ĺ SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 2 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 3 HON. JOSEPHL L. CALL, JUDGE DEPARTMENT NO. 52 4. Ś PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. 6 Plaintiff, 7 NO. A 267861 8 STEVE GROGAN. 9. Defendant. 10 11 12 REPORTERS! DAILY TRANSCRIPT 13 MONDAY, AUGUST 16, 1971 15 16 17 18. APPEARANCES: 19 (See Volume 1) 20 21 23 24 VOLUME 34: Reported by: 25 Pages 4481 - 4588 incl. VERNON W. KISSEE, C.S.R. -and-26 GEORGE WEBER, C.S.R. Official Reporters 27 28

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PEOPLE v. STEVE GROGAN NO. A-267861	VOLUME 34 - Pgs. 4481 Monday, August 16, 19	- 4588 71
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PEOPLE'S WITNESS	DIRECT	CROSS
CROCKETT, Paul (Cont'd.)	4486	451 453
	Andrew Programme	
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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, MONDAY, AUGUST 16, 1971 9:40 A.M.

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(The following proceedings were had in chambers:)

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27 28 THE COURT: Now we are in chambers. I have asked counsel to step in and the defendant and the reporter and sheriff and the clerk.

Now, basically speaking to Mr. Weedman, although
I want to take time on this, I have, Mr. Weedman, your request
here and affidavit and order for the removal of prisoners.

Now, I haven't put my name on this yet. I am disturbed. I am putting everything right on the table here. I am disturbed basically because the folks that you asked to subpoena, Taylor, Houston and Sheppard, unfortunately are men that are in San Quentin, Chino and Folsom.

Now, if it were just a question of subpoening these men in here and returning them, that is one thing.

I am very disturbed about the escape prospects of these men. In the newspapers, I believe, 30 or 60 days ago, or so, -- not one of these men, as far as I know -- but when they were subpoensed from the state prison one man was shot dead attempting to escape. I can't name his name. I don't know. It is a matter of record. The other made good on it.

In other words, I am awfully disturbed about the custody situation, bringing them over to this courthouse here or even in the other courthouse, the Hall of Justice.

And the fact that the problems arise concerning

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escape. Now, you see, we can't go with the standard I have set in this case here. I have acquired a certain amount of confidence in Mr. Grogan. That is why I am not worried.

I suppose there is an element of worry. But that awful worry is not here. I have developed confidence in him.

I have exercised and allowed a great deal of liberty. I took on, if I can use a callous expression, the sheriff's department. They wanted to cut down. I said, "I am running this courtroom, not you. When a prisoner comes in here you are out of this picture."

I am not talking about the bailiff here. This is the headquarters.

"I am running this, and not you, and you do as I tell you in this courtroom as the law provides, or you will be in trouble."

That is exactly what I said, and I will follow it up with Pitchess if necessary.

I am just showing you -- but that is only because I have a certain amount of confidence in Grogan, that I will do that.

But I am in trouble here. There is my problem. Now, can you make a showing by an offer of proof as to the absolute materiality of these men.

MR. KATZ: Certainly outside my presence. I know you wouldn't ask for an offer of proof in my presence.

I am not entitled to know, and I wouldn't ask
Mr. Weedman to make an offer of proof in my presence.

MR. WEEDMAN: I have forgotten who is there. I submitted

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a subpoena for several witnesses.

Is that Taylor and --

THE CLERK: Sheppard and Houston.

We had requested Houston while he was still MR. WEEDMAN: in the county jail, but apparently that wasn't processed rapidly enough by the sheriff's department. So we lost him, and he ended up in Chino:

Now, in connection with your Honor's request, I would ask that the matter be deferred perhaps until a little I would like to talk to my client. later in the day.

THE COURT: I wish you would. First of all what you are entitled to, I am the last person in God's world to prevent you from having.

MR. WEEDMAN: Yes, your Honor.

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about the elements of escape. Unfortunately, let's say they're in trouble, they get out of there, and they will take any kind of a chance. Like I say, one of them was shot dead.

MR. WEEDMAN: Not in connection with our case.

THE COURT: No, no. I'm showing you the overall problem.

And the other man did make good. That is what worries me.

There is a problem.

So I wish you would talk to your client -- MR. WEEDMAN: Yes, I will.

THE COURT: -- to see if it is absolutely essential. If it isn't, let's have another discussion on this.

MR. WEEDMAN: All right, your Honor. I will discuss it with him a little bit later in the morning.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WEEDMAN: And we can come back in and approach the matter again.

THE COURT: Right.

The People have another witness now?

MR. KATZ: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Let's go then.

(The following proceedings were had in open court outside the presence of the jury:)

THE COURT: Well now, gentlemen, we will go right ahead.

People against Grogan.

The defendant is here, both counsel are here.

You can bring in the jury, Sheriff, we will go

ahead.

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(The following proceedings were had in open court in the presence of the jury:)

THE COURT: Is this gentleman your witness?

MR. KATZ: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: You can step around, please, and we will swear you to be a witness in this case.

Raise your right hand and be sworn, please.

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PAUL CROCKETT,

called as a witness by the People, testified as follows:

THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear the testimony you may give in the cause now pending before this court shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

THE WITNESS: I do.

THE CLERK: Thank you, sir.

Will you take the stand and be seated, please.

THE COURT: Sit right here and pull your chair up a little -- that's it -- so you can talk in there like a telephone. Keep your voice up so all the jurors can hear everything you say. Keep that right close to your mouth.

THE CLERK: Will you be kind enough to state your name?

THE WITNESS: My name is Paul Crockett.

THE CLERK: Will you spell the last name.

THE WITNESS: C-r-o-c-k-e-t-t.

THE CLERK: Thank you.

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	1 .	THE COURT: Now we have all the jurors and alternates.
	2	You may proceed.
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INDEX	4	DIRECT EXAMINATION
	Ś	BY MR. KATZ:
	6	Q Mr. Crockett, because the jurors were not seated
	7.	when you stated your name, will you state it once again so
	. 8 (the jury knows who you are.
	9΄,	A My name is Paul Crockett.
	10	Q Mr. Crockett, calling your attention to the time
	11 -	period in August and September of 1969, where were you living?
	12	A I was living at the Barker Ranch in Goler Canyon.
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Q All ri	ЧH	1 L	٠

Paul, you have a tendency to lower your voice. Would you speak right into that microphone just like a telephone.

- A Okay.
- Q That's much better.

THE COURT: That is better.

Q BY MR. KATZ: Thank you.

And were you living with some other people at the Barker Ranch in August and September of 1969?

- A Yes, I was.
- Q And with whom?
- A There was Brooks Poston. And Paul Watkins. And there was a girl by the name of Juanita Wildbush.

THE COURT: Talk up.

THE WITNESS: Juanita Wildbush. And a boy by the name of Bob Berry.

- Q All right. And in August and September of 1969 what were you doing for a living?
 - A I was working up there with some business associates.

THE COURT: Talk up.

THE WITNESS: I was -- excuse me, sir.

THE COURT: All right. Keep your voice up.

THE WITNESS: I was working with some business associates, and at that particular time I was playing the part of prospector.

Q BY MR. KATZ: You say you were playing the part.
Were you too successful in connection with the finding of gold?

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1	A One girl we called by the name of Bo.
2	Q Barbara Rosenberg?
3	A I am not sure'
4	Q Don't guess.
5	A about that.
6	Q All right.
7	Where had you met her?
8	A She came up there with Paul Watkins.
9	Q I see. Now, after having met Charles Manson
JÒ.	around September 1, 1969, did you have some conversations with
n	him and you can answer this yes or no.
]2	A Yeah, I had quite a few, yes.
13	Q All right.
14	And can you tell us whether or not sometime in
15	September of 1969 the defendant, Mr. Grogan, came up to the
16	Barker and Myers Ranch area?
17	A He sure did.
18	Q When was it that you were first aware of the
19	presence of the defendant, Mr. Grogan?
20_	A When I was first aware of him?
21	Q Yes.
22	A Was there at the Barker Ranch.
23	THE COURT: Set the date.
24	Q BY MR. KATZ: Now, can you set the date for us?
.25	A I would say it was somewhere in the neighborhood
26 ·	of the middle of the month.
27 .	THE COURT: Of when?
28	THE WITNESS: Middle of September.

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BY MR. KATZ: What year?
                 Q
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                       1969.
                 A
        2
                       All right.
                 Q
        3
                       And this is a rough approximation, is that
        4
            correct?
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                       Right.
                 A
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                       And --
                  Q
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                  MR. WEEDMAN: Excuse me, your Honor. I think counsel --
        8
            I think we are entitled to a date of this conversation.
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THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WEEDMAN: If the witness knows the date, fine. I don't think it is fair for counsel to say, "Now, this is an approximation, right."

THE COURT: Well, set it as close as you can.

THE WITNESS: Oh, I would say in the neighborhood of about the second week of September.

THE COURT: The second week of September?

THE WITNESS: Right.

THE COURT: Of 1969?

THE WITNESS: 1969, right.

Q BY MR. KATZ: Where did the conversation take place?

A At the main house of the Barker Ranch.

Q This is where you were living in September 1969?

A No. At that time there was a little house outside of the ranch that I was staying at.

Q But you were staying at Barker Ranch as opposed to the Myers Ranch, is that correct?

A Right.

Q Do you recall who was present, if anyone, during this conversation in the second week of September, 1969?

- A Oh, there was Clem --
- Q Who was Clem?
- A Steve Grogan.
- Q Is he in the courtroom today?
- A That is him right over there (indicating).
- Q Would you point him out so we know for the record?

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27 28 A Right over there. (Indincating.)

MR. KATZ: May the record reflect the witness pointed to the defendant in this case?

THE COURT: That's right, yes.

Q BY MR. KATZ: Who else was present, if you know?

A Well, at that time there was -- the most outstanding part in my memory is the fact of what was said instead of who was present.

THE COURT: But the first thing -- you've got the cart ahead of the horse a little. I want to know -- counsel are entitled to know who was there. The jury must know, first, so we will know who we are talking to and who was there.

THE WITNESS: Clem was there.

THE COURT: You have said that Clem was there, and you were there. Who else?

THE WITNESS: Well, nearly all the members of the Manson-

THE COURT: Talk in the phone.

THE WITNESS: Nearly all the members of the Manson family were there. But you are talking about in the general area.

THE COURT: About the conversation.

Q BY MR. KATZ: We are talking about in the immediate vicinity of the conversation as opposed to being in the general area, that is, the Barker and Myers Ranch area.

- A Charlie was inside.
- Q Charlie who?
- A Manson.
- Q He was inside where?

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A The house.

Q Just fix where the conversation took place. Was this inside or outside?

- A It was on the outside of the building.
- Q I see. What part of the building?
- A It would be out in front of it.
- Q In the front of the building, is that correct?
- Á Yes.
- Q Charlie is inside this large ranchhouse, or this ranchhouse at Barker's Ranch, is that correct?
 - A Yes.
- Q All right. But who was there in the vicinity of the conversation, if you recall?
 - A The only party I remember is Clem.
- Do you recall whether or not there were other people but you don't remember specifically who it was, or are you stating let me finish the question, Paul, if I can are you stating that you just don't recall other people being present?
 - A Well, some of them I didn't know.
- O So you are telling us there were some people that were in the vicinity of the conversation but you don't recall who they were, is that correct?
 - A Right.
- Q Is there anybody else you can think of that you can identify as having been in the vicinity of the conversation?
- A There was a couple of the girls there but I don't recall offhand which ones they were.

I didn't say anything.

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1	But at that particular time there was about four
2	or five of us in there.
` 3	Q All right.
4	And under what circumstances did you see the gun?
5	A Well, I saw it pointed at my face, cocked.
6``,	Q You saw the gun pointed at your face?
7	A Yes.
8-	Q Who had it?
9	A Charlie.
10	Q And did you see anybody else in possession of that
11	gun?
12	A Well, Danny De Carlo had it. And Bruce Davis had
13	it.
14	Q Did you see each of these individuals with it,
15	Danny De Carlo and Bruce Davis?
16	A Yes.
17	Q Now, I want to call your attention to the last part
18	of September 1968
19	THE COURT: '68?
20	MR. KATC: Excuse me. '69. THE COURT: All right.
21	THE COURT: All right.
22	Q BY MR. KATZ: and ask you whether or not you
23	talked with a Deputy Pursell in the Goler Wash area.
24	A I did.
25	Q And sometime following talking with Deputy Pursell
26	did you leave Barker Ranch with somebody?
. 27	A Yes, I did.
28 .	Q Approximately when was it that you left the Barker

1	Ranch?	
2	A Well, it was October the 2nd.	
3	Q And who did you leave with?	
4	A Brooks Poston.	
5	Q Where did you go?	
6	A We went to Shoshone.	
7	Q And did you see anybody there?	,
8	A I went straight to the deputy sheriff	there.
9.	Q And the following day did you see a De	puty Ward?
10	A I did.	
11	Q Incidentally, at the time that you lef	t Barker
12	Ranch with Brooks Poston, on or about October 2nd,	1969, where
13	was Paul Watkins?	
14	A He had gone into Las Vegas to get some	supplies.
15	Q And was Juan Flynn at the ranch at the	it time, or
16	had he previously left?	,
17	A No, he was gone.	
18	MR. KATZ: Excuse me, your Honor, for stepping	g in front
19	of the bench.	
.20	THE COURT: All right.	
21	MR. KATZ: We have some exhibits here.	
22	THE COURT: All right.	:
23	Q BY MR. KATZ: Showing you People's 9-1	and 9-B for
24	identification, I want you to take a careful look	at these
25	revolvers.	
26	Would you look at these, Mr. Crockett	(handing),
27	Have you seen them? What I am asking	you, have
28	you seen exhibits 9-A and 9-B in front of you?	

I ;	A Yeah. I looked at them, yes.
2	Q All right.
3 .	I am going to ask you whether or not either 9-A
4	or 9-B looks similar to the gun that Charles Manson, Bruce
5	Davis and Danny De Carlo displayed in September of 1969.
б.	A Well, I only saw one but it's very similar to the
7	ones that I saw.
8 :	Q All right.
9	When you say similar, what do you mean by similar? A When I say similar
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13	that that is the exact gun, but it's pretty close.
14	Q All right.
15	I understand that. But with reference to the
1,6	style and shape of the gun, that is what I have reference to.
17	Was it similar in all respects to the gun that you
18	saw Manson, Davis and De Carlo with? In terms of the size and
19	shape and the model.
20	A Right.
21	MR. WEEDMAN: I will object to the question, your Honor.
22	THE COURT: Talk in the phone.
23	THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I would say
24	MR. WEEDMAN: Excuse me, your Honor.
25	THE COURT: Strike the answer.
26	MR. WEEDMAN: I will object to the question as leading
27	and suggestive, your Honor, and it is also overly broad in all
28	respects.

I think we are entitled to have this witness --1 after all it is an important piece of evidence -- tell us what 2 he remembers about the gun that he saw. 3 THE COURT: Overruled! 4 But it is a matter you can ask on cross. 5 The question is, "Is it similar?" I believe. б 7 is entitled to an answer. 8 MR. KATZ: Thank you, your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Whether it carries strength and force, that is for the jury. 10 THE WITNESS: Well, I couldn't positively say that it's 11 12 exactly the same gun, but it sure looks like it. 13 MR. KATZ: Thank you. 14 I would like to show you 32-R for identification. 15 Do you recognize this individual? 16 A Yes. 17 As having seen him before? 18 A. Yes, sir. 19 Who is that? 0 20 That is Bruce Davis. 21 Bruce Davis, you say, is one of the individuals 22 you saw with the gun similar to exhibit 9-A and 9-B, is that 23 correct? 24 A Yes. 25 And incidentially showing you this gentleman, who 0 26 is that? 27 That is Charlie Manson. 28 0 And showing you -- I should identify that exhibit.

That is People's 5. 1 Thank you. THE COURT: 2 BY MR. KATZ: That is Charles Manson depicted in 3 People's 5? 4 A Yes. 5 And showing you 32-M, do you recognize that? Q б That's Clem. A 7 By Clem who do you mean? 0 8 The defendant. A 9 Incidentally, I believe you said that Danny De Carlo Q 10 also had a gun similar to the one that Manson and Davis had, 11 is that correct? 12 That's true. 13 Showing you 32-F for identification, do you 14 recognize this individual? 15 It looks like Danny De Carlo. A 16 All right. That's 32-F for identification. 17 Mr. Crockett, I would like to show you some photo-18 graphs in the 38 series which show Barker's Ranch. 19 And can you tell us whether or not, as we look at 20 21 38-C, there is visible the place where you were sleeping at Barker's Ranch? 22 That would be the little hut in the right. 23 Is that the building which is presently encircled 24 and bears the initials P.W.? 25 26 A Right. 27 That is reflected on 38-C for identification, is 28 that correct, Mr. Crockett?

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MR. WEEDMAN: Your Honor, I wonder if I might have just a moment, perhaps about five minutes, before I start cross?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

Ladies and gentlemen, we will take a short recess.

Please do not discuss the case or come to any opinion. We will go right ahead in just a minute.

You can step down if you want to. Don't go away, but you can step down.

(Recess.)

(The following proceedings were had in chambers, outside the presence and hearing of the jury.)

THE COURT: We are in chambers, the defendant, his counsel, the clerk, the sheriff, and the reporter.

Go ahead, Mr. Weedman.

MR. WEEDMAN: Your Honor, with respect to those three witnesses, Taylor, Sheppard, and Houston, whom we requested, I feel that their testimony is extremely important here in light of the People's theory of helter-skelter, and in light of the People's apparent theory that one of the motives for the killing of Shorty Shea was the fact that he was married to a colored woman, Magdalene Shea. These three witnesses are black.

THE COURT: They are Negro, black?

MR. WEEDMAN: Yes, closely known by my client, and he to them, during a substantial period of time in the county jail.

It is unfortunate for our purposes, frankly, that we find it necessary --

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THE COURT: Now, these are all up in -- they haven't been moved down here at all into our county facilities, at all; they are all up North?

MR. WEEDMAN: They are now.

THE COURT: They are now, yes.

MR. WEEDMAN: But they were not always there.

THE COURT: If I issued a subpoena, I would want to make it very clear in the presence of everybody — I wouldn't hesitate for one minute to attempt to put restrictions on the Sheriff's Department in bringing these men in here fully cuffed so that they can't raise hell, if I can put it bluntly, just speak candidly, with my policies, but I would put them in cuffs. Now, the question that you and the defendant have to determine — and now I may be acting in a partisan manner when I say this — is the effect of these men cuffed in front of the jury. These are your decisions, they are not mine. If I bring them in here, these are things you have to decide.

THE DEFENDANT: Handcuffed? Oh, man!

MR. WEEDMAN: I think that perhaps a perusal of their respective records and their deportment while in custody, these things may have some bearing on whether --

THE COURT: It could be.

MR. WEEDMAN: In other words, it may not be necessary to handcuff them.

THE COURT: I won't make a closed-door decision, but I'm saying the door is awfully close to being closed.

MR. WEEDMAN: I might add, we are well aware that these men have serious felony convictions, which, of course,

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counsel can present to the jury. They are not the world's best witnesses, but since my client didn't have breakfast on this occasion with the President of the United States, we are stuck with these kinds of witnesses. They are not the world's greatest witnesses, except they are black. They will testify generally to my client's well-known attitude toward the black people, and we feel it is important.

I'm sorry that the case got into this area, but it has very definitely, and the only way we can counter it is by producing black people. We have others, but --

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27 28 THE COURT: I would want to make my position very clear.

MR. WEEDMAN: I appreciate that, your Honor.

THE COURT: There is an instance where I may have, as I have indicated before, told the sheriff with respect to

Mr. Grogan I am going to allow certain privileges and liberties.

But I wouldn't carry that into these witnesses.

MR. WEEDMAN: No, at all. They are not my clients.

THE COURT: I will be satisfied beyond a doubt, or I am going to cuff them.

MR. WEEDMAN: I appreciate that, your Honor,

THE COURT: There is no question about it in my mind. I am not closing the door because it is possible I may say "Well, here is a man that I can put on the stand there without danger to everybody or without making a break for the door, or somebody flip him a six-shooter or something," I don't know.

MR. WEEDMAN: Well, I think the security should be appropriate, whatever it is.

THE COURT: But I think this is something you ought to think over. These are your problems, not mine.

Do you want to talk, Mr. Katz, before I sign these orders here?

MR. KATZ: Well, the only comment perhaps I should make or would be even entitled make is this: that I had conferred with some people in our office, some of my superiors, and they were vitally concerned about bringing down what they regarded as possible dangerous witnesses, where there might not be a showing of materiality.

I know Mr. Weedman is a very fine, competent lawyer,

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 and I am sure that he is in very good faith in stating to the court --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. KATZ: -- that these witnesses would be material. The only thing my office had suggested -- I will throw this out to your Honor as a conduit, if you will --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. KATZ: Mr. Weedman perhaps might submit an affidavit which would not be available to me or to advise your Honor the facts or basis of the so-called materiality so that your Honor is satisfied.

I can tell you that Sheppard has been convicted of first degree murder and serving life imprisonment.

THE COURT: What is the setup, for instance, on -- I don't know. Now, let's see. Sheppard.

How about Houston and Taylor?

MR. KATZ: Now, as I understand Kenneth Houston I don't know what his latest arrest is. I think he is serving time for a 245 P.C., conviction which I believe to be assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily harm. And is presently in the state prison system as a reuslt of that.

THE COURT: What escapes, if any, on Houston?

MR. KATZ: Well, I have no information concerning that.

Now, there was a witness, for example, Kenneth Daniel Como, C-o-m-o, who was to be subpoenaed by the defense, and he actually effected a successful escape.

THE COURT: Is he out now?

MR. KATZ: I don't think he is even available to defense

counsel at this point.

THE COURT: No, but he hasn't been brought back into custody?

MR. KATZ: That is correct.

He has not been brought back into custody, and indeed he is a friend of a person who may be a defense witness, George Evans Harp, H-a-r-p, who had attempted escape with this Daniel Kenneth Como on one prior occasion.

And with respect to Mr. Houston -- not Houston, but I think Mr. Taylor, I have no information concerning Mr. Taylor at this time.

But once again I want to reiterate, it is not the People's position we have any right --

THE COURT: Well, I want you to be heard.

MR. KATZ: Yes. We want to emphasize that we do not feel that we are entitled to any discovery or information --

THE COURT: Well, I think as defense counsel advises me they have a materiality, as a reputable counsel at this bar, I will take his statement.

And I will issue with the caution I have injected into it -- those are decisions actually which fall upon your shoulders and on the defendant more than for me -- but I am saying that is what I would do unless I should definitely be satisfied to the contrary.

I say the probabilities are I would bring them in under full security. I would want that to be the prevailing thought.

The other would be the exception. But I will

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issue and bring them down, then see where we go.
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                            Very well, your Honor, thank you.
            MR. WEEDMAN:
 2
                          I will do it now.
            THE COURT:
 3
                            Thank you.
            MR. WEEDMAN:
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            MR. KATZ:
                         Thank you.
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            THE COURT:
                          All right.
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(The following proceedings were had in open court.)

THE COURT: Now, gentlemen, People against Grogan. The defendant is here, both counsel are here.

You can bring in the jury, Sheriff, please.

(The following proceedings were had in open court in the presence of the jury.)

THE COURT: Now, gentlemen, we have all of our regular jurors, plus the alternates.

You may proceed with cross.

MR. WEEDMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. WEEDMAN:

- Q Mr. Crockett, when did you first go up to Barker Ranch to live?
 - A It was back in March, 1969, the first week in March.
 - Q What were you doing for a living in March of 1969?
 - A I was working with my business associates.
- Q In what capacity were you working with your business associates?
- A Well, I was a partner in the -- there were three of us in it.
 - Q Who are the other two?
 - A There was Stan Berry and Jack Diggs.

THE COURT: Let's see if I can help you. When you talk, let's take our time here. Now, talk like this were a telephone.

1	the country that they were looking at at that time.
2	Q You mean Diggs and Berry took the vehicle?
3	A Right.
.4	Q Pardon me?
5	A Yes.
6	Q And you'remained behind by yourself, is that what
7	happened?
8	A Well, I wasn't necessarily by myself. I mean
9	there were other people there.
10	Q Who else was there? You were talking about the
n	Barker Ranch?
12	A Right.
13	Q Who élse was there?
14	A There was Paul Watkins and Stan's brother and the
15	girl that I mentioned, and Brooks Poston.
16	Q Did you make any money at all from March 1969
17	to September 1969?
18	A You mean personally?
19	Q Yes.
20.	A No.
21	Q You indicated that it didn't cost very much money
22	to live up there. Did it cost anything at all during that
23	period of time to live at Barker Ranch as you were doing?
24	A Did it cost anything at all?
25	Q Yes.
26	A They were bringing supplies to me.
27	Q Who was bringing you supplies?
28	A I have already stated, Stan Berry and Jack Diggs.
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:	Q When did you meet Paul Watkins the very first
1.	time?
2	
3	A It would be in the latter part of May 1969.
4 .	Q What, if anything, was he doing for a living at
5	that time?
6	A Nothing that I know of.
Ź:	Q Did he come to live with you in the latter part of
8	May of 1969?
9	A I don't know whether he came to live with me or
10	not. But
įr	Q Did he begin to live with you in May of 1969?
12	A .Well, we stayed in that same hut there that I
13	identified in the picture.
14	Q You wouldn't characterize that, then, as living
15	with you? Just sharing the same quarters, would that be a
16	fair statement?
17	MR. KATZ: I will object on the grounds it is argumenta-
18	tive and ambiguous.
19	THE COURT: You can answer the question. All right.
20	THE WITNESS: Well, we lived under the same roof, yes.
.21	Q BY MR. WEEDMAN: When did you meet Brooks Poston?
22	A When he first came there.
23	Q For the first time.
24	A The first week of March 1969.
25	Q What, if anything, was Mr. Poston doing for a
26	living at that time?
27	A Nothing that I could see.
28	Q Did Mr. Poston then live with you from March of

19.693 1 No, sir. It was some time later. He stayed in Α 2 the big house. 3. When did he begin to live with you, that is, Q. 4 Mr. Poston? 5 I think it was about two or three weeks later. 6 Now, what were Mr. Poston and Mr. Watkins doing 7 . for money, if anything, during this period of time, March to 8 September of 1969? ġ Nothing that I know of. A 10. 9 fls 11 12 13 14 15 16 AND A PROPERTY 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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-1	1	Where did their food come from, if you know, during
	2	this period of time?
	3	A During that period of time?
	4	Well, they had some supplies there. But
	5.	Q Excuse me. Like what?
	6	A Well, there was flour and several cases of bean
	7	sprouts.
	8	And then there was canned stuff. A few canned
	9.	objects. Some potatoes. Some powdered milk.
	10	And some of the things that you would classify as
	m	a commodity list.
	12	Q Did you furnish either Mr. Poston or Mr. Watkins
	13	with food during this March to September 1969 period?
	14	A Some.
	15.	Q How much in terms of their overall needs did you
	16	supply?
·	17	A Well, you can't really say that I supplied. They
	18	were living with me and I was getting supplies from Mr. Diggs.
	19	Q Well, was Mr. Diggs supplying them, that is,
	20	Mr. Poston and Mr. Watkins, with food during this period of
	21 :	time we have been talking about?
	22	λ Some, yes.
	23	Q In terms of their overall needs, how much was it?
	24	Half, or a third or 80 percent or what?
	25	A I think half would be.
	26	Q Okay. And what, if anything, were Mr. Watkins and
	.27	Mr. Poston doing in exchange for this food?
	28	A What were they doing in exchange for it?

1	Q Yes.
2	A You mean by agreement?
3	A Yes. By agreement or otherwise.
4	MR. KATZ: Well, I will object. Compound then "By
5	agreement or otherwise."
6	THE COURT: I will sustain the objection to the last
7	question.
8	Q BY MR. WEEDMAN: Was there any understanding
ý	between Mr. Diggs, Mr. Poston and Mr. Watkins relative to
10	services or payment for the food Mr. Diggs was supplying them
11	A He never came up, so I would say no.
12	Q Was there any understanding between yourself and
13	either Mr. Poston or Mr. Watkins relative to services or
14	payment for the food that you were supplying them?
15	A None that I know of.
16 .	Q Did you supply either Mr. Poston or Mr. Watkins
17`	or both with anything other than food by way of living
18	necessities?
19	A Not that I recall offhand.
20	Q Did there come a time eventually, Mr. Crockett,
21	when newsmen, people in the publishing business and the like,
22	came to the Barker-Myers Ranch area?
23	A Not that I know of.
24	Q Did there come a time when you, that is, during
25	the year 1969, sold a story or stories to a publishing house
26	or to any journalist?
27	A Yes.
28	Q How much money did you get as a result of that

(The question was read by the reporter 1 as follows: 2 ĦΟ. Do you have any background in a 3 philosophy referred to as Scientology? 4 ·A Some. Š 110 And where did you acquire that 6. background, Mr. Crockett?") 7 THE COURT: What did you want to say? Did you want to 8 be heard, Mr. Weedman? 9 10 11 是我们的 经营业 12 13 14 15 16 17. 18 19 20 21 22 . 23 24 25 26 27 28

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MR. WEEDMAN: Well, yes, your Honor. It goes, however tenuously at this point, to relationship between Mr. Crockett, Mr. Poston and Mr. Watkins. I think it has some bearing on the credibility of all three.

THE COURT: Well, I think it would be immaterial. I will sustain the objection.

Objection sustained.

Q BY MR. WEEDMAN: Did you ever discuss Scientology with Mr. Watkins and/or Mr. Poston?

A Yes, I did.

And would it be fair to say that you were in those discussions acting as teacher, and they were acting as your students?

A I would say that is true.

Q Would you describe your knowledge of this particular field of Scientology as rather extensive?

A Well, I don't know whether you would call it extensive or not.

MR. KATZ: Excuse me, your Honor. There is an objection on the grounds it would first of all call for conclusion and speculation by this witness, and, secondly, it is immaterial and not relevant.

THE COURT: Well, you have got two objections.

Read the question again, please.

(The record was read by the reporter

as follows:

"Q Wouldyou describe your knowledge of this particular field of Scientology as

1	rather extensive?
2.	"A Well, I don't know whether
3	you would call it extensive or not.")
4	THE COURT: Well, I will sustain the objection to his
5	knowledge of the philosophy of Scientology. Sustained.
6	Q BY MR. WEEDMAN: When you met Brooks Poston
7	sometime in March of 1969 was there anything unusual about his
8	appearance?
9	A Anything unusual?
10	Q Yes.
11	A Yes. I would say so.
12	Q And what was that, Mr. Crockett?
13	A That he didn't do very much.
14	Q What about Mr. Watkins, whom you met in May of
15.	1969, was there anything unusual about his appearance?
16	A I would say so in that way.
17	Q When did you first meet Charles Manson?
18	A Probably the was around the first of September.
19	Q And where was that, Mr. Crockett?
20	At the Barker Ranch.
21	THE COURT: Now, pardon me. September, what was the date
22	THE WITNESS: I would say the 1st or 2nd, right at the
23	first of September.
24	THE COURT: Of '69?
25 .	THE WITNESS: Right.
26	THE COURT: Go ahead.
27	Q BY MR. WEEDMAN: You indicated on direct examina-
28	tion that you had a conversation with Charles Manson. When

did that conversation occur?

MR. KATZ: Excuse me, your Honor. I will object on the grounds it assumes facts not in evidence. He indicated he had several conversations.

I don't know which conversation he has reference to.

THE COURT: Now, wait a minute, I will check my notes.

MR. WEEDMAN: I will withdraw the question, your Honor.

Perhaps we can speed it up.

THE COURT: Wait a minute. He testified he met Charles
Manson September 1 of '69. This is direct. Conversation
September the 15th.

Give me the question again, please.

(The question was read by the reporter as follows:

"Q You indicated on direction examination that you had a conversation with Charles Manson. When did that conversation occur?")

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THE COURT: You may answer the question. Overruled.

The date he is calling for.

THE WITNESS: On September 1st or approximately September the 1st.

MR. KATZ: Excuse me, your Honor. This is the problem: There were several conversations and counsel has just alluded to a conversation. That is why I objected on the ground it is ambiguous, and asked that the question be reframed.

THE COURT: He is calling for a conversation, as I understand it now, about the 2nd, is that right, of September?

Read the question again, please, Mr. Reporter.

(The question was read back by the reporter as follows:

"Q You indicated on direct examination that you had a conversation with Charles Manson. When did that conversation occur?")

THE COURT: And the answer?

THE REPORTER: There is no answer.

THE COURT: Answer the question. . Overruled.

THE WITNESS: In other words, when the question was asked of me to start with --

THE COURT: Let me put it this way. I'm not trying to interrupt.

You told us a few minutes ago that you had a conversation with Manson. You told the district attorney that, didn't you?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: When did that conversation take place? When?

THE WITNESS: When I was speaking with him? 10-2 1 When is the date of the conversation Yes. THE COURT: 2 that you told the district attorney you had with Manson? 3 I'm trying to find the date of it. What was the date? That was about the second week in Septem-THE WITNESS: 5 ber. 6 THE COURT: All right. Now, the second week has seven 7 days. Can you fix it any closer than that? Æ. THE WITNESS: At the end of the second week. Q That would be around the 14th? THE COURT: 10 THE WITNESS: Somewhere in there. 11 12 Of September, right? THE COURT: 33 THE WITNESS: Right. 14 THE COURT: of 1969? 15 THE WITNESS: Right. 16 THE COURT: All right. 17 Excuse me, your Honor. May we have a clari-MR. KATZ: 18 fication as to whether we are talking about Manson or the 19 defendant? 20 Who was it with? THE COURT: 21 THE WITNESS: This was with Manson, what I understand. 22 THE COURT: All right. 23 MR. KATZ: Thank you, your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Go ahead with your cross. **25** BY MR. WEEDMAN: Was this conversation with Charles 26 Manson before or after the conversation that you allegedly 27 had with my client wherein he confessed killing Shorty Shea? Refore. 28 A

1	Q And did you discuss with Charles Manson the	
2	killing or the death of Shorty Shea?	
3	A At this particular time?	i
4	Q At any time.	
5.	A Ch, yes.	İ
 6	Q Was that conversation	
7	A Let me clarify that. I didn't discuss it with him;	
8 .	he told me.	
9	Q And was that convergation with Charles Manson	
10	before or after the conversation that you had with my client	
11	relative to Shorty Shea?	
12	A Before.	
13	Q How long had you known Charles Manson then before	
14	you had a conversation with Charles Manson or he with you?	
15	A How long did I know of him?	
16	Q How long had you known Charles Manson prior to the	
17	conversation that you had about Shorty Shea?	
18	A I would say in the neighborhood of about a week.	Ì
19	Q Now, had you ever known Charles Manson beyond, that	1
20	is, prior to this one-week period?	-
. 21 ·	A I had never known Charles Manson before he came	١
22	to the Barker Ranch, no.	
23	Q How long had you known my client, Mr. Grogan, prior	
24	to this alleged conversation with him wherein he confessed	
25	killing Shorty Shea?	
26	A I had seen him a few times.	
27	Q How well did you know my client prior to this	
28	conversation?	

	I	"A You mean positively?
	.2	"Q Well, I will have to leave that to
	3	you, Mr. Crockett. Who was present, if anyone,
	4	at that conversation?")
	5	THE COURT: Strike the answer.
	6	Who was present at that time?
	7	MR. WEEDMAN: Excuse me, your Honor. I very much want
	8	that answer in. Forgive me.
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THE COURT: Let's get the answer. He hasn't answered it. Give us the answer. Who was present? That is the question.

THE WITNESS: The only positive statement that I will make there is I know I was there and I know Clem was there.

MR. WEEDMAN: Your Honor, may we have the witness -THE COURT: Do you want that other answer read?
MR. WEEDMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I'm not trying to argue with you.

I will give you the reason for my ruling.

Read the answer I struck out.

MR. WEEDMAN: Forgive me, your Honor. I urge that that answer not be stricken.

THE COURT: Let's get the answer again. Wait a minute.
Read the answer.

(Whereupon the reporter read the answer as follows:

"A I would say that there were other people that Clem was talking to, and that I was rather in the background, more or less to speak, and at that particular time I wasn't paying too great of an attention to the fact that all of this was going on, as far as I was concerned.")

THE COURT: Now, my reason for my ruling is, he doesn't answer your question. The question is: "Who was present," and he goes on and narrates about other people and other conversations. That is the reason I made that ruling.

I think the ruling should stand. If you want to

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repeat your question, I have no objection,

MR. WEEDMAN: Your Honor, I would urge that traditionally it is the examiner who has the right to move to strike the answer as nonresponsive, although, of course, we have come to the practice of having opposing counsel also enjoy that objection. But I am satisfied with the answer thus far and I want it to remain.

THE COURT: The matters, the issues, the questions and answers should be material, should be relevant.

I stand right by my ruling. If you want to repeat the question, that I have no issue with. You can narrow it down, get the witness to specify it more particularly.

Q BY MR. WEEDMAN: Mr. Crockett, who was present, if anyone, at the conversation that you had with my client wherein he allegedly said he chopped off Shorty's head?

THE COURT: Who was there? Who was talking? Who was in the circle of the conversation? That is what counsel wants.

THE WITNESS: Well, I answered the question the best way I knew how. In other words, I said I know I was there and I know Clem was there.

THE COURT: Now, who else was there?

MR. KATZ: If he knows, your Honor.

THE WITNESS: In other words, as many people changed positions and places at that particular time, to go back and pinpoint and say that I could positively say exactly who was there — the only two that I will say that I know that was exactly there is myself and Clem.

1	Q BY MR. WEEDMAN: Were others present, even though
2	you don't know their names at this time?
3	A Right.
4	Q And by "present," were they present in such a way
5	as to be participating in this conversation?
6	MR. KATZ: I will object to that on the ground it calls
7	for a conclusion and speculation, "to be participating."
8	THE COURT: Let's have the question, Mr. Reporter.
9	Whereupon the reporter read back the question
10,	as follows:
11	"Q And by 'present,' were they present
12	in Such a way as to be participating in this
13	conversation?")
14	THE COURT: It calls for a fact, were they participating.
15.	MR. KATZ: That wasn't the question, your Honor,
16	Were they in a position to participate? That was the question
17	MR. WEEDMAN: That is not my question. My question was,
18	to ask t he witness
19	THE COURT: You can answer it.
20	MR. WEEDMAN: what the word "present" means.
2 1	THE COURT: You can answer the last question, if you
2 2 .	desire.
23	That is your question?
24	MR. WEEDMAN: Yes, your Honor.
25	THE COURT: All right. Is the question clear?
26.	THE WITNESS: The question is clear in my mind, yes.
27	THE COURT: Now, try to answer the question.
28	THE WITNESS: In other words, I answered the question.

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Now, during this conversation did Mr. Grogan speak to you as distinguished from your overhearing him speaking to someone else?

A You mean by calling me by name or something like that? No.

Q Well, bear in mind, for example, that even though
I don't use your name at this particular moment, nonetheless
I clearly am talking with you and you with me. You understand that, I am sure.

Was Mr. Grogan speaking to you during this conversation, even though he may not have been using your name, of course?

- At one point there, yes.
- Q And when was that?
- A When he was looking at me, we will say that when he said it.
 - 0 When he said what?
- A When he said it was groovy to stick knives in people.
- Q And how far away were you from Mr. Grogan when he was looking at you and saying these things?
 - A Little closer than you are standing now.
- Q Well, in that event, since I am the measuring stick I will move a little closer.

Let me know when I am about the same distance from you as you were from Mr. Grogan when he spoke looking in your durection.

A Oh, I would say approximately within the range you

stand now. 1 All right. Ż. MR. KATZ: May we have a record on that, Mr. Weedman. 3 THE COURT: Well, 10 feet. I don't know. It looks to be 10 feet, your MR. WEEDMAN: 5 Honor. MR. KATZ: Yes. I think that is a fair assessment. 7 THE COURT: Is that about right? 8 BY MR. WEEDMAN: What time of day or evening did 0 9 this occur, that is, this conversation? 10 A It was late evening. 11 About what time? 12 I had no watch, so I couldn't give you about the 13 time. 14 Had the sun gone down yet? 15 Q 16 It was still light. A How many times, prior to this conversation, had 17 0. you seen my client, whether you spoke with him or not? 18 19 Oh, I would say a dozen or so. A 20 How many times, if any, had you had any conversa-21 tions with my client prior to the conversation in question? 22 Once. 23 About how many persons were present at the conversation wherein Mr. Grogan said he cut Shorty's head off 24 25 or words to that effect? 26 Oh, I would say two or three. A 27 Were those men or women, or both? 28 A Both.

. 1	afterwards.
2	THE COURT: Well, the question is clear.
3	MR. KATZ: Well, if counsel explains that to the witness
4	I have no objection.
5	THE COURT: Read the question, please.
6	(The question was read by the reporter
7	as follows:
8 ;	"Q Following your hearing my client
9	say this did you discuss it with anyone else?
10	"A No.
11	"Q Did you discuss it with Mr.
12	Watkins?")
13.	THE COURT: You can answer the question. Calls for a yes
14	or no first,
15	THE WITNESS: In what time period?
16	Q BY MR. WEEDMAN: Pardon me?
17	A Did I discuss it with Mr. Watkins?
18	Q Yes.
19	THE COURT: Listen to the question. I have no objection
20	to your question.
21	You might refine it a little bit. It is a little
22	ambiguous.
23	Restate it, if you will. Thereis a question in
24	it.
25	Read it again, please.
26.	(The record was read by the reporter
27	as follows:
28	"Q Following your hearing my client

say this did you discuss it with anyone else? 1 ** No. 2 *0 pid you discuss it with Mr. 3 Watkins?") THE COURT: All right. You can answer it. 5 THE WITHESS: Yes. 6. MR. WEEDMAN: Your Honor, I wonder if we might have a 7 brief recess. 8 THE COURT: Yes, surely. Let's take a short recess. ġ Do not discuss the case. We will proceed in just .10 a few minutes. 11 We are at recess. You can step down. Thank you. 12 (Recess.) 13 14 15 16. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23. 24 25 26 27 28

MONDAY, AUGUST 16, 1971; 1:52 P.M. LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 1 2 (The following proceedings were had 3 in open court.) 4. THE COURT: All right, gentlemen. Let's go right ahead. 5 The defendant is here and Ġ People against Grogan. both counsel. 7 You may bring in the jury. 8 9 Ì0 PAUL CROCKETT. resumed the stand 11 12 You have been sworn. Please be seated and THE COURT: 13 state your name again. Tell us your name. 14 THE WITNESS: My name is Paul Crockett. 15 THE COURT: Thank you. And remember, pull your chair 16 right up so you can talk right in the phone. 17 (The following proceedings were had in 18 open court in the presence of the jury.) 19 THE COURT: Now we have the regular jurors plus the three 20 alternates. 21 You may proceed, Mr. Weedman. 22 23 (Cont'd.) CROSS EXAMINATION 24 BY MR. WEEDMAN: 25 Mr. Crockett, we left off with my asking you if Q 26 you had discussed the conversation you had with Mr. Grogan 27 with Paul Watkins, and I believe your answer was "Yes." 28 A Yes.

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Q So my question to you now is, when did you discuss that conversation with Paul Watkins?

A Well, it wasn't directly a conversation directly with Paul Watkins. It was in the police car on the way to Independence from Shoshone.

THE COURT: Read the question to the witness, please. Wait a minute.

To the house

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discussed this with Brooks Poston? 1 2 A Yes. Had you, Mr. Watkins and Mr. Poston, continued to 3 Q 4 live together following your conversation with Grogan? 5 A Yes. So I take it following the conversation that you 6 Q Ż allegedly had with my client, you saw Mr. Watkins and you saw 8 Mr. Poston? 9 A Yes. 10 Did you see them on a daily basis up to the time 11 that you found yourselves -- found yourself, rather, in this 12 police unit? 13 Not every day. But practically every day. A 14 0 How many days elapsed, approximately, from the 15 time that you had this alleged conversation with my client and 16 the time that you and Mr. Poston and Mr. Watkins were in the 17 police car? 18 Approximately a month! A 19 Now, going back to the time that you heard state-20 ments made by my client relative to Shorty Shea, were you --21 if you can answer this question -- an active participant in 22 this conversation? I said earlier, no. 23 A 24 14 fls 25 26 27 28

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Q Did you ever hear Paul Watkins say anything about his assuming rather than hearing it with his own ears that my client had something to do with Shorty Shea? A No. Do you recall something being said by Mr. Watkins relative to my client proving himself? I'm going to object to that as assuming facts MR. KATZ: not in evidence. The question actually assumes facts not in evidence. THE COURT: Read the question as framed, Mr. Reporter. (The question was read by the reporter as follows: ۳Ò Do you recall something being said by Mr. Watkins relative to my client proving himself?") THE COURT: You can answer the question. Overruled. MR. KATZ: Then I will object on the ground it is ambiguous. Prove himself in what regard? THE COURT ! Overruled. Do you understand the question? THE WITNESS: Not really. THE COURT: All right. Read it to him again.

(The question was reread by the reporter

as follows:

Do you recall something being said by Mr. Watkins relative to my client proving himself?*)

THE WITNESS: Proving himself to what?

1	THE COURT: Is the question do you understand the
2	question or not?
3	You better restate it, I think, Mr. Weedman. I
4	don't think he understands it.
5	Q BY MR. WEEDMAN: Does that question have any
6	meaning for you at all, Mr. Crockett?
7	THE COURT: Do you want to state it again?
8	MR. WEEDMAN: That's all right.
·9	THE WITNESS: Not really.
ļ0	Q BY MR. WEEDMAN: Do you recall having an interview
İı	with Sgt. Steuber relative to statements purportedly made to
12	you by Mr. Manson as well as my client?
13	A Yes.
14	Q When did that interview take place?
15	A I had several interviews with Mr. Steuber.
16	Q Was one of those interviews recorded on tape, if
17	you know?
18	A I know that one was recorded on tape, and possibly
19	two.
20	Q Do you know when the interview that you positively
21	know was on tape was had?
22	A You mean the date?
23	Q Yes.
24	A No.
25	Q Was that before or after you were riding in this
26	police vehicle with Mr. Poston and Mr. Watkins?
27	A It was after.
28 .	Q Who was present at this taped interview between

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	1	yourself and Officer Steuber?
	2	A At the time that the tape was made?
	3	Q Yes, sir.
٠	4	A I was by myself with him.
	5	Q Where was Mr. Watkins, if you know?
	.6	A I didn't know his exact location, no.
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1	Q I take it that you mean that Mr. Watkins at least
2	was not present during the interrogation of you by Sgt.Steuber
3	A Right.
4	Q Was there ever a time when Paul Watkins was presen
5 `	with you when you were being interviewed by Sgt. Steuber?
6	A That would be hard to say because I was inter-
7	viewed so much.
₿.	Q Were you ever interviewed then by any police
9	officers in the presence of Paul Watkins?
10	A I would say yes.
11	Q During that interview did you state substantially
12	what you have said in this courtroom about what my client
13 ` .	purportedly told you relative to Shorty Shea?
14	A Yes.
15	Q Was Mr. Poston present during any of your interro-
16	gations by police officers?
17	A In some of them, yes.
18	Q Was he present at any interview of you by
19	Sgt. Steuber?
20	A No.
21	Q With respect to the gun that you saw in the
22	possession of Danny De Carlo and Bruce Davis and Charles
23	Manson, do you know where my client was?
24	A At that time?
25	Q Yes.
26	A Yes. He was sitting by Charlie Manson.
27	Q And did my client have the gun in his possession?
28	A Not that I recall.

Your Honor, I wonder if we may approach MR. WEEDMAN: 1 the bench for just a moment? 2 THE COURT: Sure. Do you want the reporter? à MR. WEEDMAN: Yes, please. 4 THE COURT: All right. Step right up here. 5. (The following proceedings were had 6in chambers.) 7 THE COURT: We are in chambers. Defendant and counsel. 8 Go ahead, Mr. Weedman. MR. WEEDMAN: Your Honor, there was testimony by this 10 witness from the grand jury proceedings in connection with .11 12 this case wherein the witness states that Charles Manson told him that he --13 14 THE COURT: Manson? 15 MR. WEEDMAN: Yes, your Honor. He, Manson --16 THE COURT: He, Manson --17 MR. WEEDMAN: Had chopped off Mr. Shea's head. 18 Then this is testimony that this witness THE COURT: 19 on the stand stated at the grand jury? 20 Yes, your Honor. MR. WEEDMAN: 21 Is that right? THE COURT: 22 MR. WEEDMAN: Yes, your Honor. 23 I would respectfully seek to offer this solely 24 as possible impeaching material. 25 I don't think you can limit it. THE COURT: 26 MR. WEEDMAN: Because it is a --27 I don't think the court can limit it to that. THE COURT: MR. WEEDMAN: It is a confession, of course, of

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Charles Manson.

THE COURT: It can be considered by the jury as a matter of law under the Green case either — as a matter of law, it either attacks credibility and/or may be considered for substantive value.

Now, I don't think you can limit it. I mean assuming you want to, you can't a It's in there.

MR. WEEDMAN: Well, of course, why the United States
Supreme Court ever ruled as they did in Green is beyond me,
and of course, a great many other attorneys, because of this
very kind of problem.

Because we are really talking about hearsay on hearsay now.

And I'm afraid the justices of the Supreme Court haven't had much trial practice. Certainly --

THE COURT: Well, let's just wait a minute here. I mean let's just analyze this. I have read this.

You can see my interlineations in here.

Let's take their statement here.

Now, this is People against Green. This is the California Supreme Court which takes on Green after the ruling in the U. S. Supreme Court.

All right.

MR. WEEDMAN: Where they overrule People versus Johnson.

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THE COURT: Right.

Let's just wait a minute now.

Now, can I amplify my ruling, gentlemen? Let's take this slowly here.

Green -- I'm reading it again here -- let's just back up to our simple beginning with Green here. Green has reference -- and then we'll pick it out of this case -- Green has reference to where their chief witness for the People, Melvin Porter, at a preliminary hearing testified in a certain fashion respecting furnishing marijuana. Now, then Porter at the trial testifies in a contrary fashion. In other words, he eliminates -- I'm pulling now a segment out of this from memory; I don't want to go through the whole opinion -- he denies or refuses to admit certain statements that he made at the preliminary hearing. In other words, at the preliminary hearing there were clear admissions of the purchase of marijuana. At the trial he doesn't state that; he cuts it out of the testimony.

Now, the substance of Green is that the prior statements of Porter at the preliminary hearing are admissible at the trial for two purposes; to impeach Porter, one, plus now the truth of inconsistent statements of Porter, because they vary from his statements at the preliminary hearing.

So they held, they being inconsistent statements, they were admissible for their truth.

Do you follow me there?

MR. WEEDMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Now, in our case here the witness, our witness

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on the stand, theoretically testifies as to statements of Manson.

Now, let's try it again. In the case at trial, the witness does not tell us of alleged statements of Manson. That is correct, right here?

MR. KATS: That's right.

MR. WEEDMAN: Only that he had a conversation with Charles Manson was established on direct by Mr. Katz. I had objected, of course, to that sort of thing with other witnesses and the court has consistently overruled me. That is the only reason I didn't object this time.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WEEDMAN: So we do have evidence that he had a conversation with Charles Manson, but the contents were not brought out.

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27 28 the conversation with Manson, or didn't he remember it?

MR. WEEDMAN: It wasn't asked other than the fact of the conversation.

THE COURT: Did the People bring out -- I am going back--

Maybe Mr. Katz can help us.

MR. KATZ: Yes, your Honor. I did not elicit the contents of the conversation at all. I merely asked him whether or not he had talked and had conversations with Charles Manson at Barker Ranch, to which he answered, "Yes."

I did not bring out the conversation.

THE COURT: Now, I want to ask you again, what did he say again when you said to him, "Did you have a conversation with Manson?" What was his answer?

MR. KATZ: Said, "Yes," and stopped there.

THE COURT: Did not?

MR. KATZ: No. He said, "Yes."

THE COURT: Yes. But it was a vague answer, wasn't it?

MR. KATZ: No, it wasn't vague.

THE COURT: He said, "Yes," period?

MR. KATZ: Yes. But I did not ask for the conversation.

THE COURT: You didn't go after it, after he said, "Yes."

MR. KATZ: Yes.

But I wouldn't be permitted to do so. It would be hearsay.

THE COURT: Now, wait a minute. I will give you plenty of time to object.

Now, you propose to impeach the witness, am I correct, by the statement? Now, have you asked the witness,

"Did you have a conversation with Manson?" to the witness, and did the witness give you an answer, Mr. Weedman?

MR. WEEDMAN: No, I have not asked him yet, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Then you have got to ask him that before you go any further.

MR. WEEDMAN: That's right.

THE COURT: He may say, "Yes."

"What's the conversation?" And he will tell it to you, right?

MR. WEEDMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Now, your disturbment, or your concern is that he may make a statement from the stand in a fashion different than he made at the grand jury?

MR. WEEDMAN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: No. All right.

What is your concern then?

MR, WEEDMAN: My concern is that it would be received substantively, and I don't want it received substantively.

THE COURT: All right. Fine.

MR. WEEDMAN: Only for possible impeachment.

THE COURT: Your statement is then that he will give the substance in substance — your statement is he will give the substance in relation of what Manson said, but it is only admissible for purposes, as I know, of contradiction. You can't put it in until there is a contradiction. Until there is a variation.

You see, you can't read the grand jury testimony unless there are purposes of impeachment. If the witness is there to tell you the story then your statement to the grand

jury is obviously hearsay. Can only be admissible for impeachment or for substantive value in the event he denies it. Unless there is a conflict there.

So you can't get into your grand jury.

If he said to you, "No, I didn't have any conversation with Manson," then you come into your grand jury testimony for impeachment for substantive value.

MR. KATZ: That is the point. Your Honor has well analyzed it.

You see, there can be no impeachment as such or raising this issue because we never brought it out on direct.

THE COURT: Yes, I don't think you can move it in until he tells you, "No, I didn't have a conversation" or recites something at variance to the grand jury testimony.

MR. WEEDMAN: Well, your Honor, it is factually inconsistent. In other words, he claims that my client told him that my client cut Mr. Shea's head off. We also know that he said that Charles Manson told him that he, Charles Manson, cut Shea's head off.

MR. KATZ: Charles Manson may very well have told him that. That is not impeachment in any manner, shape or form.

THE COURT: Well, my ruling would be that it would have to be admitted for both substantive value as well as impeachment. If it goes in.

THE DEFENDANT: He didn't testify to that here on the stand right now.

MR. WEEDMAN: What, Clem? Say it again.

THE DEFENDANT: He said, "Clem said he had to kill him.

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Sticking people with knives was groovy. " He didn't say nothing about cutting anybody's head off.

MR. WEEDMAN: I am sorry. I thought he did.

MR. KATZ: He did. He said, "The defendant, Grogan, said he had to cut off Shorty's head."

He didn't refer to a machette, but he said, "The defendant said he had to cut Shorty's head off. "

THE COURT: Let me make this one addenda, Mr. Weedman. MR. WEEDMAN: Yes, your Honor.

Suppose you ask the witness, "Now, Mr. Witness, THE COURT: you have told us you had a conversation with Manson. the conversation."

Now, if he relates the same conversation that he did to the grand jury -- some of my statements are repetitious, but I get on the level here -- you have no impeachment, in my opinion. There is nothing to impeach. Therefore, there would be no purpose in reading from the grand jury transcript.

If he says to you, "No, I didn't have a conversation with Manson" or if you say, "Relate your conversation with Manson" and he testifies to something contrary to your grand jury testimony, you can impeach by saying in substance, "Well, all right. Isn't it true you stated so and so at the grand jury hearing?" That is impeachment, (1)

(Short pause.)

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THE COURT: Now, there is a serious question at that very juncture because the statements of Manson -- see if you follow me -- the statements of Manson, alleged statements of Manson, to the witness, "I killed Shorty Shea," or whatever they are, those are hearsay; they are not substantive state-

MR. WEEDMAN: That's right.

ments of the witness.

THE COURT: Do you follow me?

MR. WEEDMAN: I most certainly do, your Honor.

MR. KATZ: It could be a statement against penal interest.

THE COURT: You are in kind of a position, the statements of Manson to the witness, "I, Manson, killed Shea," you see, that could be used for credibility. In other words -- if you follow me -- it isn't a statement of the witness saying, "I bought marijuana today," and two months later saying -- you see, he is speaking of himself all the time.

MR. WEEDMAN: It is first-hand knowledge.

THE COURT: "I," the witness, "bought marijuana." "I," the witness, "did not buy marijuana."

That is where you have a statement by the witness himself that are statements of the witness, what the witness did.

Do you see what I'm trying to tell you? That is substantive. But this case we have here would have reference to statements of the witness respecting what Manson said, you see. That is hearsay. It could go to credibility. He could say, "Manson said this to me at one time; another time Manson said this." This is credibility. But what Manson said, Manson

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said to the witness is hearsay. It would go to credibility, but it wouldn't go to substantive, because it is not what the witness did do or didn't do.

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I am probably stating it awkwardly --

MR. WEEDMAN: No, you have stated it very well and we don't find an answer to that problem in People versus Green because Green is not a case involving a witness stating hearsay.

THE COURT: No. Green involves the witness himself:
"I did buy marijuana." "I didn't buy marijuana."

MR. WEEDMAN: Exactly.

THE COURT: It goes to the witness himself.

MR, WEEDMAN: Exactly.

THE COURT: So Green says that it attacks credibility and what he said he did once is substantive testimony.

MR. WEEDMAN: The Evidence Code, Section 1235, says, of course, that prior inconsistent statements of a witness may be received substantively as well as for impeachment, but the rule is too broad --

THE COURT: Aren't you fighting shadows until you get the witness' answer? He may say it, if you ask him, "What did Manson say to you," he may say exactly what he told the grand jury. You see what I mean?

MR. WEEDMAN: I merely take the position that the witness on the one hand says that Charles Manson told him that he chopped Shea's head off and then he also says that it was my client -- my client told him that my client chopped Shea's head off.

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I think they are merely inherently inconsistent and properly the subject for impeachment.

MR. KATZ: May I be heard, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. KATZ: All right. Number one, merely because Charlie Manson may have told this witness that he himself had chopped the decedent's head off in no is impeaching of any later testimony of this witness that Clem had told him the same thing. Both of them could have indeed told him that, whether or not it is true or not. We don't know if it is braggadocio on the part of Charles Manson, for example.

We know that this witness has told us on other occasions that Charles Manson had Clem cut his head off, and if Mr. Weedman was allowed to go into this hearsay matter, I can bring in a tape which was made on 12/19/69 that goes on for some hour or beyond the time of an hour in which he lays out the whole Manson philosophy, and indeed Manson's entire confession.

I think we are getting into collateral issues. The only theory that I can see that this would be admissible under at the present time would be a statement against penal interest, that is, against Manson's penal interest, admitting that he had committed a crime. However, the rules are such that it is not admissible unless the declarant, namely, Manson, is unavailable as a witness.

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 Now, Mr. Manson may indeed be unavailable because he has a right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination—
THE COURT: Very definitely.

MR. KATZ: -- in which case it might come in under that theory. However, I am informed that it might be possible that Charles Manson will indeed testify for the defense, willingly and voluntarily.

MR. WEEDMAN: I must represent to the court that it is a possibility at this posture of the case, so that I cannot candidly state that Charles Manson is unavailable. I think the only way we could show unavailability would be for him to go on the record and refuse to testify.

MR. KATZ: I think counsel is correct. But once again what we must ask ourselves is, what is the relevancy of asking-

THE COURT: I'm worried about that again, if we may back up again. It's awful easy to branch out.

Your position again is that if you say, for instance, to the witness, "What did Manson say in this conversation?" "Manson said, 'I, Manson, killed Shea, ""

Now, I'll ask you again, where your impeachment would be? That is where I have difficulty following you.

Where would your impeachment come in at that point?

MR. WEEDMAN: The impeachment comes because it seems clear in context that only one person cut Mr. Shea's head off, if indeed it did happen, which, of course, we in nowise admit. But for the witness --

THE COURT: But it wouldn't be an impeachment of the witness because the witness is not impeaching himself. He is

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stating a series of -- he is stating what he says was done. There is where the impeachment is.

MR. WEEDMAN: But we don't necessarily have to believe him when he tells us that it was my client who told him that it was Mr. Grogan who cut Mr. Shea's head off. We don't have to accept that, and I do not accept that.

So, therefore, I feel that it is proper impeachment to point out that at one time this witness stated that Charles Manson told him that it was he, Charles Manson, who cut Shea's head off.

THE COURT: I'll stop you right there.

Couldn't the witness very well say "Grogan," which he has -- "Grogan said he cut Shea's head off." And, on another date Manson says he cut Shea's head off. Now, both statements, from what was told to him, could be true. I'm not saying that is what happened.

MR. WEEDMAN: NO.

THE COURT: I'm talking about what he heard.

MR. WEEDMAN: I understand.

THE COURT: He could be testifying, "Grogan said something; Manson said something else." He still hasn't impeached himself because he hasn't attempted to pass on the veracity of what was said. He simply said, "Grogan said this; Manson said this."

MR. WEEDMAN: That is one way of looking at it. But I can also look at it in this way: I can look at it by saying, here's a witness who claims that my client confessed to him and that my client said that he, my client, chopped Mr. Shea's

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head off. .

But I don't have to accept that, and I can argue, you see -- I can argue that the witness is confused as to who told him what and who cut Mr. Shea's head off.

THE COURT: Isn't that more a matter of argument to the jury? You can say to the jury --

MR. WEEDMAN: Whether it is impeachment or not is a matter for argument, I agree, but I think we have a prima facie showing of impeachment.

THE COURT: Well, I would be inclined to rule that it isn't an impeachment as far as the veracity of the witness is concerned, but it is a matter more that goes to the weight, or the inferences that the jury should want to infer, and that would come to argument, argument to the jury.

What about this witness? He says here, "Manson says Grogan," the defendant, "said he did this." Manson -- you still run into questions of hearsay in there because --

MR. WEEDMAN: That is why I don't want to offer --

THE COURT: You've got hearsay there because the plaintiff can say it's a hearsay statement. Shea wasn't there.

So you bump into the question of hearsay the moment you really -- the People didn't go into it. The People didn't say to the witness, "What was said? What did Manson say?" Then the door is open to cross-examination. But how can you get a statement, under what theory could you get a statement -- putting aside your other argument -- under what theory could you ask the witness, if an objection is made, "Mr. Witness, what did Manson say about who killed Shea?"

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Suppose the People say it's hearsay now.

MR. WEEDMAN: Your Honor, supposing the witness, just in a hypothetical situation, says whe defendant told me that he shot the victim. "

THE COURT: All right. Grogan said he shot the victim. MR. WEEDMAN: Then later the witness goes on and says, "Yes, and Mr. X told me that he shot the victim." Of course, you can say that both persons made those statements, but I don't have to accept that proposition. I can say that those statements are inherently inconsistent; and go to, the credibility of the witness.

And I would like to add, your Honor, that we now have developed on cross-examination with Mr. Crockett that he really was not a real substantial participant in this conver-In other words, we have an impression now that is totally different than that which was left on direct examination. We have a man who is really just overhearing a conversation, and I think that we should be permitted some latitude in impeachment.

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THE COURT: Now, can I put -- without sidestepping your particular argument, first let me say this -- I would think under ordinary conditions a statement of Manson to the witness where Shea is not present --

MR. KATZ: Do you mean Shea?

THE COURT: "I, Manson, killed him," would be hearsay. It would be hearsay.

However, there is another serious question that enters into it and that is this situation, that the People as a main factor in their case have undertaken to show a family community, community of family interests, or purpose. To go to the desert, for instance.

And I was very serious in my examination of the witness on the stand there as to what was the intention of Manson to go there. There was nothing intended to be facetious about that at all. I meant every word of that.

MR. WEEDMAN: I welcome that testimony, your Honor.

THE COURT: That I was interested to show whether there was a concert of interest to go to the desert, a concert of interest to kill Shea.

Now, Manson is a ringleader of this. Declaration of one man are declarations of another, are binding on another, may be considered as another.

Now, if the purpose of the People, which is obviously through the transcript that they are showing a concert of interest -- and I have ruled with them on a principle that an action of -- we will call it a conspiracy, a prima facie showing of conspiracy has been shown -- if the

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declarations of Manson of what the purpose of the conspiracy is, are declarations, are admissible to show the purpose I would think other voluntary admissions, if they are of Manson respecting who killed Shea, would also be admissible.

MR. KATZ: No, there is a restriction, your Honor. It has to be in furtherance of the object and design of the conspiracy. That is the reason I didn't put in the so-called "last supper" rights of Juan Flynn wherein Charles Manson completely confessed to the killing of Shorty Shea. I can't put that in because presumably the conspiracy had ended.

THE COURT: Your point is that the conspiracy has been completed.

MR. KATZ: Absolutely.

THE COURT: That is your point.

MR. KATZ: And therefore, the statement of Charles

Manson made in September of 1969 after Shorty Shea had long
been killed and buried, would not be admissible on conspiracy
theory. It would only be admissible as an admission against

Mr. Manson in his own trial.

Possibly, and I underscore possibly, as an assertion or declaration against penal interest if the foundation is properly laid.

THE COURT: The statements of a conspirator respecting the fulfillment of the conspiracy are admissible. That is the basis that I let in testimony as to what was said about disposing of the body of Shea.

MR. KATZ: That's correct.

THE COURT: It was in fulfillment of the conspiracy,

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if I can state myself correctly.

Now, the purpose of the conspiracy is to kill Shea. Now, theoretically, Manson theoretically says in effect, "Well, we finished our conspiracy. I killed Shea. I killed Shea."

Well, let's -- you have -- it's a little deeper than you think it is. Suppose Manson says, "I killed Shea."

Suppose he says that. "I killed Shea."

And this case, of course, is directed -- this specific trial is directed against Grogan.

"I killed Shea." There is a confession. A voluntary confession. Let's say it is -- or an admission, let's put it that way.

Here is an admission without police movement directed to what Manson said. "I killed Shea."

There must be some law to the extent as to how
far a co-conspirator can go in his declarations. In other
words, I realize the general statement of the jury instruction,
a statement of the -- one of the co-conspirators, respecting
the performance of the conspiracy, the acts and declarations
are admissible on the other co-conspirators.

MR. KATZ: Chuck, you are not suggesting it is admissible under conspiracy theory, are you?

MR. WEEDMAN: No, of course not.

Your Honor, I think both counsel are agreed that these statements are outside --

THE COURT: Well, I think they are --

MR. WEEDMAN: Yes, and we are not offering them under any theory of conspiracy.

THE COURT: I know it, but that thought came to me that if those statements are in fulfillment, it would be a proper —

I think it would be a proper matter of interrogation if it is permitted.

MR. WEEDMAN: But they are not.

THE COURT: I am not so sure.

MR. KATZ: They are not, your Honor. I think both counsel agree.

THE COURT: All right. All right.

Let me just take a check here on what disturbs me.

MR. KATZ: I could say one thing, your Honor, I have no objection if Mr. Weedman wants to elicit the entire conversation that Mr. Crockett had with Mr. Manson. The only problem is Mr. Weedman cannot limit that statement for impeaching purposes only. It comes in for all purposes which would be substantive purposes.

Now, this is the narrow issue with which Mr. Weedman is obviously concerned.

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THE COURT: Suppose you throw in an objection, suppose Mr. Weedman says, "What did Manson tell you?"

MR. KATZ: I won't object. I would love to hear what Manson told this witness because I know the answer, your Honor.

But I tell you it wouldn't be fair to the defendant because that confession is going to come in as substantive evidence, and it is going to be binding on the jury if they accept it.

THE COURT: There is the question again. I don't know to what extent it would be binding because it isn't an admission -- you have no -- you have no conflict. The witness -- there is the disturbing factor, it isn't that the witness said, "On such and such a day Manson stated thus and thus. And then repudiated in further testimony the impeachment." It isn't -- there is no direct impeachment of the witness that is on the witness stand testifying.

MR. KATZ: That is absolutely correct.

THE COURT: There is the thing that bothers me, you see.

MR. KATZ: You see, what Mr. Weedman is saying, he is well aware of this. The fact that assuming the statement comes in, the statement of Manson to Paul Crockett, the witness who is presently on the stand, if I do not object whether or not it is indeed hearsay makes no difference because now it comes in for all purposes.

In other words, if there is no objection and hearsay testimony comes in, it may be used for all purposes, substantive purposes, impeachment of the truth of the statements made in the declaration.

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Mr. Weedman is a good lawyer, obviously, and he does not want to have that come in as substantive evidence. I would not object if he would attempt to elicit it for all purposes.

He came in here to ask you whether or not he could bring in the statement on the theory of impeachment.

Your Honor has rightly concluded there is no impeachment of the witness at this point. The witness didn't say, "Charlie Manson didn't say that."

I didn't bring out the conversation. So there is no impeachment.

If Mr. Weedman wants to use the conversation for all purposes I would not interpose any objection. He can go into the conversation entirely.

You analyzed it right on the head of the pin, if I may be so crass in referring to it as such. You said at this posture of the questioning there is nothing to impeach the witness with because I didn't bring out the conversation between Manson and Crockett on direct examination. I just established there was a conversation.

THE COURT: Well, I feel as I did. I just don't think there is impeachment. And it would be very hazardous to ask the witness the question. The People say they won't object, but it would be a very damaging statement.

MR. WEEDMAN: Supposing we had a hypothetical situation where the witness takes the stand. He says, "I had a conversation with A, and A told me he shot the victim."

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WEEDMAN: Then, "I had a conversation with B, and he told me/shot the victim." "Then I had a conversation with C and he says he shot the victim." "Then I had a conversation with the defendant. The defendant told me he shot the victim." б He goes all through the alphabet. He says 26 people told him they each one shot the victim. THE COURT: All right. MR. WEEDMAN: Seems to me we would be entitled to bring that out, your Honor. 19b the first of

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THE COURT: There you have got it again. The witness theoretically has told the truth of what the confessors have stated. He hasn't -- his statements are simply a statement of what A, B, C and D told him.

MR. WEEDMAN: Yes, but I can -- it seems to me that I don't have to accept that. I can argue that he is mistaken when he includes my defendant in that bunch. He has mistakenly included my defendant.

THE COURT: Well, I would be inclined to rule against you. Now, I think you have made a pretty fair statement here of your purpose for the purpose of a transcript to a higher court. If you desire to elaborate on it you go ahead.

I do think that there is no question about your position. I would be inclined to rule against you and hold there is no impeachment there. There is no basic impeachment.

MR. WEEDMAN: Well, I'will accept the ruling, your Honor, of course. I will accept it insofar as obviously I am not going -- I won't urge my point any further. I will assign it as error of course for the record naturally.

THE COURT: I want you to. I ask you to. There is no issue on that.

MR. WEEDMAN: Your Honor, I apologize in advance, I am somewhat undecided now as to whether I am going to pursue the conversation with Manson.

THE COURT: Now, I want to get into that with you.

MR. WEEDMAN: To be used substantively.

THE COURT: I make the ruling I do. However, let me ask you a question. There is no jury here.

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 Suppose you were to ask -- these are your decisions. I mean it's like the subpoending in a man from the state prison.

MR. WEEDMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: These are your opinions. But here is the thing. Suppose you were to ask the witness -- the People say, "We won't object."

"Mr. Witness, you talked to Manson? Yes."

Forget your grand jury. You don't have to go into it for the moment. Maybe not at all.

MR. WEEDMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: "What did Manson tell you?"

"Manson said he killed Shea."

All right. That's all. I mean fine. Redirect or something.

Now, haven't you got a very fine position to argue to the jury at that juncture, "Well, here is Manson says he killed this man, and here is Shea said he killed him. Manson said he killed him. Do you find beyond a reasonable doubt on this?" I mean there is your argument at that point. Now, what have you got to worry about — talking frankly, from in front of the D.A., what have you got to worry about cross-examination there? What is there disturbing about that?

MR. WEEDMAN: Nothing. Quite frankly, there isn't a thing.

But we have got this problem, if that is received substantively then of course we are past a corpus delicti problem. Because it could be used --

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 THE COURT: There is the point again, there is that substantive position. I don't think it -- under the Green case that what Manson said could be considered substantively. What the witness says he did.

"I, the witness, did this. I, the witness, did this." And then at some other time he contradicts it and says, "I, the witness, did this and I did this, or I didn't do this.' Those are statements of substantive position of the witness himself.

MR. WEEDMAN: That's right, your Honor.

THE COURT: You see, here we go into statements not of what the witness did or did not do, but what --

MR. WEEDMAN: Somebody else.

THE COURT: What somebody else did.

So you are bound to get into hearsay. That is my point.

MR. WEEDMAN: That is what is wrong of course with People v. Green.

THE COURT: That is Green, yes.

MR. WEEDMAN: It creates a huge problem which of course it doesn't even purport to answer.

THE COURT: But there --

MR. WEEDMAN: Well, you see, your Honor, we of course have taken the position all along that there is no corpus delicti established for the crime of murder or homicide. And of course for the record we have also taken the position throughout that there is no corpus delicti for a conspiracy.

THE COURT: I understand that.

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MR. WEEDMAN: I am sure the record is clear in that respect.

If I do ask the question, and it is received substantively, why, then of course, it is going to feed back and support the corpus delicti. If I can be permitted at least for the record to be understood as offering it not tactically, but offering it with the understanding that I still do not concede that there is a corpus delicti, then chances are I will seek to ask the witness this question.

That is about a conversation with Charles Manson.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. WEEDMAN: Now, the prosecutor is not going to like that.

THE COURT: Stop right there. Let me stop you again. Let me ask this again. Re-pose the same argument.

If the witness testifies "Manson told me he, Manson, shot Shea", now, if that cannot, as a matter of law, be received for a substantive purpose you are not helped at all, are you? You see, this is not the witness testifying what he, the witness, did one day and didn't do the next. It is a statement of hearsay.

You see, you wouldn't have substantive statements by the witness.

MR. WEEDMAN: Well, I don't want to take the position that it is a declaration against penal interests unless I am forced to do that. I am hoping to avoid that. That is all, and merely cast doubt on the credibility of the witness insofar as he implicates my client.

I am not going to say "Well, we have a confession here from Charles Manson. Therefore Charles Manson did it."

And the reason that I say that is because I don't want to concede, and I don't want to build up any evidence tending to show a corpus delicti beyond what we have already of course argued about here.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you another question. Let me ask you another question here.

Let me see if I can express it in an easy way here Now, here is what I want to say.

I know -- I think I can answer what your argument will be, but let me put it this way.

The People contend a conspiracy exists. Where the co-conspirators, one of the major purposes of the conspiracy is to eliminate Shea or kill Shea. And they work in unison for that purpose, the commission of the crime.

That crudely, but basically is it. You can correct me if I am mistating your position. It isn't done purposely.

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Now, the People are putting on testimony directed to that point, that Grogan killed Shea.

All right. This is a conspiracy unfolding itself.

Now, in the commission of the conspiracy, the statements, acts, or declarations of one conspirator in the fulfillment of the conspiracy — the statements or declarations of one conspirator are the statements and declarations of the other conspirator or conspirators. That is true. I'm asking you to assume the basic premise —

MR. WEEDMAN: If they are in the course and furtherance of the conspiracy.

THE COURT: I'm not asking you to stipulate to any conspiracy at all. That is your basic jury instruction.

MR. WEEDMAN: But you have to add, if it is done in the course and furtherance of the objects of the conspiracy.

THE COURT: In furtherance of the object of the conspiracy.

Now, here's what disturbs me. The People have put on statements of the alleged conspirators respecting the fulfillment of a conspiracy, or the carrying on of a conspiracy to kill Shea. The very statements of the conspirators have been admitted in evidence as being made during the course of the conspiracy or in fulfillment of the conspiracy.

Now, let's say the People rest and the defendant puts on this witness.

"Mr. Witness, did you have a conversation with Charles Manson?"

"Yes."

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"Did he tell you -- what did he say?"
"Well, Manson said he killed Shea."

Now, the People immediately say that is a statement that is not -- it is not in the course of the fulfillment of the conspiracy. It is not admissible.

I'm wondering if as a matter of law such a statement is or is not admissible as a rebuttal testimony, or not a rebuttal, because you have affirmative statements of members of the conspiracy directed to the fulfillment of the conspiracy. Would not the statement of Manson, "I, Manson, killed Shea," is that not a statement that goes to the fulfillment of the conspiracy in the sense that it is a statement that Manson killed Shea and not other members of the conspiracy, and that goes to the fulfillment of the conspiracy?

MR. KATZ: No.

MR. WEEDMAN: No, your Honor.

MR. KATZ: I think counsel agrees, in no way does it go to the fulfillment of the conspiracy. The statement could only be offered if, number one, the subject matter was brought out on direct somehow so that it would be within the scope of cross and thereby invited the kinds of questions that Mr. Weedman would like to ask the witness concerning the subject matter, or if it falls within a sufficiently-laid foundation of a declaration against penal interest, meaning that the declarant, Mr. Manson, is unavailable as a witness.

Now, I don't think we have that foundation at this point, and accordingly, I say that at this point it is

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immaterial and would not be relevant and there would be an objection to that line of questioning on the ground that it is irrelevant and immaterial and would call for hearsay.

Now, once again I invite Mr. Weedman to put on the entire conversation for all purposes, and I will be very happy and I will not in any manner, shape or form interpose an objection.

But that is Mr. Weedman's decision to make tactically as a lawyer, and he is a fine lawyer, and I'm sure he would not accept my invitation.

MR. WEEDMAN: Of course, it is more than just a tactical decision. I feel compelled at this point to introduce such testimony if I can get it in because our backs are really to the wall here, in a manner of speaking.

THE COURT: Well, I'll tell you, at this juncture I would rule that, as presented, which is very clearly and fairly stated what the witness says Manson said to him, the witness; and what the witness said Grogan said to him, I don't think it constitutes an impeachment. That would be my ruling at this juncture.

MR. WEEDMAN: I take it, then, that the only theory would be a declaration against penal interest then, and --

MR. KATZ: I would concede that if counsel laid the full foundation, it would be admissible under that theory.

MR. WEEDMAN: I am unable to do so at this time because
I don't know that Charles Manson is unavailable, and I'm not--

THE COURT: I do not think Manson is available at this time. He is charged with the murder and, of course, charging

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. him, too, with the co-conspirator in there.

I don't want to take a technical advantage. If you want to revisit it and could convince me -- I really think there is no impeachment. I don't want to mislead you, but I wouldn't close you off on a technicality. If, as we go through the trial here, the issue should present itself in some other fashion, I will bring you in chambers and discuss it with you.

MR. WEEDMAN: I think that a foundational requirement for the admission of a statement which is against penal interest is that the declarant be unavailable.

MR. KATZ: That is correct, Mr. Weedman.

MR. WEEDMAN: Let me take a look at it.

MR. KATZ: The problem with that, under the Spriggs doctrine -- S-p-r-i-g-g-s, I believe -- the requirement is that not only must -- well, it must be shown that the declarant is unavailable.

Now, the problem here is that I don't know of any case that interprets unavailability to the point that it defines unavailability as relating to a person who is seeking the privilege against self-incrimination. I think, assuming for a moment that that kind of foundation would be sufficient to raise a declaration against penal interest --

- THE COURT: The statement of the witness itself, I don't think it could come in through the --

MR. KATZ: Yes, it could. That is the whole theory of the declaration against penal interest.

THE COURT: Yes, you're right.

MR. KATZ: The declarant is unavailable.

THE COURT: What is your Code section? Where is that?
Do you remember? Let me have that.

MR. KATZ: I think under 405 of the Evidence Code, or 403 of the Evidence Code, the court must make a preliminary fact determination as to whether or not there is a sufficient foundation to warrant the admission of the statement by an absent declarant on the theory that he is unavailable in concept of law.

THE COURT: Let me look at it here.

MR. KATZ: Is that correct, Mr. Weedman?

MR. WEEDMAN: I'm sorry. I was reading.

THE COURT: 405?

MR. KATZ: I believe it is 403 or 405.

It is Section 1230.

THE COURT: 1230?

MR. KATZ: Yes, but I have reference to the preliminary fact determination which the court must make in order to determine whether or not a statement is admissible as a statement against penal interest.

MR.WEEDMAN: Counsel is right. I think 1230 of the Evidence Code specifically refers to that exception.

THE COURT: Wait a minute. I want to read this again.

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(Short pause.)

THE COURT: I think this is the answer to your question here.

(Short pause.)

THE COURT: Well, I think under the People against

Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d -- 68, I have just read this case. Particularly on page 871 and basically on 873 -- no, not necessarily basically but on 873, here we are. 874, point 4; 875 on the so-called unavailability of the witness to reaffirm the statement "I, the witness, killed John Smith." His unavailability to be there.

I think -- I think such statements as the witness on the stand -- now, whether it should come in at this time I'm not debating it -- are admissible statements on the basis that they are declarations against declarant.

The code, right into it, 1230, that the exception must exist that the witness is unavailable as a witness.

Now, let's go back and start with scratch. Your statement reads, 1230:

"Evidence of a statement by a declarant"-that is Manson, Charles Manson -- "having sufficient
knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by
the hearsay rule if the declarant" -- I read in
Manson -- "is unavailable as a witness.

"And the statement" -- Manson's -- "when made was so contrary to the defendant's pecuniary or proprietary interest" -- Manson, which is 'I killed Shea' -- "or so far subject him to the risk

of civil or criminal liability" -- already he is ļ being tried criminally -- "or so far tended to render invalid a claim" --The statements would not have been made unless he believed it to be true. -22 fls б .8 Ì, 13.

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Now, the question in my mind at this point is this. Let's back up again. Suppose the defendant brings Manson in here. Manson makes statements, "I killed Shea." They are obviously admissible whether you want to call it an admission or confession, assuming they are admissible.

"I killed Shea."

Now, Manson isn't here. These are statements allegedly made by Manson to the witness on the stand, "I killed Shea," or words to that effect.

Now, the question of unavailability is present.

Is Manson unavailable or not? He is charged with the crime.

Under the reasoning carefully gone into in Spriggs, for instance, if Manson were insane in some respects, as the court points out here, for instance, reading from point 4 on page 875:

"The question remains whether the admissibility of hearsay declarations" -- now, this would be theoretically Manson's statement -- "against interest depends on the unavailability of the declarant to testify at the trial. If Mrs. Roland was deceased" -- this is the one who theoretically made admissions of her own guilt exonerating the defendant Spriggs -- "if Mrs. Roland was deceased, insane, suffering from severe illness, absent from the jurisdiction, or otherwise unavailable,"

the testimony would be admissible as being unavailable as a witness.

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Now, the question -- and then the court says,
"Such unavailability provided a necessity for the evidence" -I add, to be admitted.

Now, a footnote in Spriggs, page 875:

"The record does not disclose whether or not Mrs. Roland was available as a witness.

"If Mrs. Roland had taken the witness stand, but refused to testify regarding the possession of narcotics" -- that was the substance of her out-of-court statement -- let's read it again -- "If Mrs. Roland had taken the witness stand, but refused to testify regarding the possession of narcotics, invoking her constitutional right not to incriminate herself, she would not have been available as a witness," and therefore her testimony would be permissible.

Now, let's get down to Manson here. Manson is brought over here. You stipulate to it -- I don't know -- I'm not asking you to stipulate to anything -- if Manson is brought over here, for instance, somebody asks him that question, "Did you kill Shea," and immediately he says, or his lawyer says, Kanarek says, "I object to that question on the ground of a violation of his constitutional right and it tends to incriminate him and he is being prosecuted for murder, and advise the witness not to answer." It would be a perfect right of Kanarek to say that and a perfect right of the witness to refuse to answer.

He immediately complies with this proviso in

Spriggs.

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Then you go back and tell Manson to go back to his own trial and you go ahead and call this witness on the stand. You say, "Now, Mr. Witness, did you have a conversation with Manson?"

"Yes."

"When?"

"September 15, 1969."

"Was it about -- " frame it any way you want to --"Was it concerning the death of Shea?"

"Yes."

"Was it concerning who killed Shea?"

"Yes."

"All right. Tell the jury what Manson told you." "Manson said, 'I killed Shea.'"

Now, you have complied -- that statement could come in, in my opinion, there is nothing to stop it, in that The question is, when and where is the proper time to put it in?

Excuse me. I think there is no dispute MR. KATZ: between counsel for the defense and myself as to the admissibility of the statement assuming that Mr. Manson, outside the presence of the jury, indicates he is going to assert the privilege against self-incrimination. Obviously, the statement then made to Mr. Crockett could come in under 1230 of the Evidence Code.

But this is the problem that Mr. Weedman is confronted with at this time: We don't have the foundation.

He has Mr. Crockett on the stand, and once again I am not going to stipulate that, one, the foundation is made, namely, that Mr. Manson at this time is legally unavailable until we find that out in a hearing under 405 of the Evidence Code, outside the presence of the jury, and two, I will not stipulate that any inquiry into the alleged statement of Manson made to Crockett in September, 1969, may be limited for impeaching purposes, but if gone into by the defense, comes in for all purposes, including substantive evidence.

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THE COURT: I would say this in answer to your argument: if the defendant -- if, for instance, in his defense -- probably it comes in to a better advantage -- the question, serious question, is whether it is proper cross-examination at this time, but I think as a matter of defense that total statements of Manson, which theoretically he would deny or would refuse to answer, would be admissible through the lips of this witness as substantive evidence under this holding. I don't think there is any question about it.

So I would say, why don't you -- I want to say because I happen to look like I'm briefing the law or advancing the points of law, I'm doing nothing more than the Supreme Court will do if they get this case, if they get it. If the defendant is convicted, the first thing the Supreme Court will say is, "Why didn't the trial judge let the testimony in?" I'm not just opening the books here; I'm not advocating either party. I think the testimony is admissible. Right now I don't think it is proper cross-examination. There is a serious question that might enter there, but I do think it would be admitted and admissible as substantive evidence under this holding and under 1230 at a future time when the defendant puts on his case.

That is my feeling at this time. Somebody has got to convince me to the contrary. This goes right in -- the refusal of a criminal witness to testify.

So my ruling at the moment is, I don't think it is admissible. The question is admissible, or I don't think there is a question of conflict

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shown at this time in questioning that goes into credibility.

That would be my finding at this time. I would say that I

think if you comply with -- at a later time you could ask the

questions as indicated. I think the law is there.

That is my feeling. At the present time I will stand by my ruling that the objection is sustained at this time.

MR. KATZ: May we have a recess now?

THE COURT: Do you want to go home? We have had no recess.

MR. WEEDMAN: That's right, we haven't.

THE COURT: Shall we go over to tomorrow?

MR. WEEDMAN: Your Honor, in that connection, I understand that juror No. 5 wanted to be with her husband tomorrow. He is going to the hospital, and I don't know -- Frank told me this, your clerk -- I didn't know how serious it was.

THE COURT: I think Frank mentioned that somebody was sick there. Let's find out.

With the agreement of everybody --

MR. KATZ: We have this one problem. I will bring it to the attention of the court. I don't feel strongly about it and I certainly want to accommodate the jurors as best we can.

I understand that tomorrow in Department 106, in the so-called Manson case, they will commence evidence in the Shea case, and as a result I'm most anxious to conclude this trial so that exhibits will be once again available to this department concerning the Shea case. I understand there is some arrangement between the clerk in Department 106 and

concerned about it.

THE COURT: Do you feel that holding this case tomorrow while he is there is going to upset you, disturb you, in any way? If it is, I can, with the consent of counsel, put it over another day. I don't like to do that unless there is a real reason for doing it. That is why I'm asking you, talking to you right here.

THE JUROR: Yes. I would appreciate it very much if I could be there.

THE COURT: You think it would help him?

THE JUROR: Yes.

THE COURT: Tomorrow is Tuesday. So you would be ready Wednesday?

THE JUROR: Yes.

THE COURT: Is that agreeable, gentlemen?

MR. KATZ: Yes.

MR. WEEDMAN: We certainly agree.

THE COURT: Now, I wonder about telling -- I think maybe I'll state to the jurors that good cause exists for the case to recess from Monday to Wednesday. I do not think there is any need go go into detail, any purpose accomplished.

MR. WEEDMAN: I agree.

MR. KATZ: That's right, your Honor.

MR. WEEDMAN: The record may reflect that we certainly agree.

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THE COURT: Thank you, lady. You can go back.

(The juror excused.)

THE COURT: Then we'll go ahead and put it over to Wednesday morning.

MR. WEEDMAN: Wednesday morning.

MR. KATZ: Yes.

(The following proceedings were had in open court outside the presence of the jury.)

THE COURT: Now, gentlemen, let's proceed.

People against Grogan. The defendant is here, counsel are here.

Bring in the jury, Sheriff, please.

You take the stand.

You can bring in the jury, Sheriff.

Tell us your name again. You have been sworn.

THE WITNESS: My name is Paul Crockett.

THE COURT: Thank you.

(The following proceedings were had in the presence of the jury.)

THE COURT: Now, the jury is in the courtroom and so are the alternates.

With the consent of counsel, ladies and gentlemen, we are going to -- and for good cause -- we are going to recess or adjourn at this time until 9:30 Wednesday morning. In other words, we will not be in trial tomorrow, which is Tuesday. I'm putting this as simply as possible. We will not be in court tomorrow for trial in this case, but we will

be in trial Wednesday morning, 9:30. So for tomorrow you are excused. Please remember, ladies and gentlemen, as you have been, kindly be here promptly and we will proceed at 9:30 Wednesday. Do not discuss this case in any way whatsoever or come to any opinion or conclusion. We are at recess until 9:30 Wednesday. Thank you very much, folks. I must instruct the witness to return at that time for the rest of your testimony. Thank you very much, Mr. Crockett. .12 We are in recess. (Adjournment was taken to Wednesday, 14. August 18, 1971, at 9:30 a.m.).