -- is it fairly clear to you up to this point?

- A Yes, it is.
- 0 How the procedure runs?
- A Yes.
- Now, let's see where we are -- oh, yes, I am back to my -- one more, while I am on this point: now, in a criminal

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case the burden of proof -- by that I mean the amount of proof necessary to prove a defendant, any defendant guilty; that's the burden of the People. It is up to the People -- I am shifting my thinking as I go along here -- the burden is on the People to prove the defendant guilty and that is in line with what I just told you, that the defendant is presumed to be innocent all the time until the jury may find the defendant guilty.

All right, without trying to argue the matter, if the defendant is presumed to be innocent, then it is obvious he doesn't have to prove himself not guilty, he's presumed to be innocent.

That's one of the reasons that the People, the duty or burden is on the People to prove a defendant guilty, if they can do so; they must prove the defendant guilty at the trial.

That's where we are, starting the trial. The burden is on the People, not on the defendant to establish anything at that juncture. The People must prove the defendant guilty and the standard that the law sets up to establish the People's case, the Penal Code refers to it as reasonable doubt, and stated in more of an elaborate fashion, the doctrine of reasonable doubt means the People must prove the defendant guilty, the law states to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt. That is the burden of the People.

You jurors in the jury box, if you are selected, you must say, in effect, in your deliberations, and all 12 of you must

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do this to render a verdict of guilty or not guilty, but to establish or make a finding of not guilty as charged all of the members of the jury must be able to say in effect, "We feel the People have proven their case and they" -- "and we feel that they have proven the defendant guilty to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt; that's the way we feel about it."

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Now, that's in substance what the jury must find; and then if they feel that way, that's their feeling, they feel that the People have met that burden of proof, they have proven the defendant guilty to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt, they feel that way, they should vote guilty, if they first factually make that finding that the People have sustained that amount of proof; and if they have not sustained that, if the jury, or any one of the jurors may say, when you are taking a vote they say, "Well, we" -- or "I" -- "I don't think the People have proven the defendant guilty to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt, I don't think so"; then it is automatic from that point on, that mental conclusion, if that factual standard is met, they should vote not guilty because the People haven't met the burden of proof that is on the People.

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Now, procedurally have I made that clear to you?

- A Yes.
- O Thank you.

Now, in this case there will be, as I started in sometime ago here to state, there will be some legal principles that will be repeated to the jury and some factual matters that must be determined by the jury in accordance with these legal instructions.

The jury still finds the facts; that is to say, certain things are true or not true, is the right of the jury, nobody ever touches the factual findings of the jury. There is some law that says what facts the jury can consider, what they may not consider.

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 Now, in this case, and I will ask the People to stop me and interrupt me if I misstate anything at this point — in the trial of a case, murder, where a defendant is charged with murder, it is a general proposition, or invariably but not always, is a better way of putting it, the People, in putting on their case will have what is called direct evidence, sometimes called positive evidence, which may be brought into the courtroom by a witness who may take the stand.

To illustrate the point, the witness may say, "I know John Smith, the man who is charged with being the victim or the so-called deceased person, the man who is charged with being killed" -- not the defendant, the man that is charged with being killed.

I am putting it this way to try to make it as easy as I can - and the witness will say. "I knew that man when he was alive and I saw his body when he was dead."

Now, that establishes the fact by an eyewitness that the man that is charged with being murdered or killed, the deceased man, was seen with the eyes, was seen dead: "I know this man that is charged with being dead; I knew him alive, I saw him dead. I say he was dead. I saw him dead."

The body is established as a dead body. Is that clear to everybody?

Generally that is, in effect, what the witness or witnesses will testify to and it may be established further by the witness saying, "I saw the man deceased; here's a picture of him deceased; this is the deceased man, this is the body."

The picture is admitted in evidence as plaintiff's

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A or 1. So, what is sometimes called the dead body or the corpus, is established; the death is established by somebody who, in effect, saw him dead.

Now, in this case no one will take the stand to testify that they saw the deceased person, Shorty, as a dead person; nobody saw the body dead, but the People are relying on other evidence, what is called circumstantial evidence to establish the death of Shorty in other ways, in other means that will be developed from the evidence. They will attempt to prove to you that Shorty, deceased, was dead as the result of the actions as charged in the indictment here by the defendant.

That method of proof, as I have indicated the People will produce evidence, that is called circumstantial evidence.

The People are entitled to have a juror in the jury box who will say, in substance, and this will be restated to you by the district attorney, that you will not automatically reject such testimony, that you will fairly and impartially consider it; that you may or may not make a finding one way or the other, but that you will not reject the testimony simply because there is nobody on the stand that says, "I saw the dead body."

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.27 28 Have I substantially got that point correctly?
MR. KATZ: Yes. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: It is a touchy point. I don't want to understate it or overstate it one way or the other. You can reaffirm it in your question.

MR. KATZ: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: I am trying to get the basic principle over.

Now, I am going to read to you what the law says on circumstantial evidence and what we have referred to as the dead body, corpus delicti. It commonly means — dead body means a dead body, but it doesn't always mean that. If you will listen to me as I state what the law is respecting the proof that a person is dead, although there is no visual observation of the dead body.

Now, I have got four basic instructions. I will read them all to you. One I have gone over. I am not trying to over and underemphasize anything, but I will take this in continuity.

The presumption of innocence I have already stated to you. However, as I read along here without any attempt to overemphasize or underemphasize, I have to maintain a position of impartiality between the People and the defendant just as you jurors do. Remember that now, you folks have to be impartial, you can't take sides. To put it literally and positively, you can't take sides on this and have a fair trial. You cannot do that. If you feel you are prejudiced one way or the other you have an absolute duty to say "Well, I think some way about this. I feel some way about

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this. I feel swayed."

Then, folks, you should raise your hand and say,
"I just can't be impartial." And we will get another juror.
So you must keep your minds open.

Now, I am going to go right through these again. Now, here is the doctrine again of presumption of innocence.

"A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved. And in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown he is entitled to an acquittal. This presumption places upon the State the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt because everything relating to human affairs and depending on moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge."

Now, that is what is called the doctrine or a statement of the law respecting reasonable doubt. Now, I am going to read you the instruction on what is commonly called the corpus deliciti. That is, the dead body. I am going to

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read that instruction to you. And I will read it again maybe a number of times as we go along here.

"The term corpus delicti as used in these instructions concerning murder does not mean the production of the body or any part thereof, of the alleged deceased. Every crime, whether it be burglary, robbery or any other offense requires the proof of a corpus delicti. The term corpus delicti means the proof of the essential elements of the particular crime with which a defendant may be charged. The corpus delicti of murder consists of two elements. Number one, proof of the death of the alleged deceased. Number two, proof that the death of the alleged deceased was caused by some criminal agency. Either or both of these two essential elements which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime of murder need not be proved by direct evidence but may be proved circumstantially or inferentially. It is not necessary in order to establish the corpus delicti for murder that the body or any part thereof of the alleged deceased be produced as such. Nor that any witness be produced who has seen or found the body or any part thereof of the alleged deceased in death."

5a-1 Now, let's stop right there. Mr. Juror -- and I am only talking procedurally --0 2 have you understood everything that I have said here? 3 Yes. 4 Is it clear to you? Ś It is clear. б 7 That is what I want. Would you want me to read it again to you for clarity only? 8 0 A It is not necessary. Is that clear to you? 10 11 It is clear. A 12 THE COURT: All right. Now, the next question. 13 You have noticed that I have mentioned quite a 14 number of times the words circumstantial evidence and direct 15 Of course the juror may very readily say to 16. himself, "Well, I need more help or I need more advice as to 17. what is direct evidence and what is circumstantial evidence." 18 I have touched upon it as we go along here. 19 I, of course, can't say too much at one time or I 20 won't be saying anything. So I have to segment and come back 21 to it. 22 Now, I am going to read you the instruction. **Ž**3 are two basic instructions on circumstantial evidence. And 24 here we are. Now, here is this instruction that gives you the 25 difference between circumstantial evidence and direct evidence. 26 And I will read it. 27 "The testimony of a witness or a writing, 28 a material object or anything presented to the

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senses offered to prove the existence or the nonexistence of a fact is either direct or circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence means evidence that directly proves a fact without an inference and which in itself if true conclusively establishes that fact. Circumstantial evidence means evidence that proves a fact from which an inference of the existence of another fact may be drawn. An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts established by the evidence. It is not necessary that facts be proved by direct evidence. They may be proved also by circumstantial evidence or by a combination of direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. Both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are acceptable as a means of proof. Neither is entitled to any greater weight than the other."

Now, I am going to read to you further on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence.

"You" means the jury, "are not permitted to find the defendant guilty."

And I am speaking of any defendant in giving this instruction.

"You are not permitted to find the defendant guilty of the crime charged against

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him based on circumstantial evidence unless
the proved circumstances are not only consistent with the theory that the defendant
is guilty of the crime but cannot be reconciled
with any other rational conclusion. And each
fact which is essential to complete a set of
circumstances necessary to establish the
defendant's guilt has been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. Also if the evidence is
susceptible of two reasonable interpretations,
one of which points to the defendant's guilt
and the other to his innocence, it is your
duty to adopt that interpretation which points
to the defendant's innocence and reject the
other which points to his guilt."

Now, procedurally, further, when all of the testimony is produced in the case and the case has been argued and the jury is sent to the jury room, the jury then makes a finding, "We, the jury, find the defendant either guilty or not guilty of the crime charged." That is step number one, after discussing the case amongst yourselves.

Now, if the jury finds the defendant not guilty the case at that juncture is concluded in its entirety. It is all through. There are no further transactions. The verdict of the jury, not guilty, is final and conclusive. The whole case is tried.

I have to assume both sides of this question -if the jury finds the defendant guilty of murder then the jury

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must make a finding of degree. That is to say, the jury must make a finding of first degree murder or second degree murder.

If the jury finds the defendant guilty and sets the degree as second degree murder, then the case is concluded at that juncture, as far as the jury is concerned. The jury is excused and the case is concluded at that point as far as the jury is concerned with the finding of second degree murder.

If the jury makes a finding of guilty first degree murder then there is another step that has to be taken. That is called the penalty hearing. At that point and after the penalty hearing, the jury must make or set the penalty, and the penalty that must be set by the jury is either death or life imprisonment. That is what must be found at the penalty hearing if the other procedural steps have been followed by the jury.

Now, I am going to ask you to assume that you have been sworn and are a juror in this case and assume that we have tried the case, all the testimony has been put in, the case has been argued and you have gone to the jury room. And assume — and I am not asking anybody to concede anything, but I have to get those assumptions in to ask this question — assume that you are at a position where the jury is voting on the question of penalty, of the death penalty or life imprisonment. Now, if you will put yourself in that position right there, you are voting on that question, I am going to ask you this question—here; at that time and place, as I have indicated, would you automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty without regard to any evidence that might have been developed

at the trial of this case before you?

- A No, your Honor.
- O The answer is no?
- A No.

THE COURT: Now, let's see where we are. I think I have covered the field fairly well. I want to again say all of this elaboration I have made, it is all a procedural elaboration or statement of procedure. And I am not trying to, and not intending to speak — it just isn't a statement for or on behalf of any one person at all, it is a general statement of criminal law or criminal procedure. The rights of the defendant, the rights of the People. I think probably I have covered the situation up to this point.

Now, the law says defendant's counsel may question you, then the People's counsel may question you, then other procedures follow.

So you may proceed, Mr. Weedman, for cause or voir dire.

MR. WEEDMAN: Thank you so much, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. WEEDMAN: Thank you.

I think I can safely speak for Mr. Katz indicating that both counsel are grateful that Judge Call initially discusses these rather difficult problems with the jury. Not all courts do, and I think it is very helpful for the jury. And we are both very grateful for it.

Mr. Winn, may I inquire as to your business or occupation, please.

	A I work for the City of Beverly Hills, truck
	driver.
	Q Is there a Mrs. Winn?
	A Yes, housewife.
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All right, fine.

It is estimated that this trial may last some six to eight weeks. Would that cause you any personal hardship, if you are selected as a juror?

- No, not that I know of.
- With respect to prior jury experience, have you sat on any criminal cases before?
 - Yes.
- What kind of cases were those, if there was more than one?
 - A Just one.
 - All right. What kind of a case was that?
 - Criminal; rape.
 - 0 A rape case?
 - λ A rape case.
- O All right, and did you arrive at a verdict in that case?
 - Yes, we did.
 - You needn't tell us what it is. 0

Was that during your present tour of jury duty?

- Yes.
- I take it, Mr. Winn, that you obviously wouldn't apply anything that you may have learned in that case, particularly by way of law, to this case, understanding that these criminal cases can be vastly different and each case must turn on its own evidence and on its own particular instructions are given to you by the court?
 - Yes, I understand.

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With respect to the problem of the death penalty, will you understand that this is the only opportunity that we have to discuss the death penalty with prospective jurous and that merely because we are discussing it it does not necessarily mean that this case is going to have to go to any kind of penalty hearing?

A Yes.

As judge Call has already indicated, the matter may as well as not, and certainly looking at it at this point, end in a verdict of not guilty, in which case you would not have to worry about penalty at all in this case.

I am sure you appreciate that?

A I understand.

death penalty at this time, let me ask you this question, let's suppose that after a full, complete, thorough consideration by you and your fellow jurors, all of the evidence in this case during the guilt phase, the first phase of the trial, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that my client has committed a willful, premeditated killing of another person with malice aforethought, it is not justified in any way, it is not excused in any way, it is murder of the first degree; do you feel as you sit there now, Mr. Winn, that you would automatically impose the death sentence?

A Yes.

Q All right.

With respect to your answer, now, let me point out

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to you that during the penalty phase, so-called, if it should ever get to that point, there may well be additional evidence produced for the benefit of the jurors, and so the jurors during the penalty phase may properly consider, obviously, all of the evidence they heard during the guilt phase of the trial and, in addition to that, consider all of the evidence that they have heard relative to possible mitigation or possible aggravation.

Now, would you, notwithstanding additional such evidence during the penalty phase automatically vote for the death penalty, if you are, as I have indicated, convinced in your heart and in your mind that my client has committed this crime of a willful, premeditated, malicious murder?

MR. KATZ: Excuse me, your Honor; there is an objection on the ground that it is asking this juror to prejudge the evidence.

THE COURT: Do you care to reframe it? Do you want to

MR. WEEDMAN: Let me attempt to reframe it, your Honor, in the interest of time.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, reframe it.

Q BY MR. WEEDMAN: Assuming that during a penalty phase you would hear additional evidence from both sides, would you, notwithstanding such evidence, automatically vote for the death penalty?

A No.

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Q In a first degree murder conviction?

A No, I would not

Q I feel that I should have asked more foundational questions before I hit you with that "automatic" matter.

I take it from your first answer that you probably hadn't been really told yet that there would be two phases of this trial if it goes to a penalty phase and that the second phase of the trial would involve additional evidence which you would be expected to hear and weigh and consider.

Do you understand that now, I am sure?

A Yes.

Q And so, I take it, Mr. Winn, that your answer is that understanding that now, your answer is that you would wait until you hear any and all evidence produced at the penalty phase?

A That's correct.

And even then you wouldn't automatically impose either one penalty or the other, but you would go into the jury room and sit down with your fellow jurors and discuss the propriety of either the death penalty or life imprisonment?

A That's correct.

Q Understanding, of course, that it is still within your absolute discretion, that the law expresses no preference one for the other; you may, nonetheless, return any kind of penalty verdict you care to, it is entirely up to you.

But, do you appreciate the law does require that you at least consider both possibilities, the death penalty and life imprisonment; okay?

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A All right.

Q All right.

Can you conceive of circumstances surrounding a first degree murder conviction which would, notwithstanding any further evidence adduced at a penalty hearing, make you automatically impose the death penalty?

MR. KATZ: Excuse me, your Honor; that question, I think, asks the juror to prejudge the evidence, because the circumstances may be such as to warrant, in that juror's opinion, the infliction of the death penalty.

THE COURT: Do you want to try to reframe, or shall I rule?

MR. WEEDMAN: I would appreciate a ruling on that; thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me have the statement of counsel, will you, Mr. Reporter.

(The pending question was read by the reporter as follows:)

surrounding a first degree murder conviction which would, notwithstanding any further evidence adduced at a penalty hearing, make you automatically impose the death penalty?"

THE COURT: I will sustain the objection, "Can you conceive of circumstances" calls for speculation.

I don't think it is in the malm of factual situations, not before the court; I think it would have to stand on an abstract statement, "Will you do this or won't you do

that?" But when asked the opinion, "Can you conceive of circumstances" calls for speculation.

I would sustain the objection.

MR. WEEDMAN: Very well. Thank you, your Honor.

- Mr. Winn, would you, irrespective of the facts that may be developed during the guilt phase of this trial, and should it, of course, result in a first degree murder conviction, would you, irrespective of those facts, continue to assure us that you would consider any additional evidence adduced at the penalty phase before arriving at a decision as to penalty?
 - A I would consider all phases of it.
- Q In other words, you are not going to make up your mind about anything here, I take it it is fair to say, until you have heard everything that we have to -- by "we" I mean Mr. Katz and myself -- have to offer on the subject?
 - A Correct.
- And that is pretty obvious, I suppose, because that is the fair thing to do, isn't it, Mr. Winn?
 - A Yes.
- In connection with possible opinions you may have formed because of pretrial publicity, have you heard of the name of Charles Manson?
 - A Yes.
- Q Have you heard the phrase, the expression, the Manson family?
 - λ Yes.
 - Q Have you formed any opinion based on what you have

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1	you come to	understand that this was so despite the fact
2	that Mr. Ma	nson was not personally present at any of the
3	A	Yes.
4	Q	actual homicides?
5 . ·	,	And did you learn that Mr. Manson was sentenced
6	to die	
7	A	Yes.
8	Q	for these variety of murders?
9	•	Did you learn that other persons, other defendant,
10	were likewi	se charged along with Mr. Manson and that they
n	were likewi	se convicted and sentenced to die?
12	A	Yes.
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27 28 Q All right.

I take it it would probably be a fair assumption on our part that your opinion with respect to Charles Manson and the Manson family is not a good one?

- A No, I wouldn't say that.
- Supposing during the course of this trial it should develop that my client was, loosely speaking, because we are not sure, really, what this phrase means; but he was, indeed, loosely speaking, a member of the so-called family; do you think that you would be able, if the evidence is very close in this case, do you think you'd be able to keep this opinion that you have formed out of your deliberations?
 - A I would like to keep an open mind.
- Supposing the case is one where you have been in the jury room, now, with your fellow jurors for perhaps several days and you have gone over the evidence over and over and over and over and you simply are unable, even after so much time, to make up your mind, you can't really decide who's telling the truth and if they are telling the truth, whether it is relevant, and so on and so on and so on, you cannot decide, in other words, whether the People have a case,

Do you think at that time, Mr. Winn, you and, of course, certainly very humanly would allow your opinion about the Manson family to make up your mind for you?

- A No.
- Q Do you appreciate, Mr. Winn, in your case -- let me start over.

In your particular case, Mr. Winn, since you know

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your opinion most intimately, do you think that it would present a substantial problem for you?

In other words, do you think that you would have to actively resist a temptation to, for example, say, "Well, it is a close case. Mr. Katz has certainly put on a lot of evidence here and, of course, the defendant has put on evidence. can't really make up my mind; but, after all, I mean, don't we all know, we have read the papers, watched television, don't we all know what kind of people these Manson people are? Mr. Grogan must be guilty."

Will you permit yourself to indulge in that kind \mathbf{of}

No.

-- reasoning in this case?

Supposing one of your fellow jurors said to you, "Now, look, Mr. Winn, we have been in here four or five days and you are the only one that hasn't made up his mind so far here. Doesn't your good common sense tell you that where there is association with someone as bad as Charles Manson that he's really a no goodnik and, for heaven's sakes, must be quilty?"

What if one of your fellow jurors told you that; would you buy that or would you continue to exercise your own opinion based on the evidence that is in this court. only?

I'd go by the evidence in the court.

And, Mr. Winn, can you promise us all here that you will actively resist considering any evidence, any information that doesn't come to you through this courtroom, exhibits

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27 28 produced in this courtroom, accompanied by the court's instructions and the like; can you promise us that?

A Yes.

Judge Call has touched upon a matter which is quite important to both sides here and it is the matter of circumstantial evidence; and after Judge Call's discussion with you do you now accept the fact that in California circumstantial evidence is just as good as direct evidence?

A Yes, I do.

Q And that circumstantial evidence may be used to prove any fact that is in dispute?

A I understand.

Now, inasmuch as we had such a discussion, however, do you likewise understand that circumstantial evidence, because we have been talking about it so much, is no better than any other kind of evidence?

A I understand that.

And you understand, further, Mr. Winn, that even though you are permitted to utilize circumstantial evidence you are also permitted, if you feel it is proper to do so, to reject it?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

In other words, just because we have been talking about circumstantial evidence I am sure you understand that it is just like any other evidence, it may be accepted by you and may be utilized by you, it may be rejected by you, may be discarded by you. It is up to you to sift through and see

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where the value lies.

I am sure you understand that?

- A I understand.
- As part of the circumstantial evidence rule of law have you any quarrel with the portion of the circumstantial evidence law which says, in effect, that where circumstances are susceptible to reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the defendant's guilt, the other of which points to his innocence, that you are required that you must adopt that reasonable interpretation which points to his innocence?

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Q All right. Do you feel that you would be up to the rather difficult task, Mr. Winn, of not permitting yourself to adopt unreasonable -- or strike that -- of not adopting the reasonable interpretations which point to guilt when there exists reasonable interpretations which point to innocence with respect to a given piece of circumstantial evidence? Would you be able to do that?

A Yes, I would be able to do that.

Q I take it, Mr. Winn, that that rape case being your only criminal jury, that might be fair to say that you still, you are still in a distict process of learning?

A Right.

Q And that in perhaps this business of circumstantial evidence had not been discussed with you before?

A No, it had not.

MR. WEEDMAN: Okay.

THE COURT: Pardon me, Mr. Weedman.

MR. WEEDMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: I think we will take a short recess and then go right ahead. I will ask the jury do not discuss the case at all or come to any opinion or conclusion. We will proceed in just a few minutes. Thank you, folks.

(Recess.)

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THE COURT: Now, gentlemen, we will go right ahead in People against Grogan. The defendant is here, both counsel are here. The jurors are here.

Go right ahead.

MR. WEEDMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

I promised my wife I would wear the red underwear she bought me for Father's Day. And that is the one day that my pants go.

(General laughter.)

Well, she will get a little laugh out of it.

- Mr. Winn, during the course of the trial there will be certain objections raised both by myself and by Mr. Katz. It is almost inevitable and you have had some jury experience. I am sure you appreciate we are trying to shape the evidence as we feel it should be shaped as a matter of law, and I am sure you won't think that either of us are trying to somehow obscure the proceedings or we are trying to be obstructionists in any way doing that; is that correct?
 - A Yes.
- Q Mr. Winn, have you any relatives or close friends who are engaged in law enforcement?
 - A No.
- Q In the event that police officers testify in this case would you treat their testimony. Mr. Winn, just as you treat any other witness's testimony?
 - A Yes, I would.
- Q And therefore not apply any so-called artificial standards as, for example, all police officers lie, or all

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police officers tell the truth, or all police officers have infallible memories and so on. Those are artificial standards, I am sure you will agree. And so will you then obviously in the case of a police officer consider the fact that he is a police officer. Presumably he is trained to be an observer. He is presumably trained to make accurate reports and he is trained to have a retentive memory.

But that nonetheless he, like anyone else, if you are satisfied such is the case, may be mistaken. You have no quarrel with any of those statements I have just made?

A No.

Q All right, sir. Thank you. And finally, Mr. Winn, if the evidence in this case should show that my client has had in the past a lifestyle, a way of living which you find repugnant in any way, will you not permit that alone to influence your judgment respecting his guilt or innocence in this case?

A I would not.

MR. WEEDMAN: All right, sir. Pass Mr. Winn for cause: Thank you, Mr. Winn.

THE COURT: Pass for cause. All right. People. MR. KATZ: Yes. Thank you, your Honor.

prospective members of the panel who are presently seated in the jury box because they have heard all of the questions that counsel and I have been belaboring for the past four or five days. So I hope that you ll other prospective members of the panel will permit us the opportunity to ask Mr. Winn a few

1. questions, understanding the necessity for so doing. Perhaps I should ask you at the outset whether or not you will be prejudiced against Mr. Grogan by reason of his counsel wearing red shorts. 5. (General laughter.) ĝ 20. .21· 24° 28.

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I take it that you understand that while I meant that in a light vein it is very important not to be influenced by extraneous factors which have nothing to do with the trial, such as how I dress, whether I wear a vest, or what Mr. Weedman is wearing at a given time or even what Mr. Grogan is wearing.

You understand these are artificial standards and have nothing to do with the case; isn't that correct?

A Right.

Now, Mr. Winn, his Honor at the very beginning indicated within certain parameters what the responsibility is, for example, of the jury and what the responsibility is of the judge; for example, you are the judge of the facts, you are the sole and exclusive judge of the facts, the judge doesn't determine what the facts are, I don't determine what the facts are and Mr. Weedman doesn't determine what the facts are.

In that connection, the judge determines what the law is and what kind of evidence he will permit to be offered in the course of this trial and it has to meet certain stringent rules of evidence.

If, for example, something is prejudicial and has nothing to do with the probative value in regards to issues with which you are concerned, it doesn't come, you understand that?

- A I understand.
- And in that spirit, Mr. Weedman asked you very sincerely the question whether or not you would set aside any opinion you may have against Mr. Manson which you have learned from the news media and judge this case solely upon the facts

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in this case, and to which you responded in the affirmative, that you would do that; and, further, Mr. Weedman had asked you the question whether or not if the evidence showed that Mr. Grogan was perhaps closely associated with Mr. Manson that you could keep whatever prejudices you have against Mr. Manson aside and judge the evidence impartially, fully and fairly; and again you indicated you could.

Now, my question to you in this regard, and it is a logical extension of that, is if in accordance with the rules of evidence there is, for example, evidence of association with Mr. Grogan and Mr. Manson, will you promise that you will impartially weigh that evidence and consider it for the proper purpose for which it is offered, in accordance with his Honor's instructions?

- A I would,
- Q All right.

seen, or read or heard something outside this trial doesn't mean that merely because -- and, if it does -- some of that subject matter appears in the courtroom, that you are totally to disregard it because you heard it outside, you are to put aside any impression you have with respect to having heard, read or seen about that subject matter outside but to consider it here and evaluate it here in the light of the evidence in this case.

Would you do that?

- A I would.
- Now, Mr. Winn, I think I have a duty at the outset

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to tell you, and let me preface what I am about to tell you with the following observation: it is so important to reinforce it to each and every juror's mind, in this state upon the return of a first degree verdict, then the jury must decide the proper penalty, which may be life or it may be death; and in that connection, you will never get to that issue unless and until there is a return of a first degree murder verdict.

Do you understand that?

I understand.

Now, taking it one step further, assuming that the jury votes murder in the first degree, then additional evidence may or may not be presented in what we call the penalty hearing, or the penalty phase of the trial, such as evidence in mitigation of the ev dence, perhaps evidence in aggravation of the offense, evidence showing the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, considerations of the defendant's background and history.

These are all things which a juror may properly consider together with the evidence adduced at the guilt phase to determine the proper penalty in this case.

You understand that?

- I understand.
- Now, I don't know if you understand this point, and this is a very important one: there can be no return of a death penalty verdict unless all 12 jurors vote for death.

Do you understand that now?

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Q All right.

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Now, that means that if 11 jurors vote for the death penalty in their heart and their mind and their conscience and in their sole and absolute discretion and you, for example, as the 12th juror refrain from the death penalty and vote for life, there is no death penalty in this case.

You understand that?

A Yes.

- Would it be fair to say if you were of a mind, as you sit here now, that under no circumstances will you ever consider the death penalty, there could be no return of the death penalty in this case; isn't that correct?
 - A That's right.
- O So that it necessarily follows that the People could not get a fair trial on that issue should we reach that issue, isn't that right, if you were of that frame of mind?
 - A Yes.
- Iight of these observations and the light of the fact that there can be no return of the death penalty verdict unless and until 12 jurors unanimously vote for death, do you think that if the facts and the circumstances were such as to warrant the return of a death penalty, in your sole and absolute discretion, that you could and you would vote the death penalty?
 - A Yes.
- Now, you understand that after you get back into the jury room and discuss the issue of penalty, and let's assume that all 12 jurors vote the death penalty, you would,

nevertheless, be required to come right back into this jury box and be seated where you are sitting and tell the court by your verdict, for the crime of which Mr. Grogan is convicted of murder in the first degree he has been sentenced to die; could you do that?

- A Yes.
- O If it was consistent with your sole and absolute discretion and your conscience and your heart and your mind, could you do that?
 - A T could.
- Q Do you believe in the principle, sir, that all persons should be treated equally under the laws?
 - A I do.
- Q And I take it that you are aware of the fact that, as all thinking citizens are, that, unfortunately, this is not always the case; isn't that correct?
 - A That's correct.
- And, nevertheless, in a courtroom we try to put our prejudices aside if we can and we try to give both sides a full and fair trial; and that's what we are trying to do in this case, you understand that?
 - A I understand.

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O In that sense we are seeking one thing and I think it is fair to state that we are seeking the ascertainment of the truth. Would you agree with that?

A I agree.

O Do you believe that regardless of the person's exterior appearance, yellow, green, purple, whatever his ethnic background is, that he should be treated equally under the law?

A Right.

All right. If you were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that Mr. Grogan committed
the crime of murder in the first degree would you hesitate in
voting guilty solely because of the evident youth of Mr.Grogan?

A I -- would you --

Let me backtrack for a moment. Yes, and let me state at the outset I am not trying to ask any trick questions. If there is something in my question which causes you to become confused at all, please ask me to restate it or reframe it and I will be happy to do so. Because many times I lose my thought and I become confused and I will perhaps confuse you.

So let's backtrack and see if we understand one another. You are to base your verdict in the guilt phase based solely upon the evaluation of the evidence in the case. Isn't that correct?

A That's correct.

Now, in that connection you know, as having served on a jury before you are not to have your verdict influenced by any sympathy you may have for the defendant or any passion or

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prejudice you have against the defendant, isn't that correct?

A That's right.

Now, you will note as you see Mr. Grogan here he is in view of you, that he is a rather young man. Do you think that fact alone would cause you to render you unable to vote him guilty of murder in the first degree?

A No.

extend this concept that all people are equal under the laws, that whether a person is young or old or middle aged, or what have you, if the facts in the case warrant the return of the first degree murder verdict you would unhesitatingly vote that, is that correct?

A Yes, I would.

Q So what you are saying then is that you would not give to this defendant some benefit which you would not give to any defendant who finds himself in the same situation; is that correct?

A Right.

Now, you heard his Honor very clearly, and I thank him for doing so, discuss this concept of circumstantial evidence; did you not?

A I did.

In that connection Mr. Weedman asked you a question which pertains to one of the principles you will find in circumstantial evidence instructions, and that says that where there are two reasonable inferences -- and I underscore reasonable -- one of which points to the innocence of the

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defendant and the other pointing to the guilt of the defendant, you are dutybound to reject that which points to the guilt and must adopt and accept that which points to the innocence of the defendant.

Now, you indicated you had no quarrel with that concept, is that correct?

- A That's correct.
- Now, if his Honor will instruct you in that same instruction that where there are two inferences, one of which is unreasonable and which points to the innocence of the defendant, the other being reasonable and pointing to the guilt of the defendant, the court will instruct you that you are dutybound to again reject that which is unreasonable and adopt that which is reasonable, would you do that?
 - A I would.
- If that reasonable interpretation, that reasonable inference pointing to the guilt of the defendant created in your mind an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge, I take it you would not hesitate to vote guilty; is that correct?
 - A That's correct.
- Now, his Honor indicated to you at the outset this is a circumstantial evidence case in that there will be no presentation of the body or any parts thereof. There will be no eyewithess to the killing. There will be no evidence or testimony of a witness who had observed the body in death.

Do you understand that?

A I understand.

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Now, if from the circumstantial evidence in this case you felt an abiding conviction to a moral certainty that Mr. Grogan had murdered Mr. Shea, would you refuse to vote guilty solely because we failed to produce the body or any parts thereof or an eyewitness to the killing?

No. I would not.

Q All right. So what you are telling me is that you would not require the People to produce a body or to produce an eyewitness to the killing or an eyewitness to having observed the body in death, if the evidence in this case created an abiding conviction to a moral certainty that Mr. Shea is dead, that he met his death by a criminal agency and that Mr. Grogan was responsible for his death; is that correct?

A That's correct.

Now, do you feel because our case rests wholly upon circumstantial evidence that you would require the People to prove their case beyond all doubt and to demonstrate that degree of proof which excludes all possibility of error, or would you, rather, require the People to sustain their burden of proof which is required in all cases, namely, that degree of proof which creates an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge?

A Yes, I would.

Q All right. So in other words, we are not again going to make the People prove a greater degree of proof than that which we are already required to prove in law; is that correct?

A That's right.

Q You realize that the People are not required to prove and demonstrate this degree of proof which excludes all possibility of error and creates absolute certainty in your mind, for such proof is rarely if ever possible; do you understand that?

A I understand.

Now, I would like to give just one short example of circumstantial evidence and then ask you a question.

I am going to ask all of the prospective jurors who are now seated behind the railing to listen to this because I won't give it again in the interests of saving time. And in due respects to the other Il jurors I am going to change the example because they have already heard it.

I want you to assume for a moment you are out in the desert and you are 100 miles from any metropolitan area and there are no cars in sight and there are no buildings in sight except one building. And it seems to be a building in which refreshments are served. And there is one person there and he has three pies on a counter.

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And an individual walks up to the counter, there being no other persons within 100 miles of this little shack where they are selling pies, where this one person is selling pies. He asks how much the pies are and the individual who is selling the pies says, "Well, it's a dollar seventy-five a pie." And the person who wanted to buy the pie says, "Well, thank you, I don't have the money." And he starts to walk away.

The proprietor or the seller of the pies turns around for a moment to look in the other direction, and when he turns back about 15 seconds later he notices that there aren't three pies any more on that counter, that there are only two. And he sees the individual who had originally inquired about the pie, with a pie, and he is walking away and he is about 200 feet away from this shack where he was selling the pies, and there are no other persons within 100 miles of the place.

Now, that proprietor would draw the inference, would be not, and would be reasonable to do so, that the person who had originally inquired about the pies and who was presently in possession of one, took one without his permission; isn't that correct?

- A That's right.
- O That is a reasonable inference, isn't it?
- A That's right.
- Q All right.

So all we are talking about then in circumstantial evidence is you must draw inferences from facts which are proven to you; isn't that right?

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A Correct.

and she drives, for example, a Cougar. And she gets out of the car and you hear the car but you don't see her driving it. And she is about 3 feet from the car and you come to greet her at the front door, and you conclude that she drove home in that car. You don't see anybody else around. But yet you didn't see her drive it, did you?

A No.

Q That is a reasonable inference to be drawn, too, isn't that correct?

A That's right.

Q Isn't it fair to say in your everyday life you draw inferences, and from the inferences that you draw you act upon them, whether you punish a child for doing something, or you take certain action? Isn't that correct?

A That's right.

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Q I take it you would not hesitate, then, to draw reasonable inferences from facts that are proven to you by circumstantial evidence; is that correct?

A That's correct.

Now, it has been alleged in this indictment that Mr. Shea, the decedent, the alleged decedent, was killed between the dates August 16, 1969, and September 1, 1969.

Assuming for a moment that the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that Mr. Grogan murdered Mr. Shea between those dates alleged in the indictment would you, nevertheless, require the People to prove the exact date and the exact time of the death before voting guilty?

A I don't think so.

Q All right.

You say you don't think so?

Let me explain it this way, because I am not trying to trap you into any answer: we are only required to conform our proof to the allegations in the indictment, or the accusation, if you will; and the accusation alleges that Mr. Shea met his death between the dates August 16, 1969 and September 1, 1969; and if you were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that he, in fact, met his death during the period of time alleged in the indictment, I take it you wouldn't require us to prove the exact time and the exact date of his death; is that correct?

A That's right.

Q Is there any reason why you could not be fair and impartial to both sides, Mr. Winn?

- A No, there is not.
- Q May I ask you just generally what general area you reside in?
 - A Southwest area of Los Angeles.
- And, incidentally, with respect to police officers do you feel that police officers -- and some people, oddly enough, have this opinion -- would do anything in order to secure a conviction, such as take the stand and stretch the truth?
 - A No, I don't think they would.
- O Do you think that you would be willing to apply the same standards in judging the testimony of police officers as you would any other witness who takes the stand?
 - A I would.
- In other words, if his testimony is reasonable, if it is consistent with the other objective evidence presented in this case and you feel that it is worthy of weight, then you are entitled to accept it.

If, on the other hand, you feel it is not worthy of consideration, you are free to reject it because you are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts; is that fair enough?

- A Right.
- And it may come to pass that the People will have certain witnesses who are loosely termed former members of the Manson family.

Would your opinions be such concerning the Manson family in general that you would automatically refuse to consider their testimony in light of the objective evidence?

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A No.

Q All right.

I take it you would want to hear what they have to say, you'd observe their demeanor on the stand and you'd judge their testimony in the light of all the evidence made known to you; is that right?

A I would.

Mr. Winn, lastly, since you have had experience as a juror, I take it that you have been part of this judicious process of give and take in that you have discussed your conclusions with jurors back in the jury room and you have listened to their conclusions; is that right?

A I have.

Q And I take it that you probably found that to be not only an interesting experience but a pretty rewarding one; isn't that right?

A It was.

Mr. Winn, do you think that if you were selected as a juror in this case and you found a lot of issues that needed discussion that you'd be willing to listen to the opinions and conclusions of the other 11 members of the panel?

A Yes, I would.

And I take it you wouldn't take the attitude; as some jurors have in the past, "Well, I know how I am going to vote and I am going to sit in the corner until you come around to how I feel. I don't want to listen to what you have to say."

You wouldn't take that attitude, would you?

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A No, I would not.

And I take it that if another juror wanted to know,

"Well, Mr. Winn, that is an interesting point you raise. Can
you tell me the basis for your conclusion or your assumption?"

Will you be willing to explain to that juror,
patiently, how you arrived at your conclusion?

A Yes, I would.

And if you thought, for example, that when you initially entered the jury room that you were going to vote a certain way but after hearing the reasons for the conclusions of the other 11 jurors, assuming they had different conclusions and you thought that those conclusions were reasonable and you reexamined your own conclusions in light of their explanation, would you put your pride aside and would you change your view if, not by duress, and not by coercion, but by reason and logic you were convinced their view was right?

A Yes, I would.

MR. KATZ: Thank you, sir.

Pass for cause.

THE COURT: Now, let's see, gentlemen, where we were.

Do the People have a peremptory?

MR. KATZ: People accept the panel as now constituted.

THE COURT: Very well. How about the defendant?

MR. WEEDMAN: Your Honor, we will thank and excuse Mr. Cooley.

THE COURT: Very well.

THE CLERK: George W. McGregor, M-c G-r-e-g-o-r

GEORGE W. MCGREGOR

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27 28 BY THE COURT:

Now, I will ask you, Mr. Juror -- take it that you have heard everything that I have said this morning, you were seated in the courtroom?

Yes. A

I want you to assume that you have been sworn to try this case as a juror and assume you are a juror for the purpose of this question; and to assume the case has been tried and that the jury is sent to the jury room to try the case.

Now, assume that, and at that time the jury could make a finding of not guilty or the jury could make a finding of guilty as charged.

Now, if the jury makes a finding of not guilty, the case is concluded in its entirety.

If the jury makes a finding of quilty as charged and sets the degree of the crime murder second degree, then the jury is to say -- that is to say they have no further duties, their duties are concluded on the finding of murder second degree.

If the finding of the jury is guilty first degree murder, then the court must hold a penalty hearing; and at the penalty hearing the jury must determine whether the penalty is the death penalty or life imprisonment.

Is that all clear to you?

Yes.

Now, if you will please assume that you have arrived at this status where the jury has held a penalty

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occupation, please.

Q By whom are you employed?

hearing and you are voting on the question of penalty, I want to ask you this question; at that time would you automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of this case before you?

A No. sir.

O Thank you.

Now I will ask you another question, do you know of any reason at all that you could not be fair and impartial if you are selected to try this case?

A No, sir.

I will ask you this, should there be called any witnesses to the stand here to testify to any facts — I would ask you if you could put to one side entirely any personal feelings or convictions, likes or dislikes that you might have against such a witness and decide this case with an open mind, entirely on the facts as you believe the facts to be, in accordance with the law; but you are the judge of the facts, and disregard personal feelings or prejudices, if you have any, against any witness who may be called to testify?

Mr. McGregor, may I ask you your business or

A Yes.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Defendant may inquire.

MR. WEEDMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

1	A Bank of America.
2	Q Mr. McGregor, is there a Mrs. McGregor, and if so,
3	is she employed?
4	A No.
5 ` ³	Q I take it you are not married; is that so?
6	A I am married divorced.
7	Q. I see.
8	Mr. McGregor, should this trial last as much as
9	eight weeks will it cause you any personal hardship?
10	A Yes, it would.
11	Will you tell us about that, please.
12	A I have a letter that would cause hardship on my
13.	job to be away that long.
14	Q You say you have a letter?
15	A I have a letter to the court to that effect.
16	Q Would you care to present that to the court,
17	Mr. McGregor?
18	MR. WEEDMAN: Your Honor, may 1?
19	THE COURT: Yes.
20	Is that all right, counsel?
21	MR. KATZ: I have no objection, your Honor.
22	THE COURT: All right.
23	(Document handed to court.)
24	THE COURT: Well, suppose you counsel step up here a
.25	minute, will you come up, please.
26	MR. WEEDMAN: Yes, your Honor.
27	THE COURT: I don't think you need the reporter, unless
28 [.]	you want him. It is up to you, any way you want it.

I think we can do without him. MR. WEEDMAN: THE COURT: All right. If you want him, call him in. (Unreported discussion between court and counsel.) 8. 9. 10. · 一 21 '

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THE COURT: Now we are back in session.

Mr. McGregor, I have in my hand your letter and
I have read the letter from your employer. I appreciate the
letter but I do not feel that it constitutes legal ground for
excuse. I recognize your situation. If your employer complains,
tell him to complain to me and not to hold it against you.
Fire at me, not you.

And I do think I will overrule the letter because in the event that you are held, your services are needed as a juror. Thank you very much, though, for your statement, for this letter.

Now, where were we, gentlemen? I had finished, I had passed for cause?

MR. WEEDMAN: Yes, I believe you have, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.

BY MR. WEEDMAN:

Apart from the letter you have presented to the court, Mr. McGregor, are there any other personal hardship problems?

A No.

Q With respect to your perhaps having to serve as much as eight weeks on this jury?

A No.

Q All right, sir. In the matter of your experience as a juror have you sat previously on any criminal cases?

A No.

Q With respect to the matter of the death penalty would you in the kind of first degree murder case that I

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discussed a few moments ago with Mr. Winn automatically impose the death penalty?

MR. KATZ: Excuse me, your Honor. There is an objection on the grounds that it is ambiguous at this point. I don't know what counsel has reference to.

MR. WEEDMAN: Very well. I will withdraw the question. THE COURT: All right. It is withdrawn.

BY MR. WEEDMAN: In the event, after careful deliberation of all the evidence in the guilt phase, Mr. McGregor, you conclude that my client has committed first degree murder, a willful, premeditated malicious killing of another human being without any justification or excuse, would you automatically impose the death penalty without regard to additional evidence that may be presented to you?

A Yes.

MR. WEEDMAN: You would. Well, your Honor, I would respectfully challenge the juror for cause under Section 1073, subdivision 2, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do the People want to speak on that point?

MR. KATZ: Yes, we would like to examine Mr. McGregor.

THE COURT; Are you satisfied or do you want to examine?

MR. KATZ: I would like to examine Mr. McGregor.

THE COURT: Go ahead. Then I will go back to you in just one minute, Mr. Weedman.

Go ahead.

BY MR. KATZ:

0 Mr. McGregor, I am sure you appreciate the spirit in which these questions are asked of you, that Mr. Weedman 11-3

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certainly isn't trying to embarrass you, nor am I, you appreciate that. In that connection, sir, we are obliged to examine your state of mind in regards to the death penalty to determine whether or not you can give both sides a fair trial on the issue of penalty; you appreciate that, is that correct?

A Yes.

And in that connection you understand that if there is a penalty phase of this trial there may be additional evidence presented in the course of the penalty phase proceeding that is evidence perhaps in mitigation of the offense, evidence in aggravation of the offense, evidence showing the background, the history of Mr. Grogan. You may properly consider that along with the evidence presented in the guilt phase, and from that determine in your absolute and sole discretion the proper penalty in this case; do you understand that?

A Yes.

In other words, if you were of a mind, and I think Mr. Weedman was driving at this, that you would automatically vote the death penalty, each and every time following conviction of murder in the first degree without considering at all the evidence in the penalty phase, then you would not be an acceptable juror; you appreciate that?

A Yes.

All right. Now, would you be willing to consider whatever evidence might be presented in the penalty phase before you would make a decision as to the proper penalty in this case?

A Yes.

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- Grogan was convicted of murder in the first degree by the jury you would wait until you heard all of the evidence in the penalty phase before making a decision as to whether or not Mr. Grogan should live or die, is that correct?
 - A That's correct.
- Q I take it you are not telling us that you would automatically, on each and every ballot, irrespective of the evidence in the penalty phase vote for death; is that correct?
 - A I did not mean that, no.

MR. KATZ: All right. Thank you. I have no further questions.

A BY MR.WEEDMAN: Mr. McGregor, in the event that you have found my client guilty of murder in the first degree as I described a moment ago and no evidence at all is produced during the penalty phase, in other words, all you have then are the circumstances surrounding the killing, you have found that my client did it maliciously, wilfully, without justification or excuse, would you then automatically impose the death penalty?

MR.KATZ: I would object on the grounds that it now asks the juror to prejudge the evidence on the guilt phase, that being the sole basis for the determination of the evidence.

THE COURT: I will sustain your objection. Sustained.

Q BY MR. WEEDMAN: Mr. McGregor, would you have to hear evidence beyond the guilt phase in this trial in order to avoid the automatic imposition of the death penalty?

MR. KATZ: Again, your Honor, I think it requires a juror

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THE COURT: Well, let's have the question. Read the question, Mr. Reporter.

(The pending question was read by the reporter as follows:)

"Q Mr. McGregor, would have to hear evidence beyond the guilt phase in this trial in order to avoid the automatic imposition of the death penalty?"

THE COURT: Well, it assumes an automatic imposition of the death penalty for one thing. The witness has at this point, as I understand it, stated that it wouldn't be automatic.

MR. KATZ: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: He would discuss, he would consider the evidence. I will sustain the objection the way it is phrased.

Q BY MR. WEEDMAN: Mr. McGregor, what if any kind of evidence would you require during a penalty phase in order to avoid automatically imposing the death penalty?

MR. KATZ: Same objection, your Honor, for the reason previously stated.

THE COURT: I will sustain it.

MR. WEEDMAN: Well, your Honor, if I may be heard for the record I am willing to discuss the matter outside the presence of the jury or here.

MR. KATZ: I would rather have it outside the presence of the jury.

THE COURT: All right. You can come in chambers and argue if you desire.

(Proceedings in chambers with both counsel

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and the defendant present:)

THE COURT: We are in chambers. The defendant is here. First restate your question so we can start with the proper foundation.

MR. WEEDMAN: May we have it reread, your Honor? THE COURT: Yes.

> (The pending question was read by the reporter as follows:)

Mr. McGregor, what if any kind of evidence would you require during a penalty phase in order to avoid automatically imposing the death penalty?"

THE COURT: It is fallacious on two grounds. Then you can argue. What kind of evidence is not a statement of evidence, it is not evidence in this case. We will be arguing the law of other cases, other death penalty cases, number one.

Number two, it assumes that he is going to automatically vote a death penalty and he hasn't told us he would automatically vote a death penalty as I understand it.

MR. WEEDMAN: He did when I first questioned him.

THE COURT: Well, I don't think he understood. The question confused me. That doesn't mean that it would confuse somebody else.

MR. KATZ: My later questioning, your Honor, brought out the fact that he would not automatically impose the death penalty upon the return of a first degree murder verdict.

THE COURT: Well, I will sustain it on that ground. I don't think the testimony indicates that he would automatically 11a~3

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If he said he would automatically impose the death renalty I will excuse, and then we are just wasting time. And I don't think that is it, because he indicated that he would consider the question one way or the other on the penalty phase.

MR. WEEDMAN: Well, your Honor, I may be in error but of course during the voir dire the witnesses are sworn and in effect are testifying with respect to voir dire matters.

And the conduct of voir dire as your Honor I am sure, better than counsel knows, rules of evidence apply. I am permitted, it would seem to me, to cross-examine in a sense, this witness, relative to his, at least on the face, equivocal statements with respect to the death penalty.

THE COURT: Well, we are fighting shadows. The question is you ask the question would you automatically vote for the death penalty? Now, first of all if he says yes, he should get off of there.

MR. WEEDMAN: Counsel wouldn't permit that kind of a question. If your Honor will, I will be happy to ask it.

THE COURT: Well, yes.

MR. KATZ: That is not true, your Honor, if counsel asks a question "Would you automatically vote the death penalty irrespective of the evidence following the return of a first degree murder verdict?" then I have no objection to that question.

MR. WEEDMAN: But your Honor, the point is -THE COURT: I will permit after you hear -- if the jury
convicts the defendant and there is a penalty phase, at the
penalty phase would you automatically vote the death penalty?

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We are through. I will excuse,

MR. XATZ: No, without regard to the evidence --

THE COURT: Yes, without considering the evidence from the testimony in this case.

MR. KATE: That's right.

THE COURT: Now, would you automatically vote the death penalty? That is the end of it.

MR. WEEDMAN: Your Honor, I really asked just to come into chambers so I could make a bit of a record here.

THE COURT: Surely.

MR. WEEDMAN: I amply recognize your Honor has already ruled. I respect that, your Honor.

THE COURT: That is all right.

MR. WEEDMAN: In such a matter I thought I should particularly try and protect the record. For the record I would urge the proposition that neither side is required to produce evidence during the penalty phase. So that I should therefore be permitted to probe the juror's state of mind relative to the death penalty by asking a question in the form of "Following a first degree murder conviction, during the guilt phase would you automatically impose the death penalty if there was no evidence adduced at the penalty phase?" It seems to me to probably ---

THE COURT: Let me get my own thinking, and I will let you talk some more because I have got to answer these. Give my thinking. It assumes the People are not going to put — it is a rather unusual assumption. It assumes the People are going to hold a penalty hearing and remain mute.

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MR. WEEDMAN: They may.

THE COURT: Is it your intention to hold a penalty hearing, Mr. Katz, if there is a first degree verdict of guilty, first degree?

MR. KATZ: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. With that showing I think we are back fighting shadows. If the district attorney says, "No, we are not going to hold a penalty hearing" then I think you are in a position to ask your question. But I would make a ruling standing by my former position of objection sustained.

Now, go shead with your next position.

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MR. WEEDMAN: Well, just assuming, of course, that the prosecution did not put on any evidence at the penalty phase and assuming that the defendant does not, is a proposition only for purposes of exploring this juror's state of mind; and I admit that the People intend to put on evidence during the penalty phase —

THE COURT: Well, let's argue the law, not the facts.

If the People didn't put on a penalty hearing, the could would be immediately relegated to passing judgment on life imprisonment; and the minimum of the two requisites there, there wouldn't be a penalty hearing, I'd take hold and say, as a matter of fact, "Very well, I consider this first degree conviction to proceed on the basis of life imprisonment."

I mean, that's --

MR. KATZ: No, that's not --

THE COURT: -- from the standpoint --

MR. KATZ: That's not correct, your Honor.

MR. WEEDMAN: No; excuse me, your Honor, what I meant was -- I am sorry, I may have misspoken myself --

THE COURT: There wouldn't be any point in talking about it; that's what I am getting at.

MR. WEEDMAN: I think I misspoke myself.

It would be a penalty hearing, all right; in other words, the jury would still discuss the penalty. Counsel would argue the penalty --

THE COURT: I don't think I'd allow them. I don't think I can make a decision; I am not so sure -- I am not so sure -- now, wait a minute, I may withdraw my own thinking.

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MR. KATZ: / I think I could assist --

THE COURT: It would take a stipulation. We have got to have something for the jury to consider.

MR. KATZ: No, your Honor; may I --

THE COURT! You can't just say, "We are in a penalty hearing," period. There would have to be a statement or a clearance that all of the testimony at the trial on the merits is to be considered --

MR. WEEDMAN: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- fully. Yes, you have to have something for the jury on the penalty hearing.

MR. WEEDMAN: That is very correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WEEDMAN: But assuming that to be the case, and there would be no further, the issue would still be for the jury the question of the penalty.

THE COURT: That's correct.

MR. WEEDMAN: Your Honor, that really, then -- perhaps your Honor has hit on it; that is the thrust of my question.

In other words, and I certainly obviously didn't make it clear, if this juror, after hearing all of the evidence during the guilt phase --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WEEDMAN: -- and then, of course, taking that guilt phase evidence into the penalty phase with him --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WEEDMAN: -- but not having any additional evidence THE COURT: All right.

MR. WEEDMAN: -- would be automatically impose the death penalty.

MR. KATZ: That is asking him to prejudge the evidence, because he has heard all the evidence in the guilt phase; he has heard the quality of the killing, he has heard the circumstances surrounding the killing.

THE COURT: Yes, you see, it would -- "would you automatically?"

Now, let's wait a minute --

MR. WEEDMAN: Supposing he answered it "Yes," then I think, your Honor --

THE COURT: "Automatically impose the death penalty?"

MR. WEEDMAN: If he answered it "Yes," I think he'd be properly challenged.

THE COURT: Supposing he said, "Yes, I'd automatically impose the death penalty"?

MR. KATZ: Your Honor, may I make one observation, if I may?

Mr. Weedman is very correct when he says the law does not place the burden either on the defendant or the People to prove which penalty is the proper penalty in this case upon the return of a first degree murder conviction; so, therefore, the jury may, after considering the evidence, if any, presented at the penalty phase, for whatever reasons they have, vote in accordance with their sole and absolute discretion, the death penalty; and they may predicate that verdict based wholly on the evidence presented at the guilt phase.

Now, his question assumes that they have heard all

of the evidence; they learned the circumstances surrounding the killing, they made finding, for example, from the evidence that it was a particularly horrible and egregious crime and that it was without justification and without cause and that the culpability of the defendant is so great that in the absence of any further evidence under these peculiar circumstances, then it warrants a death penalty -- they don't know that; they can't prejudge the case.

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THE COURT: Let me take hold in this way, it could be handling the question -- first let me give you a record and say, as just framed, I would be inclined to sustain the objection; I am trying to give you a record here now.

Now, let's see if we can revamp it: if you were to state to the juror, "Mr. Juror, if you'll assume that you are at the penalty hearing and no further testimony will be produced in this case, and assume that there is no further testimony at the penalty hearing and that at the penalty hearing you are entitled to consider on the penalty hearing the testimony that has been heretofore produced at the trial of this action; but on the question of penalty, now, if such a situation should exist and you are reconsidering the testimony for the purpose of setting penalty, I want to know, are you going to automatically vote the death penalty?

MR. WEEDMAN: That's correct, your Honor.

MR. KATZ: Your Honor, I would object to that question because, again, it is asking the juror to prejudge the quality, nature and kind of evidence adduced at the guilt phase.

If he says would he automatically refuse to consider life imprisonment, irrespective of the evidence, presented in the guilt phase, then I agree he can ask that question; but it has to be --

THE COURT: This is what -- I said that.

MR. KATZ: It was not contained in your Honor's question.

THE COURT: I said it was to be presumed, if it was, could be as evidence at the preliminary phase.

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MR. WEEDMAN: Yes, you did, your Honor.

THE COURT: I said that.

MR. KATZ: Yes, you did, your Honor, but I think the court is missing the thrust of my objection.

Once they are told they can consider the death penalty based upon the evidence presented at the guilt phase, then they any properly vote the death penalty without any other evidence.

THE COURT: Yes, I can see that.

MR. WEEDMAN: That's right.

MR. KATZ: So you can't ask a juror at this time, not knowing what the evidence is going to be in the guilt phase, whether or not he would automatically vote the death penalty unless you tag along the addendum, "irrespective of the evidence" -- "irrespective of the kind and nature of the killing, would you automatically vote the death penalty without consideration of any further evidence?"

That is what we want to know.

MR. WEEDMAN: Well, your Honor, I agree completely with your Honor's question; I wish I had asked it that way, we might have saved some time; and surely we have a right to have a juror who will not automatically impose the death penalty, even though --

THE COURT: Excuse me. Now read my ---

MR. WEEDMAN: I won't say any more, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me hear my question back there, Mr.Reporter, and read the suggestion that I just made -- it is after 12 o'clock.

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Make a note of this, X it or something; here's a possible question:

position or holding or have held, about to hold a death penalty hearing, no additional testimony is given and it is — the case is turned over or submitted to the jury on the death penalty hearing on the basis of all the testimony heretofore given in the trial of this action, without further testimony being given on the position of the death penalty hearing, if that should be the situation, now, if that is the situation, at this hearing, with that testimony before you, would you automatically vote for the death penalty on the basis of that testimony?"

MR. KATZ: Well, then, your Honor, again I respectfully object on two grounds: Number one, the People, just as the defendant, are entitled to jurors who favor the death penalty, just as the defendant is entitled to have people on the jury who favor life imprisonment.

The only issue is whether, irrespective -- and that is the key -- irrespective of the evidence, would they vote automatically?

THE COURT: "Automatically."

MR. KATZ: One way or the other. If they would, then they do not comply with Witherspoon and 1073.2 and 1074.8 of the Penal Code and should be excused.

What you are telling them, in effect, by your question is, "Mr. Juror, I am going to tell you you can consider all of the evidence in this case presented at the guilt phase;

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I am going to tell you you can consider the gravity of the offense, the manner in which the decedent met his death, the personal culpability of the defendant, and I am further going to tell you, assume there is no further evidence presented at the penalty phase, would that evidence cause you, without further evidence, to automatically vote the death penalty?"

You are asking the juror to prejudge.

MR. WEEDMAN: Your Honor --

MR. KATZ: You are asking the juror to prejudge the evidence because at that point they are considering the evidence on the issue of penalty.

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THE COURT: Well, I don't necessarily agree with you, but if you were to put in your question "Would you automatically vote against the death penalty or would you consider this testimony as testimony at the death penalty hearing and then after having considered it, would you vote automatically for the death penalty?"

MR. WEEDMAN: I agree, your Honor.

THE COURT: I think if you put that in, in other words, I only partially agree. Maybe that covers you or doesn't. If you add that in there I think you are entitled to give the question.

MR. WEEDMAN: Of course, Mr. Katz will always have an opportunity to come back.

THE COURT: Well, I will allow it if you will add that in. I think it should be added in there.

MR. WEEDMAN: All right, your Honor. I will.

THE COURT: If you add that in I will overrule the objection, if it is re-asked, and I will allow the question to be asked the juror.

MR. WEEDMAN: Very well, your Honor.

THE COURT: Maybe we had better go over.

MR. WEEDMAN: Perhaps, your Honor, we could ask that question now and get an answer.

THE COURT: All right. Then we will go over.

MR. WEEDMÁN: All right.

THE COURT; All right.

The following proceedings were had

in open court:)

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THE COURT: Now we will go ahead.

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MR. WEEDMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

Mr. McGregor, assuming now that you have completed the guilt phase of the trial and from that guilt phase the jury has arrived at a verdict of a willful premeditated killing of another human being without justification or excuse. In short, a first degree murder which, of course, means maliciously as well. And of course thereafter you go into the penalty hearing and you are instructed naturally that you are to consider the evidence from the guilt phase. Do you understand me so far?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Now, in the event, during the so-called penalty phase, no additional evidence is produced --

THE COURT: Now, this is an assumption, just an assumption.

All right. I am not trying to interrupt you, but I want to get that clear.

MR. WEEDMAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Go ahead now.

Q BY MR. WEEDMAN: Assuming no additional evidence is produced so all you have to consider now is the first degree murder, my question then is would you automatically impose the death penalty?

MR. KATZ: Objection for the record, your Honor.
THE COURT: Now the objection in there.

MR. KATZ: Yes, the objection for the record, on the grounds previously stated in chambers.

THE COURT: All right; Now, I am going to add in there

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the question is: would you automatically vote for the death penalty? I am going to amplify the question. If you did or didn't vote for the death penalty at that time and place as indicated by counsel, would you consider such evidence that was given at the trial, analyze it with your fellow jurors, consider it, and then the question is would you automatically vote for the death penalty or would you consider it carefully with an open mind before passing your vote or rendering your vote? That is what the question is.

Now, restate it. I am not trying to disrupt your question, but I am trying to get it clear to the juror.

MR. WEEDMAN: I appreciate that, your Honor.

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In other words, Mr. McGregor, for purposes of our question you are in the penalty phase now and you have well in mind the first degree murder conviction. You are now convinced as the law requires you to be convinced that my client has committed a willful, premeditated, malicious murder. And you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty as you must be.

Would you in the penalty phase in the absence of additional testimony automatically return a death penalty verdict?

- A I -- in returning a death penalty I would have to hear the viciousness and the evidence of how vicious the crime was, probably before the passing the death penalty.
- All right. That is fine. In other words, Mr. McGregor, what you are telling us then is that if you go into a penalty phase you are not going to automatically do anything?
 - λ Yes.
- Dut you are going to wait until you have considered the evidence in light of the penalty determination?
- A Before passing the death penalty I would want to hear every possible bit of evidence.
- Surely. And we don't wish to mislead you here because the chances are very likely that both sides will introduce evidence during the penalty phase, do you understand that?
 - A Yes.
- Q That we would not, it is merely an assumption for purposes of trying to find out how you feel frankly about the

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death penalty.

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A Yes.

MR. WEEDMAN: Perhaps we should adjourn.

THE COURT: All right.

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I think, folks, we are after 12. Now, we will recess.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, under the circumstances as they are, we will go over from this time -- you are now down to ten minutes after 12 on Friday -- until Tuesday.

Theoretically Monday is the 4th of July, which it isn't, but it is supposed to be.

Now, several things keep in mind, folks. Return to this courtroom. Kindly return promptly because we cannot operate without,
certainly, the jurors here that are in the box and we must
have you all here promptly. And next you must not, ladies
and gentlemen, any of you discuss the case with anybody at all
or come to any opinion or conclusion.

And we will go over until 9:30 Tuesday morning. Thank you very much.

(At 12:10 p.m. an adjournment was taken until 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday, July 6, 1971.)

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