DISTRICT ATTORNEY

PRE-TRIAL

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff-Respondent.

vs.

NO. 2005

CHARLES MANSON, SUSAN ATKINS, LESLIE VAN HOUTEN AND PATRICIA KRENWINKEL.

Defendants-Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY

HON. CHARLES H. OLDER, JUDGE PRESIDING

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL

APPEARANCES

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For Plaintiff-Respondent:

THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL

600 State Building

Los Angeles, California 90012

For Defendant-Appellant Charles Manson:

IRVING KANAREK, Esq.

For Defendant-Appellant Susan Atkins: DAYE SHINN, Esq.

For Defendant-Appellant Leslie Van Houten:

IESLIE VAN HOUTEN In Propria Persona

For Defendant-Appellant Patricia Krenwinkel:

PATRICIA KRENWINKEL In Propria Persona

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J. Hollombe, CSR Murray Mehlman, CSR Official Reporters 211 West Temple Street Los Angeles, California 90012

LOG ANGELEG. CALIFORNIA THURSDAY, JUNE 11th, 1970

10:40 A.M.

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THE COURT: People vs. Charles Manson and Sustan Atkins. Mr. MINER: I'm Reiger appearing for Susan Atkins

specially today in the absence of Hr. China.

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THE COURT: Mias Atkins, is that egreeble with

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you?

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(Defendent Atkins rises from her seat and turns

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her back on the Court.)

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THE COURT: Mr. Reiger, I suggest you alvice Miss Atkins if she does not sit down and face the Court she will

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be removed from the courtroom.

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MR. REINER: Yes, your Honor. I previously advised Miss Atkins on that. Miss Ackins, would you please turn

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around.

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DESCRIBANT ATTIME: If your long doesn't respect for. Menson's rights, you need not respect mine. I have nothing

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further to state in this courtroom.

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MR. WINER: Your Honor, may I have one more word with her?

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THE COURT: Ir. Ditagerald, I suggest that you confer with your alient also.

THE COURT: The balliff will remove Miss Atkins from

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The record will show that all three of the defendants. Van Houten, Kranwiskel and Atkins, are now

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standing with their backs to the Court.

Arkins and Miss Van Houten. I advised them they should turn around and face the Court.

They have indicated they will not do so.

MR. FITZGERALD: I will make substantially the same statement on behalf of Miss Krenwinkel.

THE COURT: Very well. I order each of you ladies to turn around, face the Court and sit down, or you will be removed from the court for the balance of the proceedings.

Very well, having failed to do so, the beiliffs will remove the three defendants from the courtroom.

Mr. Kenarek, has Mr. Manson affirmed to you his desire to return to the courtroom and conform to the Court's order regarding decorum and conduct while he is in the court?

MR. KAMAREK: I cannot make that representation to the Court, your Honor.

THE COURT: Have you talked to him this morning?

MR. RANAREK: I have not talked to him specifically
about that point, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, would you confor with him at this time.

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Monor.

PR. REIMER: Excuse se, your Honor. With respect to defendant Atkins, although I indicated to Mr. Shinn I would

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appear on her behalf specially today, Miss Atkins had indicated previously it is agreeable to her. Since she did not acquiesce in open court, I think her matter will have to go off calendar.

I don't know I can properly represent her today. I certainly am willing to.

THE COURT: We won't take any action in that case until Mr. Shinn is present.

MR. STOVITZ: Will the Court contact Mr. Shinn and advise him to be present?

THE COURT: Do you know where he is, Mr. Reiner?
MR. REINER: No. I don't, your Honor.

(Mr. Kanarek reenters the courtroom from the holding room.)

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, Mr. Manson, your Honor, asks respectfully the Court to allow him to discuss the matter with your Honor. He would like ---

THE COURT: There is nothing to discuss, Mr. Kanarek. When the defendant affirms to you that he is willing to come back into the court and conform to the Court's orders, he may return. Until such time he will remain in the hold.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I do make the motion -- I believe it's already made, but out of an abundance of caution I make the motion that Mr. Manson be my co-counsel in this case, your Monor, referring, your Monor, to the statements that are in the record by the Monorable Joseph

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Bail, indicating for, Manson's intellectual capacity and his ability to even be in pro per, so a fortiori Mr. Bugliosi has made much about the seriousness of these offenses, it would need like we would be doing the best we can in protecting his legal position by allowing him to be co-counsel.

THE COURT: The motion will be denied.

Ma. STOYITZ: Your Honor, may counsel approach the bencht

I believe these proceedings, the defendants not being present, could not be harmed by our conference at the Bar, or perhaps in chambers.

MR. FITZGERALD: We would agree and join in that request.

MR. REINER: Join on behalf of the defendant Van Houten.

THE COURT: We will have a brief conference in chambers then. The Court will recess for about five minutes.

(Recess, followed by the following proceedings in chambers, all counsel with the exception of Mr. Shinn being present with the Court.)

IR. FITZGERAID: So the record may be clear, your Honor, at least on behalf of Patricia Fremeinkal, and I speak on behalf of the other defendants, we would object to the Court's procedure.

Defore we get into the objection. I think counsel on both sides would like to discuss with you a

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matter that is obviously of mutual concern.

Your Honor saw us talk with our clients. I have been privy not only to the conversation I had with lies Archalakel, but conversations for Reiner had with Miss Atkins and with lies Van Houten, only we have obviously communicated to the defendants your Unner's directive in terms of their contross conduct.

M. MINER: Perhaps, If I might interrupt, I should make some indication on behalf of my client, Miss Van Houten.

I was given prior notice of her intention to act as she has acted today.

I attempted to dissuade her. I was first notified of this tolay.

I made every argument I thought would be effective with her. In all cander I did not think any argument would be effective with her because there is a winimum amount of client control in this case. In any event I tried to point out that her conduct not only would be contemptions, but agart from that it would be futile in any event.

She was determined to go shead and do what she cid.

Now, having seted in the manner in which she did, there is no way I could have prevented or that I can prevent it. Valortunately, since there is a minimum amount

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of client control. I think now the issue we have is whather the Court may properly exclude them from the court.

I am not terribly concerned about their absence while we are arguing motters of law, although I would like them there at all times in the event I do want to confer with Hiss Van Houten.

But when we get to that portion of these procondings where we are taking evidence, and litigating matters of fact and jury selection, of course, but I am thinking even prior to that, hearings held on pre-trial, perhaps on a 1538,5 motion, it is essential, of course, that the client be there so that I might confer with her.

Now, I would hope that having made a small show of whatever it was that she was attempting to illustrate, she will then behave properly the rest of the time. But I as not confident she will; I cannot guarantee she will. She may or may not from time to time.

I am terribly concerned that while we are at that portion of the trial where I do want her present, that she may act in some disrespectful manner such as she did today by standing up and turning around and showing her back to the Court. The Court may once again remove her from the dourtroom.

Now, I don't think the Court may properly remove a defendant from the courtroom who is acting in a contemptuous and disrespectful manner unless that contemptuous conduct in some way disrupts the proceedings.

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 Now, if the conduct in no way effects the normal conduct of the proceedings, then I think the only remady that the Court has for the effront is to hold the individual defendants in contempt each time they misbehave.

But since the defendants are not guilty of screening or creating a disturbance of any sort, they are standing muto, silent, simply with their backs to the Court, the removing them from the court is improper and I don't think Allen vs. Illinois authorizes it.

I think Allen vs. Illinois specifically indicates that the Court may take this rash action of removing the desendants from the court only in the event they are preventing the Court from continuing.

MR. DTOVITZ: On behalf of the Teople we have seventy-five witnesses subposmed for June 22nd. We anticipated the trial would get under way on the 15th of June, and the jury selection would start either that day or the next day, and we would then schedule our witnesses accordingly.

We feel that Allen vs. Illinois does require tore than merely disrespect for the Court. In other words, a person can show disrespect for the Court by putting his bead down on the table.

However, if the defendant does not do anything to actually disrupt the court proceedings, then the constitutional requirements have been met.

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 The defendant is there in court. He is given an opportunity to face his accusers; he is given an opportunity to be present. If he sees fit to put his head down on the table, that may be disrespectful to the Court, but it does not disrupt the court proceedings.

We are interested in setting the case under way. We feel whether or not this is a contrived action by the descripants or not, that although the Court may be insulted by the conduct of the defendants, that it is to be weighed on the scales of justice with all things cise being equal.

Once the actual jury selection commences, I think the defendants will realize that they are acting to their own detriment, and their scorn and contempt for the Court will be transferred to the jury, and they will change their position.

Right now we want to get these preliminary motions heard.

We feel that under the present state in California law, unless the defendants expressly sign a written waiver not to be present, or unless they are told expressly that by them doing this they are in effect waiving their right to be present in court, that these proceedings would be a nullity, and might be considered error on appeal.

I sarpestly hope that your Hoper would give

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the defendants an opportunity to be present in court.

If they do not make any outbursts or cause any disruption in the court, that we might proceed with the motions.

We do want to start on the 15th, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anyone eine want to be beard?

NR. BUGLICSI: I exten with Mr. Stovitz and Mr. Reiner.

THE COURT: I disagree with all of you gentlemen.

I think that, first off, what they are doing is districtive; it is districtive;

It is a direct violation of the Court's order, and it would be a great distraction and disruption if continued during the course of the trial, which I don't intend to permit.

It is entirely in the hands of the defendants.

All they have to do is comply with the Court's order,

and --

MR. BUGLICCI: May I suggest an alternative?

THE COURT: -- they will be permitted to return at
any time.

As far as conferring with their counsel, I already said and I will say again that counsel may confer with them whenever they care to during every recess and after court hours.

We have fixed up the holding room for Mr.

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Manson with a lowispeaker. He can also see what is going on. I tested it personally myself this morning, and observed everything in the countroom from where he is except, possibly, my profile which is hidden by the doorway.

But he can see counsel; he can see the jury and he can see the spectators and he can hear everything that is going on there.

I already ordered our jury room fixed up for the young ladies in the same manner. When they are removed from the courtreom they will have the same opportunity to hear, although not see, what is going on.

The jury room is upstairs, above the courtroom; the bolding room is immediately adjoining the courtroom.

It is going to be entirely up to them.

I do not propose to try this trial with the defendents standing up in court with their backs to the Court.

HR. BUGLICIT: May I suggest an alternative, your Honor. At these stages of the proceedings right now it isn't important. But, like I said yesterday, I so reasonably confident that if the Court were to exclude the defendants from the courtroom during the trial itself, or even during the selection of the jury, I so very, very confident this would constitute reversible error on the grounds that it is denying then the right to consult with their attorneys during the trial.

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THE COURT: They have that right. All they have to do is exercise it by complying with the Court's order.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I think Illinois vs. Allen clearly says the conduct has to be so disruptive that the trial cannot progress. What I would suggest for the Court's consideration, it is a rather barsh alternative, but at least we can eliminate error, strap them to their chairs, bind them.

Now, Allen mentions that as a possibility, make them sit there and face the Court.

THE COURT: Allen also indicates that is the least desirable of the alternatives available to the Court, and I am inclined to agree.

HR. BUGLIOSI: I agree, your Honor, that is a very unattractive alternative.

THE COURT: The reason why I am removing them is not simply because of the disruptive nature of their conduct and the fact that it is a contemptuous behavior on their part toward the Court, but because we don't have a jury yet.

But if this occurred during the course of the trial itself they would be prejudicing their own interests, very likely, with the jury, and I have a duty to see that they do not do that.

I think that they would be likely to be prejudiced if they had to be gagged and shackled or just

shackled without the gage, depending on the circumstances in the courtroom.

So I am going to select the least offensive alternative that is available to the Court, simply have then removed during the period of their contemptuousness, and it is within their power to stop at any time they want to.

MR. STOVITZ: May se then have a statement for the record, then, they are given this alternative.

I know your Honor expressed it norm clearly.

THE COURT: They are not being given any alternative as far as what I am going to do. The only alternative they have is to decide whether they want to comply with my orders or not.

that your Honor, or I will do it if your Honor wants me
to, to tell them they have a right to be present if they
want to; that any time they see fit to conduct themselves
in a normal manner, as all other litigants must conduct
themselves, that they can indicate that to the bailiff and
they will be brought back into the courtroom; that if they
want to face the front of the courtroom, that is all the
Court is asking them; that they will be allowed to remain --

THE COURT: I already so advised them before they were removed.

MR. STOVITA: You have not had an express waiver from each one.

THE COURT: Walver of what?

MR. STOVITZ: Of their right to be present.

THE COURT: I am not asking for any waiver.

MR. STOVITZ: I think this is what the Code contemplates, that they are told in unequivocal terms.

THE COURT: They have been so told, and counsel have been told. They sat here yesterday when I advised Hr. Hanson several times, and his counsel, after every recess.

HR. STOVITA: I realize that, your Honor.

THE COURT: They beard all of this. There cannot be the slightest question in their minds.

MR. STOVITZ: If we can have it from their own lips that they know they have the elternative to be present so long as they are willing to conduct themselves as any other litigant would. I think the Court would be covered so far as the preliminary motions go.

As far as the commencement of the trial is concerned I feel that all the proceedings would be a mullity, and as long as they refuse to face the front of the court and conduct themselves in a normal manner, we just should not start a jury selection.

THE COURT: Well, they will be brought in so the jury panel may see them initially. But if they persist in conducting themselves in the same way they did this morning,

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 then they will be removed, and the same right of conference will exist, the same right to confer with their attorneys will exist as now exist.

There won't be any deprivation of their right to confer with counsel, and they will bear everything that is going on in the proceedings.

IR. BUGLICH: The Zammora case held there was a deprivation of the right to counsel where the defendants were actually in court with their counsel but apparently were separated from them, so it was very difficult for them to talk to counsel.

And the Court, either the California Suprese Court or the Appellate Court -- the Cuprese Court -- held even that was a decial of the right to counsel, because the right to counsel implies the right to confer, a fortiori, even in court, even though they are hearing the proceedings, I think that clearly it would be a decial of their right to counsel.

Of course the prosecution is just as concerned about this as the defense. We have to --

THE COURT: And the Court is equally concerned.

NR. REINER: If I might interject a few comments:

I agree, as any conscientious lawyer would, that the defendants are prejudicing their own case by their own conduct, certainly if the jury appears and they turn their back on the Court or act in any disrespectful manner.

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cortainly it will have an adverse effect on the jury, to the defendants.

This is an argument I made to my defendant; but it is not an argument that carries any particular weight with her, frankly. But I don't know how else to say this, but I think perhaps I can put it as succinctly as this:

A trial is not a privilege that is granted to people who will maintain good behavior. That is not the purpose or function of a trial.

I will not argue with the Court that the defendants are misbehaving. I will grant their conduct is insulting; it is meant to be insulting and it is consemptuous, and the Court in its own discretion should take whatever remedy it can toward punishing the defendants.

I am distressed that I cannot do anything about it because I am trying to do the very best job possible for my defendant, hopefully for an acquittal, if not an acquittal perhaps some lesser sentence.

Her conduct is making that job more and more difficult in a situation which is at best very, very difficult in any event.

Now, if these defendants are disrupting the proceedings so that it does in fact become impossible to proceed, then I would agree that the proper procedure would be to remove them from the courtroom.

I would vigorously oppose ever shackling a defendant, yelling and acrossing and gagging them. They

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should be removed from the proceedings and we will proceed as we do often in civil cases where the parties themselves are not present, or in a misdemeasor where the defendant is not always present.

being disrupted, where it is simply a matter of affront, whether an affront to the Court or some other person, and the proceedings may nonetheless to ahead, counsel may examine witnesses, that the witnesses may answer, that the persons may examine — that jurous may view the witnesses and reach judgments as to their credibility, that is, where all the proceedings may go ahead without any obstruction, then I don't believe the Court has the right or authority to remove the defendant from the courtroom.

THE COURT: You make this argument, Mr. Reiner.

MR. REINER: I want to bring it down to one point,
the Court said he felt if a defendant were to stand and
turn her back quietly, silently, and simply have her back
facing the Court rather than her face, that this would
be disruptive.

May I inquire of the Court specifically how this would disrupt any aspect of the proceedings, and perhaps we may then address ourselves to a point by point examination of what aspect of the proceedings are being disrupted.

THE COURT: I am not going to go through this. I

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told you what my thinking is on the subject.

I see nothing to change it. It is disruptive. It would be distractive; it would be highly prejudicial to the defendant's own case, and I will not permit it.

It would simply be up to the defendance to decide for themselves whether they wanted to be present during the course of the trial or whether they wented to have the trial so on in their absence.

MR. REINER: I don't think the test is what the defendant wants.

THE COURT: Anything further, gentlement IR. STOVITA: Not on this point, your Honor, on another point:

I think the record should be crystal clear that Mr. Kanarek is acting as Mr. Manson's private lawyer and is not a Court-appointed lawyer.

THE COURT: We have gone over that. I have nothing to do with the Hinnan case; I had only one motion before me and that was a motion for a substitution which was disposed of yesterday. In the other case I have already made it clear on the record that he is not being appointed by the Court, and whatever his arrangements are with Hr. Henson, they are private arrangements.

M. MOVITA: In the Minman case, however, a Courtappointed lawyer was removed.

THE COURT: I see not the Judge in the Himsen case.

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MR. STOVITZ: But your Monor did allow the substitution to come in, so I would like the record to be clear that on the Ringer case it. Kaparek is not substituting in as a Court-appointed lawyer.

THE COURT: He is not being appointed by me, and as far as I know he has not been appointed by any Judge.

W. STOVITA: May it be stipulated then by the attorney for it. Manson that he is coming in as Mr. Manson's privately selected attorney.

THE COURT: I don't know.

HR. KANARIK: I would like to --

THE COURT: I don't know if he cares to scipulate to anything or not, that is up to him.

MR. KANAREK: I believe the County Counsel represents the County in this regard. I believe the District Attorney, once seals, wants to usurp, wants to wove into areas that are outside of his donain.

The County Counsel, Mr. Maharg -- I have difficulty pronouncing his name, but I don't think Mr. Stovitz can speak for the County in that regard.

THE COURT: I don't understand what you're mylor. speak in what regard?

M. Kallalika: I don't believe Mr. Stovitz in convection with the matter he is speaking of has any standing. He is the prosecutor; he is a number of the District Attorney's Office and I believe --

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THE COURT: I don't see that there is snything before the Court. I did not appoint you in either case.

I made that abundantly clear. As far as I know neither has any other Julys.

Now, if you can test that, that is a matter for you to take up, Mr. Kanarak, but the record will indicate that you have not been appointed by the Court in either case.

Is that your understanding?

MR. KANAREK: I have not heard myself being appointed, your Monor, that is a fair statement.

THE COURT: Very well, let's proceed, gentlemen.

(The following proceedings were had in open court:)

THE COURT: Mr. Kadarek, in the Himsen case, No. A250361, that watter will be transferred to Department West "D" on June 18th, at 9:00 a.m.

oppose that transfer. We would ask, we would like to make argument to the Court in that regard, your Monor. It was filed in the downtown area. There are many reasons why it would be best kept in the downtown area. The salleged wrongdoing took place in that area. The People may have some -- I don't want to belabor it at this point, I would ask your Monor to keep your Monor's order in abeyance.

THE COURT: It is my understanding from talking to

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Judge Dell in Department 100, that this matter has elready been transferred for a motion on the 15th in Department West "D."

MR. KANAREK: That I am not aware of, your Honor.
THE COURT: That is the reason I am making the

Mr. KANAREK: I see. The motion had already been

THE COURT: That is what I have been informed, I don't know, Mr. Kanerek. In any event the case will be transferred to West "D" on June 18th, at 9 a.m. for further proceedings in that court.

The Court will next take up Mr. Manson's motion for discovery in the Tate-Labiance case.

HR. REIMER: If I might be heard before we proceed, your Honor, I would like to move for a stay so I might immediately seek a writ of mandate in the Court of Appeals directing the Court to have the defendant Lealis Van Houten returned to the courtroom.

I can represent to the Court that I will have the matter prepared within hours after the transcript is prepared by the court reporter.

THE COURT: Do you have may further mathers with regard to pre-trial motions, Mr. Reiner?

M. MINER: Yes, I do, your Monor.

THE COURT: Well, the motion for a stay will be decied.

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We will continue with our pre-trial motions.

PR. KAWAREK: New the record reflect that we will join in that request for a stay **

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. KANAREK: -- on behalf of Mr. Menson.

THE GURT: Are you ready to proceed with your motion for discovery, Mr. Kenerek?

WR. HANAGER: Your Honor, we are ready to proceed with the exception that we have this problem:

And Mr. Shinn is not present and in view of Mr. Bugliosi's statements yesterday, concerning the fact that he, wall, whatever the reason is, the 30 pages of transcript, or 30 pages of notes that Mr. Bugliosi made himself, being very vital, and involving Susan Atkins, that is a sine qua non, your Monor, we must have those thirty pages.

Now, we may have to take evidence on it. I would be reluctant to proceed in that connection without having Mr. Shing here.

THE COURT: All I am interested in at the moment, in. Kanarak, is proceeding with your motion.

MR. KAWAREK: Very well then, at the top of page 6 of our request, your Honor ---

THE COURT: Your request is contained in Paragraph 5 on page 5 of your proceedings.

Do the People have any objection to that request?

Henor.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I think "expected testimony" is a little broad. I don't think we have to furnish the defense with that.

I think we can formish the defense with tape recorded conversations, or police reports, at osters.

I don't think we have to tell the defense every single item of information that a particular witness will testify to.

THE COURT: Well, it is my understanding that this was part of Mr. Reform's request pesterday, the People have acceded to that request on the Court's order.

MK. BUGLICSI: The Language here is "expected testimony."

I think what they went is probably several volumes right now on every single item, including the witnesses' addresses, where they work, what they are going to testify to.

I think this is an unreasonable request.

THE COURT: I think the request should be no broader than the Court order with respect to Mr. Reiner's request.

MR. BULLIOSI: I don't think in. Reiner was asking for the expected testimony. I think he was asking for written or oral statements and also tape recorded

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conversations which we sirenly turned over.

THE COURT: The statements will contain the essential facts. I would assume to which the witness will testify.

M. BUGLIOSI: That is true, your Honor, and we have stready turned over all of our statements from witnesses to the defense.

But for me to sit down and determine exactly what each witness is going to testify to based on those statements is unreasonable and an unwarranted request, and I don't think any case on discovery has yet gone that far.

We are only required to turn over to the defense all the written statements we have of witnesses and all of the tape-recorded conversations we have of witnesses.

THE COURT: Is it my understanding then that you have complied with that portion?

HR. BUGLICSI: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have those, Mr. Knowrek?

12. KANARER: No. I do not physically have them.

MR. BUGLICSI: You have the right to inspect and copy them, as I understand, Mr. Kanarek, whether you exercise that right or not is beyond the power of the prosecution.

IR. KANAREK: I will certainly exercise the right of going to the District Attorney's Office, your Honor.

But, if I may, we have to this paragraph the

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language, "And particularly the question is asked whether Linda Kasabion will testify for the presecution, and her expected testimony."

Now, we have a problem here in preparing for trial. We have to know whether Linda Kasabian is going to be a witness or not, and --

THE COURT: The People will give you that information.

They will be required to reveal the nexes and identities

of the witnesses they expect to call.

MR. BUGLIOSI: We already turned over to the defense, your Monor, a 20-page document which I dictated concerning Linda Kasabian's expected testimony.

Now, we made an exception as to her, obviously -THE COURT: Does Mr. Kenerok have this? That is
the problem.

MR. STOVIES: Mr. Hughes was given it. It was mailed to him.

MR. BUGLICSI: I assume Mr. Rughes has turned it over to Mr. Kanerek.

MR. KANAREK: I have read, your Monor, what counsel is alluding to. However, it is a for-cry from what he synopsizes in comparison with what she will do or perhaps has already done by way of a word for word interrogation.

I am sure the District Attorney of Los Angeles County has conducted a question and answer session with her, at least I would think so since we are approaching

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trial.

THE COURT: If those statements have been reduced to writing, you are entitled to them.

MR. KAMARIK: Or if they are in the form of a tape recording we will be glad to listen to the tape or bring someone in to take it down or reproduce it.

We do sek for that, your Honor, rather than it. Bugliosi's -- after all he is an advocate here, we want what she actually uttered, rather than it. Bugliosi's synopsis.

MR. BUCLIOSI: I did not have a tape-recorded conversation with Links Kamabian, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, the Court will order the People to make aveilable to the extent it has not already been done the names and identities of all of the witnesses you may expect to call at the triel, and to permit Mr. Kanarek to inspect the statement of all witnesses who were interviewed in the same manner as the Court ordered with respect to Mr. Reiner's request yesterday.

That would seem to take care of your request.

MR. KANAREK: We have this problem, however, your

Honor, if Linds Kasabian is granted immunity, of course
then she testified and she has no privilege against selfincrimination.

I'm sure, I mean I am not really sure, or I think that it is probable that the District Attorney has

perhaps seen or knows of statements that are in the hands of the attorneys for Linia Kasabian, and there is no reason if she is granted immunity why we cannot have the statements that she may have given to her own immyers, since the attorney-client privilege is evidently not going to be of any importance to her in view of the fact that she is in the process of being given immunity, or will testify.

How, we would ask through the Court, your Honor, if Mr. Bugliosi knows of any question-and-answer type of interrogation make by her attorneys with her, if he has seen anything like that which we, I believe, in the context of what is going on here, that we are entitled to.

MR. BUGLICSI: Your Honor, Mr. Fleishoan, Links Kasabian's attorney, I am sure, has interviewed her at great depth several times.

I have no knowledge of any of these conversations being reduced to writing. I certainly don't have possession of them.

THE COURT: Very well. That will be the order, gentlemen. That occase to be the only demand that you have in your discovery motion, Mr. Monerek.

MS. KAMAREK: Wall, except on page 6 at the top, any statements made by the co-defendants.

She still, as far as the court like is concerned, is a co-

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THE COURT: Mr. Bugliosi ways he doesn't have any such statement.

MR. KANAREK: I understand, your Honor. But I just want to point out that we have this request at the top of page 6.

We consider her at this point, she has this dual capacity of a witness for the prosecution and also a co-defendant, and so out of an abundance of caution, she comes under that category also, at the top of page 6.

THE COURT: Very well. Anything further on the discovery motion?

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Bonor. At the top of page 6, "Any statements made by the co-defendant."

Now, that includes what Mr. Bugilsi was alluding to yesterday in connection with the 30-pages of notes that he lost.

This is the initial time that he has spoken to Susan Atkins. It is our request that we have those notes.

THE COURT: You are entitled to the notes if they exist, Mr. Kanarek, but I understand from Mr. Buglion he does not have them any longer.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, I don't believe I have them any longer. They served no further purpose.

Sugan Atkins has decided not to testify for the prosecution.

THE GUIRT: That is not the point. Do they exist or don't they?

MR. BUGLIOSI: To my knowledge they don't. I have tube and tube of notes and files. I will look for them again.

I looked for them last night and I could not find them. I can say this, and I will repeat it again: These 30 pages of notes were testified to in substantial accordance by Susan Atkins the Sollowing morning at the Crand Jury.

Hr. Kanarek has a copy of the Grand Jory transcript. I will make the representation to the Court that Susan Atkins' testimony was in very, very substantial accordance with what she told me the previous night.

THE COURT: That does not satisfy the request.

IR. BUQLICSI: If Mr. Kanarek is not satisfied with that, I will sit down with Mr. Manarek and relate to his my recollection, and I think it is fairly good, of what Gusan Atkins told me.

THE COURT: You can do that as a matter of stipula-

The order will be that you are to turn over a copy, or permit in. Kanarck to copy the notes of any conversation you have had with Miss Atkins.

ER. KANAKEK: Well, then, your looor, we have this problem:

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25 26 The problem is I commot eccept a non-juilcial atmosphere in connection with 12. Degliosi's statements.

The proscention has relical upon hason Athins for this case. If . Deplies, I camet -- I am not intending any personal affront to Mr. Deplies, but I have an obligation to the man I reprocess.

that this be done in an atmosphere, regrettably I must want it, and I move it be done with ir. Bugliesi under eath.

I have to do it because there is no alternative.

THE COLUMN YOU haven't completed looking through the materials yet, so there would be no point of doing it at this time.

that Dusan Asidas is offered on a vitness by the prosecution

The County I don't think that is the point, lie. Stovice. This is discovery. We are not talking about her testimony at the trial. To are talking about pre-trial discovery.

The defendants would be entitled to real the notes if they exist.

ME. MOVIED: If they exist. Is your Monor distinguishing between work product and setual notes of the conversation?

THE COURS I am talking about notes of the conversation. Statements of the witness as taken down by Mr. 2).

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IR. CTOVITZ: If those notes exist, Mr. Bugliosi will make those notes available to the Court; then your Conor can turn those notes over to whomever your Honor sees fit.

If those notes do not exist, in. Bugliosi will renier a statement to the Court under declaration of penalty of perjury.

THE COURT: Then can we expect that?

MR. STOVITZ: We can expect that on Honday, your Honor.

MR. FITZGERAID: I wish to enter an objection to that procedure, that those notes be given to the Court. We have information that those statements may not be admissible.

I have no objection to them being turned over to the clerk of the court.

IR. STOVITZ: To the clerk of the court, I am sorry, I meant the clerk of the court. You see, your Honor --

THE COURT: Just a moment, I don't follow your objection. What was the objection?

MR. STOVITS: He did not want the Julge to real them.

MR. FITZGERAID: Yes, I did not want you to read the statements.

THE COURT: All right.

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25 26 MR. STOVITA: You are, at the very beginning of the case, your Monor, we out of an abundance of caution furnished the clerk of Department 107 with a detailed statement of All of the witnesses. We furnished counsel with lettors each time we furnished additional statements; we gratuitously kept these statements to date.

Mr. Nameon personally viewed these exhibits, personally viewed the pictures.

THE COURT: Now he has counsel.

HR. BUGLIOSI: We will do the same for counsel for Hr. Muson. We are trying to cooperate.

THE COURT: We will expect the declaration no longer than Monday, June 15th as to whether or not the notes exist.

PR. STOVITZ: And If they do exist they will be turned over to the clerk of the court.

THE COURT: All right.

M. STOVITZ: Also in interpreting these cases, your Honor, I hope your Honor bears in mind that in other jurisdictions, in allowed discovery, that the Grand Jury transcripts were secret in those jurisdictions.

In this case there has been a full disclosure through the Grand Jury transcript and other transcripts.

THE COURT: Due the point is, as you well recognise, Mr. Stovies, that the notes may be inconsistent with the testinony.

MR. STOVITZ: Then if the person becomes a witness,

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25 26 then it may be used to impeach him, and have more relevance.

If it has no relevance --

THE COURT: Not just on the question of imprecisent. The notes may reveal facts that are not revealed in the transcript, for example.

FR. STOVITS: If the notes exist, your Honor, they will be produced; if not, a declaration will be produced.

THE COURTS Wary well.

MR. KANAMER: Your Honor, if I may, it is our position if Mr. Rugliosi does not produce those notes this case must be displaced.

Brady wa. Haryland we base this on.

THE COURT: You can make that motion after we find out whether they exist. There is no point is making it now.

MR. KAMANEK: Yery well, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else on the discovery motion?

Mt. KANAREK: Yes, at page 5, your Monor, transcripts
of taps recordings of statements made by the accused and
by the prosecution witnesses.

May I ask through the Court, your Honor, whether anyone, to the District Attorney's knowledge, has taken any transcription, tape recording of Linda Kasabian?

MR. STOVITE: There has been none, your Honor.

MR. HANAMER: It has been done, did I hear? MR. STOVITA: There has been none. 1

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712	KANAHEK:	Very	well.	your	Hopor,
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MR. STOVITZ: There are no tape recordings, Mr. Karazak.

Mr. KAMAREK: I will say parenthetically it sousis most incredible, but I hear it.

THE COURT: Anything wise, Mr. Kanerek? MR. KANAREK: We are asking for everything in our discovery motion. Of course.

If your liener wishes we can so --THE COURT! The only desend you have made is contained in Paragraph 5.

MR. RAMAREK: Paragraph 6, prior to trial and during the course of the trial the accused can couped the prosecution to parmit imspection or copying or produce in court any of the following **

THE COURT: That is just a citation of the law.

MR. KAMAREK: It is a pintitude, I soult, your Honor, but if I can - I will request everything in Paragraph & the purport of that ---

> Ma. STOVITZ: Paragraph 6 of what page? MR. KANAREK: Beginning on page 5.

M. STOVITZI Ch.

FR. EARAMER: The purport of that, if it is inscrumetally worded, your Honor, I plead guilty, but that is what we are demanding, this being a discovery motion, I am sure the prosecution will realize that,

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THE COURT: Have there been any clinical blood tests of any of the defendants?

MR. STOVETZ: Yes, your Honor, and they have been written up in a scientific report, and they are evallable for the defendance to sec.

I believe Mr. Firegerald even made copies of them.

THE COURT: All right. Then the order will cover such reports.

What about written statements of the accused? That's siresty been disposed of by the order.

Transcripts of recorded statements of the accused, are there any transcripts other than the notes and statements that have already been referred to?

THE STOVITE: No transcripts. There is a tape recording which Hr. Reiner has been made more he can listen to, anytime he wants to.

There is no tape recording of Mr. Messon's words.

THE COURT: Did you may a transcript?

MR. STOVITZ: Not a transcript, a tape recording of an interview with Mr. Reiner's client. He has been informed that he can listen to that.

At. Kanerek can likewise listen to that.

THE COURT: All right. We have already revered
that.

1	The names of the prosecution witnesses has
2	stresty been covered.
3	Statements by co-defendants has been covered.
4	any joint statements usde by defendants has
5	already been covered.
6	MR. KANAREK: Would your Hosor ask about that
77	*pecifically?
8	MR. STOVETS: What is that?
9	THE COURT: Joint statements.
10	MR, KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, made by defendant and
11	any co-defendant.
12	MR. STOVITZ: I have no knowledge of any in existence
13	your Monor.
14	THE COURT: Written statements of prosecution
15	witnesses relating to matters covered in their testimony
16	has already been covered.
17	The next item does not apply. There was no
.18	praliminary imering.
19	The next item, transcript of tape recording,
20	we have alrewly discussed.
21	MR. KAHAREK: I am wondering, your Honor, would your
22	Honor interrogate on that specifically? There may have
23	been a tape recording which was turned into a writing,
24	and then the tape destroyed.
25	That is conceivable.
-26	M. STOYITA: No, there are partial transcripts of
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25 26 some tape recordings, the original tape recordings have been maintained.

The only other tape recordings we know of are of hir. Hankon that he made on other occasions. We do not have those in our possession. We are seeking to obtain them. We don't have any transcripts of them because we don't have the tape recordings.

But there are, say, for instance, three recisof tape recordings of Mr. DeCarlo of which we made only a partial transcript, and we have the original tape recordings available for counsel's listening.

MR. KANAREK: May I ask this, your Honor: Are these items that counsel is indicating that he is trying to obtain, are they in the banks of law enforcement?

MR. STOVITZ: No, they are not. They are to the hands of essociates of Mr. Manson.

MR. EANAREK: May I sek what does Mr. Stovitz mean by "essociates," your Honort

MR. STOVITZ: Persons be associated with.

MR. WANABER: May we have the names of these people?

MR. STOVITA: We don't know them yet. We are seeking to find them.

int. KAMAREK: Well, your Honor, will counsel tell us how he is seeking to find them, because we would like to get them sixo, your Honor.

MR. STOVITZ: I suggest he interview his client,

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 your Ronor. We have spent a good deal of time going to Consis and Washington, D.C., trying to locate these taps recordings.

I believe they are mostly musical compositions, your Honor, if you can call it music.

THE COURT: Very well. Anything else, Mr. Kensrekt NR. KANAREK: Your Honor, referring to the top of page 7, notes male by police officers of their conversations with prosecution witnesses.

Witnesses, your Monor, the police officer reduced it to a written report interview sheet, not necessarily a verbation conversation.

Those interview sheats are all available. I think they number some one hundred or so interview sheets.

Those are available.

IR, KAMAREK: But we would ask, your Monor, for the original notes that the police officer sade. They are certainly very useful in determining what actually purportedly transpired by way of conversation.

The original statements the police officer writes down rather than his editorializing when he writes up or dictates a report.

THE COURT: We don't know that there are any or if that is the way it was done.

MR. STOVITA: Not only that, but I would suggest that

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counsel real the police interview sheet and if there is any particular sheet that he is interested to trying to see the officer's notes, we will then sontect that particular officer.

I understand it is standard operational procedure for the officers to just discard their notes, once they dictate an interview sheet.

IR. KANAREK: Under Brady vs. Haryland it is our allegation that it is a denial of due process; it is a destruction of syldence which is vital in terms of crease examination.

THE COURT: All right. That request has already been covered to the witnesses statements which the People have agreed to let you inspect and copy, and which the Court has ordered them to do.

Anything else?

IR. KANAMER: The mest, your Honor, is photographs that have been exhibited to the victim of the robbery or, purportedly, any orise for the purposes of identifying the robber or purportedly may perticular alleged criminal.

iR. STOVITE: We will make the photographs available, although there has been no robbery, your Honor, photographs have been shown to various witnesses in this case for the purpose of scaing whether or not the witness can select the proper party involved.

Those photographs are available. We will show

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those to counsel.

THE COURT: Very well. The order will cover those photographs.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, these photographs of what subjects? Are these the defendants or the victims, or what subjects?

MR. STOVITZ: They are primarily the defendants in the case.

THE COURT: Anything else, Nr. Kenerek?

NR. KANAKEK: Yes, your Honor, the next one -
THE COURT: I see it is after 12 o'clock now, we

will recess at this time until 2 p.m. this afternoon.

MR. STOVITZ: is Mr. Obina going to be here this

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Hem he been notified to be here?

THE CLERK: Your Honor, his office cannot locate

(Adjournment taken to the hour of 2:00 P.M. of the same day, Thursday, May 11, 1970.)

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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

THURSDAY, JUNE 11th, 1970

2:40 P.H.

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(The following proceedings were had in the chambers of the Court with all counsel being present with the exception of Mr. Shinn.)

THE COURT: Does anyone know where Mr. Shine is?

MR. FITZGERALD: I don't have any idea where Mr.

Shine is.

MR. MANAREK! Wall, your Honor --

THE COURT: Let me for the record state this conference is in chambers and Mr. Reiner, Mr. Hansrak, Mr. Fitzgereid, Mr. Grovitz and Mr. Bugliosi are present.

I just inquired as to whome Mr. Shiss is. We have called his office. His secretary says she doesn't know where he is.

MR. STAVITZ: We don't know where he is.

THE COURT: The Court last word to have him report to the Court as soon as he got the neckage.

HR. KANAREK: I don't want to make even an implied misrepresentation to the Court --

THE COURT: I am not making you. I simply throw out the question, does anybody know where he is. You don't have to respond to it if you don't want to.

M. KAMMER: All right.

THE COURT: That is Mr. Chin's responsibility to be

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bere, not yours.

HR. REIER: Nay I indicate in connection with it.

Shing's failure to appear, Tuesday when we appeared in

Department 105 Mr. Shing indicated to se be possibly would

not be able to appear the following day in this Department,

that would be yesterday soroing. In saked se if I would

appear especially for him, Just simply for the motion to

continue that he had filed in this court.

I said I would be willing to do so.

He asked Hims Atkins in my presence if that would be okey and instructed her to indicate to the Court that she would agree to this. That was the last contact I had with Mr. Shion.

Of course yesterday --

THE COURT: Did be indicate to you why be wight not be here yesterday?

MR. REIMER: No, he did not. He was in a hurry at the time.

THE COURT: That is not the resson I called you in here in may event.

This morning Sergeant Maupin infermed we that he was making a report to Captain Alley who apparently is his superior regarding a conversation Mr. Manson had with Sergeant Maupin yesterday after court, and Sergeant Maupin was in the process of returning Mr. Manson from this Department to the 7th floor lockup, and apparently an

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time --

route Mr. Manson made some statements to the Sergeant which the Sergmant feit that he had to report to his superior, and he also reported to me.

And he had typed a memorandum up which he intended to give to Captain Alley, and I maked him to make some Nerox copies so I could furnish copies to all counsel in the case.

it would fall within the discovery order that the Court has already made regarding statements of the defendant.

So I have copies and I will hand them out to

I did remind Surgeant Maupin that it fell within the Court's pre-trial publicity order. It should not be revealed to anyone other than to Captain Aliey, his superior, and I remind each of you gentlemen, now that when I hand you a copy of this statement, that it is within the Court's pre-trial publicity order and it is given to you sermly as being a statement that falls within the discovery order which has siresiy been made, the several discovery orders that already have been made.

So I will hand Mr. Reiner a copy, Mr. Kanarek a copy, Mr. Bugliosi a copy, and Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Stoyitz has a copy, and I will retain one copy.

So unless there is something else at this

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MR. EANAREK: Yes, your Konor, I would nove your Honor that this, that the Court make a judicial order that, and I would ask that Mr. Maupin be asked to enter the room, that your Honor order Mr. Maupin not to use this for any purpose.

I see no -- Ceptain Alley, whatever his function
is, he may be the head of the joil or whatever his duties -THE COURT: He is in the District's Department.
NG. KANARK: He is the head of probably Sergeant

THE COURT: I don't know what his title is, but he is in the Shoriff's Department.

Maupin's detail, whatever his name.

MR. RANAREZ: We would ask, your Honor, to have Mr. Maupin enter, be handed a copy of the secrecy order, and sak your Monor --

THE COURT: The order is applicable to all lawenforcement officials as well as many other people, and Captain Alley is meare of it and so is Tergeant Haupin.

I expressly adponished Sergeant Maupin this morning that it was within the terms of that order which he already knew and understood and acknowledged that he knew and understood, so I don't think snything further needs to be done in that regard, and whether this has any significance for any of you I don't know.

I am wimply giving it to you because it was given to me.

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MR. KANAREK: Well, we do make the motion that
Eargeant Maupin be brought in out of courtemy to Sergeant
Maupin, even, so it will be crystalized in his mind that he
should not repeat this, these purported statements to
anyone and that --

I think that out of an abundance of caution it certainly wouldn't take just a couple of minutes **

THE COURT: I don't think it is necessary because I already almonished him. The only copies of this document are in the hands of you gentlemen, that I just gave them to, and Captain Alley now who has the original.

IR. KANAPER: Of course it is capable of being reproduced, and the secretary knows about it, in Captain Alley's office, and so forth.

THE COURT: That is true of many other things in this case, that various people in the law-enforcement agencies know about them. That is not prohibited by the order. It is the dissemination of the knowledge to people who are not authorized to know about them.

All right, gentlemen.

MR. BUGLICUI: All right. I understand there was an article in Rolling Stones, in which a member of the prosecution spoke to someone who wrote an article about this case, and apparently the defense is going to bring this issue up.

I would request the issue be brought up here

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in chambers and not in front of the frees.

has to be privy to this. I am assuming that the reason for bringing this up is the defense is going to allege that it is prejudicial to their elients. If this comes out in front of the tress, and the Tress brings it up, all the more people will buy this particular arcicle. I don't think it serves any purpose whatever to have it out thems. I think it serves any purpose whatever to have it out thems.

I urgently request the Court to handle that particular issue back in chambers and not let the Fress pick it up and have it in the Los Angeles Times and the Exeminer tomorrow, and then everybody in town would know about it.

MR. STOVITZ: The Rolling Stones is a publication, apparently there was an article on it quoting some prosecutor on this case.

MR. FITZGERALD: I am not immediately concerned with the violation of the gag order. It is clearly in my opinion a violation of the gag order. I am not concerned with that at this time.

I feel and my co-counsel feel that the conduct engaged in by the prosecution is clearly State action; that the members of the prosecution and the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office conspired with unknown members of the Press in order to deprive the defendants of a fair trial.

We are going to make a motion to dismiss the case on those grounds.

We feel that the prejudice and the damage that has been done to the defendants is massive.

THE COURT: What are we talking about?

MR. FITZGERAID: Well, I object to handling it in chambers. I prefer to do it in open court.

THE COURT: Well, if you are seeking to avoid publicity, it seems inconsistent that you raise it for the first time in open court.

MR. FITZGERALD: So my position may be very clear, these defendants cannot at this time receive a fair trial.

I have taken that position in the Superior

Court of Los Angeles; I have taken that position in the Court of Appeal; I have taken that position before the California Supreme Court.

I do not feel in advance of publication these defendants can receive a fair trial.

I feel there will be little or no judicial relief, and this is certainly not any reflection on you personally. I feel to deprive the members of the public of this very valuable information would be to thwart the very administration of justice.

THE COURT: I don't understand, deprive the members of the public of what information?

MR. FITZGERALD: First of all I am not waiving the right of my client to be present at the time this motion is taking place.

THE COURT: Well, are you making a motion?

MR. FITZGERALD: I am making a motion at this time.

I will make a motion in open court in respect to it.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I request, your Honor, that this be

THE COURT: There is nothing before me at the moment, Mr. Bugliosi. There is nothing to be handled in chambers. Both of you have made some cryptic statements, the meaning of which I do not have the faintest idea.

MR. BUGLIOSI: He already stated he is going to make

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the motion in open court, your Honor.

THE COURT: He may make his motion. We have to hear all of the evidence before the motion is made, and state the nature of the motion and the grounds, and then if it appears some evidence should be taken or some further step should be taken, then we can decide where it should be done and under what circumstances.

MR. REINER: I might point out as a practical matter it can be observed the members of the Press occupying the jury box almost all have a copy, or many of them have a copy of The Rolling Stones, and had one for the past few days. I doubt there is a single member of the Press that has not read the article or has not viewed it here in court, what we are talking about is rather moot. The Press is aware of it.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The likelihood of their printing it is increased if this matter is discussed in open court, as opposed to back here in chambers.

MR. FITZGERALD: What I intend to do is indicate to the Court the nature and character of my motion.

I intend to mark the magazine or newspaper as an exhibit, to submit it to your Honor, and continue the consideration of the matter until after your Honor has read it, Monday or so, it is certainly agreeable that — and I will not get into the facts or the evidentiary conclusion or anything of that nature; I will certainly

abide by that.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, if I may, I would ask your Honor that the Court seal this memorandum that your Honor has given to us.

I would ask that your Honor retake this document from each of us, order it sealed by the Clerk and kept sealed in the archives of the Court.

I do make that motion on behalf of Mr. MAnson.

THE COURT: Of course the original is still with

Capt. Ally.

MR. KANAREK: I would ask that the Court order that that be brought, if we have to do it, by way of subpoena duces tecum, or something of that nature that can be done.

I wouldn't think that formality would be necessary with the position of Capt. Ally, and that all of this be sealed and kept in the archives of the Court, in the records in the Clerk's office.

THE COURT: Well, of course, what happened, if it in fact happened as stated in the memorandum, is a matter that concerns security, obviously, and it concerns the Sheriff's Department.

I am not going to recall their copy of the memorandum because it directly relates to their business.

I see no reason for recalling the copies I just gave to you gentlemen; you are all under the publicity order. It is your responsibility to comply with it.

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As far as my copy is concerned, I have no use for it. I would just as soon touch a match to it and burn it up.

I can assure you it is not going to be released by me.

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, I have one other request:

a continuing objection and not have to stretch out this record, may there be a continuing objection on the basis of right to counsel, right to effective counsel, under the Sixth Amendment, and the right by way of the due process clause of the Fourteenth and also the fact that California law allows Mr. Manson to be present at every stage of the proceedings.

THE COURT: I appreciate what you are saying,
Mr. Kanarek, and it may very well be we should have such
stipulation.

What I propose to do is when we complete these pretrial motions and those matters are out of the way, to have a pretrial conference which will relate to the conduct of the trial and rules of procedure and things like that, housekeeping details, and you might very well bring up that subject at that time, as to any stipulations as to continuing objections, or to other counsel joining in the objection.

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For example, if one defense counsel makes objection, whether or not it can be deemed that all other counsel join in it, unless they indicate otherwise.

Anything to expedite the making and hearing of the arguments and objections, that sort of thing, motions, and so forth.

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, because of, I gather, the prosecution's potential use of this memorandum your Honor has given to us, I just would like at this time, in order to preserve, to preserve while it is purportedly fresh in mind of Sgt. Malpin, I would ask for an evidentiary hearing at this point where Mr. Malpin would be sworn and we would then interrogate him.

I would ask that that be done in the presence of the defendant Manson.

THE COURT: For what purpose?

MR. KANAREK: Well, because the People are purportedly, I mean this is potentially usable by the People.

THE COURT: Potentially as any other statement of any other witness is, yes.

MR. KANAREK: Right. However --

THE COURT: And that is why you have been given a copy of it, so you know what the statement is, at least as indicated by Sgt. Malpin, you won't be surprised if anything is used, and you have the same right to, if the Sergeant testifies, to impeach him by any method as you

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would any other witness.

MR. KANAREK: There may have been other prisoners around. There may have been other deputies around. This may lose its freshness in the mind of Sgt. Malpin, and right now he will have in mind, perhaps, other Deputies who were there and we could have a better scene.

THE COURT: I see no reason why you cannot go down and talk to Sgt. Malpin yourself, if you want to, and ask him whowas there.

MR. KANAREK: Very well.

THE COURT: He doesn't belong to anybody. If he is a potential witness, he can talk to you as he can talk to anybody else.

MR. KANAREK: Very well, your Honor, we do make that motion that he be examined.

THE COURT: All right, the motion will be denied.

Now, I would like to proceed with the pretrial motions so that we can get through those as expeditiously as possible.

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Gentlemen, I am going to destroy my copy.

I don't really have any place to keep it. I don't want it.

I now am talking of Sgt. Malpin's statement. I am going to tear it up right now in your presence.

(Whereupon, the Judge tears up the statement and throws it in the wastebasket.)

THE COURT: So you now know where all the copies are and I no longer have a copy.

MR. KANAREK: Thank you, your Honor.

(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had in open court, all counsel with the exception of Mr. Shinn being present:)

THE COURT: Counsel, have the defendants affirmed to you their desire to return to the courtroom to comply with the Court's order?

MR. FITZGERALD: That is what I wanted to make the statement in regard to, if I might.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. FITZGERALD: I might say that during the noon hour I had an opportunity to discuss the matter extensively with my client, Patricia Krenwinkel.

I also discussed the matter with Leslie Van Houten and Susan Denise Atkins.

They indicated to me quite clearly that it was not their intent to disrupt the orderly presentation of evidence, argument or testimony.

They indicated quite clearly to me that their conduct this morning was in no sense a personal affront to your Honor as an individual.

They indicated to me that their conduct was a symbolic gesture of their displeasure with the Court for ostensibly silencing co-defendant Charles Manson.

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They are ready to return to the courtroom. They will maintain themselves with dignity and decorum.

They will behave as the intelligent and sensible young ladies they are.

However, they do request of the Court permission not to direct the facial portion of their body in the direction of the Court.

In that connection, I might point out that they stood up this morning and turned around only because the chairs in which they were seated were permanently affixed to the floor, so it was necessary for them to actually stand up in court and turn around.

Had they been seated in some other type of seat they would simply have directed their head or the upper part of their torso to the rear.

They are engaging in a symbolic gesture, and apparently do not wish to take it any further than a symbolic gesture.

THE COURT: Well, if they come back they are going to be sitting in exactly the same seats they were before.

In the first place, there is limited seating in the courtroom for the defendants and their counsel, and I don't want a conditional affirmation on their part.

Either they comply or they don't comply; it is just that simple.

MR. FITZGERALD: It is my understanding that it is

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clearly their desire to comport with the standards of normal courtroom decorum.

On the other hand, they must balance that against some philosophical and conscientious principles they hold to be dear.

THE COURT: All I want you to tell me, Mr. Fitzgerald are your clients willing to return to the court and conform to the Court's orders or are they not?

MR. FITZGERALD: I believe they are.

THE COURT: As I indicated, they will sit in the same chairs, and the Court will expect the same of them at this time as they did before.

MR. FITZGERALD: I would ask that they at least be provided the opportunity to comply. I would like them to be present.

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. FITZGERALD: If such is possible.

THE COURT: Will the Bailiffs return the three defendants to the courtroom?

Mr. Kanarek, has Mr. Manson affirmed to you his desire to return to the court and con,orm with the Court's order?

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I consult with Mr. Manson at this point?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. KANAREK: Thank you.

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THE COURT: You will have to wait until the Bailiff returns.

MR. KANAREK: That's right.

MR. FITZGERALD: I might state, also, to the Court that I discussed with Deputy Sheriff Ore, I also discussed with the three defendants the acoustics and communication facilities in the jury room.

The Deputy Sheriff responded to me that they were able to hear your Honor's voice quite clearly and distinctly, although they were unable to distinguish with any accuracy the content and diction of any of the other members of the prosecution and the defense, although they told me that that was based on a limited period of time during which the Court was handling some other cases, and I don't know how close those other attorneys were standing to the microphone or whatever.

THE COURT: Well, we will have it checked again.

Of course it was put in in a hurry this morning when the defendants failed to comply with the Court's order.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, while we are waiting I wonder if we could approach the bench with counsel for a very brief request?

(The three female defendants enter the court-room.)

MR. FITZGERALD: Even though it is unusual I wonder if

your Honor will entertain a motion by Miss Krenwinkel to personally address the Court?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. FITZGERALD: Apparently there is some communication difficulty between myself and my client and the Court.

THE COURT: I will hear her.

DEFENDANT KRENWINKEL: I find, your Honor, as long as you don't respect Mr. Manson's right to be here, meanwhile there is no respect due to me either, because any right which is taken from him is also taken away from me.

I feel we should all be able to be present at this play here, you know, the ball that is on the table is our lives. You have already taken away our voice, so we are not able to say anything in our own behalf.

I have also put in a motion to go pro per, and it was denied to me to be able to speak.

So I have to use someone else to give you my voice.

No one can give my voice but me. As long as that is taken away from me then I have no right here in the courtroom, really, because somebody else is playing with my life, and they have it all planned, and it has nothing to do with me.

I can sit here and tell my lawyer what to say, but it is not me saying it, and as long as I cannot say what I feel, and have to run back and forth between, you

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 know, other people, trying to say what I want to say, and I don't feel that the Court is giving me any respect to what I believe in and what I know.

THE COURT: Well, when you are represented by counsel, Miss Krenwinkel, you have to speak through your counsel, and your counsel is in charge of defending you.

You also have to comply with the Court's order with regard to your conduct and decorummin the court-room.

Now, I want you to be present during the trial.

I think it is in your best interest to do so.

At the same time I will not permit you to flaunt your defiance or to humiliate the court or be contemptuous in any respect.

You must conform your conduct to the reasonable requirements of the Court and maintain the dignity of the Court.

If you don't do that then I have to take some steps. It is entirely up to you.

DEFENDANT KRENWINKEL: The Court is humiliating me by taking away my mouth. It is like sticking something on my face and saying "You cannot speak."

THE COURT: If you wish to remain in the courtroom you understand the conditions I mentioned to you and what the requirements are.

DEFENDANT KRENWINKEL: It is the same condition that

has been here ever since the beginning.

THE COURT: Do you wish to be seated now?

DEFENDANT KRENWINKEL: No.

THE COURT: Well, we are going to proceed, and I am going to order you to sit down and conduct yourself in a dignified manner or I will have to have you removed again.

DEFENDANT KRENWINKEL: Well, then, you do with us again, you tie our hands.

THE COURT: Very well. The Bailiff will remove the three defendants from the courtroom.

MR. STOVITZ: May the record show that all three defendants did face to the rear of the courtroom, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, the record will so reflect.

MR. REINER: For the purpose of the record, may I indicate that the defendant Van Houten does not waive her presence, and counsel does not waive her presence, both the defendant and counsel object to the removal, and we will object to these proceedings continuing in her absence.

THE COURT: Very well, let's proceed, gentlemen.

MR. KANAREK: I join in with Mr. Reiner's comments, your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well.

Now, we're considering your discovery motion this morning at noon, Mr. Kanarek. Do you wish to go ahead with that?

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MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, but may we approach the bench very briefly?

I think your Honor will agree when I indicate to the Court the reason.

THE COURT: Very well.

(The following proceedings were had at the bench between all counsel who were present and the Court:)

THE COURT: Can you all hear?

MR. KANAREK: When I came out of chambers a member of the Press asked me what happened in chambers.

Of course I said that I could not discuss it, and he said, well, whatever he said, he will never ask me again, or something like that.

because what I would like to ask the Court to do, because what the court reporter is typing is a public record, I would ask the Court to seal, order sealed possibly with the County Clerk that portion of the transcript which occurred in chambers, because it is a public record and your Honor's orders to us concerning this matter will be the general subject matter, at least, so I think in the interest of obeying the spirit as well as the letter of your Honor's precise instructions that this record of what happened in chambers just a few minutes ago should be ordered sealed, separated from the rest of the transcript and sealed, because the court reporter's record is a public

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record anyway of what is happening in this courtroom, by Mr. Hollombe.

THE COURT: Of course it is not a public record. The transcript of the proceedings, the original, goes to the Court and copies go to all counsel.

All right, I will make an order, then, that nothing in the transcript of this afternoon's proceedings in chambers will be disclosed to the Press or anyone else, that it all comes within the Court's pretrial publicity order.

MR. REINER: May I indicate as a practical matter, in other cases I participated in in which the Press is interested in, it is physically impossible during the course of a lengthy trial to prevent the Press from obtaining copies of the transcript, and when they are not secret, if it is not sealed.

I am confident that by and by the Press will acquire a copy of the transcript.

THE COURT: How can it be sealed? The copies of the transcript are for the benefit of counsel to be used during the trial.

Are you suggesting I seal your copy?

MR. REINER: Yes, although Mr. Manson is not my client, ordinarily I am not terribly interested in whether the matters would affect Mr. Manson, this type of activity we are talking about --

THE COURT: I am not going to seal the transcript. 1 Now, let's get on with the motion. 2 You have heard the order. It applies to all 3 of you. 4 (The following proceedings were had in open 5 court:) 6 THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek, you may proceed. 7 MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I believe that the next 8 9 matter is at Page 7 of our motion. THE COURT: Yes, we were at the bottom of Page 7. 10 . .11 MR. KANAREK In that general area, yes, your Honor. 12 The reports of expert witnesses. We would ask 13. for any reports that have been obtained by the prosecution 14 of any expert witnesses. 15 THE COURT: Do you wish to respond to that? 16 MR. STOVITZ: If we have them we will give them to 17 him; if we don't have them we cannot give them to him. 18 THE COURT: Do you have them? - 19 MR. STOVITZ: We have some reports from chemists, 20 ballistic experts. We furnished them to other counsel and 21, we will furnish them to Mr. Kanarek. 22 MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I am referring, for instance, 23 also to medical reports involving Linda Kasabian and 24 LSD. 25 MR. STOVITZ: There are no reports and there is no 26 evidence of that, your Honor.

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THE COURT: All right, your Honor. Then the order will cover any medical reports, rather, any expert witness reports that are in the possession of the People pertaining to any of the witnesses.

MR. STOVITZ: Any of the witnesses.

MR. KANAREK: And any of the defendants.

MR. STOVITZ: And any of the defendants.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. KANAREK: Now, your Honor, to commence with page -- the next item, records of arrests and convictions of witnesses.

We would ask, your Honor -- I know that theoretically the County Clerk's records of every county in the United States is open.

But our resources are not what the District Attorney's resources are.

THE COURT: This was covered yesterday. What is your response, Mr. Stovitz?

MR. STOVITZ: My response is if we have knowledge of any witnesses arrests or convictions we will furnish that to counsel.

We will go out and get the report, but if we have no knowledge of this we are not going to try to ask the witnesses if they have ever been arrested, to try to get a record for them.

Whatever records we have have been available to

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associate counsel: they will be made available to Mr. Kanarek.

Let's say, for instance, we have a witness We won't call up Mr. Jones and say "Mr. Jones, Jones. have you ever been arrested," and then go out and get his If we have them, we will give them to counsel.

MR. KANAREK: May I be specific as to Danny DeCarlo? MR. STOVITZ: All of the records of Mr. DeCarlo have all been furnished to other counsel and will be furnished to Mr. Kanarek.

THE COURT: Were they furnished to Mr. Hughes? MR. STOVITZ: They were made available to him. I don't know if he looked at them, but the case numbers, the dates and everything.

THE COURT: The order will cover any records of arrests of the witnesses in possession of the People and the right of Mr. Kanarek, the right to inspect a copy of those records.

Anything else?

MR. KANAREK: The next item, the photographs relating to the case.

As I understand it --

THE COURT: The People have indicated in the past that you would have the right to inspect those photos in the District Attorney's possession, is that right?

MR. STOVITZ: Yes, your Honor, we ask specifically

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MR. KANAREK: Those are our requests, your Honor.

However, we have before the Court another motion as to Linda Kasabian, relating to her sanity or insanity, and in that regard there may be matters -- evidence may come into existence, and I gather that we have a continuing right to approach the Court prospectively.

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Kanarek, to the extent that the Court has denied your motion in any respect, it is without prejudice to renew it if you have some factual basis in the future to renew it upon.

Your right to discovery is a continuing one.

If any information comes into the possession of the People, that comes under the rules of discovery, you will be entitled to have it.

MR. KANAREK: Then as to the 30 pages Mr. Bugliosi referred to, his own notes concerning Susan Atkins --

MR. STOVITZ: We will submit it on the statement we made this morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: The Declaration was agreed to be furnished on or before Monday, the 15th, depending on what occurs at that time.

That is, what the contents of the Declaration are. We will go from there.

MR. KANAREK: Very well, your Honor, thank you.

THE COURT: The next motion that we will take up is

the motion of defendant Krenwinkel for a severance of her case.

Do you wish to argue that, Mr. Fitzgerald?

MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, if I might.

In the case of People versus -- I am going to spell the last name, McGautha, M-c-G-a-u-t-h-a, a 1969 case contained at 70 Cal. 2nd 770, at page 785, a paraphrase of what is contained there is as follows:

"If the defendant with knowledge of the prosecution's intention to use an unedited statement fails to demand either deletion of the inadmissible matter or severance of the trial, the error is waived."

And it is for that reason that I filed, among others, it is for that reason I filed this motion to sever the case.

And the defendant does hereby declare that it is aware of the prosecution's intention to use statements of one or more co-defendants that implicate other defendants, including but not limited to Patricia Krenwinkel.

We also, in the alternative -THE COURT: I don't follow that last.

You are saying the People intend to use statements of Patricia Krenwinkel, or statements that would affect her?

MR. FITZGERALD: The prosecution intends to use statements of other co-defendants that implicate, among

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other people, defendant Patricia Krenwinkel, and we hereby demand an effective deletion and editing of that statement or, in the alternative, we demand a severance, and by way of argument I might point out the following:

That it is my position that it is likely that deletion would be ineffective, and I think the cases stand

for the proposition that there must be an effective dele-

By "effective deletions," the Courts mean not only direct and indirect identification of codefendants, but any statements that could be employed against the non-declarant co-defendant, once their identity is otherwise established.

Also there are cases in California, including People vs. Matola at 259 Cal.Ap. 2nd, Page 686, and People vs. Graham, 71 Adv. Cal. Ap., Page 320.

They stand for the proposition that if crossexamination by one or more of the defense attorneys would render the otherwise effective deletion ineffective, the defendant would thereby be prejudiced and therefore entitled to a severance.

What I am pointing out is that even though the prosecution might represent that an effective deletion or editing might be possible, it is possible not probable that on cross-examination one or more of the defense attorneys might in an attempt to exculpate his client.

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inculpate my client, and I simply want the Court to be aware of that possibility and probablity in advance.

I also want to bring to the Court's attention the points and authorities I cited to the Court, the cases more properly, particularly People vs. Aranda.

In addition to the Aranda situations, which essentially are a violation of due process and a violation of the confrontation clauses of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, I think there is another reason why Patricia Krenwinkel ought to be granted a severance.

I think that because there has been wide public dissemination of statements of a confession-nature by Susan Denise Atkins, that no effective deletion would be possible, inasmuch as the prospective jurors had already in detail considered the public confession in which Miss Krenwinkel is implicated, and in connection therewith I have a photocopy of a Los Angeles, what purports to be a copy of materials that appeared in the Los Angeles Times on Sunday, December 14th, 1969, and it purports to be the exclusive details of Susan Atkins' story of two nights of terror.

Exhibit, Special A.

THE COURT: A for the purposes of this motion for severance.

MR. FITZGERALD: This document or a photocopy of the

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document has previously been received into evidence in the Los Angeles Superior Court under this case number, it was marked at that time as Defendant's Exhibit double G as in George.

It was introduced into evidence on March 24th in Department 106 of the Superior Court in connection with the motion to change venue.

At that time the prosecution and the defendant entered into a stipulation that a Mrs. Margit, the last name is J-o-l-d-i-c-h, be deemed called, sworn and testified that she is employed by the Los Angeles Times, and that she is informed that the daily circulation of the Los Angeles Times is 975,491, and the Sunday circulation is 1,308,711.

It is essentially our contention that because of the large circulation of the Los Angeles Times, and the large and widespread public dissemination of this so-called confession in which other defendants, including Patricia Krenwinkel, are implicated, that they would be denied due process of law by introducing into evidence at the trial any statement.

Furthermore, she would be denied equal protection of the law, and her right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment.

THE COURT: Isn't your motion premature, Mr. Fitzgerald?

It seems to me that until such time as the People in fact offer or attempt to offer a statement by

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co-defendants, that there is no issue raised.

At that time the Court will have to determine whether or not the respective deletions shall be made, whether or not the severance should be granted, or whether the evidence should be excluded in its entirety under the Aranda and Bruton rules.

At this point there is nothing before the Court.

MR. FITZGERALD: But once the jury is sworn, jeopardy attaches. If at that time your Honor would dedeclare a mistrial, Miss Krenwinkel could not be retried.

THE COURT: A mistrial?

For what purpose?

MR. FITZGERALD: If your Honor, during the course of the trial, granted a severance, it is my understanding the effect of that would be a mistrial.

It would force Miss Krenwinkel -- well, it simply --

THE COURT: Unless you make the motion to have it severed the Court won't grant it, in which case you will be waiving any right to jeopardy, claiming the defense of jeopardy.

I assume I would not grant such a motion on my own.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, may I briefly be heard?
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. FITZGERALD: I will submit the matter.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. REINER: If I might interrupt, Mr. Bugliosi, before Mr. Bugliosi is heard may I be heard briefly to join in Mr. Fitzgerald's motion, although I believe it is premature at this time, I wish to indicate to the Court I intend to raise it subsequently.

Perhaps at this time I should join Mr. Fitzgerald's motion just so there would be no question that I waive the objection.

MR. KANAREK: If I may, I will join with Mr. Fitzgerald on the motion, and also I would like to add that it includes the right to confront, the Sixth Amendment right to confront, and I would like to cite to the Court Bruton vs. the United States wherein they quote the story about the parent asking the boy to stand in the corner and not think of a white elephant, in connection with instructing the Jury not to consider, or to consider as to one and not the other.

But I believe, your Honor, Mr. Fitzgerald is correct, because if the Court could not delete -- if it were not possible to go ahead, then there would be -- then the defendants would be on the horns of a dilemma which is not of their own making, and they would either --

THE COURT: The third alternative is that the evidence would be excluded in its entirety under the Aranda rule,

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under both the Bruton and Aranda rule.

MR. KANAREK: The prosecution talks about if they don't wish to extend the proceedings. Much rather than have lip service, your Honor, we would ask them to indicate to the Court -- now they have made statements, I think this record reveals Mr. Stovitz has made statements to the effect that they are not going to use any statements of Susan Atkins.

Now, if we could -- it is like somebody saying they are not going to run for President, it really doesn't always mean that, and I would like to know with precision what Mr. Stovitz means when he said in this record that they are not going to use the statements of Susan Atkins.

If nothing whatsoever purports to come out of her mouth, or is attributed to her by way of writing or an oral statement, if we could tie it down we might be able to proceed with dispatch, your Honor.

THE COURT: We are getting afield from the motion before the Court which is a motion on behalf of Miss Krenwinkel for a severance.

MR. KANAREK: I would join --

THE COURT: Perhaps Mr. Stovitz wants to respond to that.

MR. STOVITZ: Mr. Bugliosi will respond on the motion of severance.

However, I want to correct counsel's statement

to the Court. 1 I merely told another Court that we were not 2 going to introduce Susan Atkins' testimony that she gave 3 before the Grand Jury in this trial. 4 I never stated that I would not introduce any 5 statements of Susan Atkins, that Susan Atkins made. 6 I said I would, introduce the statement she made 7 at the Grand Jury. 8 9 With that correction in the record Mr. Bugliosi 10 will respond to the motion of severance. 11 MR. KANAREK: May the record reveal I joined with Mr. Fitzgerald, your Honor, in connection with his motion? 12 13 THE COURT: In other words, you are making a motion on behalf of Mr. Manson to sever. 14 15 MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, I am joining with 16 Mr. Fitzgerald on the motion. 17 THE COURT: Joining how? Are you making a separate 18 motion to sever? 19 MR. KANAREK: Yes, that is correct, in the interest 20 of expediency. 21 THE COURT: Is that what you are doing, Mr. Reiner? 22 MR. REINER: That is correct, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Bugliosi. 24 MR. BUGLIOSI: I tend to agree with Mr. Fitzgerald. 25 I believe the proper time to hear this motion is right now. 26 People vs. Massey, 66 Adv. Cal. App. 941.

think Massey stands for the proposition that this is an issue that has to be resolved prior to the commencement of the trial.

THE COURT: What is the citation, 66 Adv. Cal. 941?
MR. FITZGERALD: 66 Cal. 2nd, 899.

MR. BUGLIOSI: That is a better citation, your Honor.

However, I think Mr. Stovitz and I can satisfy the commandments of Massey at this time, right now, by stating on the record that we do intend to introduce extrajudicial statements of certain co-defendants in this case.

However, we will delete all express and indirect references to their co-defendants, to the declarant's co-defendants.

Therefore, your Honor, I think we can comply with the Aranda case. Aranda does not sound the death knell for joint trials where you have one defendant confessing and the other defendants not confessing.

Joint trials are permissible under the Aranda case as long as the extrajudicial statement does not directly or indirectly implicate a co-defendant, and Mr. Stovitz and I will delete all possible, conceivable references to co-defendants, your Honor.

MR. KANAREK: May I address the Court, your Honor?
THE COURT: Just a moment. Actually the rule goes

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further than that, as you know, and as Mr. Fitzgerald stated, and it is clearly set out in both the Aranda and the Bruton opinions.

MR. BUGLIOSI: In Aranda the Court does go on to say effective deletion without prejudice to the declarant.

By "effective deletions" we mean not only direct and indirect indications by co-defendant, but any statements that could be employed against non-declarant co-defendants, once their identity is otherwise established

I submit to the Court, your Honor, that the statements we intend to introduce into evidence will not be able to be employed against the non-declarant co-defendants

If the Court feels there is a danger of this happening, and I believe the Massey case demands we handle this issue right now rather than after jeopady has attached

THE COURT: I have no way of knowing whether there is a danger or not.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Well, all Mr. Stovitz and I can do at this time is made the representation, your Honor, that any extrajudicial statement we introduce into evidence of a defendant will not implicate in any fashion whatsoever the co-defendants in this case.

THE COURT: It would seem to me the risk is on the People. If you wait until jeopardy attaches and the problem arises.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I think perhaps we'd better look at the

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Massey case, your Honor, at this point. I am not that sure about Massey. I am relatively sure.

THE COURT: I will read it.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I am relatively sure that Massey says this issue should be resolved.

THE COURT: The problem is your problem, Mr.

Bugliosi. You are going to have to resolve it either by presenting to the Court at this time the proposed statements and asking for a preliminary ruling, or waiting until the time you intend to offer them during the trial, and taking a chance on what the outcome will be.

MR. BUGLIOSI: We are prepared, not at this particular moment in time. I will be prepared within 15 or 20 minutes from now, offering these extrajudicial statements to the Court with deletions.

I maintain they will be effective deletions.

MR. STOVITZ: I think we should, your Honor, seeing this is a matter that will have to be ruled on by the Court as to whether or not it is admissible, perhaps this should be taken up with the consent of the defendants and their counsel outside of the presence of the general public, because in the event that the Court rules they are not admissible statements, then the white elephant will have rung.

I merely suggest this, your Honor, we feel that number one, the defendants are making this motion at the

last' moment.

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Number two, the defendants are actually seeking a joint trial, but they want to protect their rights
to keep out all of the evidence that can be adverse to
them.

We feel that we can have a joint trial and we can show your Honor the statements that will be introduced by the various persons. These statements, we believe, will be deleted so that references to other defendants will not be included within the statements.

However, assume for the moment that we have testimony that five people enter into a store, and then we have one of those people named Jane Adams identify this entering into the store, and then Jane Adams says in her statement to somebody else, "Yes, I entered the store."

Query: Is she incriminating the other four people entering into that store by saying, "I entered the store," when we have testimony from another person that five people entered the store?

This is the type of situation we are going to have here in this case. We do not have a trial brief ready as such.

However, we do have a sufficient outline of our case at this time to show to the Court that the evidence that we will offer in respect to the statements of two of the defendants, just two of the defendants that we

are talking about now, will be sufficiently edited so as to incriminate that particular person only.

The only thought I can think of is that we will have identification of four or five other people involved, and the jury might draw an inference -- your Honor remembers a recent case where they used the word "deleted," the word "deleted" had specific reference to somebody else.

I don't think it is only a burden of ours, your Honor, it is a burden of the Court.

THE COURT: At the time it is presented, yes, it has not been presented yet.

MR. STOVITZ: That is true. I think what counsel is trying to do, they are trying to ask for a pretrial ruling to preserved their record, that they in effect want a joint trial but they don't want a joint trial if we are going to introduce all of our evidence.

MR. REINER: If I might briefly respond to Mr. Stovitz, our position is the evidence is inadmissible because it cannot be effectively deleted, and that really is the beginning, middle and end of our position.

THE COURT: Mr. Reiner, this is not even your motion.

I might point out the only motion filed as a pretrial motion is the one filed by Mr. Fitzgerald on behalf of Miss

Krenwinkel, which I might also add was totally unsupported by any affidavit or declaration showing any prejudice that could result to the defendants by a failure to grant the

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motion for a severance.

The cases are fairly clear, in the absence of such a showing the Court is under no compulsion to grant the motion for severance which is an unusual act in the first place, since the Code definitely provides for joint trials when there are multiple defendants.

I let both you and Mr. Kanarek make oral motions, but neither of you, of course, has offered anything in the way of supporting declarations, either of which there would warrant the Court in granting such a motion.

Aranda problem, all I can suggest is they'd better bring it to the Court's attention before we go much further, otherwise it will be something left to me during the course of the trial, apparently.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I think it has to be resolved now. Will the Court grant a very short recess?

I will go downstairs and get the statement.

I think this should be resolved back in chambers outside of the presence of the Press.

THE COURT: I will read the Massey case. How much time do you need?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Ten minutes.

THE COURT: We will recess for ten minutes.

MR. STOVITZ: Before your Honor takes the recess,

People have a motion we would like to file with the Court, 1 and serve counsel with, so that your Honor in considering 2 the Massey case can himself consider the People's motion. 3 THE COURT: What is the nature of the motion, 4 Mr. Stovitz? 5 MR. STOVITZ: It's a motion to consolidate Case 6 Number A-253,156, commonly known as the Tate-La Bianca 7 case with Case Number A-258,361, commonly known as the 8 Gary Hinman case. 9 THE COURT: All right, the Court will recess for ten 10 minutes. 11 (Recess until 4:06 P.M., at which time the 12 following proceedings werehad:) 13 14 The record will show this conference is THE COURT: 15 in chambers. Mr. Reiner, Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Kanarek are 16 present for the defendants. 17 Mr. Stovitz and Mr. Bugliosi are present for 18 the People. 19 MR. KANAREK: It is our request that Mr. Manson be 20 here. 21 THE COURT: Very well. I am just considering the 22 fact that Mr. Shinn is not present, whether or not we can 23 accomplish anything here. 24 MR. STOVITZ: I was thinking, your Honor, this motion 25 for severance, although it was filed and it was handed to

us, at the time Mr. Fitzgerald did say he was going to make

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a 3-sentence request; that he wanted to put his notice on the record, but that in truth and in fact his client, not he, his client wants a joint trial, so we were not prepared to meet with the requirements of Aranda and Bruton. That is why counsel and I went out and prepared for this severance.

I think the whole matter should go over to tomorrow or whatever date your Honor sees fit to schedule it, put out a search warrant or duces tecum for Mr. Shinn, and resume with Mr. Shinn here, because we have filed this motion for consolidation; we would serve Mr. Shinn if he was here. He is affected by that motion for consolidation.

THE COURT: Well, I don't think we can proceed in Mr. Shinn's absence, particularly, of course, with the matters that concern him.

But even those who don't, I have permitted counsel to join in each other's motions where it was expeditious to do so, and it might be true with respect to Mr. Shinn's client on some of these motions.

We have heard nothing from him. I am going to order a body attachment for Mr. Shinn.

I will hold it until tomorrow at 10:00 o'clock.

MR. FITZGERALD: I wonder if we could go over to

Monday, your Honor. If your Honor feels it is necessary

for us to be here, I will make arrangements indeed to be

here.

I have some appearances on two separate cases in Malibu tomorrow morning. I felt that these pretrial motions would be concluded.

I anticipated that we would actually start some portion of the trial on Monday.

THE COURT: So did I. I still do.

MR. FITZGERALD: I still do indeed. I feel the balance of these motions should not take any great length of time.

THE COURT: I have read the Massey case and I believe that under the rule of that case that I have to exercise my discretion as indicated in that opinion on this motion for a severance, which means I am going to have to apparently see the proposed statements that the People would offer to determine whether or not it is possible to delete any references to the co-defendants and what other problems might exist by virtue of the statements.

I can understand why you cannot be ready in ten minutes to present them when it wasn't pinpointed in the motion.

So I think we will just have to go over to tomorrow morning. Then we will continue with this motion and the other motions.

In turn, I will take up the consolidation motion last.

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MR. STOVITZ: Would your Honor, for the convenience of counsel, want to make it tomorrow afternoon?

THE COURT: No, we have got to go, gentlemen. As far as I am concerned, this case is started, and we are going to continue the pretrial matters until such time as they are concluded and then we are going to start the trial.

MR. STOVITZ: Very well. If any persons do ask of the News Media, we are going to start on Monday, not necessarily with jury selection, but we finish up whatever pretrial motions there are.

THE COURT: We will go every day until something else occurs, and I don't know what that might be.

MR. STOVITZ: And the time will probably be 10:00 o'clock at first until your Honor disposes of your calendar.

THE COURT: That was one of the things I wanted to take care of in our pretrial conference, once the pretrail motions are out of the way we will sit down and have a conference. I will lay out some ground rules, time of sessions and so forth, so everybody knows what we will be doing.

But we can only take up one thing at a time.

So far we are still wrestling with the pretrial motions.

MR. FITZGERALD: In regard to the motion to sever,

it was not my intent to mislead either the Court or the

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District Attorney's Office.

THE COURT: I assume you are serious; that you want a severance.

MR. FITZGERALD: I am.

THE COURT: If you are not, now is the time to indicate it, because it may be granted, you never know.

MR. FITZGERALD: Counsel in cases wear several different hats, sometimes, and provide for their client different functions, maybe a strategic or legal or factual function, you have to balance it, certainly my understanding of the case law should be the motion should be made in order that I can extract from the District Attorney representations that there would be an effective deletion.

I just want it to be clear that I was not attempting to mislead anybody,

THE COURT: I would question that strategy,
Mr. Fitzgerald, if in fact you don't want a severance,
because you have the simple protection, as I see it, if
you wait until the time that the People offer the statements to make your objection.

The Court at that time then has to rule on the Bruton-Aranda question. If effective deletions cannot be made, either the severance must be granted, if that is what the defendant wants, or if the Court denies that, then the evidence has to be excluded.

So you have exactly the same protection.

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What I am saying to you now is if you make a pretrial motion I might just grant it.

You cannot have it both ways.

If your motion is good, even though you may not want me to grant it, I may grant it anyway.

I may not have any choice.

MR. FITZGERALD: I did not know there were two options available to me. I felt after reading what I thought were the applicable cases, that there was no alternative; that if I was going to raise the issue of the Aranda-Bruton Sixth Amendment-Fourteenth Amendment, probably I would have to do it at pretrial rather than in-trial.

THE COURT: Well, that is not my understanding, Mr. Fitzgerald.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I think you can waive it at any time, but if you do waive it before trial the issue has to be resolved before trial.

THE COURT: That is what the Massey case says. That was an issue raised pretrial, and what the trial judge did in that case was to rule in effect that he did not have the power to make the decision, so he failed to exercise his discretion, and the Supreme Court said that that was error; he should have exercised his discretion, and whether or not, if he denied the motion, it would have been an abuse of discretion was another question entirely.

He failed to exercise his discretion. Then he goes on to discuss the various options that would have been open.

Apparently from this case I do have to exercise my discretion if you make the motion. That is what I am saying.

The fact that you may not want the motion to be granted is going to be immaterial if in fact you make it an I am forced to make the decision.

MR. FITZGERALD: Indeed it is. I might point out to the Court I intend to join in Mr. Kanarek's motion, and it is my understanding Mr. Reiner wishes to join in Mr. Kanarek's motion to have Linda Kasabian, the prosecution witness examined, maybe at this time we can inform the Court which motions we will intend to join in so the Court will be clear and we will present any additional materials to the Court that the Court feels proper.

THE COURT: I think I am going to have to hold you to the orders I previously made.

I made it quite clear on June 1st that all pretrial motions must be noticed for hearing on or before June 10th, and certain things had to occur before June 5th.

I am going to hold you to that, otherwise we are going to be here endlessly with pretrial motions, and that was exactly the purpose for which I made such an order.

MR. FITZGERALD: I take it then you will not entertain

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the prosecution's motion to consolidate.

MR. BUGLIOSI: We would ask the Court to make an exception as to this one point.

MR. STOVITZ: The reason for it --

THE COURT: Everyone wants an exception.

MR. STOVITZ: Our motion to consolidate, your Honor, is really aimed due to -- this was a very recent United States Supreme Court case, I don't even have the name of it, I just saw it in the weekly criminal law bulletin, which states when a prosecution has knowledge that a defendant has committed two or more crimes, that they cannot take separate bites of the apple; that they should --

MR. BUGLIOSI: That is the Kellet case.

MR. STOVITZ: The Kellet case was a different one. This was two murders or two robberies.

The Grand Jury indicted Mr. Manson on this Tate-La Bianca. Evidence developed after the indictment and the new indictment was reached.

Now, we don't want to be precluded six months from now or a year from now or two years from now of going to trial in the Hinman case as to Mr. Manson and Susan Atkins by saying, "Well, you should have gone to trial all at once."

So, this is, frankly, why we are making the motion.

THE COURT: I am just wondering whether this motion

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should not have been made in Department 100.

MR. STOVITZ: This motion should have been made in Department 100. However, the case was transferred out of 100 to this court before we had knowledge of the new indictment, and the effect of the new case that came down, so we are making it at this time.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Let me say this, it is not just because of the new case. I think we are seeking a consolidation, aren't we?

MR. STOVITZ: Yes.

MR. BUGLIOSI: So apart from this new case, Kellet, Section 954 of the Penal Code permits a consolidation of two or more accusatory pleadings if the charges contained in these multiple pleadings could have been joined initially in one pleading.

THE COURT: Well, let's not get into the merits of the motion now, gentlemen, we will take it up tomorrow or whenever the other motions are completed, and there is still a question as to whether we will take it up at all in view of my previous order, I won't rule one way or the other on that.

MR. KANAREK: May I ask your Honor this, am I part of this motion to sever on the part of Mr. Manson? I wish to make a motion to sever, as your Honor knows under Peole vs. Cravedi, you are entitled to some reasonable time to prepare.

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Now, I have, because of the motion that was made personally against me, your Honor, there are only so many hours in the day, and the motion that the prosecution made concerning me, as I say, and I attempted to be as expeditious as possible, and so I just want the record to reveal, I believe in a matter such as this, as I say, time being what it is, it certainly has not been excessive.

THE COURT: You have been representing all along you are going to be ready on the 15th.

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, I am talking about the pretrial.

Your Honor could sever and we could be ready on the 15th. We would just go to a different court, not that we would welcome that, because we are not saying we don't enjoy being in this court.

But what I am saying is we still are ready to go to trial to represent Mr. Manson, but I want the record to be clear, I think under the Cravedi case and the Cravedi concepts that we have a right to make a motion to sever.

I just wanted to make sure that our joining with Mr.Fitzgerald, that that is -- your Honor indicated pre-viously that was a valid joinder, because we do, I think --

THE COURT: Well, I think I would permit you to join in the motion for severance. It is a common problem. It is a little bit different here; you may or may not have been aware of any incriminating statements made by a co-defendant

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25 26 at the time you came into the case, and so forth.

I think I would expand my order to that extent, to permit you and Mr. Reiner to join in on the motion for severance.

But I am not going to permit you to keep adding motions, either side, unless there is some compelling reason, and so far that is the only one I can see.

MR. KANAREK: Well, what I am saying, there are problems, but in connection with the time aspect, as I say, Cravedi — the Court makes an order and you do your best to follow the Court's order, but I think the Cravedi doctrine tempers that.

THE COURT: I am not sure I understand what you are talking about, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: What I am saying is this, your Honor:

A Court can make an order and a lawyer can try his level best to follow the Court's order and do what the Court says, but sometimes, as I say, there only being 24 hours in a day, it is not possible.

THE COURT: You can raise that when we get to the end of our pretrial motions. It is now 4:25, gentlemen, and I think we will adjourn until tomorpow morning.

MR. REINER: May I be heard very briefly on just this matter before we adjourn today.

With respect to joining on behalf of the defendant Leslie Van Houten to a motion to sever, it was my

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understanding before the motion was made we will not have to join in such a motion in order to preserve our right to object during the couse of the trial to the introduction of any statements which we feel would not properly be edited.

Out of an abundance of caution we did join.

In light of the Court's indication a moment ago, it is not necessary to request a severance pretrial in order to make --

THE COURT: I am not making a positive statement. I am simply expressing an opinion. If you have any question as to what rights the defendants have, and when they should be exercised, you will have to make your own independent decision as to that.

MR. REINER: Very well, then, I won't pursue that any further at the moment.

The second matter that I wish to bring up is this, your Honor:

A motion is pending before the Court with respect psychiatric examination of Linda Kasabian. I did not prepare a separate motion for the reason it simply would have been a matter of duplication.

THE COURT: With respect to that, I don't see any need for anybody to join in that motion. If it is granted the benefits will accrue to all of the defense counsel.

MR. FITZGERALD: Just suggesting permission to argue it.

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THE COURT: All right, just so it isn't simply repetitive.

MR. REINER: If denied, of course, if we have not joined in it we would not be able to complain about it later, if that should be the case, that is the only reason for wishing to join.

THE COURT: But I would again suggest that you give some serious consideration to your motions for severance as to whether or not you intend to pursue them or not when we resume tomorrow, on the basis of what I said.

Notwithstanding the mental reservations you have when you make it, I don't know about them and I don't really care about them. All I am concerned with is the record in the case. If the motion is before me I will rule on it.

MR. BUGLIOSI: When you are thinking about compelling reasons for altering your June 10th rule with respect to the consolidation, we are talking about saving the County of Los Angeles a considerable sum of money.

THE COURT: I can see the problem and the reasons for the motion. I am not sure it is one that should be determined by this Court, though. I think, perhaps, it is one that should be filed in Department 100. We can take that up again tomorrow, too.

MR. BUGLIOSI: You will advise us tomorrow what to

1 THE COURT: Yes. MR. BUGLIOSI: That is one very compelling reason 2 for extending the June 10th deadline one day to save the 3 4 County some money. 5 THE COURT: I know really nothing about the Hinman case except for this motion of substitution I heard 6 7 yesterday. 8 There is a third defendant, isn't there? 9 MR. BUGLIOSI: Bruce Davis. He has not been found, 10 yet. 11 THE COURT: He is not in custody. 12 MR. STOVITZ: He is not in custody. 13 MR. BUGLIOSI: This motion for severance tomorrow, 14 do you just want to see the statements or do you want any-15 thing else from the prosecution? 16 THE COURT: Are these the statements as deleted or 17 the entire statements? 18 MR. BUGLIOSI: These are the entire statements, and 19 I don't know exactly what the Court wants to do. 20 Does the Court want to look at these statements 21 and see whether they are susceptible to deletions? 22 THE COURT: How long are they? 23 MR. BUGLIOSI: There is one here, 47 pages. 24 The other one is 60 pages, and the other one is 25 half a page. 26 THE COURT: 47, 60, and one-half?

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MR. BUGLIOSI: You can have these overnight.

THE COURT: I am not going to be able to do it tonight

If you want to leave them I may be able to do them in the morning before court starts. If you want to offer them in evidence now as Exhibits for the purpose of this proceeding --

MR. BUGLIOSI: All right, your Honor, I have here a statement by Virginia Graham purportedly containing conversation that she had with defendant Susan Atkins, I believe in early November of 1969.

May it be marked People's 1?

THE COURT: 1 for the purpose of this particular motion.

MR. KANAREK: This is for identification only.

THE COURT: This is for the purpose of the motion only.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Transcript of another tape-recorded conversation between Ronnie Howard and Susan Atkins.

THE COURT: That will be People's 2 for the purpose of the motion for severance.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Forgive this shabby document here, I will try to get you a better one tomorrow. I do have another one but I cannot find it.

This is a statement, an excerpt from a transcript of a tape-recorded conversation between -- not between, but Diane Lake gave it to the Los Angeles Police Department concerning her conversation with

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defendant Leslie Van Houten. 1 May that be marked People's 3 for identifica-2 .3 tion. It will be marked People's 3 for the 4 THE COURT: purpose of this motion for severance. 5 I will give these to you, Mr. Darrow. #3 6 You can give them to me in the morning. 7 8 MR. BUGLIOSI: I don't believe we have another state-9 ment, do we? 10 MR. STOVITZ: The statement of Patricia Krenwinkel, but we are not going to use that. 11 12 MR. BUGLIOSI: We are not going to use that. 13 MR. FITZGERALD: We are talking about guilt and 14 penalty, your Honor. 15 THE COURT: In what respect? 16 MR. FITZGERALD: I mean when we talk about the state-17 ments, I must hope for the best and assume the worst, and in 18 the event there is a penalty trial in the attempt to intro-19 duce any statements, my motion is directed to those state-20 ments, as well. 21 I say that only to clarify their thinking. 22 THE COURT: Your motion as it now stands is a motion 23 for severance. 24. MR. FITZGERALD: That's correct. 25THE COURT: Not to exclude any particular evidence. 26 MR. FITZGERALD: That is correct, based on Aranda

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ground that it cannot be effectively deleted.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, if I may, I feel constrained to reply at the earlierst possible time to Mr. Bugliosi's statement concerning the cost to the County of Los Angeles.

This is irrelevant. Every trial is THE COURT: expensive and some are more expensive than others.

That is not the point. The point is that we will try to expedite the trial of this case with due deliberate speed, and at the same time respect all the rights of all of the parties, and the cost is what it will be. That is all.

I will take the bench once more and formally adjourn for today.

(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had in open court:)

THE COURT: In accordance with our conference in chambers, gentlemen, we will adjourn at this time until 10:00 A.M. tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, proceedings in the above-entitled matter were adjourned to Friday, June 12, 1970, 10:00 A.M., this same Department.)

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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

FRIDAY, JUNE 12, 1970

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THE COURT: Very well, the record will show this conference is being held in chambers.

10:17 A.

Miss Van Houten, Miss Krenwinkel and Miss Atkins are present. Mr. Manson is present.

Mr. Kanarek is present, Mr. Reiner is present, Mr. Fitzgerald is present, Mr. Bugliosi and Mr. Stovitz are present.

Did I miss anyone? Mr. Shinn is not present. Do you have any knowledge of the whereabouts of Mr. Shinn?

MR. REINER: Yes, your Honor, I received a phone call here in court just a few moments ago from Mr. Shinn. The call was from Tokyo. He informed me he had an emergency illness in the family. He called in from Tokyo. He said he was not aware the court would be in session on this matter yesterday; he thought the motions would have been concluded Wednesday and he had made arrangements for me to stand in in his behalf for Susan Atkins on Wednesday.

I told him that I did this on Wednesday; that on Thursday when I attempted to do the same thing, that at that time it became impossible to represent Miss Atkins because she would not acquiesce to the substitution, as we all

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observed yesterday, so for that reason her matter could go off-calendar yesterday, and I told him the Court had issued a body attachment for him but it was held until 10:00 A.M. this morning.

He said he was first informed that the Court was seeking him today when he received a telegram from his office today, being Saturday in Tokyo and Friday here, or perhaps it was late last night. I'm not sure which.

He said he would try to be back Monday; that he thinks he probably will be back Monday.

I guess that is really about all the information I have.

I told him that I would represent Susan for him, especially during his absence, if it is agreeable with Susan and if it is agreeable with the Court.

THE COURT: Have you discussed this with Miss Atkins? MR. REINER: Not since the phone call. As soon as I hung up the Clerk informed me you wished to see all of us in chambers.

I have discussed this previously with Susan; so has Mr. Shinn in my presence, at which time he asked her if she would agree to have me represent her in his absence.

She said she would, and of course the Court observed on Wednesday she did agree.

Yesterday she did not disagree, but it was yesterday Miss Atkins decided she did not want to participate

in the proceedings, and stood mute. 1 For that reason the substitution was impossible Ż yesterday. 3 I have not had an opportunity to once again 4 discuss it with her this morning since that phone call. 5 THE COURT: Miss Atkins, do you wish Mr. Reiner to 6 appear for you today in place of Mr. Shinn? 7 8 DEFENDANT ATKINS: I have no objection. 9 THE COURT: You have no objection, is that what you said? 10 DEFENDANT ATKINS: 11 12 THE COURT: All right. I take it that Mr. Shinn has 13 asked you to do so? 14 MR. REINER: Yes. THE COURT: Mr. Shinn has asked you to appear for him 15 16 in representing Miss Atkins with her consent. 17. That is correct, your Honor. MR. REINER: 18 THE COURT: All right. 19 MR. STOVITZ: Would you request of Miss Van Houten 20 whether it is agreeable with her that her lawyer likewise 21 represent co-defendant Atkins. 22^{\cdot} THE COURT: Is that agreeable with you, Miss Van Houteh? 23 DEFENDANT VAN HOUTEN: Yes. 24 MR. REINER: I just thought of something, in some 25 respects it would be impossible, at least with respect to **2**6 one motion, the motion to consolidate.

THE COURT; There is no problem there because that motion has been transferred over to Department 100, and Department 100 will rule on that motion.

MR. REINER: Very well.

MR. FITZGERALD: Would that be today, your Honor?
THE COURT: I would guess so. I don't know.

MR. FITZGERALD: I think there is a problem insofar as one other motion is concerned. I believe Mr. Shinn has filed with the Court a motion for continuance.

MR. REINER: That's correct, I have not been informed of Mr. Shinn's ground.

THE COURT: I won't hear that until Mr. Shinn returns.

Now, the second thing is, Mr. Kanarek, our proceedings were delayed this morning because of your absence. Do you have any excuse for not being here at 10:00 o'clock?

MR. KANAREK: I tried to get here, your Honor. I think I was about eight minutes late.

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to require counsel to be scrupulously punctual in their appointments in this court; that goes for everyone.

I understand the problems. You are all busy attorneys; there are lots of things to be done in connection with this case.

On the other hand, I am going to have to insist

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on absolute punctuality, and I want you to all know that I intend to enforce it.

For this time I will let it go with an admonishment, but please bear it in mind.

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, if I might just make this record:

I think the first day we were here, I guess it was the 10th, the 10th, the day that we were here on motions, I think your Honor calendared this for 9:00 o'clock and we did not get going until 11:30.

What I am saying, your Honor, these are the problems in the practice of law and also in the judicial administration.

THE COURT: That has nothing to do with what I am saying. If I calendared it for 9:00 o'clock, I expect you to be here at 9:00 o'clock.

MR. KANAREK: I was here, your Honor, for two and a a half hours I waited.

THE COURT: At any event, today it was calendared for 10:00 and you were not here.

MR. KANAREK: I was eight minutes late, your Honor.

THE COURT: Bear in mind what I said.

MR. KANAREK: Certainly.

THE COURT: I asked the defendants to be present this morning because I want to go over with them again this problem of their conduct in the courtroom.

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As you all know, the trial has not yet started; we are in the pretrial stages.

The things that you do in court now, while they may very well create some unfavorable publicity for you, do not have any direct effect on the jury.

However, when this trial starts if you persist in the kind of conduct that has been going on, not only will it constitute a contempt, disrespectful, disorderly and disruptive conduct as far as the Court is concerned, but, even more seriously from your standpoint, I think that it would seriously prejudice your cases with the jury.

So I would ask you to seriously reconsider what you are doing because I think you are hurting yourselves.

Now, I am going to, when we resume our proceedings today, I am going to have you come back into the courtroom and sit down, and as long as you sit down and behave
yourselves and act with the dignity that is expected of you
in the courtroom, we will have no further problems.

If you stand up again, as you have in the past, and turn your back on the Court, I will ask the Bailiffs to assist you back into your seats.

If you do it again I will ask them to assist you again into your seats.

If there is any physical resistance on your part, or if you continue to stand after you have been re-seated by the Bailiffs, then I will consider that to be a disruptive,

disorderly and contemptuous act on your parts and I will again have you removed from the courtroom.

I don't want to do that; I don't think you are accomplishing a thing by it. But if that is what you do, then I want you to know that that is what I will do.

Now, do any of you have any questions?

MR. MANSON: Your Honor, you mentioned --

THE COURT: Let me add one thing, Mr. Manson, before you make your statement:

If you are removed from the courtroom you may return at any time that you are willing to affirm to the Court your willingness to come back in and conform to the Court's orders. All you have to do is just let your counsel know that you are so willing to return, and I will let you return to the courtroom.

In the meantime, if you are removed from the court you will be placed in the holding tank, as you have been, where you can hear, in your case, Mr. Manson, and see the proceedings, if you care to.

In the case of the young ladies, they will be taken up into our jury room above the court where they will be unable to see the proceedings, but there is a speaker provided and they will be able to hear the proceedings.

All right, go ahead, Mr. MAnson.

DEFENDANT MANSON: You mentioned "reconsider." Then you could possibly reconsider, if you can ask me to

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Let me ask you to reconsider. I have a position as well as your Honor has a position.

My position is still as strong as it was the first day I was arrested. The position that I hold is as follows:

The confusion that has been created around the situation could be eliminated, over 50 percent of the confusion could be eliminated if your Honor would allow me to have my own voice in court.

I am not here to use any dilatory tactics or cause confusion. I am not here to shout in your courtroom. I am not here to fight with your Bailiffs, and I am not here to go against my brother.

I am just here to try to explain that these two gentlemen, even though sincere as they may be, they have no idea of what is going on.

They are still in the dark about the whole situation. They have a bunch of facts; they have a bunch of things --

THE COURT: What two gentlemen are you talking about? DEFENDANT MANSON: The District Attorneys, they are very good at what they do, but they are way out, they are on the edge of town, you know, like it's --

THE COURT: Are you making some kind of a motion, Mr. Manson?

DEFENDANT MANSON: Yes, I'm making a motion, if I can finish, I lishted to you.

THE COURT: Just tell me what the motion is.

DEFENDANT MANSON: It is my opinion that the Court is not supposed to think, but supposed to administer the laws that go into the book, Manson vs. United States; you give me a case --

THE COURT: Mr. Manson, I don't want to hear a speech.

If you have a motion or a request, state it to the Court so

I would know what you want.

DEFENDANT MANSON: I would like to associate in with Mr. Kanarek as my own counsel.

THE COURT: I already ruled on that several times. Your motion will be denied.

DEFENDANT MANSON: Yeah, okay, then you leave nothing you know, there is nothing else I can do. You can kill me now.

THE COURT: All right.

DEFENDANT MANSON: You understand what I am saying to you? Do you understand what I am saying to you?

THE COURT: Is there anything further, gentlemen, before we resume in the courtroom?

MR. REINER: Well, other than, of course, to indicate once again we do object to the defendants being removed.

Well, perhaps I am being premature. Perhaps they will not do that.

THE COURT: There is one other matter I want to take up with you gentlemen, and that is the publicity order.

DEFENDANT MANSON: You don't obey your own publicity orders; you don't obey your own laws. You can remove me now, you hear me? I am not going to understand you. You don't understand me. You don't try to reach an empathy with me; why should I try to listen to you?

THE COURT: If you are not quiet I will have you removed.

DEFENDANT MANSON: Remove me. Do your job.

THE COURT: I order you to be quiet, Mr. Manson.

DEFENDANT MANSON: I will not be quiet, absolutely not.

THE COURT: The Bailiffs will remove Mr. Manson from the room.

DEFENDANT ATKINS: Nor will I be quiet.

DEFENDANT KRENWINKEL: Nor I.

THE COURT: The record will show the three young ladies are standing up.

Sit down, young ladies, or I will have you removed from the room.

The Bailiffs will seat the young ladies.

The record will show that the young ladies are getting up and resisting the Bailiffs.

Assist them to their seats again.

THE DEFENDANTS (in unison): Now we can get up again.

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THE COURT: The record will show the young ladies resisted the Bailiffs and are again standing up, so I will have to ask you to be removed from the room.

(Defendants removed.)

THE COURT: Now, to go back to the subject that I started to mention, which was the publicity order.

I read the newspapers, as I am sure the rest of you do, and I am convinced that both sides are guilty of, if not actual violation of the publicity order, they are treading a very narrow path which is right on the border-line.

I suggest, first of all, that all of you go back and read that publicity order because I intend to enforce it.

For example, on Page 3 of the order, Lines 9 through 13, read as follows:

"Nor shall any such person" --

Referring to persons named before as to whom this order applies --

"Nor shall any such person make any statement for public dissemination as to the content,
nature, substance or effect of any testimony which
may be given in any proceeding related to this
matter, except that a witness may discuss any
matter with any attorney of record or agent thereof."

Now, these various statements that have been given out to the Press by the People and by defense counsel relating to this motion, for example, of the People, to have an evidentiary hearing with respect to Mr. Kanarek's substitution, are, in my opinion, violations of that publicity order. Statements about the length of the trial and what the evidence is expected to show by calling Judges, and so on and so forth. This has no place whatever in this trial. There is no excuse for it, in my opinion, and I order you to stop lt. and that goes for both sides.

Don't try to try the case in the newspapers,

I am simply going to admonish you now. I will tell you again I intend to enforce the publicity order.

If there is any repetition of what is going on we are going to have some difficulties.

MR. STOVITZ: May I say, your Honor, Paragraph V on Page 3 says:

> "This order does not include any of the following, the scheduling and results of any stage of the judicial proceeding held in open court and in open or public session."

Now, yesterday, or the day before, we had an open public session.

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THE COURT: That is not what I am talking about,
Mr. Stovitz. That's right, that is excluded, as you have
indicated.

What I am talking about are the statements made to the Press that don't fall within that exclusion, and I think there have been numerous such statements.

All right, I don't want to say anything more about it now. I just simply want to call it to your attention.

I admonish you, I warn you that the order is in full force and effect. It applies to all of you and I expect you to recognize it and comply with it.

MR. REINER: Excuse me, your Honor, if I might inquire:

The Court initially stated it felt the order had been violated by all defense counsel.

THE COURT: No, I did not say all defense counsel. I said some, but not all.

MR REINER: The reason I inquired, the newspaper the Court has before it, I read it myself; it does quote certain statements I made. I tried scrupulously to stay within the order re publicity.

remarks I made with respect to the petition I intended to file and the like, fell without the order of the publicity.

THE COURT: As I interpret the order, I don't think

that there is excluded any petition which you intend to file in an appellate court or any discussion about it.

MR. REINER: When you say "exclude", you mean I may or may not:

THE COURT: The publicity order covers that.

MR. REINER: The reason I commented on that is that the Court recalls in open court I asked for a stay of proceedings pending the petition I proposed to file.

THE COURT: I am not saying you don't have a right to file a petition. That is not what I am saying at all.

You have the right to file any petition you want in the appellate court.

What I am saying is disseminating this information and discussing the merits of any such petition, or the issues involved, prior to your having filed it, after it is filed, of course, it is a matter of public record and will speak for itself, there is nothing needs to be said about it.

Certainly nothing needs to be said to the Press about the merits of the controversy before the Court has decided it. That is what I am talking about.

MR. STOVITZ: May we ask when we go back, your Honor, does your Honor intend to bring the defendants down before the open court?

THE COURT: Yes, as I indicated to them, I will bring them into the courtroom and again hope that they will be

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seated and conform their conduct to what is expected of them.

MR. REINER: May I confer with Miss Van Houten? THE COURT: You all may confer with your respective clients before we resume.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, if I may, I would and do. your Honor, solicit through your Honor a stipulation that it is deemed, so there is no question about it, Mr. Manson's constitutional right to be present, the right to effective counsel, are those rights that is the making of the record. if I can couch it in those terms, as far as these in camera type of proceedings are concerned, in chambers, do we have a continuing record that indicates that each and every moment when Mr. Manson is not here, that these rights are asserted, so that I don't have to say it every time.

He has a right to be present.

THE COURT: I don't know that I know what you are talking about, Mr. Kanarek. If you have some objection, state it for the record.

MR. KANAREK: My objection is to have Mr. Manson removed. He has a right to be present at every stage of the proceedings. He has a constitutional right to effective counsel, and he has a right to know what is going on in his own murder case, and our appellate courts say and have said on numerous occasions unless you are vigorous in trying to convince the trial court that these constitutional

matters are important, and have the Court change its rulings, then you have waived on appeal these rights.

I just want to make sure -- I don't want -THE COURT: I won't enter into any stipulation with
you. You may state any objections you have as you go
along.

MR. KANAREK: The objection is to his being removed.

I assert it is a violation of his constitutional right to effective counsel, and to a fair trial, and his right to be present at every stage of the proceedings, due process.

It is in our Code, a defendant shall be present at every stage of the proceedings.

MR. STOVITZ: Your Honor, may we have this thing rather than have an argument each time, when counsel gets up and say, "I'll make an objection, number one, objection number one is that the defendant is not being present.

"I make objection number two; the fact he has no pro per status or associate counsel status."

We used to do this, rather than say the dirty jokes, we would say "Number one," and "Number two."

THE COURT: I don't want to tell Mr. Kanarek how to make his objections. He is perfectly capable of making them for himself.

MR. REINER: Perhaps at this time I should make the objection that I previously began to make, which at that time was premature.

I would object to Miss Van Houten being removed from chambers during the course of these proceedings, and I object to the proceedings continuing.

I also wish to point out for the record that Miss Van Houten did not speak out.

Miss Van Houten did stand up, and Miss Van Houten had the hands of the Bailiff placed on her shoulder; they were gently placed on her shoulder; she sat down; immediately, as soon as the hands of the Bailiff were taken off her shoulder, she immediately stood up.

On the second occasion the Bailiff gently placed her hands on her shoulders.

Immediately, upon the hands being placed on her shoulder she sat down; immediately upon the Bailiff removing the hands from her shoulders Miss Van Houten stood up.

I believe on the third occasion the Court ordered Miss Van Houten from the chambers. Miss Van Houten did not speak or say a word during this entire proceedings.

THE COURT: My recollection is they were all speaking; they were all resisting, and all repeatedly rose after the Bailiff re-seated them.

MR. STOVITZ: And they acted in unison, your Honor.

MR. FITZGERALD: On behalf of Patricia Krenwinkel,
I object. The removal is a violation of the due process
clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution, the Sixth Amendment, and the applicable

provisions of the California Constitution and the California Penal Code.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, if I may, and I do make a motion for an evidentiary hearing, in view of your Honor's statement, and also what happened, I make a motion there be an evidentiary hearing in connection with the publicity that has taken place in this case.

I ask your Honor conduct a hearing wherein the Press, the representatives of the mass media be brought here wherein your Honor view the evidence and make a finding of fact as to whether or not there has been a denial of equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Mr. Manson is entitled to that equal protection and due process.

THE COURT: Your request is denied.

Now, let's get back into the courtroom, gentlemen, and go to work.

(The following proceedings were had in open court, all counsel being present with the exception of Mr. Shinn:)

THE COURT: People versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, and Leslie Van Houten.

The record will show that the four defendants are present. They are presently standing with their arms outstretched.

The record will also show that their respective counsel are present, except for Mr. Shinn, and in our conference in chambers this morning Miss Atkins indicated to the Court that she was willing and consented to the appearance of Mr. Reiner to represent her for these preliminary trial proceedings, in Mr. Shinn's absence.

Will the counsel for the defendants kindly ask their respective clients to sit down and be seated.

(Counsel comply.)

THE COURT: The record will show that each of the defendants is presently standing with his or her head bowed and arms outstretched.

I order each of you to sit down so these proceedings may proceed.

There's been no attempt by any of the defendants to comply with the Court's orders, so I will ask the Bailiffs to assist each of the defendants to be seated.

The record will show Mr. Manson is physically resisting the Bailiffs, and there is an altercation between Mr. Manson and the Bailiffs, and that the young ladies have resisted, each of them, the Bailiffs, and have refused to be seated and have stood up again.

I order you once again to be seated, all of you.

The record will show there is a physical altercation going on between Mr. Manson and the two Bailiffs who

are attempting to hold him in his chair,

Will the Bailiffs please assist the young ladies to be seated.

All right, the record will show that Mr. Manson is still physically resisting the attempts of the Bailiffs to keep him in his chair and is engaged in an altercation with them; that the female defendants have each resisted the attempts of the Bailiffs to have them seated, and have again risen; they are standing facing the Court with their arms outstretched.

I find that the conduct of each of you is disruptive, disorderly, disrespectful and I order each of you to be removed from the courtroom.

Remove the defendants from the courtroom.

MR. FITZGERALD: I would object to the removal fo Patricia Krenwinkel from the courtroom on the following grounds:

It is a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; that it violates the applicable provisions of the Sixth Amendment, including the right to fair trial and confront witnesses and to be present at proceedings, also violation of the applicable provisions of the California Constitution and a violation of the California Penal Code provision that a defendant must be present at all stages of the proceedings.

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MR. KANAREK: Also, if I may address the Court, I adopt what Mr. Fitzgerald stated and, furthermore, your Honor, I must plead with the Court, because your Honor did not follow the procedure your Honor himself stated.

Your Honor indicated previously that they would be brought back into court and then if they proceeded, I mean positionwise not do what your Honor wished, they would be removed.

Honor, in connection with this forced seating, and I would ask your Honor to review your Honor's own words that are in this record, where your Honor indicated that the -- you told them that if they did not, if they did not, they would be brought down, and if they did not position themselves correctly, I am paraphrasing, but your Honor indicated to them --

THE COURT: You are not paraphrasing it, Mr. Kanarek, you are misstating it.

The record will speak for itself, gentlemen; are there any further objections?

MR. STOVITZ: Not any objections, but I would state, your Honor --

MR. REINER: Excuse me, perhaps all defense counsel should be heard.

THE COURT: Just a moment, Mr. Reiner, Mr. Stovitz was speaking.

MR. STOVITZ: I believe he was going to join in the motion.

THE COURT: I want one counsel at a time to speak.

When Mr. Stovitz is speaking you remain quiet,

Mr. Reiner.

MR. STOVITZ: I will yield to Mr. Reiner.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. REINER: Thank you.

With respect to the defendant Leslie Van Houten,
I will make the same objections on the same grounds as
presented by Mr. Fitzgerald.

With respect to the conduct of Miss Van Houten here in the courtroom I would wish to indicate for the purpose of the record when Miss Van Houten entered the courtroom she took a seat, the seat assigned to her.

A few minutes later she then did stand up in unison with the other two girls; she did place her hands out to the side; she let her head drop.

The Court ordered her to sit down.

THE COURT: The record already reflects that. I stated on the record, Mr. Reiner, exactly what happened.

MR. REINER: I am in dispute with the Court's -THE COURT: If you have an objection, state your
objection. I already stated on the record what the conduct
was.

MR. REINER: My objection to the Court's statement of

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the defendant Leslie Van Houten, that it was incorrect.

THE COURT: It was precisely correct. Get on with your objection, sir.

MR. REINER: May I state the reason I feel it is incorrect?

It is incorrect for the following reasons: That the Court correctly stated her conduct up to the point where the Court said when his Honor ordered Leslie Van Houten to sit down, the Deputy Sheriff then had physically required her to sit down, a precise description would be the Deputy | Sheriff placed her hand on Leslie's arm, the weight of her hand upon the arm; Miss Van Houten sat down immediately.

Upon removing her hand from Miss Van Houten's arm, Miss Van Houten stood up.

The Court then ordered Miss Van Houten to sit down a second time. On the second occasion Miss Van Houten responded to the Court order. She did not have a hand placed on her.

THE COURT: Mr. Reiner, I heard all I want to hear from you. If you want to state any legal objection you may do so. I stated precisely what happened.

MR. REINER: Your Honor is aware, perhaps I should say, that all counsel, including the prosecution have argued to your Honor that your Honor has authority to remove disruptive defendants from the courtroom, not non-disruptive members.

1	The question is whether they were disruptive.
2,	THE COURT: They were disruptive.
3	MR. REINER: This is a conclusion.
4 .	THE COURT: Do you have an objection to make, sir?
5	State it.
6	MR. REINER: I am stating the objection as clearly as
7	I possibly can state it.
8	THE COURT: What is your objection, Mr. Reiner?
9`	MR. REINER: That your Honor may not remove the
10	defendants from the courtroom because they were not, in
11	fact, being disruptive, notwithstanding the Court's
12	characterization of their conduct as being disruptive.
13	That is a conclusion.
	! , , , ,)
14	I may indicate for the purpose of the record
14 15	I may indicate for the purpose of the record my view of precisely what occurred.
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15 16 17	my view of precisely what occurred. If the Court disputes that, and we have an evidentiary hearing
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15 16 17 18 19	my view of precisely what occurred. If the Court disputes that, and we have an evidentiary hearing THE COURT: You made your position clear. Let's proceed.
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15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	my view of precisely what occurred. If the Court disputes that, and we have an evidentiary hearing — THE COURT: You made your position clear. Let's proceed. MR. REINER: I haven't concluded indicating the entire conduct of Miss Van Houten. THE COURT: I am not interested in your description. I found it disorderly and disruptive.

Honor's holding that I may not indicate for the purpose of the record a description of what took place?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. REINER: Thank you.

MR. STOVITZ: So counsel would not be misled, whereas yesterday I did not think the defendants conduct was disruptive, today I believe it was disruptive today.

I believe my observations were that Mr. Manson did disrupt this court and that the girls, the three defendants, in following the lead of Mr. Manson also disrupted the orderly processes of this court.

THE COURT: There isn't the slightest question about it. They physically resisted the Bailiffs; they have failed to comply with the Court's order after being repeatedly ordered to do so.

MR. STOVITZ: We are not joining with the request that the defendants physically be brought here. They were admonished in the chambers what procedure would be followed.

MR. KANAREK: May I address the Court very briefly?

THE COURT: If it is on this subject, Mr. Kanarek, you already stated your objection.

MR. KANAREK: It isn't on this subject.

I would request some medical assistance for Mr. Manson, your Honor.

THE COURT: I will ask the Bailiff to check and see if he needs any. If he needs any he will get it.

THE COURT: No, you may not, not at this time. We are going to proceed.

Now, then, we were proceeding with Miss

MR. KANAREK: May I go in there a moment, your Honor?

I have read the various exhibits that were offered by both sides on the question of this motion.

MR. FITZGERALD: Before your Honor rules, may I be heard? It is a motion to withdraw the motion.

THE COURT: I am not through yet.

Krenwinkel's motion for severance yesterday.

MR. FITZGERALD: Excuse me.

THE COURT: All right. In view of what you said I will hear from you, Mr. Fitzgerald.

MR. FITZGERALD: After consulting with your Honor in chambers yesterday afternoon, and consulting with co-counsel and consulting with counsel for the prosecution, where it was made clear that counsel would have the right to raise the Aranda problems in connection with the statement during the trial, and outside the presence of the jury before such statement was introduced, the defendant Krenwinkel will now respectfully ask leave of the Court to withdraw the motion to sever on her behalf.

I would inform the Court that I intend at the time /
the prosecution tenders this statement to make a motion for
your Honor outside the presence of the jury to conduct a
hearing to determine the admissibility of those statements,

and particularly whether or not those statements can be sufficiently edited as to not be prejudicial to Miss Krenwinkel.

THE COURT: I take it then that at this time you wish to withdraw your motion; is that right, Mr. Fitzgerald?

MR. FITZGERALD: That is correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: That is, your motion to sever?

MR. FITZGERALD: That is correct.

THE COURT: Now, I want you to be perfectly clear on one thing: There has been no representation to you by the Court as to anything.

If you are withdrawing your motion, you are withdrawing it on your own, not based on any representation that the Court has made to you in regard to this matter.

Is that perfectly clear?

We talked about many things in chambers yesterday regarding these motions and other things. If you say you are withdrawing it on the basis of something I said to you, I can tell you right now I will not receive any such conditional withdrawal.

It is entirely up to you whether you withdraw it or go ahead.

MR. FITZGERALD: I choose to withdraw it. It is not contingent upon anything your Honor said, but in a sense my withdrawal is based on a colloquy and conversation that all counsel and your Honor had with respect to the applicable

law in the area.

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. REINER: On behalf of the defendant Leslie
Van Houten I would also withdraw her motion to join in
the motion of Mr. Fitzgerald.

THE COURT: Verywell.

Mr. Kanarek did not have any motion for severance filed.

Do you want to be heard, Mr. Kanarek?

MR. KANAREK: I have nothing to say at this time, your Honor.

THE COURT: There is nothing before the Court on any motion for severance. The only motion for severance hereto-fore filed and made in this court has heretofore been withdrawn.

MR. KANAREK: We joined with Mr. Fitzgerald in that motion, your Honor.

THE COURT; In which motion?

MR. KANAREK: The motion to sever.

THE COURT: I told you, though, you had failed to comply with the Court's order. I would not permit you to entertain the motion.

MR. KANAREK: That is not my recollection, your Honor. I think your Honor indicated that -- but, very well.

THE COURT: What is your position, Mr. Kanarek, so we will be absolutely clear.

1 MR. KANAREK: At this time I don't have anything to 2 state to the Court in that regard, at this time. 3 THE COURT: In what regard? 4 MR. KANAREK: In regard to the motion to sever. 5 THE COURT: Are you making such a motion? 6 MR. KANAREK: Well. I thought I was part of Mr. Fitzgerald's -- I adopted what Mr. Fitzgerald had 8 filed, your Honor. 9 10 THE COURT: Are you making such a motion or are you not? 11 **12** MR. KANAREK: In view of your Honor's statements it 13 would appear your Honor is not allowing it at this time. 14 THE COURT: I am asking you if you care to make such 15 a moment? 16 MR. KANAREK: I perhaps will. I would like to 17 consult with my client and discuss it with him. 18 As your Honor knows, because of the activities 19 of the District Attorney against me personally --20 THE COURT: Never mind that. What I want to know at 21 the moment is, are you asserting a motion to sever or are you 22 not? 23 MR. KANAREK: At this instance, your Honor, I thought, 24 I am telling your Honor my true state of mind was that I 25 would be arguing a motion because of the fact that I was 26

joining with Mr. Fitzgerald.

Are you making the motion to sever?

The first I knew that Mr. Fitzgerald was not going to pursue it, and I think Mr. Manson and I -- if I may most respectfully state to the Court, that I would like to defer answering that question until I consult with Mr. Manson.

THE COURT: Then there is nothing before the Court with regard to any motion for severance.

Now, the next motion the Court will take up is Mr. Manson's motion for a Court-appointed psychiatrist for a psychiatric examination of Linda Kasabian.

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you wish to address yourself to that,
Mr. Kanarek?

MR. KANAREK: Yes.

MR. STOVITZ: Counsel was talking to me.

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. FITZGERALD: I just want to indicate to the Court I would like to join in that motion, your Honor, as I indicated to the Court yesterday afternoon, I think I have some argument that will be illuminating on the subject, it will not be repetitious.

THE COURT: In view of your failure to comply with the Court's order regarding the filing of the motion, I will not permit you to make the motion at this time. You had ample opportunity to do so and you failed to comply with the Court's order.

All pretrial motions were to be noticed on or before June 10th.

MR. FITZGERALD: We discussed that yesterday afternoon in chambers. Your Honor indicated you would hear argument on this matter. Your Honor indicated to me you would allow me to join in Mr. Kanarek's motion to have Linda Kasabian examined.

THE COURT: I think I indicated I might hear you argue.

I did not indicate I would let you join in the motion.

In any event, if the motion is granted it would accrue to the benefit of all of the defendants, so the question is really moot.

MR. FITZGERALD: It is not moot insofar as the standards of this court apply equally to the prosecution and the defense.

THE COURT: This has nothing to do with that, sir, you failed to comply with the Court's order regarding the making of pretrial motions.

MR. REINER: On behalf of defendant Leslie Van Houten, it is my recollection in chambers yesterday we discussed this matter with respect to this motion.

THE COURT: I don't want to hear from you, Mr. Reiner, on that. Let's proceed, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. REINER: I would like to indicate --

THE COURT: Sit down, Mr. Reiner.

MR. REINER: Thank you, your Honor.

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MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, in this motion that we have, to have Linda Kasabian examined, we have a way, your Honor, of having some people who are experts in the behavioral sciences for the prosecution as well as the defense examine this lady, and guide us in deciding whether or not she is presently insane.

I think we have set it out in the Declaration as to the factual basis there, in the Declaration.

It is noteworthy, your Honor, that the prosecution has not responded.

They have spent, evidently, great numbers of hours on other matters, but they have not responded, to my knowledge, with one piece of paper in opposition to this motion.

Now, I believe the quantum of proof in connection with this motion is the civil quantum of proof, that is, the preponderance of the evidence dictates whether your Honor grants the motion or not.

We don't have to prove our case beyond a reasonable doubt as far as the motion goes. You use the civil quantum of proof, and in this case there is no question, there is nothing here. We have Dr. Tweed who has his Declaration before the Court.

We have the Declaration of Kathryn Share.

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We have the Points and Authorities which speak much more eloquently than I can, so there is just nothing on the other side at all, and when you look at the quantum of proof that is necessary to carry a motion, the People having set forth nothing, and I mean nothing, by way of pieces of paper, so to speak, we ask your Honor to grant the motion.

It is that simple, your Honor.
Thank you.

THE COURT: Do you wish to argue, Mr. Fitzgerald?

MR. FITZGERALD: If I might, your Honor, I think

there is authority in the case of Ballard vs. Superior

Court, a 1966 case in 64 Cal. 2nd, Page 159, the standard

set out was for the ascertainment of the mental and

emotional condition as it may bear on a witness' credibi
lity, if a compelling reason for such examination exists.

The only authority in California for such an examination is in the area of sex cases where there is a female prosecuting witness.

I do, however, feel that although this is a case of first impression, this is a case in which there is a compelling reason for an expansion of that rule, and I feel that it is within your Honor's discretion to order her examined.

Now, I'm not proposing in the abstract, nor in this case am I proposing that simply because it has been

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alleged that somebody has used dangerous drugs or narcotics that they should be examined by a psychiatrist before they testify for the prosecution.

and the declaration of Kathryn Share set out that the drug in question is lysergic acid diathylamide, and I think without asking the Court to take judicial knowledge or judicial notice of the drug lysergic acid diathylamide, it is fair to say that there has been a good deal of publicity and a good deal of controversy and a good deal of public concern and public debate over the ingestion of drugs similar to lysergic acid diathylamide, and lysergic acid itself.

I think this debate has taken place in the popular press, magazines, periodicals. It has taken place in scientific journals. It has been the subject of debate in the United States Congress, both in the House of Representatives and the United States Senate.

Legislature, and it has been the subject of debate in many
Municipal and State Governments throughout the country.

Lysergic acid is defined and classified as a hallucinogenic drug, a hallucinogenic drug itself, it is my understanding, artifically or chemically induces fantasy, and that is the crucial area of this motion, I think, that the chemical fact of lysergic acid is to distort reality

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and to blur distinctions between reality and fantasy.

The drug itself induces mental states that are quite similar to psychoses, and some authorities feel the prolonged use of lysergic acid actually induces insanity, and results in organic brain disorder and disturbance.

Certainly lysergic acid disturbs and distorts emotions. It disturbs and distorts organized thought processes. It disturbs and distorts memory, and disturbs and distorts recollection.

It also disturbs and distorts the ability of a person to recollect and communicate about things they have perceived, and it is a drug that distorts perception itself.

As your Honor knows, these are very important and crucial areas in the area of impeachment. The witness's ability to recollect and communicate about things to which that person has been a witness.

I think that when one is under the influence of lysergic acid diathylamide or the prolonged residual effect of ISD, that is in essence uncontrollable; that the person who has ingested the lysergic acid diathylamide presently or previously is unable to control his mental or thought processes.

There is substantial medical and scientific evidence to the effect that actual drug states are subject to recurrence without notice or warning. This is the so-called flashback effect of lysergic acid.

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It has been documented in several places that lysergic acid has residual effects to the organic brain processes. There has been a great deal of concern that at least in one mental area, at least in one physical-mental area it destroys the normal production of chromosomes.

It has led to permanent brain damage in large doses.

It has led to permanent disturbances of motor functions, to permanent disturbances in intellectual functions. It also led to the disturbance of so-called superego functions, which is the conscience or moral functioning area of the brain.

The Legislature in the State of California has recognized the danger of lysergic acid. It has made the possession and use and sale of lysergic acid a felony, and they have not done so because lysergic acid is habituating, or because it is a narcotic.

They have done so because they are terribly concerned about the damage it causes in persons, and the reality distortions that may occur.

It is illegal because of this danger.

Now, originally in California the use and possession of lysergic acid was not even a crime at all. It was made a misdemeanor, and subsequently because of the substantial danger surrounding its use, it was made a felony.

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Now, I think the most recent case involving the Court's discretion is People versus Francis, a 1970 case located at 5 Cal. App. 3rd, page 414.

In that case the Court set out the test as follows:

Whether in light of the totallity of circumstances revealed, it is necessary or proper that psychiatric knowledge in general be utilized in order to aid the trier of fact in it; s assessment of credibility.

And I suggest that it would be of the utmost importance that the trief of fact in this case, the jury, be allowed to listen to the testimony of an expert psychiatrist in the field.

I think, without belaboring the point, the stakes are extremely high in this case, the very lives of these defendants depend upon some adjudication of guilt.

I think that because this is a very peculiar drug, and because it is a drug that distorts reality, and it is very germane to a witness's testimony, that your Honor ought to exercise his discretion and appoint a physiciatrist to examine her and report to the Court.

Thank you.

MR. REINER: May I be heard, your Honor?

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. REINER: I would wish to join in the motion made by Mr. Kanarek, and I would adopt the arguments made by

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Mr. Fitzgerald on behalf of the defendant Leslie Van Houten, and since I am appearing especially for Miss Atkins, it would be on her behalf as well.

THE COURT: Do you wish to respond?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Very briefly, your Honor.

Kathryn Share, your Honor, upon which the motion is predicated, is known by the name of "Gipsy".

MR. KANAREK: I object, I must object, your Honor, to counsel -- May we approach the bench?

THE COURT: Mr. Manarek, you may not. You are interrupting Mr. Bugliosi's argument. Sit down.

MR. KANAREK: There is no factual basis before the Court for --

THE COURT: Don't interrupt.

MR. BUGLIOSI: One of the most hard-core members of the Hanson family, your Honor, if the Court is in the frame of mind to grant this motion, I would respectfully ask that the Court permit Mr. Stovitz and me to cross-examine her under oath as to her declaration.

Honor, when I argued about the fact that the right to counsel of one's choice is not an automatic right, it is not an absolute right, I learned this Court's reliance on judicial precedence and judicial authority, without criticising the Court, I did not have any authority directly on the point, so I was out of the ball game at least for that

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particular issue.

I don't think there is any question, your Honor, that the defense has absolutely no authority whatsoever for examining or having a psychiatric examination of Linda Kasabian.

The leading case in California, your Honor, on this point, is Ballard versus Superior Court.

In Ballard versus Superior Court it is stated there is no right of psychiatric examination of a complaining witness in a sex case. It is up to the discretion of the Court.

The Court went on to say that if the trial Judge does order a psychiatric examination he should only do so if the circumstances indicate a necessity for the examination.

The Court went on to say that such necessity would generally arise only if a little or no corroboration supported the charge, and if the defense raised the issue of the effect of the complaining witness's mental or emotional condition upon her veracity.

I submit to the Court that there has not been any evidence adduced by the defense in this case that Linda Kasabian's testimony will not be corroborated. I make the representation to the Court at this time that her testimony will be corroborated at the trial.

So even in a sex case, your Honor, which is the

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only type of cases thus far where the California Supreme Court has authorized a psychiatric examination, even where the person who is sought to be examined is the complaining witness, the prosecutrix, even in that type of situation there is no automatic right.

It is a matter within the discretion of the Court, and the discretion should only be exercised where it is a matter of necessity.

The Court goes on to say in Ballard, your Honor, that the complaining witness should not, and, realistically, cannot be forced to submit to a psychiatric examination, or to cooperate with a psychiatrist.

Here, your Honor, not only is this not a sex case, and not only isn't Mrs. Kasabian a victim, she is a co-defendant.

And I might add that Mr. Kanarek should have had the decency to file this motion on Mrs. Kasabian's attorney, Gary Fleischman, and he didn't even do that.

So I don't see --

THE COURT: This is being filed for the examination of a prosecution witness.

MR. BUGLIOSI: What I mean is, the brief.

THE COURT: Incidentally, she apparently is going to be a witness.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I am referring to the brief and declaration in support of the motion not having been filed

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on Mrs. Kasabian's own attorney, Gary Fleischman.

I think this, of necessity, would have to be done, so Mr. Fleischnan could be present in court representing Mrs. Kasabian.

THE COURT: Well, the order could not compel her to undergo an examination if she did not vant to do it.

IM. BUGLICSI: That is true, your honor, Dallard versus Superior Court specifically holds that, but I think Mr. Fleischman should be present in court, your Honor, to represent Mrs. Kasabian, inasmuch as it is his client whom the defense is seeking to have analyzed.

Very briefly, your Honor, there is just absolutely no authority for this type of a procedure, and we would urge the Court to deny the defense motion.

IR. KANAREK: Your Honor, there is authority. I refer your Honor to the language of Giles versus Laryland, United States Supreme Court case, and the reason that the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in that case and granted a hearing and decided the case, was — The way it did — was because of the fact that the subtleties that occur in connection with a person's state of mind, the subtleties that are ascertainable by someone who is an expert, a psychiatrist, and the People have a right, your Honor, to have their psychiatrist examine this lady also, these subtleties will be completely unknown to the jury, that is, someone may be a pathological liar.

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one can take the witness stand and appear as lucid, as clear as a June morning, but it doesn't mean that they are not as insane as someone who may act and give the outward manifestations of insanity, and the Court can take judicial notice of the fact of a recent case in Torrance, wherein, and I think this is a situation which is analagous because it goes to the fact of the mental state of the particular person before the Court:

In this case in Torrance, the defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity, on two counts, wherein he, I believe, had allegedly caused the passing away of two relatives.

In in connection with these two counts of murder he was found not guilty by reason of insanity, because of his ingestion of LSD.

Now, if he was found not guilty by a Judge of the Superior Court --

THE COURT: I question that statement, Mr. Kanarek. He may have found him not guilty by reason of insanity, but I doubt if the rest of your statement is true, or at least confirmable.

MR. KANAREK: What portion is your Honor referring to?

THE COURT: As to the cause of his insanity, the finding was simply whether he was same or insane, not for

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what reason.

MR. KANAREK: Dr. Tweed was the psychiatrist there, and the LSD aspect is what caused the insanity, your Honor.

THE COURT: That was his testimony?

MR. KANAREK: We have the right to believe that a Judge of the Superior Court in rendering his decision --

THE COURT: I don't want to argue the evidence in that case, but I question your statement.

MR. KANAREK: I am just citing that by way of example, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KANAREK: If that man was insane, let's say he was a defendant before the Court, the question is, let's say he is then called as a witness; that particular man is now adjudged not guilty by reason of insanity.

Now, instead of his being a defendant in the case, he is a percipient witness, and let's say that I called him as a witness.

The first thing the District Attorney would say is, "You can't use that man. He is insane."

And so by the same token, Linda Kasabian is going to be here; we are going to have to assess her credibility, and one of the most important aspects of credibility is sanity.

In fact there is a jury instruction in connection with sanity, where there is the aspect that one is

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presumed to be same.

Now, in this case, your Honor, where the prosecution is basing their case upon a person who has ingested LSD, at least 300 times, and in fact has taken amounts that are in the order of a thousand micrograms, which is set forth in the declaration, we are going to have a game; it will be a characes here, unless we have some scientific knowledge of this particular witness's mental capacity, and the prosecution is not foreclosed —

(Off the record interruption.)

MR. KANAREK: -- the prosecution is not foreclosed, but it is most interesting, your Honor, there isn't any declaration by Linda Kasabian that she has not ingested LSD over 300 times.

Now, obviously the prosecution is in very close touch with Miss Kasabian and her attorney, to the point that although the immunity has not been technically granted, Mr. Bugliosi has been out and expended -- he says 20-page statement -- of what this lady is going to testify to.

Therefore, there is no question about Linda Kasabian being available for this examination, her attorney wanting her to have this immunity, I'm sure, will agree to it, because if she is going to be a prosecution witness, and the Court makes the order, she either is or she isn't.

If she is going to be a prosecution witness, and she chooses not to have this examination, that itself

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 is a fact which our case law says can be brought forth and presented to the trier of fact.

So the People are not helpless in the situation, but the point is they don't want it. They just don't want it.

But they have offered nothing by way of paper work, points and authorities or declarations, even of Linda Kasabian, that our facts are not true.

I would ask your Honor to consider the Russell case, the language of the California Supreme Court in the Russell case.

THE COURT: I have read it.

MR. KANAREK: I would say, your Honor, we are not extending the law, that is, the administration of justice is not turning it's back, or should not turn it's back on the rest of our society, on the other aspects of American life.

We should not insulate ourselves and deprive our self of the learning of other fields.

The law is not stagnant, I hope.

The point is, it is not a matter -- is it a sex case or is it a murder. The question is, is it something that will help the trier of fact, and we contend, your Honor, that with the facts that we have before the Court that are absolutely unrefuted, we have a psychiatrist who has been used by this Court perhaps thousands of times.

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We have the evidence before the Court by way of a declaration.

of psychiatrists in this city, and the People could not come up -- let's forget about Linda Kasabian -- they could not come up with one psychiatrist to testify that this is gobbledygook.

There is not one psychiatrist in this city that the prosecution could come up with who, under the penalty of perjury, would say this is nothing, meaningless, it is obstructionism, if I may use that kind of term.

They cannot do that, your Honor, and therefore we say that the quantum of truth being just the mere civilian quantum of proof, that your Honor should order this examination.

THE COURT: Well, gentlemen, I have considered all of the circumstances presented in your motion, and your supporting declarations.

I have read the various cases, the Ballard case, the Russell case, the other cases cited by counsel.

The law in California, as you know as well as

I, is that the Court has the discretion to order such a

psychiatric examination if there are compelling reasons to
do so.

However, in this case I find no such compelling reasons.

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The cases in which this has been done have so far been restricted in California to, I think without exception, sex cases, although there is the law in other jurisdictions which indicates that where the evidence in indicates a pathological condition, or incompetence on the part of the witness, the Court may order such an examination.

However, the circumstances before the Court do not present such a question at this time.

If Miss Kasabian testifies at the trial, her credibility is subject to impeachment in the same manner as any other witness, and I am going to deny the motion, without prejudice, at this time, to renew it if during the course of the trial the circumstances then known to the Court would make such an order necessary and proper.

At this time it is denied. The motion will be denied.

MR. KANAREK: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Gentlemen, I believe that we will adjourn at this time, and I will see counsel in chambers for the remaining time between now and our noon recess.

With respect to the other motion which is still pending, we will adjourn until 1:45 this afternoon.

MR. STOVITZ: May we, for the record, know what motions are still pending so we can try to find the briefs on them?

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THE COURT: The defendant Manson's motion under 1538.5 of the Penal Code, and Miss Krenwinkel'd motion under 1538.5 of the Penal Code.

And the motion of the defendant Atkins, for continuance.

MR. STOVITZ: May that, upon stipulation of all parties, go over until Mr. Shinn is here, or can we not stipulate to that?

THE COURT: I won't entertain it until he is here.

I would be willing to hear from Mr. Reiner on that, if he wants to go ahead and argue that, but I don't think we need to take it up at this time.

The only other remaining motion will be the motion to consolidate, which I indicated to counsel in chambers earlier, has been transferred to Department 100 for decision.

MR. STOVITZ: Would your Honor indicate what date Judge Dell set for that?

THE COURT: I don't think any date has been set. I would imagine he may very well rule on the motion summarily.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, if I may, I would ask your Honor to order Mr. Bugliosi to be here in connection with the 1538.5 motion, because we intend to call him as a witness.

It is just possible he may not show up in connection with this 1538.5 motion. I will ask he be here.

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MR. BUGLIOSI: I will be here ad nauseam, Mr. Kanarek.

THE COURT: We will recess at this time. We will see counsel in chambers.

MR. KANAREK: May I just make this one more point?
THE COURT: Very well.

MR. KANAREK: In connection with the matter, your Honor, which I indicated, this is a matter that has been scheduled for some time in Santa Ana.

Now, there is a matter before the court there at 1:45, which is only going to take a few minutes, and it is a matter, being a judicial matter, that I have not been able to resolve, but if your Honor will allow me, say because I am just going in — actually it is a matter which is just a formality, it is a matter involving other attorneys where there is no dispute, it is a matter of settlement of a matter.

THE COURT: You are talking about your day?

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: No, you will have to be here at 1:45, Mr. Kanarek. You should have made arrangements for that earlier.

MR. KANAREK: I tried to, your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. We will recess until 1:45.

I will see counsel in chambers.

(The following proceedings were had in the chambers

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of the Court at 11:45 A. M.)

THE COURT: The record will show we are in chambers, and all counsel except Mr. Shinn are present.

That is, Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Kanarek, Mr. Reiner, Mr. Stoyitz and Mr. Bugliosi are present.

I wanted to review again in your presence, Gentlemen, precisely what occurred this morning when the court opened, and I will give you a chance to give your version, Mr. Reiner.

As you recall, we had a conference in chambers beforehand, in which the defendants were present, and they were told by the Court at that time various things which the record will reflect.

We also had a disruption in chambers, the nature of which has been described on the record, and the defendants were removed from chambers.

We then commenced the court proceedings, and all of the defendants were in the courtroom, as I ordered them to be, and immediately after I took the bench I noticed that Mr. Manson was standing.

He was seated at counsel table first, and then he stood up with his head down and his arms outstretched.

I then noticed that the three defendants,
Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins and Miss Van Houten also stood -they were seated just inside the railing, facing the Court--

They all then stood up, following Mr. Manson,

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bowed their heads, with their arms outstretched in a sort of an inter-locking fashion, overlapping their arms, but outstretched.

I then asked counsel to request that their clients be seated, and counsel then did, apparently from my observation, confer with their respective clients. What they said, I have no way of knowing.

Then counsel resumed their chairs at the counsel table.

The defendants remained standing, with their heads bowed and their arms outstretched, and I then ordered them to sit down.

There was no response from them whatever, and no action was taken, no movement taken by any of them to comply with my order.

I then requested the Bailiffs to assist them to be seated, which they did.

At this time Mr. Manson physically resisted the attempts of the Bailiffs to have him seated, and a violent physical altercation ensued, in which at one time Mr. Manson was leaning over, and in fact I think he was on the floor at one time engaged in what amounts to a fight with the Bailiff, and his chair was tipped over backward; there was a violent scuffle going on in the courtroom.

At the same time the female Bailiffs were attempting to, by gentle pressure, have the three women defendants

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seated.

The three women defendants did succumb to the pressure, and did sit down, but they immediately stood up again.

What I have just stid was repeated two or three times. Each time Mr. Manson engaged in a violent struggle, in fact it never really ceased, because when they were able to get him into the chair he continued to resist, and they had to hold him there, and the resistance would continue, and the same thing occurred with the ladies.

Each time they were gently pushed down into their seats, they immediately rose again and bowed their heads and outstretched their arms.

I finally ordered each of them to comply with the Court's orders. They refused to do so, and they were then ordered to be removed from the courtroom.

Mr. Manson continued to struggle violently all the way into the lockup. There was a great deal of scuffiling and noise and groans and grunts. It was a violent physical encounter between Mr. Kanson and the two male Sheriff's Deputies, who were attempting to get him out of the courtroom.

Now, did you wish to respond to that, Mr. Reiner?

MR. REINER: Yos, briefly, your Honor.

I am more substantially in accord with your

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up.

Honor's observations here in chambers than the observations as I initially recall them with respect to the girls. There is no question Mr. Manson was violently resisting any attempt by the Bailiffs, three in number, to have him seated. He was engaged in an altercation, and clearly Mr. Manson's conduct was destructive today; the Court described Mr. Manson as standing with his arms outstretched, and his head down. That is an accurate description; his arms were outstretched so as to make a 90-degree angle with his body, and the arms perpendicular to the floor.

The girls' arms were not outstretched quite so far, perhaps 12 inches from their bodies, to make a 45-degree angle; their arms were just raised out just a little bit.

They did have their heads down. Their arms were not so much interlocking as they were overlapping, in that they were standing next to each other.

The Court is correct that gentle pressure was exerted on Leslie Van Houten. The gentle pressure was simply the Bailiff placed her hand upon Leslie's arms and said, "Leslie, sit down," and at that time she sat down.

The Court had previously ordered Leslie Van Houten to sit down, and she did not.

Immediately after sitting down, she again stood

The Court once again ordered her to sit down,

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and this time Leslie Van Houten did, in fact, sit down.

Two Bailiffs assisted the other two, but on this second occasion the Bailiff did not touch her in any way.

Then she stood up for a third time, and it was on this occasion, as I recall, the Court ordered them from the courtroom.

They walked out of the courtroom. They were not physically taken from the courtroom. They were just instructed by the Bailiffs to leave the courtroom.

One of the girls spoke, I don't recall which one it was, after they had taken a few steps.

Leslie remained mute until she reached the door leading up to the jury room, after she had gone some 20 or 30 feet. At that time she turned back and said something, and I did not hear what it was. I assumed she said something, in that I saw her lips move. I did not hear what she said.

THE COURT: Incidentally, Mr. Reporter, were you able to take down statements of the young ladies as they left the courtroom?

THE REPORTER: No, your Konor.

THE COURT: I want the record to reflect that as the women defendants were being led from the courtroom, they were making loud and disrespectful statements to the Court, each of them.

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I observed each of them to make statements: I was not able to understand everything that was being said; but there were statements such as "Why don't you kill us now, you have already deprived us of our freedom."

MR. FITZGERAID: "You already deprived us of a fair trial."

MR. REINER: One very important comment, considering the mental state of the girls, one of the girls either Miss Atkins or hiss Krenvinkel, I don't recall which one it was, I don't now recall, said, "Can't you see who we are?"

MR. BUGLIOSI: That was Patricia Krenwinkel.

THE COURT: There were other statements made. I was not able to understand them, because they were talking simultaneously.

However, what they were saying was loud, it was destructive, it was disorderly, and I consider it to be disrespectful.

MR. REINER: I do not disagree with the Court's characterization of those statements being loud; they were spoken above the conversational tone, not exactly shouting, but quite loud.

THE COURT: They were shouting.

LR. REINER: Very well, shouting, but I wish to indicate that Miss Van Houten did not open her mouth to speak at all until she was at the door.

THE COURT: She did speak while she was in the

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courtroom today; they turned, and I saw her; she was talking directly to me.

MR. REINER: With respect to Miss Van Houten, your Honor, I focused my eyes on her at all times, because she was, of course, my sole responsibility, and I followed her with my eyes all the way out of the courtroom.

Her lips did not move until she reached the area inside of the courtroom, perhaps one step or less than a step from the door.

THE COURT: Immediately adjoining the bench.

MR. REINER: That is correct, that is where the door leading to the courtroom is.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. REINER: One thing I must say, that just occurred to me a moment ago, I am representing Miss Atkins on behalf of Mr. Shinn. I indicated a moment ago I was concentrating all my attention on Miss Van Houten because of the situation that occurred in the courtroom, it actually slipped my mind that my responsibilities extended to Miss Atkins as well.

I made no observations of her.

THE COURT: The conduct of all three of the women was substantially identical, including the shouting and loud talking, as they were led from the courtroom.

MR. FITZGERALD: I would like to address the Court.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FITZGERALD: I at all times will conduct myself

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respectfully to this Court.

I will in no way try to indicate any disrespect to the Court. I want your Honor to believe that.

But I am going to be very candid and very frank.

I feel that in a sense, and I don't question your Honor's motives, but I think in a sense, in a very real sense, that the physical altercation, and I viewed it as a brutal sort of a fight, it was not a pleasant spectacle at all, to watch, particularly in a court of law.

I feel that in a sense this Court almost provoked and contrived that physical brutal altercation, and I wonder if, with the Court, we might, counsel and the Court, agree in some fashion so we can avoid a repetition of that altercation.

I think it was contrived and provoked.

such confrontations. That is the reason I again had you and your clients in chambers this morning, to explain to them that they could come back into the courtroom.

I wanted them to come back into the courtroom; they would be seated, as long as they remained seated there wo uld be no problem, and if they insisted on standing up I would ask the Bailiff to assist them back into their seats If they continued to do that, and refused to obey the

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Court's orders, they again would be taken from the courtroom.

MR. FITZGERALD: That is particularly at the point —
THE COURT: The resistance was the defendants, and
Mr. Manson obviously was looking for an opportunity for a
physical confrontation. He leaped at the opportunity at
the first chance.

MR. FITZGERALD: But I think your Honor provided him with the opportunity, your Honor, when he simply stands up-

MR. FITZGERALD: I want to be honest with you. At the point where Mr. Manson or any of the girls stand up, would your Honor consider at that point removing them rather than instructing the Bailliffs, because I don't want to see a repetition.

THE COURT: You gentlemen were the ones that yesterday, in fact all of you, the People and the defendants both objected to my removing the defendants when they stood up and refused to obey my orders, without having to seat them again.

MR. FITZGERALD: And I recognize the folly of my ways.

THE COURT: Just a moment now; I considered your

statements and I felt, well, I would give them some more

rope, you know, I'm not trying to be arbitrary about this,

and I'm going to overlook all of the insignificant things

that occur, if I can, if I can do it and still maintain the

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dignity of the Court, and not allow the proceedings to be disrupted.

So I thought that I would bring them back in here this morning, have an informal conversation with them in chambers, explain what they were doing, the consequences to themselves, and what the Court's position was, and what the Court expected of them, so that when we went back outside in the courtroom, that they would have a full and complete understanding of what was expected of them, what they could do, and what procedure was going to be followed, so there wouldn't be any surprises, and that is exactly what was done.

It is perfectly obvious that Mr. Manson and the defendants had already made up their minds before they returned to the courtroom this morning, that they were going to resist.

I had no way of knowing that. I was giving them another opportunity to return into the courtroom.

But I cannot overlook a violent confrontation like that; I will not permit them to stand with their arms outstretched, their heads bowed, and their backs turned, and disrupt the proceedings.

That is when I asked the Bailiff to assist them to be scated again; that is when the confrontation occurred.

Do you have some suggestions how to handle that?

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MR. BUGLIOSI: Mr. Stovitz observed if they kept their hands out long enough, sooner or later they would drop to their sides.

MR. FITZGERALD: I simply would like to avoid another confrontation that might result in substantial injury.

THE COURT: So would I. I think every reasonable precaution has been taken, every reasonable admonishment and warning has been given to the defendants. They know exactly what the Court expects of them; they were told exactly what they could or could not do before they went out there; they simply made up their minds in advance that they were going to ignore the Court's order and create a violent physical confrontation, which they did.

You might be giving some serious thought as to what will happen when this trial starts and we have the jury in progress.

It may very well be we will have the same type of thing.

I would hate to start out a trial by excluding the defendants without giving them a chance to be present, at first to see if they can conform their conduct.

It may well be, if I do give them the chance and order them to be present, when we start this thing and the same thing happens again, there may be another confrontation.

MR: BUGLIOSI: I think we are approaching the point,

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I want to say this on the record, where they should be bound. I don't think you can convict any person -- this Court indicated very clearly two days ago, it wasn't going to take pioneer stands on a particular issue. I am not criticising the Court --

THE COURT: Not taking what?

MR. BUGLIOSI: A pioneer stand on a particular issue.

THE COURT: That is a general statement I did not make.

MR. BUGLIOSI: This is what I gleaned from the Court's position.

THE COURT: If you are talking about your motion in regard to Mr. Kanarek, you are 'way off base. That has nothing to do with a pioneer position.

you sought was clearly contrary to the defendant's constitutional and statutory rights. It wasn't a pioneer area; it has been pioneered long ago.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I tend to disagree with the Court.

THE COURT: Let's not re-argue that.

MR. BUGLIOSI: It is relevent to what I am going to say right now.

THE COURT: I hope you are not going to generalize as to what I think I am going to do throughout the trial. I can assure you I don't know myself yet. I will take each problem as it arises.

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MR. BUGLIOSI: I understand it, your Honor. I don't think there is any authority anywhere in the world, and there is not going to be any authority within the foresecable future, for convicting any person of seven counts of murder and having them suffer their death in the gas chamber when they were not present at their trial.

I just don't think this can be done. I think the only alternative the Court would have to preclude a nullity, as Mr. Stovitz has said, is to force these defendants to stay in court, and bind them to the chairs. But they have a right to be present during the trial proceedings.

Now, if they start screaming, start sticking to the point where we cannot accept any testimony from the witness stand, that is a different story.

THE COURT: That is exactly what was happening this morning.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I am not joining in Mr. Fitzgerald's statement that the Court provoked it, because I don't think the Court did provoke it.

THE COURT: That is absurd.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I am not joining in that, but I think it could have been avoided by just permitting them to stand up as long as they were silent, because as long as they are silent, this is not disrupting the dignity of the court.

THE COURT: It certainly is.

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MR. BUGLIOSI: But it is not preventing the proceedings from continuing on.

THE COURT: It is not only disruptive. it is destructive. It is an insult to the dignity and decorum of the Court, and there isn't a court in the world that I know of that would tolerate such behavior.

MR. STOVITZ: I don't agree with Mr. Bugliosi. I feel, your Honor, in view of the chamber conference we had this morning, where your Honor did set out the guidelines, if they would continue to stand, the next thing would have been some type of a tap dance or song they would have sang, if that did not get it.

Their standing with their arms outstretched and their heads lowered, was intended to be disruptive.

THE COURT: Certainly, it was obvious. They were doing it by agreement among themselves, since they were taking exactly the same stance and posture, each of them, and holding their heads and arms exactly the same way.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I think it's a question of degree, your Honor; I'm not questioning it is disruptive, the Allen case says it has to be so disruptive you just cannot continue on.

THE COURT: If disruption comes when the Court attempts to enforce its orders regarding dignity and decorum in the courtroom, and the defendants resist, that is my position, gentlemen; I understand yours, Mr. Bugliosi, I don't agree with it.

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MR. STOVITZ: The only reason Mr. Bugliosi is mentioning it, your Honor, if this is the defendants' course of conduct, and I think your Honor should give them another opportunity when we do start the selection of the jury, rather than to go through with the trial, that we try to test it some way by Mr. Reiner's writ of mandate or some other form of procedure, so that we don't go ahead with a trial of three, four, five, six months —

THE COURT: It may very well be these defendants have made up their minds that they are not going to permit a trial to be held. The more I see of them the more I am beginning to believe that is exactly what they agreed among themselves to do. Certainly their behavior this morning indicates that they were acting in concert, and were intending to, and did, disrupt the proceedings.

MR. REINER: I have some understanding of my client and some understanding of the other defendants, and perhaps my understanding is only because I have had access to them intimately over a long period of time, perhaps more substantially than of other persons.

I think the Court's grasp of these people is superficial. I think the Court is viewing these people as one would view ordinary people, and they are not ordinary. I don't --

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Reiner, it's after 12:00 now. We are going to recess until 1:45.

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People versus Charles Manson, Patricia THE COURT: Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins and Leslie Van Houten.

MR. FITZGERALD: Counsel for Miss Krenwinkel is present. Miss Krenwinkel is not present, your Honor.

MR. REINER: Ira Reiner appearing for Miss Van Houten, your Honor, Miss Van Houten is not present.

THE COURT: Also for Miss Atkins.

MR. REINER: I'm sorry, your Honor, also for Miss Atkins, Miss Atkins also is not present.

THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek is present appearing for Mr. Manson.

Gentlemen, have your clients affirmed to you their desire to return to the courtroom to conform with the Court's orders?

MR. REINER: Your Honor, I had an opportunity to confer with Miss Van Houten within the last few moments.

She said she will come into the courtroom; she will remain silent, but she does wish to stand during the proceedings rather than sit.

THE COURT: What about your client, Mr. Fitzgerald? MR. FITZGERALD: Her position is essentially the same.

THE COURT: I'm not sure I understand what that means.

MR. FITZGERALD: She will return to the courtroom, request permission to remain standing. I think a direct answer to your Honor's question would be she does not intend to comport.

MR. KANAREK: Mr. Manson's position is the same as it has been previously.

THE COURT: I am not aware he has any position. What is it?

MR. KANAREK: His position is, your Honor --

THE COURT: That he does not wish to conform to the Court's orders, is that what you are saying?

MR. KANAREK: Well, --

THE COURT: That is all I am interested in. Does he, or does he not, intend to conform to the Court's orders?

MR. KANAREK: Not as --

THE COURT: Mr. Reiner, what about Miss Atkins?

MR. REINER: Your Honor, I did indicate to the Court on behalf of Miss Atkins as well her statement to me was in sum and substance the statement Miss Van Houten made to me.

At this time, since neither Miss Atkins or Miss Van Houten is present, I would object to these proceedings continuing, and ask that the Court bring the defendants into the courtroom. I would make that on all previously stated grounds.

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THE COURT: Your well,

MR. MANARKE: May I join with Mr. Reiner on that, that is, we have a continuing objection on constitutional grounds previously enuncrated, that Mr. Masson has the right to be present; we ask that the Court allow him to be present.

THE COURT: As I stated on numerous occasions, all the defendants have to do in affirm to the Court, through their counsel, if they are willing to return and conform to the Court's orders and conduct themselves with dignity, and not disrupt the proceedings, they may do so.

Now, the next notions remaining on our pretrial motion, are the motions of Mr. Manson under Penal Code Section 1538.5, and also the notion of Miss Frenwinkel also under 1538.5.

Both are under Code Section 1535.5.

With regard to these motions, gentlemen, on June 1st in this Department, the Court ordered all pretrial motions be moticed for hearing no later than June 10th, for the reason the trial was set on June 10th.

The Court also ordered in the case of search and seizure motions, the moving party file and serve no later than June 5th, a designation of the precise items sought to be suppressed or returned.

Motion papers were to be filed by defendants

Manson and Exempirical on June 5th, pursuant to 1538.5 of the

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Penal Code; they failed to comply with the Court's order in that they failed to designate the precise items sought to be suppressed, or even to allege a search or seizure was made at all.

The courts of this State have held that the moving party has the burden of identifying a tangible or intangible thing sought to be suppressed or returned, and the necessity for such identification arises out of the fact that the People should be given an opportunity to prepare their case in opposition to the motion, to marshall their evidence, and the Court must, of course, rule on the motion.

Since there has been a failure to comply with the Court's order, I am going to order these motions off calendar.

Subdivision H of 1538.5 provides that the Court, in it's discretion, may permit the motions during the trial.

I will exercise my discretion under this subdivision, and I state now that the defendants will be permitted to make the motions during the course of the trial,
and they will be heard if and when the People seek to introduce any evidence the defendants contend was obtained as
the result of any unreasonable search and seizure.

That leaves remaining for pre-trial consideration the motion of Miss Atkins for a trial continuance.

Do you wish to take that up at this time,

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Mr. Reiner?

MR. KANAREK: May I be heard in connection with your Honor's last ruling?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, in connection with the points and authorities, and our motion we have -- you see, Mr. Caballero and Mr. Bugliosi conspired to have Miss Atkins make certain statements.

Now, you cannot make allegations in a pleading.

You cannot make an allegation that you don't know, I mean as a lawyer I cannot do that. That is why Mr. Bugliosi is here to give testimony. It is our belief -- May I have the Penal Code just a moment, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

(Pause.)

MR. KANAREK: 1538.5, your Honor, under sub-Section 2, it refers to the search or seizure with a warrant, was unreasonable because, first, "the warrant is insufficient on its face;"then, going down to sub-Section 5, "there was any other violation of Federal or State constitutional standards."

Now, in this case, your Honor, there is a warrant set out after the Grand Jury purportedly indicted Miss Atkins, there was a warrant issued purportedly pursuant to that indictment. Mr. Manson was purportedly arrested pursuant to that warrant.

It is our position, your Honor, and we believe that as a result of the prosecution conspiring with Mr. Caballero to allow a \$90,000 fee to issue for this as a result of the purported exclusive story of Miss Atkins, that the result of a purported Grand Jury indictment predicated upon possible perjury where the District Attorney's office suborned the perjury.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, I want to interrupt at this time.

If Mr. Kanarek is going to have diarrhea of the mouth, I think he should make an offer of proof back in chambers.

This man is totally irresponsible. I am not going to sit here and listen to this hogwash.

I urgently request the Court we go back in chambers. God knows what this man is going to say next.

He is totally irresponsible.

THE COURT: All right. Confine yourself to the argument, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: Mr. Bugliosi has stated, he says that he has "lost" --

MR. BUGLIOSI: I have those papers for you, Mr. Kanarek. Do you want to see them now?

THE COURT: No colloquy between counsel, gentlemen.

MR. KANAREK: Counsel has the original notes, your Honor?

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THE COURT: I don't know what you're talking about,
Mr. Kanarek. I assume you want to say something with
regard to the order I just made.

MR. KANAREK: Yes.

THE COURT: Direct yourself to that.

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, it is our position under Section 1538.5, sub-Section A, parenthesis 2, then small Roman numeral v, that as a result of Mr. Bugliosi's conspiring with Mr. Caballero, there was to be a most unusual type of interview outside of the County Jail, in Mr. Caballero's office, as the result of an order by Judge Keene, allowing Mics Atkins to leave the County Jail and go to the office of Mr. Caballero.

It is our position that as a result of State action there came about a Grand Jury indictment, predicated upon these procedures which we allege are improper, and which resulted in a rehearsed, a rehearsed type of approach to this witness, such that the District Attorney now says he is not even going to use the statements at the Grand Jury in connection with this case.

If he is not going to use the statements in connection with the Grand Jury, they must be tainted in some way; he must recognize they are tainted in some way.

One of the taints is if the District Attorney has suborn perjury, then of course what happened cannot be used, can not be the basis for a valid Grand Jury indictment:

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And even after a 995, there is case law that there is a possible release on habeas corpus, even though a 995 has been denied.

I mean, there are cases that support that position. What I am saying is that the District Attorney, that we have every reason to believe -- I know Mr. Bugliosi is now saying he has the 30 pages of notes that he previously stated he did not have.

I gather this is the purport of what he told the Court.

But our position is that Miss Atkins, her physical body has been seized as the result of a warrant predicated upon testimony before the Grand Jury, which is tainted, we believe, with perjury, with this rehearseal that we have alluded 40

It is a most unusual situation. I don't want'to repeat it, belabor it, so therefore we wish to take evidence to find out whether the District Attorney of Los Angeles County caused this rehearsal to take place.

Miss Atkins has now repented. She has indicated that what she stated before the Grand Jury is not true.

Somebody is not telling the truth, or else this was put into the middle of this thing by the force of the District Attorney of Los Angeles County, and so we are entitled to get evidence to determine whether or not these

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statements have been tainted with the kind of taint that even allows a coran nobis type of relief after judgment, and the time to get at it is now.

Now, may I inquire through the Court, as to Mr. Bugliosi saying he has found those 30 pages of notes that he previously told us he lost?

THE COURT: I am not really concerned with that. That came under the discovery motion.

It was my understanding he was going to file a declaration no later than Monday, or produce the notes.

So we will take that up on Monday as part of the discovery proceedings, if necessary.

MR. KANAREK: Very well.

THE COURT: You have stated your position. Now, I made my order with respect to the 1538.5 motion.

There remains the motion of Niss Atkins for a trial continuance. Do you wish to direct yourself to that, Mr. Reiner?

MR. REINER: Yes, your Honor, although I indicated I would represent Miss Atkins in the absence of Mr. Shinn, however, since this is a pending motion, there perhaps would be a conflict of interest between the interests of Miss Van Houten and Miss Atkins.

On behalf of Miss Van Houten I am prepared to argue against a continuance, so I cannot represent Miss Atkins in a motion for continuance.

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I will ask that go over until Mr. Shinn returns from Tokyo.

THE COURT: Since the Court did not excuse Mr. Shinn and received no factual information or evidence which would excuse his presence here, I am going to take the motion off calendar.

As I indicated to counsel earlier, I do want to have a pre-trial conference with counsel before the actual trial commences, and I will set that for 10:00 o'clock on Monday morning. That will give Mr. Shinn an opportunity to be present too.

When the present trial conference has been concluded, I assume all counsel will be ready to commence the trial.

MR. FITZGERALD: I have a matter I would like to bring to the attention of the Court, that I mentioned brief-ly to the Court in chambers yesterday, when Mr. Bugliosi and I had a colloquy in front of the Court.

I believe that we can demonstrate to the Court that there has been a massive deprivation of due process.

In connection therewith I have an exhibit I would like to have marked, and I would like your Honor to read and consider it.

This is a joint motion on behalf of all four of the defendants, and if your Honor feels it necessary to conduct an evidentiary hearing, or if your Honor feels at that

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25· 26 point that it is necessary or desirable for counsel to engage in argument, we will at that time.

THE COURT: Is this something that is merely repeti-

MR. FITZGERALD: No, it is not. It is an entirely new and different violation.

THE COURT: Well, how new, how long have you known about it?

MR. FITZGERALD: The day before yesterday, and I brought it to the Court's -- today is Friday -- I learned of it Wednesday night at 11:45 P. M.

I brought it to the attention of my colleagues yesterday morning, and to the attention of counsel for the prosecution yesterday noon, I believe, and we brought it to the attention of the Court yesterday afternoon in chambers.

This was the matter that Mr. Bugliosi requested be conducted outside the public.

I do not join in that consideration.

What I have, your Honor --

THE COURT: Are you making a motion of some kind, Mr. Fitzgerald?

MR. FITZGERALD: Yes.

THE COURT: What is it?

MR. FITZGERALD: The motion is to dismiss as the result of a denial of due process of law under the

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Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and by way of offer of proof I would like marked --

THE COURT: Rather than do it this way, I will ask you to put your motion in writing, support it with what-ever motion papers you like, and a written offer of proof accompanying your motion, setting forth what you expect to prove, and by whom you expect to prove it, and I will take it up on Monday.

MR. FITZGERALD: That is agreeable. I think, however, it will be helpful inasmuch as the material I am going to offer the Court also involves a 36-Count direct violation of the Court s order that the Court might be better prepared if the Court had the information before it on Monday.

But I will present to the Court a notice of declaration.

THE COURT: We will adjourn at this time.

Do you have anything else, Mr. Kanarek?

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor.

Would your Honor clarify for me your Honor's ruling in connection with that 1538.5?

Did your Honor indicate that we did not indicate what we wanted suppressed, is that what your Honor is saying?

THE COURT: That is exactly what I was saying.

MR. KANAREK: I refer your Honor to page two, your

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Honor, wherein we point out, paragraph 3, the warrant of arrest for the defendant Manson was thus based on illegally obtained and perjured testimony, and the seizure of the person of Charles Manson was illegal. The person of Charles Manson must, therefore, be suppressed from evidence.

Also our position that the 1538.5 applies to all items of evidence, and what item of evidence is greater than his own person, his physical appearance, his own physical body?

If your Honor makes the proper order pursuant to that sub-Section, that Roman Numberal v, his physical body be suppressed, then in fact that piece of evidence which is his physical body is not before the Court conceptually to be used in evidence;

He cannot be identified by witnesses; he cannot, the same way as a bindle of heroin or any other illegally obtained evidence, he cannot be used. The due process clause of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment-of the Constitution protect Mr. Manson against unlawful seizures.

Mr. Manson is before this Court as the result of perjured and rehearsed testimony, so we believe, your Honor, that we have a right to proceed because of the fact that he is being used as evidence. There is no question; he's been identified and all that.

THE COURT: 10:00 o'clock Monday, Gentlemen, for our 1. pretrial conference. (Whereupon, proceedings in the above-entitled matter were adjourned to Monday, June 15, 1970, at 10:00 A.M., in this same Department.) 5. --000--8. 0 5

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES HON. WILLIAM B. KEENE, JUDGE DEPARTMENT NO. 100 & 107 HON. GEORGE M. DELL, JUDGE DEPARTMENT NO. 100 5 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff, NO. A 253,156 VS. CHARLES MANSON. PATRICIA KRENWINKEL 9 SUSAN DENISE ATKINS, LESLIE VAN HOUTEN. 10 Defendants. 11 12 13 STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 14 I, Lois R, Johnson, Official Reporter of the 15 Superior Court of the State of California, for the County 16 of los Angeles, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages, 17 1 through 24, 33A through 33H, 34 through 157, 159 through 18 198, 484 through 500, 614 through 616, 617 through 630, 19 647 through 654, all inclusive, comprise a full, true and 20 correct transcript of the proceedings had on December 10, 11, 21 22 16, 19, 22, 24, 1969; January 6, 14, 19, March 16, April 3. 10 and 17, 1970, in the matter of the above-entitled cause. 23 Dated this 28th day of May, 1971. 24

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/s/ Lois R. Johnson Official Reporter

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Ì. FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES HON. WILLIAM B. KEENE, JUDGE DEPARTMENT NO. 100 & 107 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. 5 Plaintiff. No. A 253, 156 VS. CHARLES MANSON, 8 PATRICIA KRENWINKEL. SUSAN DENISE ATKINS. .8. LESLIE VAN HOUTEN, 10 Defendants. 11 12 STATE OF CALIFORNIA 13 88 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES **14** I. Anne F. Smith, Official Reporter of the 15 Superior Court of the State of California, for the County 16 of Los Angeles, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages, 17 25 through 33, 158, 304 through 308, 334 through 358, 417 18 through 442, 445 through 483, 501 through 529, 612 through .19 613, all inclusive, comprise a full, true and correct 20 transcript of the proceedings had on December 17, 1969. :21. January 19, February 3, 9, March 6, 11, 19, 30, 1970, in 22 the matter of the above-entitled cause. 23 Dated this 28th day of May, 1971. 24 25

/s/ Anne F. Smith
Official Reporter

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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 2 DEPARTMENT NO. 100 HON. GEORGE M. DELL, JUDGE 5 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 6 Plaintiff. 7 CHARLES MANSON, PATRICIA KRENWINKEL. No. A-253156 8 SUSAN ATKINS, and 9 LESLIE VAN HOUTEN, Defendants. 10 11 STATE OF CALIFORNIA 12 SS. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES) 13. I, JAMES E. VAUGHN, Official Reporter of the Superior 14 Court of the State of California, for the County of 15 Los Angeles, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages 16 numbered 230 through 250 , inclusive, comprise a full, true 17 and correct transcript of the proceedings had in the matter 18 of the above-entitled cause on January 22, 1970. 19 Dated this 3rd day of May, 1971. 20 21 /s/ James E. Vaughn 22 Official Reporter 23 24 25 26

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 2 ---000----3 DEPARTMENT NO. 100 HON. GEORGE M. DELL, JUDGE 4 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. Plaintiff. No. A-253156 .8 CHARLES MANSON, 9 PATRICIA KRENWINKEL. SUSAN ATKINS. 10 LESLIE VAN HOUTEN, Defendants. 11 12 13. STATE OF CALIFORNIA SS. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 14 15 16 I, MERLE SANDERS, an Official Reporter of the Superior 17 Court of the State of California, for the County of Los 18 Angeles, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages or 19 to303 , inclusive, comprise a full, true, and correct 20 transcript of the proceedings had in the above-entitled 21 cause on January 28, 1970. 22 Dated this 28th day of April, 1971. 23 24

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/s/ Merle Sanders.

Official Reporter

13-MK Certif.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT NO. 100 3

HON. GEORGE M. DELL, JUDGE

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THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff.

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vs.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

NO. A 253 156

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SUSAN ATKINS, and LESLIE VAN HOUTEN, Defendants.

CHARLES MANSON, PATRICIA KRENWINKEL,

88.

I, MARCIA KING, an Official Reporter Pro Tempore of the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of Los Angeles, hereby certify that the foregoing 12 pages, to 333 , inclusive, comprise a full, true and correct 322 transcript of the proceedings had in the matter of the above-entitled cause on Friday, February 6, 1970, including all rulings of the Court and matters to which the same relate.

Dated this 30th day of April, 1971.

MARCIA KING Official Reporter Pro Tempore

1	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
3	DEPARTMENT NO. 100 HON. GEORGE M. DELL, JUDGE
4	
5	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
6	Plaintiff,
7	vs.) No. A-253156
9	CHARLES MANSON, PATRICIA KRENWINKEL, SUSAN ATKINS, LESLIE VAN HOUTEN, AND LINDA KASABIAN,
10	Defendants.
11	
12 ⁻	STATE OF CALIFORNIA,)
13	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.
14	I, BOB L. SPEAK, Official Reporter of the Superior
15	Court of the State of California, for the Courty of Los
16	Angeles, do hereby certify that the foregoing page 555 to 669
17	comprise a full, true and correct transcript of the
18	proceedings had on April 17, 1970, in the matter of the
19	above-entitled cause.
20	Dated this day of, 1971.
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22	REPORTER
23	. VET-ANTEN
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THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE O	F CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS AS	NGELES
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DEPARTMENT NO. 106 HON. MALC	OLM M. LUCAS, JUDGE
5.	
6 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	,
Plaintiff,	}
8 Vs.) No. A-253,156
9 CHARLES MANSON.	
PATRICTA KRENWINKEL, SUSAN DENISE ATKINS,	
LESLIE VAN HOUTEN,	
Defendant	8.
13	
14	
STATE OF CALIFORNIA)	
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES	
I, JULIUS KOLINER, C. S. R., &	n Official Reporter
of the Superior Court of the State of	California, for the
County of Tos Angeles, do hereby cert	, , , ,
nages	
Pages 199 to and including	229,
Pages 309 to and including	321,
Pages 359 to and including	381,
Pages 443 to and including	444,
Pages 530 to and including	611,
Pages 631 to and including	
26 Pages	-
755 to and including	794
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comprise a full, true and correct transcript of the shorthand notes taken down by me, to the best of my skill and ability, of the proceedings had and testimony given in the above-entitled cause.

Dated this 13th day of May, 1971,

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Julius Koliner, C. S. R. Official Reporter

ı	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
3	DEPARTMENT NO. 104 HON. CHARLES H. OLDER, JUDGE
4	
5	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
6	Plaintiff,
7	vs.) NO. A-253156
8	CHARLES MANSON, PATRICIA KRENWINKEL, SUSAN ATKINS, and LESLIE VAN HOUTEN,
9	Defendants.
10	
11	
12	STATE OF CALIFORNIA) ss.
. 13	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)
14	I, JOSEPH B, HOLLOMBE, Official Reporter of the
15	Superior Court of the State of California, for the County
16	of Los Angeles, do hareby certify that the foregoing pages
17	670 through 755 and pages 795 through 1063 comprise a
18	full, true and correct transcript of the proceedings had
19	and the testimony taken in the matter of the above-entitled
20	cause in pretrial hearings.
21	Dated this 14th day of June, 1971.
22	
23	
24:	Marine programmer and a second of the second of the
,2 5	JOSEPH B. HOLLOMBE /s Official Reporter

1	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2	FOR THE COUATY OF LOS AUGELES
3	DEPARTMENT NO. 104 HOM. CHARLES H. OLDER, JUDGE
4	
5	THE PLOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,)
6.	Plaintiff,)
7	vs.) NO. A-253 156
8	CHARLES MANSON, PATRICIA KREDWINKLA, SUSAN ATKINS, AND LESLIE VAN HOUTEN,
10	Defendants
11	
12	STATE OF CALIFORNIA (
13	COUNTY OF LOS ANGLIES)
14	I, CHARLES H. OLDER, Judge of the Superior Court of
1 5	the State of California, for the County of Los Angeles, and
16	being the Judge who presided at the trial in the above-
17	entitled criminal cause, do hereby certify that no
18	objection has been wade to the within transcript by either
1 9·	the defendants or tagir attorneys, or the District Attorney,
. 20 -	within the time allowed by law, and the same is now, therefor
21	approved by no this Gay of, 1971.
2 2	
23	
24	
25	Judge

. 1	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
3:	DEPARTMENT NO. 104 HON. CHARLES H. OLDER, JUDGE
4	
5.	THE PLOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
6	Plaintiff,
7	NO. A-253, 156
8	CHARLES MANSON, PATRICIA RELAWINKEL, SUSAN ATKINS, and LESLIE VAN HOUTEN,
·9·	Defendants.
10	DateWaires.
, 11 :	
12	STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
13	COURTY OF LOS ANGELES
14	I, CHARLES II. OLDER, Judge of the Superior Court of
1 5	the State of California, for the County of Los Angeles, and
16	being the Judgo who presided at the trial in the above-
17	entitled criminal cause, so hereby certify that the
18	objections hade to the transcript herein have been heard
. 19	and determined, and the same is now corrected in accordance
20	with such determination, within the time allowed by law;
21	and the same is new, therefore, approved by me this
22	day of 1971.
23	
24	
25	Judge
_, _	

1	Due service of the within and receipt
2	of a copy hereby admitted this
3.	day of, 1971.
4.	JOSEPH P. BUSCH, JR., DISTRICT ATTORNEY
.5.	B7
6	Deputy
7	Due service of the within and receipt
8	of a copy hereby admitted this
9	day of, 1971.
10	EVELLE J. YOUNGER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
41	BY
12	pepacy
13	Due service of the within and receipt
14	of a copy hereby admitted this
15	day of
16	
17	Charles Manson, In Propria Persona
18	Due service of the within and receipt
19	of a copy hereby admitted this
20	day of , 1971.
21	
22	Patricla krenwinkel, in Propria Persona
23	
24	Due service of the within and receipt
:25	of a copy hereby admitted this
26	day of, 1971.

1	Due service of the within and receipt
2	of a copy hereby admitted this
3	day of, 1971,
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6	Attorney for Defendant Susan Atkins
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