DISTRICT ATTORNEY

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff-Respondent.

vs.

CHARLES MANSON, SUSAN ATKINS, LESLIE VAN HOUTEN AND PATRICIA KRENWINKEL,

Defendants-Appellants.

NO. 3011

APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY

HON. CHARLES H. OLDER, JUDGE PRESIDING

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL

APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff-Respondent:

THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL

600 State Building

Los Angeles, California 90012

For Defendant-Appellant Charles Manson:

IRVING KANAREK, Esq.

For Defendant-Appellant Susan Atkins: DAYE SHINN, Esq.

For Defendant-Appellant Leslie Van Houten: IESLIE VAN HOUTEN In Propria Persona

For Defendant-Appellant Patricia Krenwinkel:

PATRICIA KRENWINKEL In Propria Persona

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MR. REINER: Then I may not individually ask questions that I previously asked other jurors?

If that is the Court's position, then I will go on, but I am at a loss to understand why the Court refuses to be specific.

THE COURT: Mr. Reiner, I am going to ask you to sit down if you are not willing to continue with your voir dire.

MR. REINER: I am trying to find out if the Court is instructing me to discontinue asking questions --

THE COURT: No. I am instructing you to proceed.

MR. REINER: Thank you, your Honor.

Q Mr. Cato, this case, of course, involves certain killings which are especially grotesque.

Would you permit the very grotesqueness of these crimes to influence your judgment to the extent that you would allow your emotions to overwhelm your judgment?

A No, sir.

Q So, notwithstanding/these particular crimes are especially grotesque, will you, nonetheless, take great care during the course of the deliberations and during the course of the trial as you receive evidence to try to determine guilt with respect to the defendants and not simply to be so influenced by the grotesqueness of the evidence that you would convict all the defendants, if you were to believe that even one of them were guilty?

A Would you repeat that question?

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ପ୍	A11	right.	That	was	an	overly-long	question.
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- A That statement.
- Q If you were to -- strike that.

Because of the very grotesqueness of this case,
Mr. Cato, would you allow yourself to convict all defendants
in the event that the evidence were to be sufficient to
establish the guilt of only one or more of the defendants?

A No. sir.

Q Now, perhaps you have observed Miss Van Houten's conduct in this trial so far, and perhaps you have read about it before you came to court, but irrespective of what your view is of her conduct or your interpretation of her conduct, if it should appear to you that Miss Van Houten wishes to be convicted in the event that any defendant in this case is to be convicted, will you, nonetheless, base your judgment solely on the evidence and not upon her wishes in the matter?

A Yes, sir.

Q And do you feel that you can do all of this in good conscience, Mr. Gato?

A Yes.

Q And you say all of this without any reservation whatsoever?

A No. sir.

MR. REINER: Thank you very much.

I have no further questions.

1	THE COURT: Mr. Shinn?
Ż	MR. SHINN: Yes, your Honor.
3.	
4	VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MR. BAER
5	BY MR. SHINN:
6	Q Mr. Baer, I don't know whether or not other
7.	counsel has asked you this question:
· 8	Do you have any relatives or close friends
9	with any law enforcement agency, the Police Department,
10	the District Attorney's office, the Sheriff's office?
11	A No, sir.
12	Q I think counsel has stated that Linda Kasabian
13	may be a witness for the prosecution.
14	Did you understand that?
15	A Yes.
16	Q Linda Kasabian?
17	A Yes, sir.
18	Q If you find, Mr. Baer, that as a result of her
19	taking LSD
20	MR. BUGLIOSI: Oh, your Honor, wait a while.
21	I will object to that question.
22	I don't know what counsel is trying to do, your
28	Honor.
24	This is totally improper voir dire
25	MR. SHINN: I said "if".
26	MR. BUGLIOSI: asking the juror to prejudge the

evidence. The objection is sustained. THE COURT: 3. MR. BUGLIOSI: Besides, it is an inflammatory remark. 4. MR. SHINN: Your Honor, may we approach the bench, your Honor? THE COURT: Very well. 8: ; **10** . 16

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8e-1	ì	(Whereupon all counsel approach the bench
	2	and the following proceedings occurred at the bench
	3	outside of the hearing of the prospective jurors:)
	4	MR. SHINN: Your Honor, that last remark of counsel,
	5	I think, is uncalled for in front of the jury.
	6	THE COURT: What did he say?
	7	MR. SHINN: That remark that he made.
	8	THE COURT: I didn't hear it.
	9,	MR. KANAREK: He referred to it as an inflammatory
	10	remark.
	11	THE COURT: What are the remarks? I didn't hear
	12 ° .	them.
	13	MR. KANAREK: Mr. Bugliosi's remark, your Honor.
	14	THE COURT: Let's go back.
	15	Did you take down the remarks of Mr. Bugliosi
	16	THE REPORTER: Yes, sir.
	17	(Whereupon the record was read by the
	18	reporter.)
	19	THE COURT: In the first place, Mr. Bugliosi, just
	20	make your objection. If you want to argue, come to the
	21	bench, just as other counsel have requested.
	22.	There is no necessity for making a gratuitous
	23 ,	statement in front of the jury.
	24	You don't want Mr. Shinn to do that.
	25	MR. BUGLIOSI: He already did it.
	26	THE COURT: That doesn't give you a license to make

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that kind of a remark.

MR. BUGLIOSI: It was inflammatory. It was almost in the nature of invited error for him to get up in front of the jury and tell them that.

THE COURT: Make your objection, Mr. Bugliosi, and then you can argue it.

MR. SHINN: There is a question as to whether or not she did take LSD.

In fact, your Honor, we have a declaration-THE COURT: It is improper. I have ruled on it.

Let's proceed.

Mr. Reiner, you went back and did exactly what I told you not to, and if you do it again I will have to do something about it.

MR. REINER: I am at a loss to understand your Honor.

THE COURT: You know how I feel. There is no point in your repeating questions to juror after juror after juror when those questions could be put to them all at once and they can each be asked individually for their response.

Do you understand what that means?

MR. REINER: My response to that was:

Does your Honor mean to say that I may put to the jurors a general question as to whether or not they have heard and understood and would answer the question the

same as other jurors have, and only --1 THE COURT: No, put the question --2 MR. REINER: If I may finish? 3 And only in the event that they answer 4 negatively may I then inquire further? 5 Your Honor refuses to say what your Honor 6 means. 7 It sounds like that is what you mean, 8 but I am at a loss as to why your Honor is so disinclined to be specific. 10 THE COURT: How can I be more specific? 11 You insist on being obtuse on this particular 12 point. 13 You can ask your question and then you can 14 ask each individual juror his response to it. 15 What is more specific than that? 16 Just don't keep repeating the question to 17 every juror. You don't need to do that. 18 How can I ask each individual juror 19 MR. REINER: his response without asking the question other than asking, 20 "Have you heard all prior questions?" 21 22 THE COURT: They all hear it at the same time. 23 I am talking about after each question. MR. REINER: I may ask the question once and then 24 25 turn to seven people at a time and ask them their answers, 26 and then go to the second question, and then turn to them

again and ask them one at a time, all seven? THE COURT: You can elicit answers from one of them and then ask them whether any of the others have any different answers. It is very simple. Let's proceed. 8f fls

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MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I ask the Court to admonish the jury that Mr. Bugliosi's comments should not be considered for any purpose?

THE COURT: His comments have no effect whatsoever.

Let's proceed.

(Whereupon, all counsel return to their respective places at the counsel table and the following proceedings occurred in open court within the presence and hearing of the prospective jurors:)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I will admonish you to disregard the remarks of counsel, that is, any colloquy between counsel, or between the Court and counsel, and confine yourselves solely to the questions that are being asked of you and the answers being given.

Let's proceed, gentlemen.

MR. SHINN: Thank you, your Honor.

Q If a psychologist testifies that a certain witness is insane, will you then disregard the witness testimony?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Oh, your Honor, I object again. This is asking the juror to prejudge the evidence. I make the same objection.

THE COURT: The objection is sustained.

MR. SHINN: I have no further questions.

THE COURT: Very well.

Mr. Kanarek?

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25 26 MR. KANAREK: No questions.

THE COURT: Mr. Bugliosi?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Thank you.

Mrs. Evans, Mrs. Lee, Mr. Zamora, Mr. Baer, Mr. Stringer and Mr. Cato.

In the interest of time, ladies and gentlemen, I am going to ask you, all of you, my questions collectively with the exception of one that I would like to get an individual response to, but every other question I will ask of you collectively.

If my question happens to pertain to you individually, I would be seech you to raise your hand so that I will be able to address my attention to you alone.

I would make a further observation that even though a particular question of mine lends itself very easily to a yes or no answer. I would urge you to qualify or explain the particular yes or no answer if you so desire.

I understand that none of you -- and I am referring to the six jurors whom I have just mentioned -- none of you are opposed to the death penalty; is that correct?

Now, the individual question which I will ask of you, and I will try to make it as expeditious as possible we will start with you, Mrs. Evans.

Mrs. Evans, let me mentally transport you, if

you will, to three or four months from now, back into the 1 jury room. 2 Let's assume hypothetically that these 3 defendants have been found guilty of first-degree murder. 4 It is going to be your job, along with your 5 co-jurors, to decide whether they should receive life 6 imprisonment or death. That is certainly an awesome. 7 staggering responsibility for any juror. 8 If you felt, Mrs. Evans, after reviewing all of 9 the evidence and considering all of the circumstances, 10 that you thought this was a proper case for the imposition 11 of the death penalty, would you personally have the 12 courage to come back into this courtroom with a verdict of 13 death? 14 I object, your Honor, on the grounds of MR. KANAREK: 15 improper voir dire examination. 16 MR. SHINN: Join. 17 THE COURT: Overruled. 18 MRS. EVANS: Yes, I would. 19 20 MR. BUGLIOSI: Mrs. Lee, you heard the question? MRS. LEE: Yes. 21 MR. BUGLIOSI: What is your answer to that? 22 MRS. LEE: The same. 23 24 Your Honor, may my objection stand as MR. KANAREK: 25 to each juror?

THE COURT: Very well.

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1	MR. SHINN: Join, your Honor.
2 ;	MR. REINER: Join.
3	MR. FITZGERAID: Join.
4	MR. BUGLIOSI: Your answer is that you could?
,5	MRS. IEE: Yes.
6	MR. BUGLIOSI: There is no doubt in your mind about
7	that?
8	MRS. LEE: No.
9	MR. BUGLIOSI: Mr. Zamora will you please pass the
, 1 0	microphone back to him, ma'am.
11	MR. ZAMORA: Yes.
12	MR. BUGLIOSI: All right. Thank you, sir.
13	Will you pass the microphone to Mr. Baer.
14	MR. BAER: Yes, sir.
15	MR. BUGLIOSI: All right.
16	This is going more quickly than even I thought
17	it would go.
18	Mr. Stringer?
19	MR. STRINGER: Yes, sir.
.20	MR. BUGLIOSI: And Mr. Cato?
21	MR. CATO: Yes, sir.
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MR. BUGLIOSI: Could all of you -- again referring just to you six -- vote for the death penalty for a female defendant?

MR. KANAREK: Improper voir dire, your Honor.

MR. SHINN: Objection, your Honor.

MR. KANAREK: Object on the grounds that we have already stated, your Honor.

MR. REINER: Join.

MR. FITZGERALD: Join.

THE COURT: Overruled.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The answer is yes from all of you folks?

MRS. EVANS: Yes.

MRS. LEE: Yes.

MR.ZAMORA: Yes.

MR. BAER: Yes.

MR. STRINGER: Yes.

MR. CATO: Yes.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Are any of you of such a frame of mind that if a particular defendant in this case did not personally kill someone you would never vote for a verdict of death as to him? Are any of you of that frame of mind?

MR. KANAREK: I object on the ground that it is improper voir dire, your Honor.

May I approach the bench?

THE COURT: No. We have discussed this before.

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MR. SHINN: Yes, your Honor. I object on the same ground as we discussed in chambers.

THE COURT: All right. Overruled.

MR. REINER: Join.

MR. FITZGERALD: Join.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Perhaps I should ask this again.

If I were in your shoes I would have forgotten what

my question was.

MR. KANAREK: I will object to that, your Honor, counsel's gratuitous statement.

THE COURT: Overruled. Let's proceed.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Are any of you of such a frame of mind that if a particular defendant in this case did not himself personally kill anyone that you would never, under any circumstances, return a verdict of death as to him?

Are you of that frame of mind?

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may the objection stand as to that question?

MR. FITZGERALD: Join.

MR. REINER: Join.

MR. SHINN: I join.

THE COURT: Overruled.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Do you folks recall the question? And your enswer is what, that you are not of that frame of mind?

Do any of you not understand my question? 1 Do you all understand the rule of 2 conspiracy which makes a conspirator equally guilty 3 of the crimes committed by his co-conspirators even 4 though he did not himself commit the crime and even 5 though he was not even present at the scene of the crime? 6 Do you all understand that? 7 MR. FITZGERALD: Objection as an improper statement 8 of the law. 9 MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor. It is an improper 10 11 question. MR. SHINN: I object. 12 13 MR. REINER: Join. 14 THE COURT: Hold your objections until the question 15 has been completed. 16 The objection will be sustained. 17 MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, I believe this is a 18 question that I have been asking all the other jurors. 19 I will sustain the objection. THE COURT: 20 MR. BUGLIOSI: Maybe I left out a crucial comma 21 or word, so I will restate it. 22 MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I will object to counsel's sarcastic comments. 24 It is not sarcastic. MR. BUGLIOSI: 25 THE COURT: Let's proceed. 26 MR. BUGLIOSI: Do all of you understand the

rule of conspiracy which makes a conspirator equally guilty of the crimes committed by the co-conspirators?

MR. KANAREK: Objection, your Honor, improper

MR. SHINN: Join.

voir dire.

MR. FITZGEALD: I join in that objection.

MR. REINER: Join.

THE COURT: There is no way that they can understand that type of question unless they have been trained in the law.

You can ask, as other counsel have and as you have, whether they will follow whatever instructions are given by the Court.

You are now getting into an improper area.

The objection is sustained.

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MR. BUGLIOSI: May I approach the bench?

THE COURT: We have gone over this time and time again.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, this question, I think the record will reflect, has been asked for three weeks.

THE COURT: Let's proceed, Mr. Bugliosi; I have ruled on it.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I urgently ask the Court to permit a discussion on this issue at the bench, your Honor.

THE COURT: It will not be necessary. It has been discussed and now I have ruled on it.

Let's proceed.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Very well.

At the end of this case, ladies and gentlemen, or at least at the end of the evidence, but before you retire to the jury room, his Honor is going to instruct you on the law applicable to this case.

Among other things, his Honor will instruct you to the effect that a conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime followed by an overt act to carry out the object of the conspiracy.

His Honor will further instruct you that --

MR. SHINN: Objection on the same ground, your Honor.

MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor.

MR. BUGLIOSI: These are the exact questions that I asked --

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THE COURT: The questions are objectionable in the form in which you are putting them, Mr. Bugliosi. I may or may not instruct on quite a number of points.

MR. KANAREK: That's right.

THE COURT: What we are trying to elicit from the prospective jurors is whether or not they will follow the instructions regardless of what they are.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Let me try to rephrase this.

If, at the end of this case and before you retire to the jury room to deliberate, his Honor instructs you that a conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime followed by an overt act to carry out the object of the conspiracy, will you follow the Court's instruction?

MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, on the grounds that it is improper voir dire examination and an attempt to preinstruct the jury.

MR. SHINN: Join.

THE COURT: Overruled.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Will you follow the Court's instruction on that?

MRS. EVANS: Yes.

MRS. LEE: Yes.

MR. ZAMORA: Yes.

MR. BAER: Yes.

MR. STRINGER: Yes.

MR. CATO: Yes. 1 MR. BUGLIOSI: If his Honor further instructs you to 2 the effect that once a conspiracy is formed each conspirator 3 is equally guilty of the crimes committed by his co-4 conspirators if these crimes were committed to further the 5 act of the conspiracy, will you follow the Court's 6 instruction on that? 7 8 MR. KANAREK: Objection, your Honor, --MR. SHINN: Objection. 9 10 MR. KANAREK: -- improper voir dire. An attempt to 11 preinstruct the jurors. 12 THE COURT: Overruled. 13 MR. BUGLIOSI: Will you all follow the Court's 14. instructions on that? 15 MRS. EVANS: Yes. 16 MRS. LEE: Yes. 17 MR. ZAMORA: Yes. 18 MR. BAER: 19 MR. STRINGER: Yes. 20 MR. CATO: Yes. 21 MR. BUGLIOSI: Do you all understand that particular 22 rule as I have indicated the Court will instruct you on? 23 Do you all understand it? 24 MR. KANAREK: Objection, your Honor. There is no 25 foundation for this. 26 THE COURT: That objection is sustained.

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MR. BUGLIOSI: Let me give you an example of what I am trying to articulate here.

Let's assume, ladies and gentlemen, as I assumed with other jurors in the previous panels, let's assume hypothetically that parties A, B, and C conspire to commit a robbery. However, only parties B and C committed the robbery. A, being a co-conspirator, is equally guilty of that robbery even though he, himself, did not commit the robbery and even though he was not even present at the scene of the robbery.

Do you all understand that?

MR. KANAREK: That is objected to as improper voir dire examination, your Honor.

MR. SHINN: I object.

THE COURT: It is improper, Mr. Bugliosi. The objection is sustained.

You are doing again what we discussed before.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Very well.

If the Court instructs you that conspirators are equally responsible for and equally guilty of the crimes committed by their co-conspirators even though they did not themselves commit the crime, will you promise to unhesitatingly follow the Court's instruction on that if you find it applicable to the facts in this case?

MR. KANAREK: Objection. Improper voir dire examination, your Honor.

MR. SHINN: Objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Do you wish to have that read back, ladies and gentlemen?

MRS. LEE: Yes.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I believe you do, Mrs. Lee?

MRS. LEE: Yes.

MR.BUGLIOSI: Would the Court have the reporter read that question back?

THE COURT: Yes. Read the last question.

(Whereupon the question was read by the

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reporter.)

MR. BUGLIOSI: Did you all understand my question?

MRS. EVANS: Yes.

MRS. LEE: Yes.

MR. ZAMORA: Yes.

MR. BAER: Yes.

MR. STRINGER: Yes.

MR. CATO: Yes.

THE COURT: The purpose of these questions, ladies and gentlemen, is not to instruct you on the law. The Court will do that at the proper time.

These questions are being asked only to determine your state of mind now as to whether or not you will follow the Court's instructions, whatever they might be, and to point out to you, in general terms only for illustration, areas of the law in which instructions may be given, because some of these concepts may be new to you, or conceivably you might have some ideas or opinions about these now.

That is the sole purpose of these questions, ladies and gentlemen. These are not to be taken as definitive statements of the law.

The law will be given to you in the Court's instructions, as I have indicated, at the proper time.

Do you all understand that?

MRS. LEE: Yes.

MRS. EVANS: Yes. 1 MR. ZAMORA: Yes. 2 MR. BAER: Yes. 3 MR. STRINGER: Yes. 4 MR. CATO: Yes. 5 THE COURT: All right. 6 You may proceed. 7 MR. BUGLIOSI: I would like to reask that question, 8 your Honor. There has been too much of a hiatus, I think. 9 THE COURT: All right. 10 MR. BUGLIOSI: If the Court instructs you, again, 11 in this case, ladies and gentlemen, that each conspirator **12** is criminally responsible for and equally guilty of the 13 crimes committed by his co-conspirators even though he 14 himself did not commit the crime and even though he 15 wasn't even present at the scene, will you all promise 16 to unhesitatingly follow the Court's instructions on 17 that rule of law if you find it applicable to the facts 18 19 in this case? 20 MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I must object on the **21** grounds that it is improper voir dire examination. 22 Join. MR. SHINN: 23 THE COURT: Överruled. 24 MR. BUGLIOSI: Did you all understand my question? 25 Mrs. Lee, did you understand my question? 8j fls26 MRS. LEE: Yes.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Do you all recall Mr. Reiner stating that the Court will instruct you to the effect that you cannot convict any defendant on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice?

Do you all recall him saying words to that effect?

Do any of you not recall Mr. Reiner saying that?

MR. KÄNAREK: That is improper voir dire examination, your Honor.

MR. SHINN: Join.

MR. BUGLIOSI: It is foundational, your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled.

MR. BUGLIOSI: For those of you who perhaps do not recall Mr. Reiner saying that, I believe the Court will instruct you to the effect that you cannot convict a defendant on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.

Linda Kasabian will testify for the prosecution in this case.

Linda Kasabian is already charged with the same seven murders that these defendants are charged with.

If the Court instructs you that the mere fact that Linda Kasabian is charged with these same seven murders does not, in and of itself, make her an accomplice, will you follow the Court's instructions on that?

MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor. Improper voir dire.

This is an attempt to preinstruct the jury. 8,72 1 MR. FITZGERALD: Join. 2 3 MR. REINER: Join. 4 MR. SHINN: I join. 5 Overruled. THE COURT: 6. MR. BUGLIOSI: Will you all follow the Court's instruction on that? I am again referring just to you six. 7 8 MRS. EVANS: Yes. MRS. LEE: Yes. 10 MR. ZAMORA: Yes. 11 MR. BAER: Yes. 12 MR. STRINGER: Yes. 13 MR. CATO: Yes. 14 MR. BUGLIOSI: Now, assuming that Linda Kasabian is 15 deemed to be an accomplice -- and I am not stipulating to 16 that for one single, solitary moment -- but assuming that she 17 is deemed to be an accomplice. 18 If the Court instructs you that to constitute 19 corroboration of her testimony it is not necessary that the 20 evidence corroborates each fact to which she testifies, 21 will you follow the Court's instructions on that? 22° 23 24 25 26

9-1	1	MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, improper voir
	2	dire.
)	3	THE COURT: Overruled.
	4	BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
	5	Q Will you follow the Court's instruction on
	6	that?
	7	MRS. LEE: Yes.
	8	MRS. EVANS: Yes.
	9	MR. ZAMORA: Yes.
	10 ·	MR. BAER: Yes.
	11	MR. STRINGER: Yes.
	12	MR. CATO: Yes.
	13 ;	BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
	14	Q I'm getting affirmative nods, for the
	15	record,
	16	If the Court further instructs you that
	17	this evidence in corroboration may be circumstantial
	18 ,	evidence, will you follow the Court's instruction on that?
	19	MRS. LEE: Yes.
	20	MRS. EVANS: Yes.
	21	MR. ZAMORA: Yes.
	.22	MR. BAER: Yes.
	23	MR. STRINGER: Yes.
	24	MR. CATO: Yes.
	25	BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
	26	Q' You all realize that in a criminal case the

1 .	prosecution only has the burden of proving a defendant's
2	guilt to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt, do you
3	all understand that?
4	MRS. LEE: Yes.
5	MRS. EVANS: Yes.
6	MR. ZAMORA: Yes.
7	MR. BAER: Yes.
8	MR. STRINGER: Yes.
9.	MR. CATO: Yes.
10	BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
11	Q You all realize that we do not have the
12	burden of proving any defendants guilty to an absolute
13 .	certainty, you understand that?
14	A Yes.
15	Q Before any of you six jurors will return a
16	verdict of first degree murder against these defendants
17	are any of you of such a frame of mind that you would
18	require the prosecution prove the guilt of these defendant
19	to an absolute certainty?
20	A No.
21	Q I take it you would only require we prove
22	their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, am I correct in
23	assuming that?
24	A Yes.
25	Q Do you recall the brief little discussion
26	on circumstantial evidence?

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1	A Yes.
2	Q I believe the first group of jurors had
3	the cookie jar and the footprint example.
4 .	The last group, I think, were given the
5 ·	example of the stolen property being in the possession
6	of the burglar.
7	Do you recall that?
8	A Yes.
9.	Q Do you all understand the difference between
10	direct and circumstantial evidence?
11:	A Yes.
12	Q Are any of you in such a frame of mind that
13	you are opposed to sitting as a juror on a case where
14	the People rely in part on circumstantial evidence?
15	Then I believe it was Monday afternoon and
16	Tuesday morning that Mrs. Roseland was on the firing line
17	for about an hour and a half.
18	Do you recall I asked Mrs. Roseland countless
19.	questions that I am not asking you folks right now, do
20	you recall that?
21	I don't expect you to recall what those
22	questions were, to be truthful with you, I don't remember
23	myself, unless I look up my notes.
24	However, when I was asking Mrs. Roseland all
25	these other questions were you mentally asking yourselves
26	the same questions?

Looking back do you recall any question that 1 I asked Mrs. Roseland to which you said to yourself: 2 "If you were to ask me this 3 question my answer would be different from 4 the answer being given by Mrs. Roseland"? 5 Was there any question that I asked that 6 your response would have been different from Mrs. Roseland? 7 A No. 8 To give you an example of what I am talking 9 about, I think I named 12 attorneys and I asked Mrs. 10 Roseland if she was associated with them, was represented 11 by them, had spoken to them and her answer was no. 12 That gives you an example of what I am 13 seeking now. 14 Would any of your answers have been different 15 from the answers given by Mrs. Roseland? 16 17 Do you realize that both the prosecution, 18 that is the People of the State-of-Galifornia, and the defendants, they are both entitled to a fair and impartial 19 20 trial. 21 You understand that?___ 22 Á Yes. 23 You have already indicated you can give these Q. 24 defendants a fair trial and I urge you to give them a fair 25 trial. 26 On the other hand, are you all positive that

Looking back do you recall any question that 1 I asked Mrs. Roseland to which you said to yourself: 2 "If you were to ask me this 3 question my answer would be different from the answer being given by Mrs. Roseland"? 5 Was there any question that I asked that 6 your response would have been different from Mrs. Roseland? 7 A No. 8 To give you an example of what I am talking 9 about, I think I named 12 attorneys and I asked Mrs. 10 Roseland if she was associated with them, was represented 1İ by them, had spoken to them and her answer was no. 12 13 That gives you an example of what I am seeking now. 14 Would any of your answers have been different 15 from the answers given by Mrs. Roseland? 16 17 Do you realize that both the prosecution, 18 that is the People of the State-of-Galifornia, and the defendants, they are both entitled to a fair and impartial 19 20 trial. 21 You understand that? 22 Á Yes. 23 You have already indicated you can give these Q. 24 defendants a fair trial and I urge you to give them a fair 25 trial. 26 On the other hand, are you all positive that

1	you can give the People of the State of California a fair
2	trial?
.3	A Yes.
4	Q Is there any doubt in any of your minds
5	about that?
6	A No.
7	Q Can any of you think of any reason at all
8	not already touched upon by his Honor or defense counsel
9 .	or myself why you feel you should not sit, or would rather
10	not sit as a juror on this case, any reason whatsoever?
11	A No.
12	Q Again, now is the time to speak out.
13	(Juror No. 4, Mrs. Lee, raises her hand.)
14.	Q Yes, ma'am?
15	MRS. LEE: Are you saying not previously touched
16	upon?
17	MR. BUGLIOSI: Yes, not previously touched upon.
18	MRS. LEE: No.
19 ;	BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
20	Q You cannot think of any?
21	A No.
22	Q Thank you very much.
23	THE COURT: Do the People pass for cause?
24	MR. BUGLIOSI: People pass for cause, your Honor.
25	THE COURT: Do all of the defendants pass for
26	cause?

	1 .	MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, your Honor.
	2.	THE COURT: Defendants may exercise a joint
	3	peremptory challenge.
	4.	MR. FITZGERALD: There is no unanimity of opinion;
	5	there will be no joint challenge, your Honor.
	· 6	Patricia Krenwinkel separately accepts the
	7.	jury as now constituted, your Honor.
	8.	THE COURT: Mr. Reiner?
	.9	MR. REINER: Your Honor, may I exercise a peremptory
	10	challenge?
	11	THE COURT: No, you may not, sir, you have used
	12	yours.
- 1	13	MR. REINER: Why did your Honor address me, I don't
	14	understand.
	15	THE COURT: I had forgotten it momentarily.
	16	Mr. Shinn?
	17	MR. SHINN: Accept the jury as presently constituted.
	18	THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek?
,	19	MR. KANAREK: Mr. Manson accepts the jury as
	20	constituted.
	21 ,	THE COURT: Mr. Bugliosi?
	. 22	MR. BUGLIOSI: The People thank and excuse Mr.
	23 .	Cato.
9a	fls. ²⁴	THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cato, you are excused.
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MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may we approach the bench?

THE COURT: Do you wish to approach the bench at this time, Mr. Kanarek?

MR. KANAREK: May I, your Honor?

THE COURT: Very well.

(The following proceedings were had at the bench out of the hearing of the prospective jurors:)

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I would like to state on behalf of Mr. Manson, your Honor, that it is our position that we cannot at all ever get a fair jury in this case because of the prejudicial publicity and other factors which have occurred in connection with this case.

And so, having to make a decision, being in the trial, we accepted / jury because, relatively speaking, considering everything, we felt that because of all of these overpowering matters, we have -- it was incumbent on us to accept the jury at that point.

We would like to have the record reflect that the person who has been excused is of the black or Negro race.

THE COURT: All right, the record will so reflect.

MR. FITZGERALD: I will join in Mr. Kanarek's remarks, objections and statements.

MR. SHINN: Join, too.

THE COURT: I did not understand there was an objection. He was simply noting for the record Mr. Cato

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25. appears to be black.

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, what I'm saying is, it is our position -- what I am really doing is, what I have done before. I did not want to belabor the record.

What I am really doing is, I am asking for an evidentiary hearing which we indicated previously.

It is our position the People are deliberately excusing people of the black or Negro race.

It is our position this is a State action, a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Just for the record, your Honor, the case of Swain vs. U.S., a United States Supreme Court case cited in People vs. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d, I think, says the court cannot presume that the prosecution is excluding jurors from the panel simply because they are Negro.

The United States Supreme Court has held that.

MR. KANAREK: That may be a presumption, but as counsel well knows, at an evidentiary hearing it may turn out that presumption is successfully rebutted, that is the reason we are asking for the hearing, taking counsel's own statements.

A presumption is certainly not to be taken as absolute. That is why we are asking for the hearing, to see.

THE COURT: Well, the motion will be denied.

Now, we have time to call one more prospective juror before lunch, and at least get partway.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Will this be back in chambers?

THE COURT: Yes, since we have been conducting our pretrial exposures in chambers.

MR. BUGLIOSI: We are going into the first phase back in chambers.

(The following proceedings were had in open court in the presence and hearing of the prospective jurors:)

THE COURT: I will ask the parties and counsel to join me in chambers and then we will call the next prospective furor for seat No. 11.

(The following proceedings were had in chambers of the Court, all defendants and their counsel being present, the People being represented by Mr. Bugliosi:)

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		(A	prospective	juror	enters	the	chambers	oi
the	court:)							

THE CLERK: The prospective juror's name is Don L. Sabin, Jr., D-o-n, S-a-b-i-n, Jr.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF DON L. SABIN, JR. BY THE COURT:

Q Now, Mr. Sabin, if you were selected as a juror in this case would you be able to serve?

A No, sir.

Q Why is that?

A Well, first, among several reasons, I don't really care to leave my wife alone.

We haven't anyone at home any more except the two of us, and this would require that my wife be alone for the long sequestering period.

We have been married almost 35 years, and we are not used to being separated for that long a period of time.

In addition to that, my company would and will pay me for 25 days of jury service, and after that time I am on my own.

Q What company is that?

A North American Rockwell.

I have determined this yesterday morning by calling our employee services to be sure how they stand on

that point.

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I know your Honor brought that out before to be sure and have an understanding about that.

THE COURT: Will there be a stipulation?

MR. FITZGERAID: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Q BY THE COURT: Mr. Sabin, I am going to ask you the same questions regarding the death penalty that I put to the other prospective jurors.

First, do you entertain such conscientious opinions regarding the death penalty that you would be unable to make an impartial decision as to any defendants guilt regardless of the evidence in the case?

A I think that I would, your Honor, simply because that is my religion.

Simply that my religious philosophy might impair my objectivity.

Q Is that a belief that you have held for some time?

A Oh, yes.

Q I take it that because of your conscientious opinions you are opposed to the death penalty, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, the question I am asking you is not whether or not you are in favor of the death penalty, but whether by

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reason of those opinions and beliefs you would be unable to make an impartial decision as to guilt?

A Even if I were to determine that guilt was evident, I might not be able to make such a declaration.

- Q You are talking in terms of "might."

 Do you believe that that is a strong likelihood?
- A Yes, sir, I would not make a decision of guilt.
- Q Do you think as it now stands that you could not be impartial in a case where you might have to be called upon to decide the question of whether the penalty should be life imprisonment or death?
 - A Yes, sir, I would have trouble with that question.
- Q Let me ask you the next question, and you will notice that this question goes to the so-called penalty phase of the trial.

It assumes that there has been a conviction of murder in the first degree.

Do you entertain such conscientious opinions regarding the death penalty that you would automatically refuse to impose it without regard to the evidence in the case?

- A Yes, sir.
- Q Is there any question in your mind about that?
- A No, sir.
- Q Can you think of any possible circumstances or facts or any type of case where you would not

1	automatically refuse to impose the death penalty?
Ž	A No, sir.
3	Q Assuming there was an option that was
4	available?
5	A I understand, sir.
6	THE COURT: Any questions?
7	MR. FITZGERAID: May I ask a question?
8	THE COURT: Yes.
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BY MR. FITZGERALD:

Correct me if I am wrong, and I don't want Q to put any words in your mouth, but it is your position that you could never find anybody guilty if you were later going to have to determine life or death?

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MR. SABIN

That is what I said before. The question A of guilt, even though it was apparent, and I may feel that, it would affect my objectivity to the point that I would not put myself into a position of saying that a person is guilty because of my emotional response to such an answer and how it would affect me in the future.

I know how I react to -- not this particular situation -- but to a situation where a life is involved, even an animal's.

I have one -- may I cite the topic, sir? THE COURT: In a moment. Let me put the question to you in a different form to make sure we understand what you said so far.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MR. SABIN (Reopened) BY THE COURT:

Are you saying that because of the fact the case might get to where you might have to vote on the question of life imprisonment or death, that would so affect your thinking in the first part of the case that

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1	A Yes, sir.
2	MR. BUGLIOSI: No further questions.
3.	THE COURT: You may go back into the courtroom,
4	Mr. Sabin, thank you very much.
5	MR. SABIN: Thank you.
6	THE COURT: Do not discuss with anyone what has
7.	occurred in here, will you?
8	MR. SABIN: All right.
9	(Mr. Sabin leaves the chambers of the Court.
10	MR. BUGLIOSI: We move to excuse this jury on
11	two grounds, your Honor, actual bias under 1073,
12	Paragraph 2 of the Penal Code and implied bias under
, 13	Section 1074 Subdivision 8 of the Penal Code.
14	Also the Supreme Court case of Witherspoon
15	vs. Illinois.
16	MR. FITZGERALD: We object to the challenge on
17	due process and equal protection grounds.
18	MR. REINER: Join.
19	MR. SHINN: Join.
20	MR. KANAREK: Join.
21	THE COURT: Very well.
22	I have understood all along that when you
23	say "we object," that everybody has already joined.
24	MR. FITZGERALD: Yes.
25 :	MR. KANAREK: That is correct, when Mr. Fitzgerald
26	moska unlara indicated atherwise he checks as far as

I am concerned for me and Mr. Manson. 1 The challenge will be allowed. THE COURT: 2. Mr. Sabin will be excused for cause. 3 It is now four minutes to 12:00. 4 Is your Honor's ruling on both MR. REINER: 5 grounds put forward by Mr. Bugliosi? 6 THE COURT: Yes. 7 MR. REINER: The challenge for cause/being 8 allowed as to both grounds? 9 THE COURT: Yes. 10 MR. REINER: Thank you. 11 THE COURT: It is now four minutes to 12:00 so 12 we won't have an opportunity to call in another prospective 13 juror. 14 We will adjourn until 1:45 this afternoon. 15 (Noon recess.) 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

1	LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, THURSDAY, JULY 9, 1970
2	1:47 P.M.
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4	(The following proceedings occurred in
5	chambers:)
6 ,	THE COURT: All counsel and their parties are
7	present.
8′	Will you call in the next prospective juror?
9.	MR. STOVITZ: While that juror is being brought in,
10	your Honor, I understand, your Honor, that you have
11	intimated that Mr. Reiner here does not have any more
12	peremptory challenges.
13	If that is the ruling of the Court, I would
14	like to be heard on that.
15	I have a great many cases that we have
16	considered. I have read these cases, and I feel that a
17	reading of 1070.5 is clear, that the first 20 challenges
18	must be exercised jointly. If they are not exercised
19	jointly, they are to be considered as joint challenges.
20	The language is specific. It says a defendant
21	must or shall have the same number as prescribed in 1070,
22	which is 20, and then it says if there are more than one
23	defendant, they have five shall have five additional
24	challenges, which may be exercised separately.
25	And so that your Honor does not cause the
26	People to exercise at now, we are up to No. 9 that we have

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your Honor changes your mind to allow the defendants to start exercising their challenges, it would cause an imbalance in the jury.

In this way, if the challenges go from defense to the People and from the People to the defense, et cetera, it would be a better balanced jury.

So, I want to ask your Honor to again read 1070.5 of the Penal Code.

I have a list of cases in Cal. Jur. 2d on the subject.

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THE COURT: Well, what are you trying to tell me, Mr. Stovitz, I don't quite follow you.

MR. STOVITZ: I believe Mr. Reiner is entitled to 20 challenges and then five additional ones.

If the co-defendants do not wish to join in the challenges, the first 20 challenges shall be -- must be considered joint challenges.

That is the way I interpret the cases.

THE COURT: Well, I don't think that is the law at

Have you read People vs. King and People vs. Lara?

MR. STOVITZ: I read those cases.

THE COURT: They say just the opposite.

MR. STOVITZ: No, those cases say that the Legislature can define any number of ways challenges can be exercised; the Legislature can say they are entitled to five, and that is constitutional.

They are not entitled to any particular number of challenges except that which is prescribed by statute.

But the statute is clear they are entitled to 20 challenges in a case where life or death is an issue.

THE COURT: Are you talking now about separatelytried defendants?

MR. STOVITZ: No, I'm talking about 1070.5, when they are jointly tried, but that the first 20 challenges must be

considered -- the first 20 challenges must be considered joint challenges.

THE COURT: That is not what it says.

It says they are entitled to 20 challenges to be exercised jointly, and in addition five individuals per defendant.

MR. STOVITZ: Yes.

THE COURT: But the cases hold that if they don't exercise the challenges jointly then they are left with their individual challenges.

MR. STOVITZ: But the cases also hold, and Cal. Jur. 2d holds that they cannot be deprived of their first 20.

THE COURT: That is not what the cases hold, Mr. Stovitz, that is precisely the point.

I am looking now at People vs. King, 240 Cal. Ap. 2d at Page 389.

What happened in King was that they were able to agree only on five joint challenges, and they each had five individuals, and their contention was that they had only 10 peremptory challenges, that is, the five joint plus the additional five each, individual peremptories, while any defendant tried individually would be entitled to 20.

That is precisely the argument they were raising.

MR. STOVITZ: I realize that, your Honor. I merely
state the failure to give the defendant the full number of
peremptory challenges to which he is entitled is reversible

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error per se, and I say that a plain reading of Section 1070.5 says that a defendant shall be entitled to the number of challenges prescribed by 1070, and that the challenges must be exercised jointly, and that in the event once exercised, he is entitled to five additional challenges, which may be exercised separately.

And that means he is entitled to 25 challenges, the first 20 being joint challenges.

Now, I know the language in the King case.

THE COURT: No one is arguing with that. The question is, what happens if they don't exercise the challenges jointly, that is the problem.

MR. STOVITZ: The point is that the Court orders that the first 20 challenges exercised by the defendants are deemed joint challenges.

THE COURT: They are not deemed joint challenges. They are only joint challenges if all the defendants join in them.

If your Honor would read the history MR. STOVITZ: of the section, 1098, the preceding section before 1070.5, the judges in the criminal courts before 1949 would just announced the first challenge is a joint challenge.

Now the statute says that they must be exercised jointly.

If at all, that is what that means, if THE COURT: at all.

How can you force them to exercise them jointly? 1 MR. STOVITZ: They don't have to. Then the Court 2 just deems them joint challenges. 3 In other words, Mr. Reiner has exercised five. 4 Now, Mr. Fitzgerald does not want to exercise 5 any; Mr. Shinn does not want to exercise any. 6 MR. FITZGERAID: That is a misstatement. I exercised 7 one peremptory challenge on behalf of Patricia Krenwinkel 8 separately. 9 MR. STOVITZ: I am just assuming a hypothetical. 10 MR. FITZGERALD: Oh, excuse me. 11 MR. STOVITZ: Now you go back to Mr. Reiner. 12 He exercises his challenges, the first 20 13 challenges Mr. Reiner exercises, assuming that same pattern 14 is followed, are deemed joint challenges because the 15 defendants not agreeing on their challenges waive their 16. right to participate in those challenges. 17 THE COURT: Cite me some authorities for this. 18 MR. STOVITZ: I cite you the code section. 19 THE COURT: The cases hold exactly the opposite. 20 MR. STOVITZ: I cite you the code section. I will cite People vs. Aguinaldo, 3 Cal. Ap. 2d 22 254. 23 24 This was a 1934 case. THE COURT: We don't have to go back to 1934; we have 25 a California Supreme Court case in 1967, People vs. Lara. 26

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MR. STOVITZ: That is the Lara case.

In the Lara case, there was no request by the defendants as such, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, there was. There was a request for additional challenges in Lara.

Here is what it says:

The trial court properly allowed the prosecutor to challenge for cause those prospective jurors who expressed a conscientious objection against imposing the death penalty. Alvarez objected on the ground that such challenges were not proper as to him because he was not subject to the death penalty in view of his age at the time of the commission of the crime. The court overruled the objection, observing that the challenge was nevertheless proper as to Lara, and this was a joint trial.

"Alvarez had exhausted all his individual peremptory challenges, Lara declined to join in a joint challenge of a certain additional juror. Alvarez then requested the Court to allow him additional peremptory challenges equal in number to the challenges for cause exercised by the prosecutor on the basis of conscientious objection to the death penalty.

"Finding no statutory authority 1 for such additional challenges, the Court was 2 not in error in denying the request." 3 MR. STOVITZ: But it doesn't how many challenges 4 he used, your Honor. 5 THE COURT: He used five. 6 Yes, it does show that. He used his five. 7 They were unable to agree on a joint 8 challenge. Then he requested some more, and the Court 9 said no. 10 MR. STOVITZ: He requested as many as the prosecu-11 tion had used for cause. 12 13 THE COURT: What difference does it make? point is that the Court said he was not entitled to 14 any more. 15 16. MR. STOVITZ: I realize that language is there, 17 but I want to get the trial briefs in that case to see 18 whether or not he exercised the 20 or whether he exercised 19 only five, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: It says that he exercised five. Well, no. I take that back. 21 22 It says: 23 "After Alvarez had exhausted all 24 his individual peremptory challenges, Lara 25 declined to join him in a joint challenge of 26 a certain additional juror. Alvarez then

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"requested the Court to allow him additional peremptory challenges equal in number to the challenges for cause exercised by the prosecutor on the basis of conscientious objection to the death penalty, which the Court declined."

MR. STOVITZ: I can get the transcript very easily because the case is being retried now. So, I will find that out by tomorrow morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: I am still, as I mentioned the other day, concerned about why you are bringing it up.

> I am bringing it up for two reasons. MR. STOVITZ:

No. 1, assume for the moment that your Honor is wrong, I think that it would constitute reversible error per se, because there was a case reversed where the defendant was given only ten challenges in a case where life imprisonment was involved.

Secondly, if your Honor then later changes your Honor's mind, the People have now exercised -assume for the moment, your Honor, the People have exercised 25 peremptory challenges, and now your Honor decides that he is wrong -- it would then cause an imbalance to the jury, and the People would be --

THE COURT: An imbalance how?

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MR. STOVITZ: The People would be restricted in having 15 more challenges to the defendants' 35.

THE COURT: That is what happened in these two cases, only the imbalance was claimed to be the other way.

MR. STOVITZ: I don't think there should be an imbalance either way, your Honor.

THE COURT: As the Court pointed out, the defendant has no constitutional right to any particular number of challenges other than what the section provides for.

MR. STOVITZ: Agreed.

THE COURT: What his constitutional right is is a right to a fair and impartial jury, and that is all he can ask for, and that is all he is entitled to. It is just that simple.

What is that section number? MR. STOVITZ: 1070.5.

May I look at your other Penal Code?
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I use this Penal Code?

THE COURT: It is perfectly clear. I can't imagine
how it can drafted any clearer.

MR. STOVITZ: I agree with your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't always agree with the Code sections as far as clarity is concerned, but this one seems to admit of no ambiguity whatever.

MR. STOVITZ: And I agree with that, your Honor. The

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English language couldn't be any clearer.

It says that when two or more defendants are jointly tried for any public offense, the State and the defendants shall be entitled to the number of challenges prescribed by Section 1070 of this Code.

Now, going back to 1070 of the Code, it says 20 challenges in a murder or life sentence trial.

So, they shall be entitled to 20.

"Which challenges on the part of the defendants must be exercised jointly."

Now, your Honor asks what happens if the other three defendants don't want to join?

Well, it doesn't matter. The Code says they must be exercised jointly. So, the first 20 challenges are exercised jointly by operation of law.

THE COURT: Mr. Stovitz; you don't really believe that, do you?

MR. STOVITZ: Yes, I do.

Then it goes on and says, "Each defendant," using the term "shall," "shall also be entitled to five additional challenges."

So, the statute contemplates that they are entitled to the number that they have by 1070, plus five additional challenges which may be exercised separately.

I think, your Honor, if your Honor is certain on this particular point, then I may be in error in reading the **4A3**

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English language, but I think it says exactly that, that they are entitled to 20 which must be exercised jointly.

THE COURT: If at all.

MR. STOVITZ: It doesn't say "if at all." It says "must be exercised jointly."

Anyway, your Honor, I bring this point out.

THE COURT: I find it difficult to see how we could on the basis of that language.

MR. STOVITZ: I bring this up merely for preventive medicine. I am very optimistic in believing that we may get a conviction someday in this case, and if we do, I would not like it to be upset on that point.

THE COURT: I should not like there to be any error either, and I am just as concerned as anyone else in seeing that the defendants and the People both have every right to which they are entitled.

This is one, however, I do not think anyone is entitled to. That is, additional challenges.

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MR. STOVITZ: I will endeavor to do some reaearch from other states, your Honor. I realize that each state has a statute of its own.

The California cases that your Honor cited are the latest ones in the books.

I will get the actual facts of the Lara case and see if it is supported, if the decision supports the facts.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FITZGERALD: Whether the decision supports those facts or not, the decision is the decision.

MR. STOVITZ: Except that if they had exercised 25, and then the decision goes and says that the defendant wanted more to meet with the prosecution's request for cause challenges.

MR. REINER: May I just add one point?

Apart from whether the statutes mandates that we be given additional challenges, I think it is clear that if the Court feels, under the circumstances of this particular case, that additional challenges are warranted to insure a fair trial, then, of course, the Court may do so.

I would think that because of the circumstances of the limitation of challenges to just the individual challenges, that the Court, in the exercise of its good

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discretion, should allow counsel for Leslie Van Houten additional individual challenges.

Most especially, when --

THE COURT: Why?

MR. REINER: This being a capital case, your Honor, instead of having double the number of challenges, from ten to twenty, in fact it has been halved down to five, through no action on the part of Leslie Van Houten or her counsel.

We are being put in a position by the unilateral action of the prosecution in joining more than one defendant under Section 954 of the Penal Code.

THE COURT: But this begs the question, Mr. Reiner.
This is precisely what these cases dealt with, just
exactly that objection.

We have no statutory right to it. That is what the cases hold.

I agree that the Court could grant additional peremptories, but the basis, if it did so, would not be your argument, because the cases have already decided that that is not a legitimate argument. It would have to be a different argument.

I agree that if it appeared to the Court that there was not a fair and impartial jury, and all the challenges had been exhausted, that I would have a duty to do something about it, and I would do it. Thatwould be

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a legitimate reason. But simply because you don't get as many challenges as you would if your defendant was tried individually, is not, according to the cases or the Code Section a legitimate reason or basis for giving you more.

MR. REINER: According to the cases, your Honor, that the Court has relied upon, apparently the Code does not mandate, and I am not arguing, as Mr. Stovitz is arguing, that the Code mandates that we be permitted to exercise joint challenges, but I what in effect, arguing is that pursuant to the Reardon Report -- which is not controlling, but at least it is persuasive authority of the highest sort -- that because of the nature of this case, with the very high level of pretrial publicity, that the Court should take extraordinary steps to enable counsel for the defendants in the case to obtain as fair a jury as possible under these circumstances.

Now, we will have a jury here, no doubt, made up of 12 persons who have been exposed to pretrial publicity. We are trying to get 12 people who have been exposed to perhaps the least amount of publicity, or the 12 people who, notwithstanding their exposure, have the greatest ability in our judgment to overcome this pretrial publicity.

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This requires the use of peremptory challenges, where the person is not clearly subject to a challenge for cause.

In a case of this sort the defendants' need for additional peremptory challenges almost rises proportionately with the amount of pretrial publicity.

I think for that reason, in this particular type of case, the Reardon report surely contemplates that the Court should take such extraordinary steps as to give constantly additional peremptory challenges.

I would argue that even if Miss Van Houten were tried separately and had 20 challenges and used all 20, and 20 is a large number, at that point perhaps the Court might give counsel unlimited challenges.

THE COURT: The Reardon report is not the law of California yet.

I see no reason, at the moment at least, for granting any additional peremptory challenges.

Let's call in the next prospective juror.

MR. BUGLIOSI: May I make one statement, your Honor, if the Court changes its mind I would appreciate it, like Mr. Stovitz says, if it changes its mind not at the last moment.

THE COURT: Well, I think it would necessarily be at the last moment, Mr. Bugliosi, because my present feeling is, I believe the philosophy behind the decision in these 13-2

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.25 two cases is sound.

I don't think the number of challenges that a party has is the important consideration.

I think whether or not there is in fact a fair and impartial jury.

As long as there are unused peremptory challenges I am not going to grant additional peremptories, there would be no point to it.

MR. BUGLIOSI: You see, the danger inherent, your Honor, in changing the Court's mind at one second before midnight, if we would have exercised the entire 40 peremptory challenges and then the Court changes its mind, it seems to me at that point then the defense can have the type of jury they want, unimpeded by any efforts on the prosecution's part.

THE COURT: I suppose if additional peremptories were granted to one or more defendants, the People would be entitled to the same number.

That is what the code seems to say -- that is what it does say in connection with the present statute.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Well, let's say hypothetically we have exercised 40 peremptories, and the defense has exercised a total of 10.

The Court decides to give the defense five extra separate peremptories.

Would the Court then be of a frame of mind to

give the prosecution five extra peremptories at that point? Because if not --

THE COURT: Just a minute, I think the situation you just suggested does not exist.

Well, Isuppose it turns on the meaning -- I have found one ambiguity in 1070.5.

It says each defendant shall also be entitled to five additional challenges which may be exercised separately. The State shall also be entitled to additional challenges equal to the number of additional separate challenges allowed the defendants.

Now, to me that means if the defendants exercise five individual peremptories, then the People are allowed only five individual peremptories additional beyond the 20.

It does not mean the People automatically get five for every defendant, whether or not the defendants exercise individual peremptory challenges.

That does not seem to make good sense, and I don't think that was intended.

So when you say, to follow what you said before, if the defendants have exercised 10 and the People have 40, I don't think that condition could exist.

You have 20 plus the 10 which would be 30, if they exercised 10 individuals.

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MR. BUGLIOSI: All right, 30 as opposed to 10. THE COURT: As opposed to 40.

MR.BUGLIOSI: Right, 30 as opposed to 40.

We have exercised 30; we are not entitled to any more, and they have exercised 10.

All of a sudden the Court says "Well, I don't think this jury represents a fair jury for the defense, I'm going to give the defense / my discretion five extra peremptories."

My point is, at that point the Court should give the prosecution five extra peremptories because if it did not, we say the defense could basically pick their own jury, and we would not be able to stop them.

So my point is that the Court is contemplating changing its order, we would appreciate if the Court would change its position relatively early and not wait until the prosecution has eaten up all of its peremptories, or come close to using up all of our peremptories, because then we will be subject to the will of the defense, as to what type of jury we are going to have.

MR. STOVITZ: Your Honor must be aware from the nature of the jurors we have excused that many times we used our peremptories to excuse a juror who actually has expressed a hardship.

We do not want to have a juror sitting on this jury that is concerned with their own personal problems,

and have to concentrate upon this case, because if we take an extra day or two in presentation of our evidence, or an extra day or two in our argument, we don't want the juror to concentrate on his own personal family life.

We want them to concentrate on this trial.

So we have used these peremptories sparingly, excusing many times jurors who had personal hardship rather than they were not kindly towards the prosecution.

MR. KANAREK: If I might respond to that very briefly.

I hope my prediction is wrong, but I predict there won't be any black persons on this jury, and the prosecution will excuse each and everyone.

MR. STOVITZ: If we have 12 black jurors, will you apologize, Mr. Kanarek?

MR. KANAREK: I prefaced it with the idea that I hope I was wrong.

MR. STOVITZ: Would you apologize to Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Kanarek?

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, this inter se --

THE COURT: Let's get on, gentlemen.

MR. KANAREK: I would ask the Court to ask counsel not to speak inter se. I am trying to follow the Court's orders.

THE COURT: I appreciate that and I will ask counsel not to engage in colloquy back and forth.

It only precipitates unpleasantness such as 1 I would like to avoid. 2 Let's call our next prospective juror. 3 (Prospective juror enters the room.) 4 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 5 THE CLERK: The prospective juror's name is Mrs. 6 Beverly A. Zuver, B-e-v-e-r-l-y, Z-u-v-e-r. 7 8 VOIR DIEE EXAMINATION OF MRS. ZUVER 9 BY THE COURT: 10. Mrs. Zuver, if you were selected as a trial Q. 11 juror in this case would you be able to serve? 12 Well, not very well, you see, I have a job. 13 Excuse me, will you keep your voice up 14 because everyone has to hear you. 15 I am employed. When I was called in this 16 last time for jury service, which makes the fourth time, 17 and my boss got kind of hot under the collar. 18 Whom do you work for? 19 20 I work for Mobil. But then, there are two others in the same 21 22 department of ten who have jury service this year, so that is why he kind of objected. 23 And he was not too happy about my being 24 25 here now. 26 Is there any other reason why it might Q

	1	constitute a	hardship?	
	2	A	Not a hardship, no, but	;
	3	Q.	Well, then, let me go on to some other	ı
	4	questions.		, ,
•	5		You heard me ask the questions regarding	ı
	6	the death pena	Ity of the other prospective jurors?	ı
	7	A	Yes.	1
	.8	Q	Have you had an opportunity to think about	
	9 .	those question	ns and your answers to them?	
	10	A	Well, I know that I	<u> </u>
	11	Q	I'm not asking for your opinion now.	
	12	I will put th	e questions to you in a moment, but have	
<u>.</u>	13	you had a cha	nce to think about the subject?	
	1,4	A	Yes.	<u>.</u>
	15	Q	All right. Do you entertain such conscienti	ous
	16	opinions rega	rding the death penalty that you would be	
	17	u _n able to mak	e an impartial decision as to any defendant's	
	18	guilt regardl	ess of the evidence in the case?	
	19	. A:	Well, I don't know, I kind of have my doubts	
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3B-1	1	Q Yes, it is.
	2	A To vote the death penalty, and I don't know what
	3	I would feel at the time I was called upon to do it, whether
	4.	I could do it or not. I just don't know.
	, 5	Q When you say "do it," you mean impose it?
	6	A Impose.
	. 7	Q You see, this question is not that question.
	8	What I am asking you now is a question directed
	.9	toward that part of the trial, the first part, when the jur
	10	determines the question of guilt.
	11	A Oh, I see what you mean.
	12	Q And do you think you could be impartial on the
	13	question of guilt, notwithstanding your feelings about the
	14	death penalty?
	15	A Well, my feelings are now that I would have to
	16	overcome the prejudice of their guilt now.
•	17	I think my feelings
٠.	18	Q Because of the death penalty?
	19	A No, I think my feelings are the reverse of
	20	what they should be.
	21	I don't know if I can look at them and say they
	22	are innocent.
	23	Q We will get to that in a minute. I want to
	24	take up one thing at a time, you see.
	.25	Because of your opinions regarding the death
	26	penalty do you think that you would not be able to be

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impartial on the question of whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty?

- A No, I do not.
- Q You could be impartial?
- A I could be impartial, yes, I think.
- Q In other words, your beliefs about the death penalty would not affect your ability to render --
 - A -- a decision.
- Q -- a just, fair and impartial decision on guilt or innocence?
- A Yes, once I was convinced whether they are or not, I could give my opinion.
- Q That's right, and it would be unaffected by your beliefs about the death penalty, is that right?
 - A Yes, yes.
- Q. Now, the second question goes to whether or not you could impose the death penalty, and that question is this -- and of course you understand that it assumes that there has been a conviction of murder in the first degree, because if there has not been such a conviction, you will never be asked to make that decision about the penalty.

Do you understand that?

- A Yes.
- Q Do you entertain such conscientious opinions regarding the death penalty that you would automatically

refuse	tö	impose	it	without	regard	to	the	evidence?
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- A I don't think so, I don't really know.
- Q Well, let's see if I understand.

 Now, you correctme if I don't state your views accurately.

A Yes

Q Are you saying that regardless of what you believe about the death penalty you would be willing to listen to the evidence in the case and then make up your mind?

A Yes.

Q And you are not saying that you have already made up your mind and it would not make any difference what the evidence was, you would automatically refuse to impose it.

You are not saying that?

- A No, no.
- Q Now, have you formed any opinions about the innocence or guilt of any of the defendants?
 - A Well, I think I have, yes.
- Q And what has caused you to form this opinion or these opinions?
 - A Well, what I have read in the newspapers.
- Q In other words, the publicity concerning the trial and the defendants, is that right?

A Yes.

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3B4	1	Q	What is your opinion regarding the defendants?
	2	, * , .A .	Well, I lean more toward guilt.
Ĺ	3		It would have to be proved to me they are
	4	innocent.	
	5		It is the other way.
	6	Q.	You would require proof of innocence?
	i	A	Rather than guilt.
	8	Q.	Rather than proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
	9 ,	doubt, is t	that right?
	. 10	A.	Yes, in reverse of what I should be.
	11	Q;	Well, we appreciate your being honest about it.
	12	A	Yes.
_	13	Q	We cannot always help our beliefs.
	14	. A.	I don't know why I feel that way. I just feel
	15	that way.	
	16	Q	It is important we know exactly what your
	17	beliefs are	≛.
	18	A	Yes.
	19	-Q	Then I take it from what you say that you
	20	would be un	nable to give the defendants the benefit of the
	21	presumption	n of innocence.
	22	A	Right.
	23	Q	Because, of course, that presumption starts right
	24	now and con	ntinues
	25	A.	Yes, right.
	26	- Q	until such time as the People are able to

prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? 13b5 1 You understand that? 2 A. Yes. 3 Are you saying you would not be able to do that? Q. A No, I think I am in reverse of what I should be. 5 You would not be able to give the defendants the 6 benefit of the presumption of innocence? No. I don't think so. 8 THE COURT: Do you care to inquire, Mr. Fitzgerald? 9 MR. FITZGERAID: No, your Honor. 10 MR. REINER: No questions. 11 MR. SHINN: No questions. 12 MR. KANAREK: No questions. 13 MR. STOVITZ: No questions. 14 THE COURT: All right, thank you, Mrs. Zuver, you * 15. may go back into the courtroom. 16 Will you refrain from discussing with anybody 17 what has been said in here? 18 MRS. ZUVER: Yes. 19 THE COURT: Thank you. 20 (Mrs. Zuver leaves the chambers of the court.) 21 MR. FITZGERAID: Challenge her for cause. 22 MR. REINER: Join in the challenge. 23 MR. SHINN: Join. 24 MR. KANAREK: Join. 25 THE COURT: The challenge will be allowed. **26**

I did not mean to cut you off if you had some-İ thing to say. MR. STOVITZ: Submit it, your Honor. THE COURT: The challenge will be allowed. Mrs. Zuver will be excused for cause. 15.

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MR. BUGLIOSI: Before we go back in open court I have another question to bring up.

THE COURT: Do you want to take it up now?

MR. BUGLIOSI: After we get the jury.

THE COURT: I am going to have the juror brought in now.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Before we go back in open court I have a legal question. We can discuss it now or after.

THE COURT: Why don't we take it up now unless it is something that should wait.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Again, your Honor, I am going to go back to vicarious liability.

The record was clear up until this morning, the Court has permitted the prosecution to ask the jury whether they had an understanding of this rule of conspiracy.

This morning the Court changed its mind and said that that question was no longer a proper question.

However, the record is abundant here that the Court overruled objections on this point many times during the last couple of weeks.

THE COURT: I can remember specifically stating to you at one time that it seemed to me it would be impossible for anybody to answer that without having had some legal education.

MR. BUGLIOSI: That's right, and then I made an argument back in chambers, and the Court said it would

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reconsider its position.

The following day I commenced asking those questions and I have been asking those questions for the past couple of weeks.

The record is clear on that, and I think defense counsel will agree on that.

And the Court permitted the questions.

I will draw the Court's attention to People vs. Love, 53 Cal. 2d 852, a footnote in Love which uses this language:

"Inquiry into a juror's understanding, the same word of a principle of law may, however, be a prerequisite to inquiry into his willingness to apply that principle of law.

"To preclude such inquiry might under some circumstances constitute a refusal to permit the reasonable examination of prospective jurors to which the parties are entitled."

I would draw the Court's attention to the fact that is the only rule of law that I asked the jury if they understand.

It is more difficult than other rules of law. I don't want to abuse our right, as I feel it, to go into this area.

I don't want to abuse it at all. But on the

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25 26 all-important area of vicarious liability -THE COURT: What was the question you asked again. to

refresh my recollection, which question are you talking about?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Let's say I am asking a particular juror, "Mr. so-and-so, do you understand the rule of

conspiracy which makes one conspirator criminally

responsible for the crimes committed by his co-conspirators?

THE COURT: The thing that bothers me about it/that he cannot possibly understand it unless he is one of those rare individuals who may have gone to law school or had some special reason to understand it.

MR. BUGLIOSI: But I am stating, before I ask this question I am telling the juror what the conspiracy is and what the rule is, and I give him an example, A, B, and C, and after I give the example I ask if he understands.

And I know Mrs. Lee did not understand that particular question, and I kept on going over and over and over again.

Finally she understood.

It is not the type of thing a juror will pick up automatically.

THE COURT: I keep getting the feeling that it could be put in so much simpler terms.

MR. BUGLIOSI: If I knew how, I would appreciate it, so I can tell my law students.

THE COURT: I will be willing to swear to almost anything that these jurors are not grasping the subtle intricacies in the law that counsel are propounding in their questions.

MR. BUGLIOSI: What could be more simplified than to tell the juror what a conspiracy is, an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime, and the overt act, and then say, once the conspiracy is formed each conspirator is responsible for the crimes of the coconspirator.

Let me give you an example, A, B, and C, and then say, "Do you understand this?"

THE COURT: I don't think you ever put it that simply before.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I have, I have, I swear I have because I write out my questions before I ask.

with the six jurors this morning I did not go into that background because I had already gone into it with Mrs. Roseland, so I was starting out with, "Do you understand it?"

But with Mrs. Roseland I did go into the conspiracy laws and I talked about being responsible, one conspirator being responsible for the other's acts.

I gave the A,B, C example.

My question was, "Do you understand what I am talking about?"

If it were not so crucial to this case I would not overuse what I think is a right. But we are attempting to bring Mr. Manson into criminal responsibility for these murders under that theory, that very theory of vicarious liability.

I am not using those terms to the jury, but this is a very precise theory that we are relying upon against the main defendant in this case.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. BUGLIOSI: And if there is some juror that for some reason does not understand this, and then five months from now he says to himself, "Mr. Manson was back on the Spahn Ranch, I just don't like this business of his being responsible for these crimes."

Now, the Court can say, "Well, the jurors have promised to follow the Court's instructions."

But I can give the Court authority for this, and I will very shortly. It is human nature, your Honor, that people are going to be swayed by their beliefs, even if unconsciously.

If some juror does not like that rule of law he might be swayed in applying it to the facts of this case, and this is what I am concerned with.

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Let me cite one case to the Court where the Appellate Court had to acknowledge something that all lawyers and judges know, that simply because a juror says he will follow the instructions of the Court, it doesn't necessarily mean that.

I cite to the Court --

THE COURT: Of course, that is true no matter what you tell him or no matter what you elicit from them.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Right.

I am saying, your Honor, simply because we are getting that answer, it should not preclude the attorneys from going into a certain amount of depth on these individual issues.

Now, in People vs. Bennett, 70 Cal. App. 89, the Court said:

"A Court may charge a jury accurately respecting the law pertinent to the case, yet it does not follow therefrom that the jury will accept the Court's statement of the law as correct and follow it in passing upon the issues to be decided."

The Appellate Court is just recognizing something that everyone knows.

In view of the Supreme Court of the State of California in People vs. Love --

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THE COURT: What was the Court talking about specifically in the Love case? What type of question? Or was it just philosophizing generally?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Let me get that. It is 53 Cal. 2d.

MR. SHINN: Your Honor, may I say something in response to Mr. Bugliosi's statement?

THE COURT: You mean on this subject?

MR. SHINN: Yes, on the same subject, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SHINN: He wants to instruct the jury in a general form.

Now, then, as the Court is fully aware of the fact, there are exceptions to this law: In the event that the conspirator goes out and does something that they didn't agree to, then that conspirator would not be liable.

Then the defense counsel would get up and try to instruct the jury on the law in a different way, and it gets the jury all confused, your Honor.

THE COURT: I know.

MR. SHINN: He wants to instruct the jury on the law to his advantage, the way he wants them to look at it.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The Court in Love does say that any suggestion in People vs. Bennett that the parties must be permitted -- using the word "must" -- to question prospective jurors as to their understanding of general

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principles of law is inconsistent with the foregoing cases and is disapproved.

In other words, there is no automatic right to it, your Honor, but then the Court goes on to say in the footnote:

"However, inquiry into a juror's understanding of a principle of law may, however, be a prerequisite to inquiry into his willingness to apply that principle of law. To preclude such inquiry might, under the circumstances, constitute a refusal to permit the reasonable examination of prospective jurors to which the parties are entitled."

And what I am saying is that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, your Honor, where the People's case against the main defendant, Mr. Manson, is predicated solely on this rule of conspiracy, I feel that it is just absolutely essential that each juror have some idea of what we are talking about, because he might go back there and when he really does come to grips with this particular rule of law, and he doesn't like it, and he hangs up the jury, we have to try the case all over again for another four or five months, and I think it is well worth that extra question that takes ten seconds to preclude this type of situation.

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MR. STOVITZ: Not to belabor it, your Honor, but the average intelligence of these jurors, although they have passed an intelligence test to qualify, as your Honor noticed in the questioning of the last juror, they are not overly intelligent, or they appear to be nervous.

I went to trial in People vs. Varnham, in which one defendant did the shooting and the other two defendants did not, in which at the end of the trial the two defendants that didn't do the shooting didn't understand how they were convicted of murder.

They asked the Court the question. The Court answered the question. They appealed on that point.

The case was reversed on another point.

They came back for a new trial four years later, and four years wiser. They still didn't understand how they, who didn't do any shooting of any gun, could be convicted of first degree murder.

And I submit that the average juror doesn't understand the principle that one person can be convicted of a murder when another person does the actual killing, and if they have any prejudices against that rule of law, now is the time to find out about it, your Honor.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I would like to argue very briefly further, your Honor.

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A juror with a fixed opinion against a particular rule of law cannot always act in the impartial manner required by Section 1073 despite his claim that as he will follow the law/given to him by the Court.

I submit that it is human nature for a person to be swayed, even if unconsciously, by his sentiments.

Now, 1073, Paragraph 2, says that particular causes of challenging for cause are of two kinds. Sub 2, for the existence of a state of mind on the part of a juror in reference to a case or to either of the parties which will prevent him from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice to the substantial rights of either party, which is known in this Code as actual bias.

Now, I submit that common sense would dictate, your Honor, that we cannot ask a juror whether he is prejudiced against a particular rule of law unless he has an idea of what that rule of law is.

For him to say, I am prejudiced against it, or not prejudiced against it, and not have any idea what that rule of law is, by definition, your Honor, is inconsistent.

1073, Sub --

THE COURT: I have been permitting both sides to inquire of the prospective jurors.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Whether they will follow the Court's

instructions on these rules of law.

THE COURT: For example, Mr. Reiner has inquired at some length on the law of accomplice, and you have inquired at some length on other aspects, and Mr. Fitzgerald has gone into some other things.

MR. BUGLIOSI: But this question is different, and it is the only area that we are going into.
"Do you understand?" That is the key word, your Honor.

THE COURT: I can tell you --

MR. BUGLIOSI: When I say, "Do you understand," your Honor, I am not asking if the Court understands. I mean, I am looking at a juror and saying, "Do you understand."

THE COURT: I have looked at the questions, when you asked them, the same way the juror would. In other words, I am trying to anticipate whether the question has any meaning to the prospective jurors.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Thus far, your Honor, the answers have been very good.

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THE COURT: When you are asking, "Do you understand the law of conspiracy," then --

MR. BUGLIOSI: I am not asking that, your Honor.

THE COURT: But you have put it in that form.

MR. BUGLIOSI: No, I have not.

MR. STOVITZ: Maybe we can, on the record, ask it again, drawing attention to the previous questions that he asked Miss Roseland, and if the juror says he didn't hear those questions, then counsel can put it to him.

I think when he asks, "Do you understand that rule of conspiracy," he limits it to that particular point.

MR. BUGLIOSI: That rule.

Thus far, your Honor, the answers have been excellent, the jurors have said, "Yes."

Then I asked, "Have you thought about it?" And they say, "Yes."

Then I ask, "Do you have any prejudice against this?" And the answers have been, "No."

But let me say this and put this on the record, your Honor. One juror, thus far, has said that he disagrees with this rule. Parrish.

Parrish says that he does not agree with that rule of law. And I will state, as an officer of this court, that outside of this court many people have told me that they don't like that rule of law and that they will not convict someone unless that person were involved at the

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scene of the crime.

People have told me this, your Honor, and I will make this representation to the Court.

Thus far, your Honor, Parrish is the only one of all these jurors, but it only takes one to hang up a jury. Parrish is the only one who says he does not like that rule of law.

I want to find out if the other jurors don't like it.

My point is, your Honor --

THE COURT: I think, Mr. Bugliosi, that our differences don't stem from the fundamentals but from the form of the question you have been asking. Not all of them, but some of them.

I have never told you that you can't go into that subject.

MR. STOVITZ: It is a matter of semantics, perhaps.

THE COURT: I think some of the questions are objectionable in the form in which they are phrased.

MR. BUGLIOSI: But the word "understand" is the simplest word I can think of, your Honor.

THE COURT: It depends on what goes with the rest of

MR. BUGLIOSI: I could use "comprehend;" I can use "apprehend," but the simplest word is "understand."

THE COURT: There isn't any ambiguity in the word

"understand," It is what the rest of the sentence consists of. MR. BUGLIOSI: "Do you understand the rule of law," or "this rule of conspiracy," and I previously indicated what that rule is. THE COURT: Well, we will try it again. MR. BUGLIOSI: Okay. MR. KANAREK: May I be heard, your Honor? THE COURT: Yes. 9. MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, because counsel want's to THE COURT: What point are you talking about now?

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MR. KANAREK: I am saying, your Honor, that this emphasis as to this point that Mr. Bugliosi is doing, is advocating in this voir dire, it is denying Mr. Manson a fair trial. There is no question about it, because Mr. Bugliosi has no case, and Mr. Bugliosi has a desire --

THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek --

MR. KANAREK: It is true, your Honor. He has a desire --

THE COURT: When you make a statement like that, Mr. Kanarek, it is just wasting time.

MR. KANAREK: He just said so. He said there is no case against Mr. Manson.

MR. BUGLIOSI: What? When did I say that?

MR. KANAREK: The fair implication of his remarks.

THE COURT: What point are you making? Will you get to it?

MR. KANAREK: I am making the point that this constant emphasis upon Mr. Manson being the "main defendant" and all of that.

THE COURT: I never heard anybody say that.

MR. KANAREK: He said it in this record. Not right now.

MR. STOVITZ: Not before any of the jurors has he ever made that statement.

MR. KANAREK: I am not talking about that.

The point is that right here, right here

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in your Honor's chambers, right here in chambers he made the statement that Mr. Manson is the maindefendant, and it shows the vendetta in connection with what he is asking this Court to do.

In other words, your Honor, he has a weak case, he has no case, so, therefore, he is going to this jury and hammering on voir dire and preinstructing, arguing, in fact, the case to the jury, and it shows that he is, to paraphrase or to compare it to the death orientation, he is conviction-orienting this jury towards Mr. Manson.

And that is just illegal, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, that is not true, Mr. Kanarek.

In the first place, I haven't heard the evidence. I have no way of knowing whether he has a weak case or a strong case, but the principle involved is precisely the same in either case. That is, he, like any other party, has a right to reasonable examination of the jurors to determine their state of mind with respect to these things, including whether or not they would be willing to follow the Court's instructions.

Now, what we have been talking about pertains to the form of these questions.

MR. KANAREK: But what he is saying is, your Honor, that there is a particular rule of law. What he is saying is that there is a particular rule of law that he has determined through his -- whatever it is -- whatever you

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want to call it -- that he has determined that this rule of law is not adopted by a lot of people, and, therefore, he wants some special kind of privilege to advocate that particular proposition to the jury.

THE COURT: All right, let's bring in the next prospective juror.

THE CLERK: Is this one excused, your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes. Mrs. Zuver is excused for cause.

MR. KANAREK: I request, your Honor, our motion is that Mr. Bugliosi, because of what he has just argued to the Court, that he be ordered not to interrogate in connection with -- I don't care which way he states it, whether he puts "if" in front of it or not -- that he not be allowed to interrogate in connection with the law of conspiracy, because this is just one principle of law that he wishes to dwell upon because, admittedly, by his own statements, he has no case against Mr. Manson.

MR. BUGLIOSI: When did I say that, Mr. Kanarek? THE COURT: All right.

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MR. FITZGERAID: May I make a remark, your Honor? THE COURT: Yes.

MR. FITZGERAID: Your Honor, the law of conspiracy is difficult, it is intricate, and it is sophisticated, and I think that Mr. Bugliosi has made an honest attempt to explain in his questions certain basic premises of the law of conspiracy, but almost every question he asks assumes a definition or a knowledge of the term "conspiracy" to begin with, and frequently he asks questions the form of which goes something as follows: If two or more people conspire, do you understand that?

Well, that presumes knowledge on the part of the juror as to conspiracy.

I would have no objection if your Honor wants to instruct the entire jury panel on the law of conspiracy. That seems to be the only fair way to do it, because to ask these jurors --

THE COURT: I don't think that is necessary.

I think the questions can be phrased in a general way.

In other words, you could say, for example, that there is, in the law, a theory of liability which runs something like this, and keep it in general terms.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Very good.

THE COURT: And "If you were instructed in this case," I mean, you can expand on it a little more, but I am just

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giving you an example of an introduction.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The theory --

THE COURT: Let's not argue about the specific question. The point is that with a little thought I think it can be done and the questions can be tailored so that they are not ambiguous to elicit whether or not the juror understands the fundamentals that you are talking about and whether if, in this case, he is so instructed, and he finds it is applicable under the facts as he finds them, he would be willing to follow such an instruction, and then you get over exactly the same thing without all the intricate, complex details of the law.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I am not going into details, your Honor. There is no other word that I know of.

THE COURT: The principle involved is very simple.

Two or more people agree on something and they commit an overt act, and there may or may not be liability.

It is when you get into all the refinements.

MR. FITZGERAID: I agree with the Court, but what Mr. Bugliosi does, your Honor, there are male and female defendants on trial here, he uses the personal pronoun, "he," which singles out the male defendant in the case, and other times he uses the personal pronoun "she," which singles out the females.

If he would use the pronoun "one," or "If a person conspires," then --

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MR. BUGLIOSI: I will try to do that.

THE COURT: I have said that on innumerable occasions in this case. If you will try to keep your questions regarding specific points of law in general terms, then you won't run into any problem. It is when you try to get down into specifics that it becomes instruction and indoctrination, and I repeat again, that is where the problem is.

MR. BUGLIOSI: There is no way to avoid the use of the word "understand." That is the most simple word, your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't have any objection to that.

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MR. BUGLIOSI: This is what I want to do. I want to ask them if they understand something. Now, I have to state to them what, basically, the law --

THE COURT: You ask them if they understand the law of conspiracy.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, I never asked that question.

THE COURT: Perhaps I misunderstood you then, Mr. Bugliosi.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I asked, "Do you understand this particular rule of conspiracy which makes one conspirator responsible for the crimes of his co-conspirator."

I know of no more simple way of articulating that theory of vicarious liability.

I will say that that statement is not only correct, but it is immensely more simple than the instruction in CALJIG.

THE COURT: It may be.

MR.BUGLIOSI: That is a very much more simplified statement.

THE COURT: There is more than one instruction on that.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I am talking about this particular rule of law, vicarious liability.

That statement that I make is in much more simple language than CALJIG.

THE COURT: I meant, there is more than one 1 instruction in CALJIG on conspiracy, if I remember right. 2 MR. BUGLIOSI: There is just one instruction as far 3 as I know on vicarious liability. THE COURT: All right. 5 I think we understand each other. Ġ. MR. BUGLIOSI: I don't know if we do. 7 THE COURT: Apparently it is a disagreement on 8. semantics on a particular point in time. 9 MR. BUGLIOSI: The key word is "understand." 10 We will try again. 11 THE COURT: All right. 12 Let's bring in the next prospective juror. 13 14 (Whereupon a prospective juror enters the 15 Court's chambers.) THE COURT: Good afternoon, sir. 16 MR. VITZELIO: Good afternoon. 18 THE CLERK: The prospective juror's name is Walter 19 Vitzelio; W-a-1-t-e-r, V-i-t-z-e-l-i-o. 20 MR. STOVITZ: "V" like in Victor? 21 THE CLERK: Yes. $\cdot 22$ 23 VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MR. VITZELIO 24 BY THE COURT: 25 Mr. Vitzelio, if you were selected as a juror 26 in this case, would you be able to serve?

1	A Yes, I believe I could.	
2	Q You do recall, do you, that I have asked the	
.3	other prospective jurors certain questions regarding the	
4	death penalty?	
5	A Yes, sir.	
.6·	Q And have you had an opportunity to think about	
7	those questions and to think about your answers to them,	
8	sir?	
.9	A Yes, sir.	
10	Q All right.	
11	I am going to ask you those questions now.	
12	Do you entertain such conscientious opinions	
12 13	regarding the death penalty that you would be unable to	
14 14	make an impartial decision as to any defendant's guilt	
1 5	regardless of the evidence in the case?	
1Ġ	A No.	
17	Q Do you entertain such conscientious opinions	
18	regarding the death penalty that you would automatically	
19	refuse to impose it without regard to the evidence in	
2 0	the case?	
21	A No, sir.	
22	Q Now, I'm going to ask you some questions	
23	about what you may have learned about this case or any	
24	other defendants from reading newspapers, watching television	n,
25	listening to the radio, and so forth.	
26	A Yes sir.	

1	Q Have you lived in Los Angeles County
2 [.]	continuously since last August?
3	A Yes, sir.
4	Q Do you subscribe to a daily newspaper?
5	A No, sir.
6	Q Do you read a daily newspaper on a regular
. 7	basis?
	A Every Sunday I get the Sunday Times, and I
· 9	read the advertising section, that is all.
10	MR.FITZGERALD: I didn't hear the last?
11	MR. VITZELIO: I said that every Sunday I get the
12	Sunday Times and I read the advertising section. That is
13	all I read in the paper.
D . 14	THE COURT: Would you keep your voice up as much as
15	you can, please, Mr. Vitzelio.
14f fls ₁₆	MR. VITZELIO: Yes, sir.
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L4F 1 1	THE COURT: Q Do you watch television?
2	A I watch Channel 9, What's My Line, occasionally;
•	and once in a great while the news at 6:00 o'clock, Channel
. 4	2.
5	Q The 6:00 o'clock news?
6	A Yes.
Ż.	Q Once in a while, you say?
8.	A Yes. Not regularly.
9	MR. STOVITZ: Channel 2?
10	MR. VITZELIO: Channel 2.
1,1	THE COURT: Q Do you listen to the radio at all?
12 ·	A Yes, sir. In the morning when we eat breakfast,
13	KFWB.
14	Q This is a news program?
15	A Yes. KFWB.
16	Q Keep your voice up, please.
17	A Generally station KFWB while we are eating
18	breakfast.
19	Q All right.
20	Now, as a result of whatever you have learned
21	about this case, have you formed any opinion as to the
22	guilt or innocence of the defendants?
23	A No, sir.
24	Q Before you came into this case on this jury
25	panel, did you know the names of any of these defendants?
26	A No.

I saw Mr. Manson on television. That was, oh, .4F2 1 months ago, when he was first picked up as a suspect. think I saw that on the news just partly, and that is the last time that I ever saw him. 5 Did you know the names of any of the female 6 defendants? 7 No. A 8 Do you know the names of any of the victims? Q 9 Ă No, sir. 10 Did you ever know them? Q 11 À No, sir. 12 Did you ever hear of Sharon Tate? Q. 13. Yes, I heard of that when it first happened, A, 14 when the murder was committed. 15 Do you know the names of any of the other ,16 victims? 17 A No. sir. 18 Have you ever read or heard anything which Q. 19 appeared to be a description of what happened in these 20 killings by someone who is there? 21 A No. sir: 22 Now, you know, of course, that the defendants 23 have been arrested and charged with these offenses? 24 Yes. 25 And that they are before the Court for trial

to determine their guilt or innocence.

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Do you understand that?

A Yes.

Now, apart from those facts, have you ever learned anything which caused you to believe that there was some connection between the defendants and the commission of the alleged crime?

No. sir.

Did you hear me state in court yesterday -- or perhaps it was the day before, I am not sure -- that in every criminal case a defendant is entitled to the presumption of innocence?

> A Yes, sir.

If you were selected as a juror, would you give the benefit of the presumption of innocence to each of these defendants?

> Yes, sir. A

You understand that that presumption of innocence continues until such time as the People are able to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?

A Yes, sir.

Do you understand that? Q.

Ä. Yes.

Now, if the People were unable to prove guilt Q. beyond a reasonable doubt, would you then vote for an acquitta1?

> Unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt? A

L4F4 sir. 1 If the People were unable to carry their Yes. 2 burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . 3 A Yes. 4 Would you then be willing and would you vote for 5 a verdict of acquittal? 6. Yes. A 7 1.5 8 .9 10 11 12 13. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

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Q On the other hand, if the People were able to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, would you be willing to vote a verdict of guilty?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you feel that at this moment you are entirely impartial as far as the question of the guilt or the innocence of any of the defendants is concerned?

A Yes, sir.

Q You don't tend to lean one way or the other?

A No, sir, there is one question, though.

Q All right.

A I have a brother who is a deputy sheriff. He is in the reserve.

Q You have a brother?

A Yes, he is in the Sheriff's Department Reserve.

Q Would that affect your thinking?

A No.

Q If you were a juror?

A No, I thought you would ask.

Q Yes, I am sure the attorneys will be glad to know that and probably would have asked you that later.

Now, if you were selected as a juror would you be willing to put whatever you heard or learned about this case, or the defendants, to one side and decide the issues solely on the basis of the evidence that comes in during this trial?

15-2	1	A Yes, sir.
<u>~</u>	2	Q Do you have any question about your ability
	3	to do so?
	4	A No, sir.
	5	THE COURT: Mr. Fitzgerald.
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	7	VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MR. VILZELIO
•	8	BY MR. FITZGERAID:
	9	Q Is Mr. Manson famous?
	10	A Mr. who?
	11	Q Mr. Menson, Charles Manson.
	12	A No, not that I know of outside of this case
	13	here. He's got a lot of publicity.
• .	14	Q Did it get a lot of publicity, Mr. Manson and
	15	his case?
	16,	A I imagine it did.
	17.	Q Well, I am asking you for your opinion.
	18	Did it get a lot of publicity?
	19	A Well, I don't know why not, yes, I imagine it
	20	did.
	21	MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, can he speak up?
:	22	THE COURT: Yes, keep your voice up, sir.
	23	Q BY MR. FITZGERAID: You heard Mr. Manson's
,	24	name frequently on radio and television?
<u> </u>	2 5	A No, not frequently. I don't listen to radio
	26	that much.

1	Q Where did he get the publicity that you
2	mentioned?
3	A Well, when he was first picked up.
4	Q Where was that publicity?
<i>5</i>	A Well, Channel 2 is where I saw it on there where
6	he first was a suspect.
7	Q . What was said on television?
8	A Nothing was said.
9	I don't remember now, the exact words. I just
10	saw them taking him down the corridor, I think it was, I
11	don't know what building it was even.
12	Q Who did you think he was?
13	A What?
14	Q Who did you think Mr. Manson was?
15	A Well, he was a suspect in that murder case, the
16	Tate murder case, I guess it was.
17	I don't know whether it was or not, I saw him
18	walking is all I saw.
19	Q Did you know anything else about Mr. Manson?
20	A No, sir, I never heard of him before.
21	Q The only thing you know is what?
22	A That I saw him on television. He was
28	suspected of a Hollywood killing.
24	Q Do you know anything about his background? .
25	A No, sir.
26	Q Have you ever heard anything about his background

1 1	A No.
2 '	Q Do you know where he went to school?
3	A No.
4	Q Do you know where he was born?
5	A No, I don't.
6	Q Did you know the names of any of the female
7	
· 8	defendants in this case?
9	Q Have you ever heard the name Atkins, Susan
10	Atkins?
11	A Yeah, I heard about her when they were taking
12	him, Mr. Manson
13	THE COURT: Keep your voice up.
14	THE PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I heard her name mentioned
15	once, I believe, I don't remember whether it was when they
16	were taking Mr. Manson in custody or not.
17	Q BY MR. FITZGERAID: Do you know who she is?
18	A Well, she is one of these the girl in the
19	blue, is that her?
20	Q That's right. Had you heard anything about
21	the girl in blue before you came into court here?
22	A No, sir, I saw her picture once when they had
23	Mr. Manson there, I think it was her, when they were
24	walking down the corridor.
25	That is the only thing I ever saw anything
26	about her.

1	Q Do you know why Miss Atkins is charged with
2	Mr. Manson?
3 .	A Why?
4	Q Yes.
5	A No, I don't. I know she is charged with
6	murder, but I don't know why she is charged with him.
7	Q Did the thought ever occur to you, did you ever
8	ask yourself why Susan Atkins is in the same case with
9	Charles Manson?
10	A Well, they were supposed to have a kind of
11	communal clique, or something, didn't they?
12	Q A communal clique?
13.	A Yes.
14	Q Where did you hear that?
15	A Well, I'm aware I heard it.
16	Q On radio, television?
17	A I don't remember, possibly on radio, because I
18	don't watch television enough to see it on television.
19	Q And what about the other two girls, Patricia
20	Krenwinkel and Leslie Van Houten, have you ever heard of
21	them before?
22	A No, I didn't even know their names.
23	Q Did it ever occur to you why they were charged
24 ,	with Mr. Manson?
25	A No.
26	Q No reason at all?

1	A	No.
2	Q	Do you know who killed Sharon Tate?
3	A	No, I don't.
4	Q	Do you have an opinion?
5	A .	No, I do not.
6	ର	Did anybody ever discuss it with you?
7	A	No, sir.
\$	Q	Did you and your wife ever talk about it?
9	. .	No, never talked about it.
10.	Q.	Did you ever talk about the offenses themselves?
11	A	No, sir.
12	Q	Didn't you say to your wife, "Oh, what a
13	horrible th	ing this is"?
14	Á	No, we have not talked about it.
15	,	My wife don't look at television at all very
16	much. She	has a couple of cataracts covering her eyes.
17	She don't w	atch television very seldom.
1 8	Q	Do you have any personal feeling about
19	Mr. Manson?	<i>.</i>
20	A * *	No, sir.
21	Q,	Do you have any personal feeling about the
22.	female defe	ndants in this case?
23	A	No, sir.
24	Q	Have you ever heard of Mr. Kanarek?
25	A	Kanarek? Yeah, that is a defense lawyer for
26	Mr. Manson,	I believe, is that who you are talking about?

1	Q Yes, had you ever heard about Mr. Kanarek
2	before you ever came to court?
3	A No, not until he was introduced in court here,
4	Monday, I believe it was.
5	Q You've got a pretty good memory.
6	A Yes.
7	Q You heard Mr. Kanarek's name once?
8	A Well, I don't know if I heard it once. I
9.	know I heard it in court here I think it was Monday when
10	Judge Older here introduced him.
11	Q Do you know the names of the other defense
12	attorneys?
13	A Well, let's see, I believe that is Mr. Reiner in
14	the back here no, here is Reiner over here.
15	Q Is that about it?
16	A I don't know which one is Mr. Fitzgerald.
17	You are Mr. She?
18	MR. SHINN: Mr. She?
19	THE PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Shee or someone I don't
20	know.
21	Q BY MR. FITZGERAID: But you did not hear about
22	Mr. Kanarek on the radio?
23	A No.
24	Q Or seen him on television.
25	A No, only as an attorney on this case.
26	MR. FITZGERAID: Thank you.

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1	THE COURT: I think we'd better take our recess at
2	this time, gentlemen.
3.	You may go back into the courtroom, Mr.
- 4	Vitzelio.
5	We will take a recess and then come back.
6	Please do not discuss with anyone what you have
7	heard in chambers.
8	MR. VITZELIO: All right.
9	(Recess.)
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15a-1 (The following proceedings were had in the chambers of the Court, all defendants and counsel being present, Mr. Bugliosi and Mr. Stovitz representing 3 the People:) 4 THE COURT: All parties and counsel are present. 5 I had concluded. MR. FITZGERALD: 6 THE COURT: Mr. Reiner? 7 MR. REINER: No questions. 8 No questions. MR.SHINN: 9 THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek. 10 MR. KANAREK: No questions. 11 THE COURT: Mr. Stovitz? 12 13 VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MR. VILZELIO 14 15 BY MR. STOVITZ: Sir, how old are you? 16 Q 67. 17 A And you are retired, sir? 18 Q 19 A Yes, sir. Assume for the moment that you are out in 20 this jury box for the next four or five days while we are 21 back here picking a jury, do you think you could follow 22 the Court's admonition and not read anything about this . 23 24 case and keep your voice just as pure as it has been? 25 Yes, sir. 26 You won't be tempted to go to the library and

15a-2 ₁	read up about all of the things you missed out on?
2	A No. sir.
3	Q All right, and assume that the Court does
4	not sequester the jury, that means keep them in a hotel
. 5	night after night, do you think you can follow the
6	Court's admonition and just listen to the evidence
7	and decide this case solely on the evidence?
.8	A Yes, sir.
9.	Q Do you know the difference between rumor and
1Ô	evidence?
11	A Yes, sir.
12	Q And you think you can judge this case solel
13	on the evidence?
.14	A Yes, sir.
15	MR. STOVITZ: I have no further questions.
16	THE COURT: All right, Mr. Vilzelio, would you the
17	go back in the courtroom and please refrain from talking
18	about what was discussed in here with everybody?
19	MR. VILZELIO: Yes, sir.
20	THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
21	(Mr. Vilzelio leaves the chambers of the
22	Court.)
23	MR. FITZGERALD: For the record, your Honor, we
24	would like to interpose an objection, a challenge for
25	cause on the basis that this juror was exposed to
26	prejudicial pretrial publicity.

15a-3 MR. REINER: 1 Join. 2 MR. SHINN: Join. MR. KANAREK: Join. 3 4 MR. STOVITZ: Object to this challenge, your Honor. THE COURT: The challenge will be disallowed. 5 6 Now, we have 12 persons in the jury box all of whom have gone through the preliminary voir dire 8 here in chambers, so at this time we should go into ["]9 the courtroom and continue your voir dire on other matters, 10 if you care to. 11 MR. REINER: Just Mr. Vilzelio. 12: THE COURT: He is the only one that has not already 13 been examined. 14 MR. STOVITZ: Mr. Baer, your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Mr. Vilzelio came into Seat No. 11, 16 after the Mr. Cato was challenged by a peremptory challenge 17 this morning. 18 MR. STOVITZ: I'm sorry, I was looking at an old 19 sheet, your Honor. 20. THE COURT: All right. 21 MR. KANAREK: I gather then whatever voir dire 22 Mr. Bugliosi does will be as to Mr. -- how is that? 23. THE COURT: Vilzelio. .24 MR.KANAREK: -- Vilzelio only. 25. THE COURT: Well, I would assume so. He is the 26 only person that has come into the jury box since the last

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challenge.

MR. KANAREK: Right. I just wanted to pinpoint that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I won't foreclose any counsel if they deem it of some importance, to reopen, go back and ask a question again of someone else.

I hope we can avoid going over things again unless it is absolutely necessary.

MR. KANAREK: Very well, your Honor.

MR. REINER: Before we go back into open court, something has been brought to my attention.

Apparently the prospective jurors seated in the audience have been discussing the case among themselves.

Perhaps the prospective jurors as well as the jurors who have been called into the box might be admonished that they should not discuss the case or the voir dire examination.

THE COURT: Of course I do admonish them every day on that.

MR. REINER: Does the Court's admonishment take in other jurors seated in the courtroom?

THE COURT: Absolutely, the entire panel.

MR. REINER: Perhaps they don't understand it is not a conversation among themselves, because they are not very guarded in their conversation.

They discuss the case quite freely, apparently,

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while seated in the audience out there while we are in chambers, not in the jury but in the audience.

THE COURT: All right, I will admonish them again this afternoon when we adjourn, and I will make a point of it.

If I forget, why, remind me, and I will make a point of saying that the admonition applies to the entire panel.

MR. STOVITZ: I think, your Honor, I have heard smatterings like "Where are the defendants now?" and "What are they going to do now?"

I don't know whether that is talking about the case. Most jurors think talking about the case means talking about the evidence in a case.

Jurors are out there doing absolutely nothing. Some of them don't even bring any reading material or knitting.

So maybe they don't understand what talking about the case means.

You should say "don't discuss the case in any facet, shape, manner or form."

Maybe that will be better.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I think that would be an unreasonable abridgement of their constitutional rights to freedom of speech.

THE COURT: I don't really see it is objectionable

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when they wonder where the defendants or counsel are.

All right, let's go back in open court.

15-B-1 1	(The following proceedings were had in open
2	court in the presence and hearing of the prospective jurors,
3	all defendants and their counsel being present; Mr. Bugliosi
4	and Mr. Stovitz being present.)
5	THE COURT: All parties and counsel are present.
6	All of the prospective jurors are in the jury
. 7	box.
. 8 .	Do you wish to inquire further, Mr. Fitzgerald?
9	MR. FITZGERALD: Yes.
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. 11	VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MR. VITZELIO
12	BY MR. FITZGERAID:
13	Q Mr. Vitzelio, what is your business or
14	occupation?
15	A Retired.
16	Q What did you do for a living?
17	A Well, I was a guard the last 20 years.
18	Q You were a guard?
19	A Yes, sir.
20	Q Whom did you guard for?
Ž 1	A Plant Protection, Goodyear Rubber Company.
22	Q For Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company you were
. 23	a security agent?
24	A Yes, sir.
25	. Q You carried a gun?
. 26	A Yes, sir.

	1	·
15B2	1	Q You are familiar with firearms?
	2	A Yes, sir.
	3	Q Have you ever testified in any legal proceeding?
	4	A No, sir.
	5	Q Have you ever been the complaining witness
	6	or the prosecuting witness in any kind of criminal
	7	action at all?
	-8	A No, sir.
	9 .	Q You have never been a witness in a criminal
	10	case, is that right?
	11	A No, I have been a witness in a traffic accident.
	12	Q In the course of your employment as a security
_	13	guard, I take it you never got involved in any kind of
	14	burglary or robbery or anything like that where you had to
1	.15	testify in court?
	16	A No, sir.
	17	Q Did you ever have to use your weapon in the line
	18	of duty there at Goodyear?
,	19	A No, sir.
	20	Q You have a brother that is a police officer,
	21	isn't that correct?
j.	. 22	A Sheriff's Department Reserve.
	23	Q What does that mean?
	24	A Well, he is in communications with the
	25	Sheriff's Department, Reserve Deputy Sheriff.
	26	Q What I mean is, what is a reserve deputy

1	sheriff?	
2	A	Well, he works part-time, I guess.
.3	·Q	Does he have some other business or occupation?
4	A	Yes, he does.
5	Q	What does he do for a living ordinarily?
6	A	Well, he is in the bronzing business.
7	Q	Do you see him often?
8	A	Possibly once a month.
9	Q	I take it he is dedicated to some sort of law
10	enforcement	function, right?
11	A	Well, I don't know, I wouldn't say that.
12	Q	Does he discuss his views of law enforcement
13	and crime w	ith you?
14	A	No, sir, he is in communications.
15	Q	He is not going to influence you in arriving
16	at a verdic	t, is he?
17	A	No, sir.
18	Q	Could you acquit these defendants?
19	. A	If the evidence showed they were innocent.
20	Q.	Do we have to prove it to you?
21	A ·	Yes, sir.
22	Q.	We would have to prove that we were innocent?
23	A	Yes, sir.
24	Q	What if the prosecution did not prove they
25	were guilty	r beyond a reasonable doubt?
26	A	Then I would find them innocent.

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1	Q	So you would not make us prove that we were
2	innocent.	
3		Maybe we are quibbling over words.
4		You understand that a defendant in a criminal
5 .	case is pres	umed to be innocent?
6	A	Yes, sir.
7	Q	If you were sworn as a juror and you did not
8	hear any evi	dence at all, and you went back in the jury
9	room, what w	ould you do?
10	A	I didn't hear no evidence?
11	Q.	Yes.
12	A	I couldn't do nothing; I couldn't make no
13	decision.	
14	Q	You would have to find them not guilty, would
15	you not?	
16	A.	That's right.
17	Q.	Because their guilt had not been proven to you?
1,8	A . '	That's right.
19	Q,	Who do you think has to prove their guilt?
20	A	The prosecution.
21	Q.	And how do they have to prove it?
22	A	Beyond a reasonable doubt.
23	વ	Let's say they put on some evidence; they
24	did not prov	e it beyond a reasonable doubt. What would you
25	do?	,
26	A.	Find them innocent.

1	Q And do you think you have the courage to acquit
2	these defendants of murder and still face your brother-
3	in-law and anybody else?
4	A Yes, sir.
5	Q Do you have the courage of your convictions?
·6	A Yes, sir.
. 7	Q Would you give the defendants in this case the
. 8	benefit of your own individual opinion in arriving at a
9	verdict?
10	A Yes, sir.
. 11 +	Q Do you understand that the defendants in this
12	case cannot be convicted without your personal vote?
13	A Yes, sir.
14	MR. FITZGERAID: I have nothing further.
15	THE COURT: Mr. Reiner.
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5c-1	1	VOIR DIRE EXAM	MINATION OF MR. VITZELIO
	2	BY MR. REINER:	
):	3	Q Mr. Vit	zelio?
	4	A Yes, si	\$•
	5	Q Did you	have an opportunity to hear the
	6	questions that I have	asked from time to time of the
	7	prospective jurors?	•
	8	A Yes, si:	₹
	9	Q Would yo	ou like to hear them again?
	.10	A No, sir	•
	14	Q Do you :	cecall any questions that I asked
	1 2	of other prospective	urors that you perhaps would have
	13	answered differently?	
	14	A No, sir	•
	15	Q Do you	Geel you can give Miss Van Houten
	16	a fair trial?	
	17	A Yes, si	
	18	Q Do you	eel that you could acquit her if
	19	the eyidence is insuf-	ficient, irrespective of whether it
	20	is or not sufficient	s to any other defendant?
	21	A Repeat	that question again.
	22	Q Do you	Teel you can acquit Miss Van Houten
	23	if the evidence as to	her is insufficient, even if it is
	24	sufficient as to some	other defendant?
,	25	A Yes, si:	C•
	26 :	Q You wou!	d not as a group convict them all or

day, could/think of any answer that you would give that would be different from the answers Miss Roseland gave?

A No, sir.

Q Now, assume for the moment, sir, that all of those questions were asked, and your answers were substantially the same, and you went out to deliberate on this case and you were convinced beyond any reasonable doubt as to the guilt of this young lady, Miss Van Houten.

You have seen her now; you were in the Judge's chambers; you had a good close look at her.

Do you think if that evidence convinced you of her guilt that you would have the courage of your convictions to come back and say "Yes, I do find you, Leslie Van Houten, guilty of murder in the first degree"?

A Yes, sir.

Q All right, now, this decision, is a personal one, isn't it, one that you yourself would have to make in your own mind?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, we are going to assume that you made up your own mind, the verdict is guilty of murder in the first degree, now, there will be a second trial known as the penalty trial.

You may or may not hear any evidence concerning Leslie Van Houten during that penalty trial.

15c-2 ₁	acquit them all if there is evidence as to one or more?
2	A No. sir.
3	MR. REINER: Thank you, no further questions.
4	THE COURT: Mr. Shinn?
5	MR.SHINN; No questions.
6	THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek?
7	MR. KANAREK: No questions.
8	THE COURT: Mr. Stovitz?
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10	VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
11	BY MR. STOVITZ:
12	Q How do you pronounce your name, sir?
18	A Vitzelio.
14	Q Sir, have you ever been a juror before in
15	any type of criminal case?
16	A Well, I was with the Municipal Court here,
17	oh, some seven or eight years ago. I was in a traffic
18	case.
19	Q And you understand that the doctrine of
. 20	proof beyond a reasonable doubt means exactly what the
21	Court explained to you the other day?
22	It does not mean proof to an absolute
25	certainty. You understand that?
24	A Yes, sir.
28	Q Now,/Mr. Bugliosi's questions were read
` 20	to you as they were asked of Miss Roseland, the other

1	Do you understand that?
2	A Yes, sir.
3	Q Do you think that you could go back and
4	consider whether or not she should be given the death
5	penalty for her complicity, if that is proven to you in
6·	this case?
Ť	A Yes, sir.
8	Q Do you have any reservations in your mind
9	about voting for the death penalty?
10	A No, sir.
11	Q If the evidence were to be sufficient in
12	your mind to warrant the imposition of the death penalty
13	as to anyone of these defendants you could vote accordingly
14 .	is that correct?
15	A Yes, sir.
16	Q Now, sir, thinking about your own background,
17	thinking about what little you know of this case, do you
18	think you could give both parties, the People and the
19	defendants a fair and impartial trial?
20	A Yes, sir.
21	MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I would object I
15d fls.22	will withdraw the objection, your Honor, I'm sorry.
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25 26 Q BY MR. STOVITZ: Sir, it may very well be that throughout this trial you may agree with certain lawyers as to their points of view.

You may say to yourself, "This Mr. Reiner here, he is a very intelligent, reasonable fellow. He is reasonable in all his questions, and he is reasonable in his approaches to the witnesses."

And later on at the end of the case he is going to make an argument to you.

Do you understand that the argument is not evidence; do you understand that?

A Yes, sir.

Q You understand that you are to be governed solely by the evidence in the case and not by the appearances of the attorneys.

Do you understand that?

A Yes, sir.

Q And regardless of how reasonable or unreasonable an attorney appears to be, it is not the attorney that is going to be deciding in this case, is that right?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now again, thinking of your own background, is there anything you want to tell us before you are selected as a juror in this case?

A No, sir.

MR. STOVITZ: Thank you very kindly.

You are welcome. 15D2 MR. VITZELIO: 1 The People pass for cause, your Honor. MR. STOVITZ: 2 THE COURT: The defendants may exercise a joint 3 peremptory. 4 MR. FITZGERAID: There is no unanimity of opinion. 5 There will not be a joint peremptory challenge. 6 Patricia Krenwinkel separately and individually 7 accepts the jury as it is now constituted. 8 MR. SHINN: Susan Atkirs accepts the jury as it is now 9 constituted. 10 THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek? 11 MR. KANAREK: Mr. Manson accepts the jury, your 12 Honor, as constituted. 13 THE COURT: Mr. Stovitz? 14 MR. STOVITZ: Yes, your Honor. May counsel confer? 15 (Off-the-record conference between Deputies 16 District Attorney.) 17 MR.STOVITZ: The People thank and excuse Mr. Stringer. 18 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Stringer, you are 19 excused. 20 MR. KANAREK: May we approach the bench, your Honor? 21 MR. FITZGERAID: Can we defer it? We are going to 22 select the name of another prospective juror and then go 23 into chambers. 24 THE COURT: Yes. 25 MR. KANAREK: That is agreeable, your Honor. 26

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THE COURT: All right, I will ask the parties and counsel to come into chambers and then we will call the name of the next prospective juror and resume the examination in chambers.

(Whereupon, at 3:46 p.m. the following proceedings were had in the chambers of the court, away from the hearing of the prospective jurors, all defendants and their counsel being present, Mr. Stovitz and Mr. Bugliosi representing the People.)

THE COURT: All parties and counsel are present.

Will you call the next prospective juror.

Before they come in, we might just check our notes. My notes indicate that the People have exercised 12 peremptory challenges.

Mr. Reiner; on behalf of Miss Van Houten, has exercised five individuals, and Mr. Fitzgerald has exercised on behalf of Miss Krenwinkel one individual.

There have been no joint challenges exercised on behalf of the defendants.

Does that conform to your records?

MR. FITZGERALD: Correct.

MR. STOVITZ: May we, your Honor, in the event we do arrive at a jury as far as the first 12, may we have the individual consent of the defendants to the effect that it is agreeable with them that their counsel --

THE COURT: Let's not go out of the way, Mr. Stovitz.

I think it is of vital concern. MR. STOVITZ: 1 THE COURT: They are represented by competent counsel 2 in my opinion. 3 Counsel are obviously consulting with their 4 They are perfectly capable. -5 MR. STOVITZ: I know they are consulting. 6 like it for the record just to make sure that it is with 7 the consent of the defendants that the jury is accepted. 8: I just wanted to make a point briefly, MR. KANAREK: 9. the last juror excused was of the black or Negro race. 10. May the record show that same juror MR. STOVITZ: 11 expressed hardship, your Honor, and the People are helping 12 this juror get back to his wife and four children. 13 THE COURT: Very well. 14 The solicitude is noted, your Honor. MR. KANAREK: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

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16-1	1	THE COURT: Bring in the next prospective juror.
	2	(A prospective juror enters.)
): 	,3	THE COURT: Good afternoon.
	4	MRS. VAN PELT: Good afternoon.
	5 .	THE CLERK: The prospective juror's name is
	6	Katherine A. Van Pelt, K-a-t-h-e-r-i-n-e, V-a-n P-e-l-t.
	7	
	8	VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MRS. VAN PELT
	·9	BY THE COURT:
	10	Q Mrs. Van Pelt, if you were selected as a juro
	11	in this case, would you be able to serve?
	12	A I'd rather not.
	18 .	MR. STOVITZ: I couldn't hear you.
	14	(The answer was read by the reporter.)
	1 5	THE COURT: You will have to keep your voice up.
	16	MRS. VAN PELT: I am sorry.
	17 .	THE COURT: You are really talking to that man
	18.	down the hall about 50 feet, because there are bad
	19	acoustics in this room.
,	20	So, please keep your voice up.
	21	MRS. VAN PELT: All right.
	22	BY THE COURT:
	23	Q Why would you rather not?
	24	A Because I don't think that I am really
	25	impartial. I think I have a definite opinion.
:	26	Q All right.

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16-2	1	I will get to your state of mind
	2	A All right.
	3	Q as to those questions a little bit later.
	4	A Physically, yes.
	5 ;	Q Sometimes people have problems
	6	A I do work.
	Î	Q sometimes physically they can't
	8	A I work. I don't know how long they will
	9	pay my salary.
	10	Q Where are you employed?
	11	A The Ben Franklin Division of City Products.
	12	Q Have you been able to find out from your
	13	company what their policy is on jury service over 30 days?
	14	A No. That never came up. I could find out.
	15	Q Would you?
	16	A Yes.
	17	Can you hear me?
	18	MR. STOVITZ: Yes. Thank you.
	19	BY THE COURT:
	. 20	Q I have asked the other prospective jurors
	21	regarding the death penalty. Did you hear those questions?
	22	A Yes.
	23	Q Have you had a chance to think about them
	24	and your answers to them?
	25	A Yes.
	26	Q I am going to put the same questions to you

now. 1 Do you entertain such conscientious opinions 2 regarding the death penalty that you would be unable to 3 make an impartial decision as to any defendant's guilt regardless of the evidence in the case? 5 No. 6 Do you entertain such conscientious opinions 7 regarding the death penalty that you would automatically 8 refuse to impose it without regard to the evidence in the 9 case? 10 No. 11 You mentioned something about your state of 12 mind. Was that on the subject of an opinion one way or 13 the other as to the defendants' guilt or innocence? 14 Yes. 15 16 Q. All right. 17 Have you, at this time, an opinion on that 18 question? 19 A Yes, I do. 20 Q. And what is that opinion based on? 21 Well, publicity, I think; things I have seen **22** on television that made an impression, and I am not too could 23 sure I/forget them. 24 Do you remember that in court, when the panel 25 came in the courtroom, I instructed them, among other things, 26 that in every criminal case a defendant is entitled to

	1	the presumption of innocence?
	2	A Yes.
	3	Q Do you understand that that presumption
	4	continues until such time as the People prove their
	5	guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?
	6	A Yes.
	7	Q If they are able to do this.
	8	A Yes, I understand, yes.
	9,	Q Are you telling me that you would be unable
	10	to give that presumption of innocence to these defendants?
	11	A No. I think what I am trying to tell you
	12	is that I really well, I don't know whether I could
	13	or not.
.	14	I couldn't say yes. I could assume this.
16a :	E1 ¹ §.	I couldn't say yes. I could assume this. I think your attitudes hold over. I don't know.
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16a :	E1¹5. 16	
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16a :	16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	
16a :	16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	
16a :	16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	

6A-1	1	Q Well, you apparently have read
	2	A You would try, you know.
	3 .	Q and heard and seen something regarding this
	4	case and the defendants?
	5	A Yes.
	.6	Q You have seen publicity or heard it?
	7	A Yes.
	8	Q Now, do you think you can set whatever you
,	.9	learned about the case to one side, and recognizing that
	10	you have learned certain things through the media, do you
	11	think you can set that to one side and decide the questions
•	12	in this case solely on the evidence that comes in in this
_	1,3	case?
	14	A Yes, I think I could.
	15	May I say something, your Honor?
•	16	Q Yes, surely.
	17	A There was one question that was brought up on
	18	the first day or so I don't remember who brought it up
	,19	about somebody in your family being involved in a trial.
	20.	Q Yes?
	21	A My nephew is in prison.
	22	Q Your nephew is in prison?
	23	A Yes. He wasn't convicted on a murder charge.
	24	Excuse me.
	25	Q That is all right. Take your time.
	26	A The murder charges were dropped against him.

He was convicted on armed Attempted murder. 16A2 1. robbery. 2 I don't know if this holds true for this case. 3 Do you think this would affect your ability to be fair and impartial in this case? 5 6 No. In other words, you wouldn't be more likely to 7 find the defendants guilty or not guilty because of some-8 thing that has happened to your nephew? 10. No, because his penalty was fair; I mean, it was right. 11 12 That wouldn't have any effect one way or the other on your decision in this case? 13 So far as I am concerned, no. 14 15 Is that right? Q. 16 A Yes. 17 Have you learned anything about this case other 18 than the fact that the defendants have been arrested and 19 charged with these offenses, which, of course, you know, 20 because for one reason, I told you when you came into the 21 case what the charges were, but aside from those facts, 22 do you know or have you learned anything that causes you 23 to believe that the defendants are connected with the 24 commission of the offenses charged against them? 25 A The facts, no. 26 Well, facts, rumors, anything. Q.

A No, I don't believe so.

Q Have you ever read or heard anything which you believe to be was a statement by any of the defendants about anything?

A Probably at the beginning. I can't give you any details because after a while I didn't read any of it.

It was when it first started, and when they were first arrested. But then you get tired with it, you get disgusted, and you don't read about it any more.

16b-1 ₁	Q Well, is there something that you have
Ź	learned somewhere along the line that causes you to
3	think that perhaps the defendants are more likely to
. 4	be guilty than innocent?
ร ์	A Well, I suppose it is the over-all things
6.	that I have seen on television or read at the beginning,
4	and probably my disapproval of the way they live that
8.	I would think, well, it's not beyond them, you know,
9	it is possible.
10.	Q Does your feeling go beyond the mere
, 11	possibility that they could be guilty?
12	A No. No, I couldn't say to you that they
13	did it. I mean, like that.
14	Q You think it is probable that they did it
. 15	as distinguished from merely possible?
16	A No. Possibly. I would say that would be
17	my state of mind.
18	Q Would that be the same feeling you might
19	have about any criminal case?
20.	A Yes. You are right.
21	Q The defendant has been arrested and charged.
22 ·	Now, you know nothing about the case. Would you have
23	that same feeling because he has been arrested and
24	charged, it is possible that he is guilty?
.25	A I think you are right, your Honor, yes.
26	Q Is there anything more about this case?

16b-2	1	In other words, does this case go beyond that feeling that
	2	you would have in any criminal case?
• ,	3	A No, I guess not, it doesn't.
	4	Q Do you think you could be fair and impartial
	5.	in this case and decide the case solely on the basis of
	6	the evidence?
	7	A On the evidence and the instructions?
	8	Q Yes.
	9	A Yes, your Honor, I think I could.
	10	THE COURT: Mr. Fitzgerald?
	11	MR. FITZGERALD: Thank you.
	12	
_	13	VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
	14	BY MR. FITZGERALD:
	15	Q Do you subscribe to a newspaper?
	16	A Yes.
	17	Q The Los Angeles Times?
	18	A Yes.
,	19	Q Do you also read the Herald-Examiner from
:	20	time to time?
2	21	A Yes.
2	22	Q Do you subscribe to it?
	33	A Yes.
2	4	Q Have you read about the defendants and this
2	5	case in the Herald-Examiner and the Los Angeles Times?
2	6	A Well, as I say, I don't read about it any
	- 1	

1	more. At the beginning, yes.
2	Q What do you mean by the beginning?
3	A . When the crime was first committed I read
4	about it. I mean, you know, the headlines and everything
5	When they were arrested at the beginning,
6	. I read about it. But as it carried on, no, I didn't read
7	about it.
8 .	Q And you have also seen things on television
9	in regards to this case?
10	A This is correct, yes.
11	Q Have you also heard things on the radio
1 2	in connection with this case and the defendants?
13	A I don't listen to the radio too much but
14	probably yes.
15	Q When the defendants were arrested, did you
16	read, hear or see anything about them?
17	A Yes, I am sure I did.
18	Q Let's take them one at a time.
19	Did you read, see or hear anything about
20	Mr. Manson when he was arrested?
21	A Yes.
22	Q Aside from the fact that he was arrested,
23	what did you learn by way of exposure to the newspapers,
24	television or radio?
25	A Well, the way they live, commune style.
26 .	I suppose it was his appearance as much as anything.

	1	I can't get down to specifics. It is more
	2	of an over-all impression from everything.
	3	Q Did you think it was true that they lived
	4.	in a commune?
	5	A Yes.
	6	Q Why did you think that was true?
	7	A Because I read it, I guess.
	8	. Q I see.
	9	You don't need to apologize. We all have
	10	these feelings and opinions.
	11	A All right.
	12	Q Did you learn anything else about Mr. Manson
	13'	A They called them a Family, but it was not
	14	a Family as I would know. It seemed to me immoral.
	15	Q You felt that as a result of what you had
	16	learned from the media he was engaged in some kind of
	17	immoral conduct?
16c	£1 ¹⁸ .	A Yes, this is the way I felt.
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16C-1	1	Q.	Was that immoral sexual conduct or other kinds
	2	of conduct?	
	3	A	Immoral sexual conduct, as far as I was con-
	4,	cerned.	
	5	Q	Do you know anything about Mr. Manson other
	6	than that?	
•	7	A	No.
	8	Q	Do you know how old he is?
	9	A	No.
1	ro	Q	Do you know anything about his background or
1	l1	history?	
1	12	A	· No.
j 	13		I believe I saw a picture of him one time when
	L 4 ;	he had shor	t hair and no beard; but no, really, I do not.
ï	15	Q	Did you ever read anything about any aspects
1	16	of good cha	racter about Mr. Manson?
-1	1.7	Ą	Not that I remember, no.
1	18	Q	Did you read anything that you would interpret
1	19	as being ba	d character?
	20	A	No. As I say, just his way of living. I
2	21	guess this	impressed me, I don't know.
2	22 .	Q	What about, let's say, Susan Atkins? Have you
2	23	ever heard.	of her?
5	24	A	Yeş.
()	25	Q	What have you heard about her, or read or seen?
-	26	A	Well, the same life style and the like.

.6C2	1,	I cannot give you any specifics as to names.
	'2	I mean, so-and-so did this, you know, at a certain time, or
	3	anything.
	4	It is, as I say, more of an over-all opinion.
	5	I guess I am taking them as a group rather than
	6	just individually and, really, I don't remember specific
	7	things. It is more of an over-all impression.
	8	Q You lump them altogether in your mind?
	9	A This is right, I do.
	10	To me, this is loose living. As I say, it is
	11	foreign to my way of living.
	12	Q And you don't approve of it?
<u>`</u>	13	A This is right, yes.
	14	Q Do you think that it is morally irresponsible?
	15	A I think it is morally wrong, yes.
•	16	Q Would it be fair to say that you consider their
	17	conduct sinful, or is that a term that is foreign to you?
	18	A Well, I say morally wrong. I mean, as far as
	19	I am concerned.
	20	Q At sometime in the past you thought to yourself,
	21	"Why did they do it?"
	22	A Yes.
	23	Q Which assumes, does it not, that they did it?
•	24	A That's right.
	25	Q You got beyond whether they did it or not
	26	and you were simply trying to find a reason?

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Yes. Why?

If you had your choice, would you prefer to 16d-1 1 sit on a case where you didn't know anything about the 2 defendants or the crime? Do you think you could be more 3 fair, if that is a proper term? That is almost impossible now, to sit on 5 6 a case where you didn't know -- well, maybe not, but there is so much publicity about everything that you almost know 7 8 a little bit. But maybe yes, I would prefer it. 9 Well, there were 300 murders in the City of 10 Los Angeles last year and you don't know everything about 11 every one of those 300, do you? 12 A No, I don't, 13 Would you prefer to sit on one of the other Q 14 2997 15 Probably, yes. Α 16. Q. Is your nephew named McGinnis? 17 A No. I have nothing further. MR. FITZGERALD: 19 THE COURT: Mr. Reiner? 20 MR. REINER: I have no questions. 21 No questions, your Honor. MR. SHINN: 22 MR. KANAREK: No questions, your Honor. 23 MR. STOVITZ: Yes, your Honor. 24 25 26

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16d-2	1	VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MRS. VAN PELT
	' 2	BY MR. STOVITZ:
	3	Q Mrs. Van Pelt, was your nephew convicted
	4	here in the County of Los Angeles?
,	5	A Yes.
	6	Q And did he have a trial or did he plead
	7	guilty?
	:8	A I believe he pleaded guilty.
	9	Q Then you have no quarrel with his guilt
	10	then, is that right?
	11	A No.
	12	Q You do not have any animosity against our
<u> </u>	1 3	office for prosecuting him?
	14	A Oh, no.
	15	Do you have any children of your own?
	16	A I have three sons.
	17	Q How old are they?
	18	A 32, 28 and 23.
	19	Q Now, assume that the 23-year-old son of
	20	yours was on trial and charged with the murders in this
	21	case, and you know your frame of mind. Would you want
	22.	a juror in your frame of mind to sit on a case involving
	23	your 23-year-old son?
	24	A I have a hard time putting myself in that
	25	position.
	26	Q Is it because of the pretrial publicity,

.6 d- 3	1	or is it because it was your son that was on trial?
-	2	In other words
	3	A If it was my son? Oh, I see what you mean
	.4	Q In other words, we are trying to get to
	√5	your frame of mind.
	6.	A Yes, my frame of mind.
	7	What I am saying
	.8	Q Let's go back to the time when the
	9	defendants were first arrested.
	10 .	A All right.
	11	Q Did you read in the papers why they were
	12	arrested?
	13	A Somebody confessed or said that they did
	14	it.
	15	Q They certainly weren't arrested because
	16	of their way of life; is that right?
	17	A This is right, yes. It actually has no
	18	bearing, I know.
	19	Q This somebody that confessed or this
	20	somebody that said that the defendants did it, do you
	21	know who that somebody is?
	22	A The one that you are going to have come
	23	in and testify.
	24	Q Linda Kasabian?
	25	A Yes.
	26	Q - Are you sure it wasn't one of the three
		i de la companya de la companya de la companya de la companya de la companya de la companya de la companya de

girls here now? 1 Really, I don't remember the specifics. 2. As I say, it is over-all impressions. 3 Really, I quit reading about it. Like I 4 say, it disgusted me and I just didn't want to read 5 about it any more. 6 MR. STOVITZ: No further questions. Thank you. 7. 16e fls. MR. REINER: May I inquire, your Honor? 9 10 **11** 12 13. 14. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22; 23 24 25 26

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16-E-1 ₁	THE COURT: I don't think it will be necessary,
2	Mr. Reiner.
3	MR. REINER: Very well. No questions.
4	THE COURT: You may go back into the courtroom,
5	Mrs. Van Pelt. Thank you very much.
6	Will you refrain from speaking with anybody
7	about what has occurred in here?
8	MRS. VAN PELT: Yes, sir.
9	THE COURT: Thank you.
10	MR. REINER: Thank you.
11	MR. FITZGERAID: Challenge the juror for cause because
12	of her exposure to prejudicial pretrial publicity, and
13	also pursuant to 1017, Subparagraph 2.
. 14	MR. KANAREK: Join.
. 15	MR. SHINN: Join.
16	MR. REINER: Join.
17	MR. STOVITZ: Submit it.
18	THE COURT: Mrs. Van Pelt will be excused for cause.
19	The challenge is allowed.
ž 0	I think we had better adjourn at this time,
21	gentlemen.
22	MR. STOVITZ: Tomorrow morning is the matter of
23	Mr. Kanarek going to be taken up at 8:15, 8:30?
24	MR. FITZGERALD: You are not invited.
25	THE COURT: It is scheduled at 8:15.
26	MR. STOVITZ: All right. 8:15.

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MR. SHINN: Then will it still be 9:00 o'clock for the rest of us tomorrow morning?

THE COURT: Yes.

We will go back into open court and then I will dismiss the jury for the day.

(Whereupon, the following proceedings occurred in open court, all parties and counsel being present as well as the prospective jurors.)

THE COURT: All parties and counsel are present, all prospective jurors are in the jury box.

Ladies and gentlemen, we will adjourn at this time until 9:00 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Do not converse among yourselves nor with anyone else on any subject relating to the case, nor form or express any opinion regarding the case until it is finally submitted to those of you who are selected as jurors.

Additionally, do not read, watch or listen to any news reports concerning the case while you are connected with this case in any way.

And in case my admonitions may have been misunderstood as applying only to the 12 people in the jury box, they should be understood as applying to all of the prospective jurors in the courtroom, including those of you who are sitting out in the courtroom.

9:00 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:14 p.m. court was adjourned to reconvene Friday, July 10, 1970, at 9:00a.m.)

1	LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, FRIDAY, JULY 10, 1970
.2	9:08 o'clock a.m.
3	- MA COM PAR
4	(The following proceedings were had in the
5	chambers of the Court out of the presence and hearing
6	of the prospective jurors, all defendants and all counsel
7	being present:)
8	THE COURT: The parties and counsel are present.
9	Is there anything to take up before we call
10	in the next prospective juror?
11	MR. KANAREK: Not at this time, no, your Honor.
12	THE COURT: All right, please call the next
13	prospective juror.
14	(The prospective juror enters the room.)
15	THE COURT: Good morning, sir.
16	THE CLERK: The prospective juror's name is
17	Tomas M. Salas, T-o-m-a-s; S-a-1-a-s.
18	
19	VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF TOMAS M. SALAS
20	BY THE COURT:
21	Q Mr. Salas, we asked you to come in here
22	so that the Court and the attorneys could ask you ques-
23	tions out of the other prospective jurors.
24	Now, if you were selected as a juror in
25	this case would you be able to serve?
26	MR. SALAS: No, your Honor.

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1	BY THE COURT:	
2	Q	What is your situation?
3	A	Hardship, for one.
4	Q	Well, what is the nature of the hardship?
5	A	Financial.
6	Q.	Are you employed by someone?
7	A	Yes, sir.
8	Q	Who is your employer?
9	A	McDonnell-Douglas Corporation.
10	THE CO	URT: Keep your voice up as much as you can,
11	Mr. Salas.	
12	Q	How long have you been employed by
13	McDonnell-Dou	glas?
14	A	A little over two years, sir.
15	ତ	Have you discussed this with your employer,
16	that is, if y	our jury service should extend beyond 30
17	days?	
18	A	Yes, sir.
19	Q	And what have you learned?
20	A.	They can only pay for 160 hours or about
21	22 days, I be	lieve, one month.
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23	* 1	
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THE COURT: Well, I am going to excuse Mr. salas.

MR. KANAREK: Would your Honor set aside that

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order for just a moment? Just for a half a minute, your 1 Honor. I just want to make a point. 2 One of our grounds for challenging the jury 3 panel is the fact that because of economic, alleged economic, 4 hardship the defendants are denied due process and that we 5 are denied very fair jurors. 6. If your Honor wishes I could make this argument 7 outside the presence of the juror. 8 THE COURT: Well, I think you have already made the 9 argument for the record. Mr. Kanarek. 10 MR. KANAREK: Very well. 11 12 THE COURT: You just want to renew the objection on 13 the ground? 14 MR. KANAREK: What I am saying, your Honor, our challenge to the jury panel, I would just like to make that 15 point to the Court, that it involves, of course, this, that 16 17 our position is that excusing very good jurors because of 18 economic hardship has this denial of due process aspect to 19 it. 20 THE COURT: Well, in this particular case I am 21 going to excuse Mr. Salas for hardship reasons. 22 Thank you, Mr. Salas. 23 MR. SALAS: Thank you, your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Would you refrain from discussing with 25 anybody what has been said here this morning, sir? 26 MR. SALAS: Yes, sir.

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MR, BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, before you call the next juror, may I make one comment?

THE COURT: All right.

MR. BUGLIOSI: It concerns Mr. Kanarek's repeated motion ad nauseam and ad infinitum on the same issue.

Doing it back in chambers, your Honor, is one thing, but how in the world should Mr. Kanarek be permitted to make the identical objection in open court in front of the jury 20 or 30 or 40 times. The Judge, the Court, overruled the objection, but he nonetheless makes the same identical objection.

This is gross misconduct.

THE COURT: Which objection?

MR. BUGLIOSI: To some of the questions that Mr. Stovitz and I have been asking the jurors.

THE COURT: I don't see anything objectionable to that, Mr. Bugliosi, especially since I told Mr. Kanarek a long time ago that I wasn't going to permit blanket objections, because that clutters up the record and makes it unintelligible.

When the question is asked, he has got to state his objection.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I understand that when we pose a different question, he may make an objection, but where it is obvious that we are asking the same question and yet he makes the same objection which the Court has overruled

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many many times, yet he repeats the objection, that is misconduct.

THE COURT: I thought this was on the same subject, not the identical question.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The identical question.

The Court has been concerned with the welfare of the jury, and here the jury is sitting here, Mr. Stovitz and I ask a question which is perfectly proper, because the Court has already overruled many objections, the same objection, Mr. Kanarek objects, and then these people have to wait for the colloquy at the bench and then the question has to be reread, or they have forgotten what the question was.

It doesn't bother me because I am aware of Mr. Kanarek's technique, it doesn't bother me at all, but in the interests of the jury, why should they have to tolerate this gross misconduct on his part?

THE COURT: I don't consider it to be misconduct.

I think he has to do it.

The fact that I disagree with him or that I overrule the objection doesn't mean that it is misconduct for him to make it.

He has to protect his record just as every other attorney.

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 MR. BUGLIOSI: My point is this, your Honor: If I phrase a certain question and he objects and you overrule it --

THE COURT: I am not talking about another juror.

If this occurred with the same prospective juror. Of

course, you don't repeat the same question.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Right.

THE COURT: So it doesn't occur.

But where you are talking about successive prospective jurors. I think he has to make his objection, because he wants to make his record. Otherwise, we get into a situation where you have a so-called blanket objection, but then if a question is varied in any aspect, you have the problem of whether or not the objection applies and whether or not he is protected.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Right.

THE COURT: That is why I refuse to permit blanket objections.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Right; and I am fully cognizant of that. But I am saying, your Honor --

THE COURT: Or a continuing objection is what I really mean.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Right. I am cognizant of that, your Honor; but the Court can take judicial notice that these questions that I am asking are almost identical and there is no variance, and Mr. Kanarek knows there is no variance,

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and he still objects on the same ground.

For instance, he has objected 10 or 15 times to the use of the word "proper," and the Court has told him that this is all right and you overruled the objection, then I ask the question again and he objects again to the use of the word "proper."

He knows what the Court's ruling is going to be and he nevertheless makes the objection.

And the problem is that the juror then can't answer the question until an interlude of 30 seconds, sometimes up to three or four minutes.

THE COURT: Well, I am not going to tell him that he can 't object because I can 't anticipate everything in advance, so that it is one of those things.

I think an element of good sense enters into it.

and I think an attorney has to consider that if he makes
objections which he knows in advance are going to be overruled and continues to make them, that he should consider
what effect that might have on prospective jurors as far
as their view of him as an attorney is concerned.

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MR. BUGLIOSI: Very well.

THE COURT: I don't know what else I can say.

MR. FITZGERALD: I want to bring something up in connection with these hardship cases.

As Mr. Kanarek points out, it is the defendant's position that the jury fees of \$5 a day paid to the jurors in Los Angeles County is obviously economically discriminatory and denies the defendants a trial by their peers; obviously only wealthy jurors, or jurors who are employed by firms who can afford to pay them while on jury duty are able to sit.

Now, your Honor pointed out to me that was a matter I ought to take up with the Legislature.

I suggest it is analogous to the problem of apportionment, and gerrymandering, that the Legislature haven't done anything about it, and at some point the Court must intercede, and I am suggesting that your Honor has the power to intercede and do something about it.

The judiciary in San Diego stopped it, and they stopped it in Alameda County.

THE COURT: Stopped what?

MR. FITZGERALD: Stopped the practice of paying an economically discriminatory rate to jurors on criminal cases.

They invalidated the jury system in San Diego County for that very reason.

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this.

in other cases.

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They did the same thing in Alameda County.

In addition I would like to point out to
the Court that I don't believe these hardships. I do not
believe and I think I am a reasonable man, I do not
believe that, for example, McDonnell-Douglas Corporation,
a multi-million dollar corporation, that is extremely
concerned about its public image, will not pay one of
their employees while they are on a notorious case like

I think they are misleading the Court.

THE COURT: We have had dozens of prospective jurors, not only in this case -- there haven't been that many in this case -- but there have been a number in this case, and over the past several years I have had dozens in similar cases, who were employees at McDonnell-Douglas who all said the same thing, 20 days compensation is the company policy, period.

MR. FITZGERALD: If your Honor made a statement in open court about the McDonnell-Douglas Corporation -THE COURT: I have done that, not in this case but

MR. FITZGERALD: If you do it in this case, where it has, to say the last, the public eye, I will submit the public relations director of McDonnell-Douglas will be on the telephone tomorrow morning.

There is not a large corporation dependent

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on the public support in this entire state that will not pay a juror while they are on jury duty in this case, because if they don't I think they just sustain irreparable damage.

THE COURT: We had another one from North American Rockwell, and we have had Lockheed in this case.

MR. FITZGERALD: We also had Hughes Aircraft stated the same thing.

Frankly, I think that if these prospective jurors would go back to somebody sufficiently well placed in the corporation and point out that they are being excused, that they are having to point out to the Court and ask for an excuse satisfactorily based on the grounds that they won't pay them, that the company will make an exception.

What I am suggesting is the company will make an exception in this case, not across the board in all civil cases, but in this case.

And it is a number of these things we are taking into consideration in refusing to stipulate to these hardships.

I concede that it is a problem. I concede that it is a very sincere, difficult problem for the Court to handle and for all counsel to handle.

But it certainly is not our clients' fault that this case is going to take however long it takes.

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THE COURT: Well, I agree with you. I think it is outrageous for these companies to refuse to pay their employees for jury service.

I can understand it in the case of small owners, two-man companies, where you take one of the personnel and in effect they shut off the business.

But where you have a company the size of Hughes Aircraft and they refuse to pay compensation to jurors who are called for jury service. I think it is outrageous and I know of no way that they can be compelled to do so other than simply shaming them into it, perhaps.

However, in spite of the fact that I think it is outrageous. I don't think that in any way deprives the defendants of a fair and impartial jury because they can obtain fair and impartial jurors from other sources from the panel, and that is exactly what we are in the process of doing.

It just makes the process longer. It takes more time, it costs the County more money.

But in the end it really doesn't make any difference whether the jury is composed of people from Lockheed and Douglas or from whatever source, so long as the jury is fair and impartial.

All right, let's call in the next prospective juror.

I will say, however, Mr. Fitzgerald, that I

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have given this problem a lot of thought over the time

I have been on the bench, and I think something should be

done, and if you have any suggestions as to how to do it I

am certainly happy to listen to it, even though they may not
go into effect on this particular case.

The problem, of course, is that you find all kinds of companies, some that can well afford it and others than can ill afford it.

The other problem is that if the County or State were to start paying compensation, it seems to me you would get into a hopeless quagmire of determining whether or not a person is entitled to compensation, how much he is entitled to, whether you were getting jurors who are applying for compensation that were not entitled to it.

In some cases it still would not be enough, no matter how much you made it, the man might be making twice that much on the outside.

You get into questions of standards of living.
The more I think about it, the more hopeless

on the other hand, you will find such a disparity in the types of companies involved, and you try to do it from the opposite side, and that seemingly there are many problems there, so I really don't know what the answer is.

it seems to attack a problem from that side.

It would seem that the answer should be that

every citizen employer should be sufficiently public minded and have sufficient civic responsibility that unless it were an absolute, a real hardship, not just an imagined one, that he would want to continue the compensation of an employee on jury service.

But we know that is not true from what we have been hearing.

So if anyone has any constructive suggestions as to how to remedy that problem I am willing to listen to it.

MR. FITZGERALD: Our suggestion is that you invalidate this panel.

THE COURT: I don't think --

MR. FITZGERALD: or dismiss the case.

THE COURT: I don't think that is either desirable or necessary.

As I say, I think we can get a fair and impartial jury even though we don't have a single Douglas. Lockheed or Hughes Aircraft employee on the jury.

I don't think that is the answer. It would just cost the government more.

MR. STOVITZ: I think the facts show that the defendants in this case were unemployed, therefore we would get people who are unemployed, and \$5 a day to a person who is unemployed is more money than they were making before.

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THE COURT: Of course that is an answer to the argument, they are not being tried by their peers.

That depends on the definition of peers. I suppose.

MR. REINER: If we were to take Mr. Stovitz's suggestion to its illogical extreme, then Mr. Manson is quite correct, he is entitled to a jury of persons who have served some 20 years in penitentiaries, which I think is contrary to the position Mr. Stovitz has previously taken.

I might indicate that Supervisor Hahn yesterday indicated he was going to go before the Board of Supervisors and see perhaps about raising the fees paid to the jury members somewhat comparable to Alameda and San Diego.

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3b-1	1	THE COURT: What do they pay?
)	.2	MR. REINER: I think it is twenty-seven fifty in
	3	Alameda per day, and Mr. Fitzgerald informs me he believe
	4	it is \$24 a day in San Diego.
	5	THE COURT: That was done how? What were the
	6	mechanics of the increase, where does it come from?
	7	MR. REINER: Talking to Supervisor Hahn he said
	·8	they have the power to allocate the money; he said he
	.9	thinks it should be done.
	10.	He said it had not been called to his
	11	attention previously, until yesterday for the first time.
	12	He said he would get on it immediately.
	13	Immediately was yesterday, and he would see what can be
	14	done about raising the pay of prospective jurors.
	15 ·	If they receive \$125 a week that would not
	16	take care of all their problems. It reduces the problem
	17	from an impossible one to one that is merely awkward.
	18	THE COURT: It takes \$125 a week for a man to
	19 _.	support his family, and if he is paid \$27 you haven't
	20 [.]	solved this problem.
	21	MR. REINER: \$27 per day instead of \$5 per day.
	22	THE COURT: That's different.
	23	MR. REINER: Presently they receive \$25 per week.
	24	(A prospective juror enters the chambers
	25	of the Court.)
	26	THE COURT: Good morning sir.

3b-2 ₁	THE CLERK: The prospective juror's name is
2 .	Bernard T. Roszhart, B-e-r-n-a-r-d; R-o-s-z-h-a-r-t.
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4	VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF BERNARD T. ROSZHART
5.	BY THE COURT:
6	Q Mr. Roszhart, if you were selected as a
7	juror in this case would you be able to serve, sir?
8	A No, sir.
9 .	Q What is your situation?
10.	A Well, my company will only allow me 30 days
11	they would pay me for, and I could not afford that.
12	Q Who is your employer?
13	A TTT Cannon, Electric.
14	Q Is that the full name or are you just using
15	the initials?
16	A International Telephone and Telegraph,
17	Electric.
18	Q Where is the corporate headquarters of that
19	company?
20	A The main headquarters are in New York.
21	Q Is that a nationwide company?
22	A It is nationwide. It is very big. They
23	are everything.
24	Q How many employees are there? Do you have
25	any idea?
26	A In the ITT organization?

1	Q IIT Camon?
2	A Cannon well, I imagine there is close
3.	to a thousand all togéther.
4	Q How long have you been with the company?
5	A 19 years.
6	Q And have you discussed this particular
7	problem with some supervisor or manager in the company?
8	A Yes, just within the last couple of years
9 .	they allow us the 30 days through the union, they got
10	us the 30 days.
11	30 days would be the most they would
12	compensate us for.
13	Q Do you have a family?
· 14·	A I do, yes, sir, I have a wife and a
15.	teenage boy, 17.
16	Q And do you rely upon your compensation
17	from ITT Cannon to support your family?
18	A I do, yes, sir.
19 .	THE COURT: Will there be a stipulation?
20	MR. FITZGERALD: No, your Honor.
21	THE COURT: Are you asking to be excused, Mr.
22	Roszhart?
23	MR. ROSZHART: Yes.
24	MR. REINER: Excuse me, may I inquire?
25	THE COURT: Yes.
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1	VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MR. ROSZHART
2	BY MR. REINER:
3	Q Sir, how recently was it that ITT first
4	began to compensate its employees for jury service at
5	all?
6	A Approximately two years ago I think.
?	Q Prior to that they did not compensate any
8:	employee for any jury service whatsoever?
9	A No.
10	Q Was this as a result of a bargaining
11	agreement with the union they first began to compensate
12,	employees?
13	A Yes, sir.
14	Q It is now limited to how many days?
1 5	A 30 days.
16	Q Calendar days?
17	A One calendar month.
18	Q One calendar month?
19	A Yes, sir.
20	MR. REINER: Thank you very much.
21	
22	VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MR. ROSZHART
23	BY THE GOURT:
24	Q If you were selected as a juror in this case
25	and lost your compensation from your company as a result
26	of going beyond the 30 days, would you have any other

1	source of income?
2	A No, sir.
3	Q Other than the \$5 a day you received as a
4.	juror?
5	A That's right, sir.
·6	Q You have nothing else?
7	A Nothing else.
·8	THE COURT: All right, the Court will excuse you,
9	Mr. Roszhart, on the basis of hardship. Thank you, sir.
10	MR. KANAREK: That is over the objection may
11	the record reflect it is over the defendants' objection.
12	THE COURT: The record will reflect Mr. Roszhart
13	already left the room and I had asked if there was a
14	stipulation and you said no.
15	MR. KANAREK: No, there is no stipulation, no
16	stipulation.
17	(A prospective juror enters the room.)
18	THE CLERK: The prospective juror's name is Mrs.
19	Ethel W. Hoover.
20	,
21	VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MRS. ETHEL W. HOOVER
22	BY THE COURT:
23	Q Mrs. Hoover, if you were selected as a juror
24	in this case would you be able to serve?
25	A I am afraid not, Judge, my company would
26 .	not allow me other than the 30 days.

		·
1,	Q	What company is that?
2 ` .	. <u>A</u>	Edison.
3	Q	Southern California Edison Company?
4 ;	Ä	Yes.
5	Q	Is that right?
6	A	Yes, sir.
7	Q	Have you talked with some supervisor or
8	manager?	·
9	A	I talked to my boss.
10	Q	What position does he have?
11.	, A	He is not the top man, he is third from the
12	top. He was	to talk to Mr. Lester, but he was quite sure
13	I would not b	e able to be out six months.
14	Q	Is it still indefinite?
15	A.	Well, he suggested I renege on it.
. 16	Q	Well, I can understand how they would be
17	reluctant to	allow an old and trusted employee to be away
18	for a number	of months.
19		The question is whether they would continue
20	your compense	tion while you were gone?
21	A	We did not discuss that. I really don't
22	know but I ju	ist told him that there was a possibility that
23,	I would be ca	illed.
24	* *	
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Q Is this something that you can find out, say, before this afternoon's session?

A I could call on the lunch hour.

Q All right. Would you do that, please?

A Yes, I will.

Q And you might point out to your employer that this is a very serious and important civic responsibility.

A Yes.

Q That many companies continue to pay their employees while they are on jury service because they realize it is important?

A Yes.

And if you want to give your superior my personal opinion, you can tell him that I believe that particularly a company of the size and integrity of the Southern California Edison Company should set an example to other companies in the community and pay their employees when they are on jury service.

A Yes, sir.

Then there is another thing, your Honor.

Q Yes?

A I am on medication for vertigo, this dizziness that I have had for a year and a half, and I take two shots a week.

Now, that, to me, would be quite an imposition to be locked up. I don't know how you --

1 Q Where do you receive the shots? -2 2 A At the Edison Building, the nurse there. ž Q This is something that will continue, is it? 4 Well, over a period of a year and a half, 5 I have had two specialists, and they finally decided it was 6 just an unbalanced condition of the inner ear, and this 7 medication seems to level it off. So, I don't know how much longer I will have it, but I have been taking it a year and a half. 10 Q I see. It is something that can be taken by pill? 12 Hypodermic. Α 13 Q A shot? 14 Yes. Then the medication by mouth every day. A. 15 Of course, that would be no problem, the 16 medication. 17 Has your doctor given you any indication of how 18 long the shots will continue? 19 No, he hasn't. 20 I know I made a trip back home, back to 21 Missouri recently, and he had me take my medicine with me 22 because I was going to be gone two weeks, and he thought it 23 was necessary that I shouldn't miss a shot, and I had to 24 go to a hospital to have it done while I was there. 25

Will there be a stipulation?

THE COURT: All right.

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1	this case, would you be able to serve?
.2	A Yes, sir.
3.	Q You recall that I have asked the other
4	prospective jurors questions concerning the death penalty?
.5 ·	A Yes.
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Q Have you had an opportunity to think about those 4A-1 1 questions and your answers to them? 2 A Yes, sir. 3 4 All right. I am going to ask you the same questions now. 5 First, do you entertain such conscientious 6 opinions regarding the death penalty that you would be 7 unable to make an impartial decision as to any defendant's 8. 9 guilt regardless of the evidence in the case? 1Ò Á No. sir. Q 11 Do you entertain such conscientious opinions regarding the death penalty that you would automatically 12 refuse to impose it without regard for the evidence 13 14 in this case? 15 No. sir. 16 Now, I am going to ask you some questions to 17 find out what, if anything, you may have learned about 18 this case or the defendants over the past months. Α Yes. 19 20 . Have you been living continuously in Los Angeles County since last August? 21 22 A Yes. 23. Do you subscribe to a daily newspaper? 24 We did at one time. Now we just buy it, you 25 know, when we feel like reading it. **26** Q

regular basis? 1a@ 1 Α No. 2 Q Do you watch television regularly? 3 Ą Yes. 4 Do you watch the TV news reports? 5 Usually I do, but I haven't now. I stayed 6 away from them. Q. Are you employed outside the home? 8 Yes. Ì Q Do you remember when you first learned about the 10 fact that there had been some killings that were the 11. subject of this -- that are the subject of this case? 12 Yes, I think so. 13 Α Q When was that? 14 I don't remember now. I can't remember exactly Α 15 when it was. 16 Q Was it right around the time when they were 17 discovered? 18 Α It must have been shortly after. Well, when it 19 first came out in the papers I read about it. 20 21 All right. · A Yes. 22 Then at some time later, Mrs. Hines, do you 23. recall learning that the defendants had been arrested? 24 Yes. 25

26

And do you remember how you learned of that?

1	A I can't remember if I read it in the paper or
2.	I heard it on the news broadcasts.
3.	Q Now, before you came into this case did you
4	know the names of any of the defendants?
5	A Yes, sir.
6	Q Which names did you know?
7.	A Well, I knew their names, but when I came into
8	the courtroom the only one I recognized was Mr. Manson.
9	Q But you knew the names of the female defendants?
10	A Yes, sir.
11	Q Did you know one any better than the others,
12	or about the same?
13.	A No. I think I heard Susan Atkins! name more
14	than I had the others.
15	Q Under what circumstances did you hear Susan
16	Atkins' name?
17	A I can't recall, sir.
18.	Q Have you heard or read anything which appeared
19	to be a description by someone of what actually happened on
20	the night of the killings or the nights of the killings?
21	A No, sir. I read, I guess, of what was
22	found, or what was said to have happened.
23	Q By whom?
24	A That is about it.
25	Q Was this something right after it occurred,
26	when the bodies were found? Is that what you mean?

í	A	Yes, sir.
2	Q .	In other words, whatever the police found and
3	was reporte	d in the newspaper?
4	. A	Yes.
5	Q	You read about that?
6	A	Yes. That is what I am referring to.
7	Q	Did you ever read any statement by any
8	defendant a	bout anything?
9	A	If I had I can't recall what it was.
10	·	Well, I am not asking you at the moment what it
11	was but whe	ther or not you ever read or heard any such
12	statement.	
13	A	I don't think so.
1;4′	Q	Now, you know, of course, that the defendants
1 5	have been a	rrested and they have been charged with these
16	offenses?	
. 17	A	Yes.
18	·Q	And they are before the Court to stand trial?
19	.	Yes.
20	·	As to whether or not they are guilty or not
21	guilty.	•
22	A .	Yes.
23	Q	Now, aside from those facts, Mrs. Hines, have
24 ;	you ever le	arned anything which caused you to believe that
25	there is so	me connection between the defendants and the
26.	alleged off	enges?

No, to tell you the truth. A Do you care to inquire, Mr. Fitzgerald? MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, sir. 5 ' 8: 5.

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4b - 1VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 1 2 BY MR. FITZGERALD: 3 Are you nervous? 0 4 A little bit. 5 You are not on trial, here. We just want Q. 6 to ask you some questions about your state of mind. 7 A Yes, sir. 8 Do you know anything about the defendants 9 at all as a result of watching television, listening to 10 the radio or reading the newspaper? 11 À Oh, a little. 12 Could you tell us what you know? 13 A Well, that one of them had given birth, 14 that they lived in commune style. **1**5 One of the people who is said to have been 16 there is going to be a witness for the prosecution. 17 Oh, and they are trying to extradite one 18 other gentleman, I think, from Texas. 19 That is about all I could recall at the 20 moment. 21 When you say that you read, heard or saw 22 that they were living commune style, what did you take 23. that to mean, or what was your impression? 24 A Just that everybody was living together 25 in one house. 26 And who is everybody, Mrs. Hines?

	- 1	•
4b-2	1	A Mr. Manson and his friends, the Family.
	2	Q Do you know anything about the background
	3	and history of any of these defendants, the girls or
	4	Mr. Manson?
	5 `	A No. That I don't.
	6	Q Do you know where they came from? Where
	7	they were born? What schools they attended?
	8	A No, I don't.
	9	Q Did you read anything about the good
•	10	character of any of these defendants?
	11	A No, sir, I can't recall.
	12	Q Did you read anything about the bad
	13	character of any of the defendants?
	14	A No, sir, I haven't read that either.
	15	Q And you are unable to tell us how, in your
	16	mind, you associate the name Susan Atkins; is that right?
	17	A Yes.
	18	Q Does she look like one of your relatives
	19	or sister or anything?
	20	A No.
	21	Q Did you ever read anything that was
	22	written by Susan Atkins or read anything that was said
	28	by Susan Atkins or seen anything that Susan Atkins
	24	did?
	25	A I must have otherwise her name wouldn't
ਲ	26	have stood out in my mind, but I can't recall what it was.
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4b-3	1	Q And you said, I believe, that one of the
	2	persons who were there was going to be a witness for
	3	the prosecution; is that right?
	4	A Yes, sir. I read that in the newspapers.
	5	Q Do you know who that is?
	6	A Linda Kasabian.
	7	Q Do you know, from reading the newspapers,
	8	what Linda Kasabian is likely to testify to, or do you
•	9	have an idea what she might testify about?
	10	A No, I don't, sir.
	11 ·	Q You just read that she was going to testify;
	12	is that right?
	13	A Yes, şir. That was a while ago.
	14	Q And how did you know that Linda Kasabian
	15	was there at the scene of the crime?
	16	A Oh, I personally don't. All I know is, you
•	17	know, what I read and heard on the news broadcasts.
	18	Q What did you hear or see or read that led
	19	you to believe that she was there at the scene of the
	20	crime?
	21	A I can't answer that.
•	22	Q Well, I don't want to put words in your
	23 .	mouth, Mrs. Hines, but did you read where Linda Kasabian
	.24	said that she was there, or did you read that some
,	25	reporter implied that she was there, or that the prosecu-
	26	tion said she was there or her mother said she was there?

That is the sort of thing we are asking, 4b - 41 the purported source of the information, even though it 2 is contained in the paper or on television. 3 I understand what you mean. 4 A afraid I j,st can't recall. 5. Do you approve of the defendants as 6 Ż persons? 8 Well, I have nothing to really disapprove. Α . 9 You mean, as far as their character goes? 10 Yes. As a result of what you know. Q 11 I take it that you don't know any of the 12 defendants personally; is that right? 13 Á No, I don't. 14 I take it you don't know anybody who does Q. 15 know them personally? 16 No, sir. 17 So that all you know about them you have 18 read, seen or heard on radio, newspaper or TV? 19 Yes, sir. À 20 Based on what you have heard, read or seen 21 on the radio, newspaper and television, do you approve 22 of the defendants or disapprove of them, Mrs. Hines? 23 Well, I don't disapprove but I don't Ά 4c fls. exactly approve either. 26

4c-1	1	Q You are certainly entitled to that opinion.
•	2	Can you tell us, though, can you elaborate on
	3	your statement? Can you tell us upon what you base that
	. 4	opinion, and so on?
	. 5	A Well, the only thing I don't approve of is
	. 6	the style of dress.
	7	Q of the young ladies or of the denims Mr. Manson
	8	is wearing, or what?
	9	A Well, so far as Mr. Manson, well, I don't
	10	mean as far as what he is wearing now.
	11	Q Were you familiar with some clothing he wore in
	12	the past?
	13	A No, sir.
	14	Q Is he all right as he is dressed now?
	15	A Well, I am referring to his hair.
*	16	Q Oh, to his hair?
	17	A Yes.
	18	Q The length of his hair? You don't think
	19	men should wear long hair?
	20	A No, sir, I don't.
*	21	Q I take it, though, it is all right for women to
	22	have long hair?
	2 8 .	A I think it does look better on a woman.
•	24	Q So, it is a matter of taste or aesthetics?
	· 25 .	A Yes.
	26	Q You don't think that Mr. Manson is any less of a

4C2	; ;	man because he has long hair, do you?
402	1	
	2	A No. That I don't believe.
	3 [,] .	Q And you don't think it is effeminate, or do you?
	4	A Well, that, I think, is built into a person
	5	themselves, because I have met a few people, men, who do
	6	have long hair, and they didn't seem feminine at all.
	7	Q Is that going to influence you in arriving at a
	8.	verdict in this case?
	9	A What?
•	10	Q Do you think that will have a tendency to
	11 .	influence your judgment in this case?
	12	A No, I don't believe so.
	13	MR. FITZGERALD: I have nothing further.
	14	THE COURT: Mr. Reiner?
	15	MR. REINER: Thank you.
	16	
	17	VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MRS. HINES
	18	BY MR. REINER:
	19 .	Q Mrs. Hines, there are two areas I wish to go
	20	into.
	21	one is notwithstanding anything that you may
	22	have seen or heard, that is, read in the newspaper or
	. 23.	seen or heard on radio or television, your ability to be
	24	impartial in this case; and the other area of inquiry, to
	25	go into some depth as to just what it was that you have seen

read or heard in the newspapers, radio and television.

have seen,

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Now, since these crimes occurred last August, you have watched the television news on a fairly regular basis, have you not, ma am?

A More or less.

Q And you have read the daily newspaper on a fairly regular basis; is that so?

A Again I have to say more or less.

Q Now, notwithstanding anything that you have read in the newspaper or seen or heard on radio or television, Mrs. Hines, do you feel that you could be impartial in this case and base your decision solely upon the evidence that is presented here in court?

A Yes, sir.

Now, going to the information, if we may call it information, the information that you received that came to your attention from the newspapers or on radio and television, Mrs. Hines -- first of all, you do appreciate that candid answers with respect to what exposure you have had to such information is essential to the administration of justice? You appreciate that, do you not?

A Yes.

Q Now, do you recall one morning picking up the newspaper or listening to the radio or seeing the television news and hearing of the crimes that had been committed the night before, the so-called Sharon Tate killings?

Do you remember that, ma am?

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Q And would it be a fair statement to say that in the days, and perhaps even weeks, that followed, that there was a great deal of attention given to these particular killings in the newspapers, radio and television?

A Yes, sir, I believe it was.

And without reference to these specifics,
Mrs. Hines, you did hear a lot about these particular
killings and read quite a bit about it in the days and
weeks that followed these facts; is that right?

A Yes.

Q Is it your recollection that the news sort of died down for a while up until the time that certain persons were arrested in connection with this crime, at which time the news began to build up again?

Is that your recollection, ma'am?

A I think it did.

Q Now, do you recall, then, one day seeing in the newspaper big headlines that the so-called Tate case -- that there had been arrests in the so-called Tate case in connection with that case?

A I can't recall. I didn't always get the paper. A lot of times I just heard about it on the radio or television.

Q Well, the name of Mr. Manson is presently familiar to you, is it not, Mrs. Hines?

A Yes.

.24 25

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1	Q I mean, it was familiar to you before you
· 2 · .,	even came to court as a prospective juror?
3.	A Yes.
4	Q The name of Susan Atkins was also familiar
5 .	to you; is that right?
6	A Yes.
7	Q Did you learn of it presumably for the
· 8	first time after the arrests had occurred in connection
. 9	with the case?
10	A Yes.
11	Q Before that these names were totally unknown
12	to you; is that right?
13	A Yes, sir.
14	Q And the likeness of Mr. Manson, that is,
15	your ability to recognize him, this was something that
16	you were not familiar with prior to the arrests; is that
17	also true?
18,	A I am sorry, could you repeat that, please?
19 ,	Q Yes.
20	You were able to recognize Mr. Manson when
21	you came to court; is that right?
22	A Yes.
23 .	Q And that was from pictures that you had
·24	seen previously of Mr. Manson; is that correct?
25 .	A Yes.
26	Q And these pictures that you had seen of Mr.

Manson you had seen after the arrests had occurred in 1 this case; is that right? 2 A Yes. 3 Q. Now, try to recall as well as you can the time that the arrests in connection with this case 5 involving Mr. Manson and any of the other defendants 6 occurred, when that first occurred. 7 Do you recall seeing a headline in a news-8 paper about it, or do you perhaps recall hearing about it 9 for the first time on the television news or radio. 10 perhaps? 11 I can't remember where I heard it first. 12 Now, at that time, do you also recall the Q. 13 name of Susan Atkins coming to your attention for the 14 first time? 15 A Yes. 16 Do you recall the names of any of the other 17 defendants coming / your attention for the first time 18 right at the time that the arrests occurred? 19 Α Yes. 20 Can you recall the names now, the names that Q. were brought up then for the first time? 22 À Yes, sir. What were those names? Q. 24 Α Well, Patricia Krenwinkel and your client. 25Are you referring to Leslie Van Houten? 26

	į	A Yes, Leslie Van Houten.
	2	And then there was another gentleman, I
	3	think, whose name was also Charles. I can't remember his
	4	last name. That they were trying to bring back here.
	5	Q Are you referring perhaps to Charles Watson
	6	in Texas?
	Ż.	À Yes.
	8	Q Do you recall whether or not any of the
	9	other defendants were out of the State of California?
	10	A I think one of the girls was.
	11	Q Do you remember which girl it was?
1	12	A No, I don't.
 :	13	Q Do you remember where she was? In which
	14	other state she was?
5 fls.	15	A No, I don't, sir.
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Q How is it that the case against Mr. Manson was made in the first place, how is it that these arrests occurred?

Do you recall reading that in the newspaper or hearing about it on television or radio?

A I have heard, but I cannot remember.

Q Well, do you recall anything in connection with Susan Atkins, right about the time the arrests involving Mr. Manson and the others occurred?

A No. I can't.

Q Do you recall any person testifying before the Grand Jury, causing these indictments of certain persons and their arrests?

A No, sir, I don't.

Q Now, from that time, the time of these arrests up until the present, You have continued to read the newspaper, the daily newspaper, and watch the daily newsprograms on television on a more or less regular basis.

Would that be a fair statement?

A Yes, sir.

And while watching the news and reading the newspapers, a substantial amount of information has come to your attention, whether it is accurate or inaccurate is unimportant at the moment.

A Yes.

Q But a substantial amount of information has come

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to your attention in connection with this case, in connection with the defendants, even perhaps in connection with the attorneys?

A Ýes.

Q And if information regarding that would touch upon this case, if that were to come to your attention now that you are a prospective juror --

A Uh-huh.

Q You would discipline yourself not to allow any suggestions that be contained in that information, of the relative guilt of the defendants, to influence you, is that true?

A Yes, sir.

Q That is because you know you are a prospective juror in this case, would that be true?

A Yes, sir.

Q Last December when all of this broke, and the months that immediately followed, you did not at that time anticipate that there was even a possibility that you might some day be a juror in this case, did you?

A No, sir.

Q It never occurred to you?

A It did not.

Q So at that time you did not have any reason to discipline yourself to ignore any of the suggestions that would appear in the newspaper or on television, would that

be a fair statement?

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Yes, sir.

So that if you were to read today that some reporter says he thinks Charles Manson is quilty, you would discipline yourself to ignore that information, that suggestion, on the part of the reporter because you are a prospective juror?

> Ã Yes, sir.

If you had read such a thing last December you would not have disciplined yourself to ignore the suggestion if there was such implicit in such a statement, because you did not think you were going to be a juror, would that be a fair statement?

> Α Yes.

So would it also be a fair statement to say that because you had no reason to do so, in fact, you did not discipline yourself to ignore the suggestions that were contained in the media, by media I mean newspapers, television and radio, relative to the guilt of the defendants or any of them, would that be a fair statement?

> A I am sorry, would you repeat that?

Q Yes, perhaps I was overly long.

Because you had no reason to discipline Yourself to ignore the suggestions in the media, in fact you did not discipline yourself to ignore any suggestions that were contained in the media?

A That's right.

Q And would it also be a fair statement to say that by and large all of the information that appeared in the newspapers, on radio and television tended to suggest or assume that the defendants, or some of them, were guilty of these crimes?

THE COURT: I think that calls for speculation.

Q BY MR. REINER: Well, in your view --

THE COURT: You are asking in her view?

Q BY MR. REINER: In other words, when you read these newspaper articles and saw the headlines and you saw the television news, and so forth, did it appear to you that the assumption was implicit in these stories, at least from the view of the writer, to the effect that the defendants or some of them were actually guilty of these crimes?

THE COURT: I think that question is so vague.

Mr. Reiner, I don't --

MR. REINER: Perhaps I might restate it.

THE COURT: "Suggestions implicit" -- that is a rather vague terminology.

MR. REINER: Very well, perhaps I should restate it.

Q BY MR. REINER: Mrs. Hines, in your view was the brutality of the information that was contained in the newspapers and other media unfavorable toward Mr. Manson and the other defendants?

1	Would that be a fair statement?
2	A I think I would say it was probably both.
3	Q Do you recall whether it was unfavorable to
4	start with?
5	A Nothing stands out in my mind, sir.
6.	Q What do you recall that was favorable?
7	A I cannot remember that, either, I'm sorry.
8	Q Did you think you ever did read or hear any-
9	thing about Mr. Manson or any of the defendants that you
10	would characterize as favorable?
14	A I am afraid I cannot recall.
12,	Q And you are unable to recall reading a
13	single newspaper article or hearing a single comment on
14	radio or television that in your view indicated that these
15	defendants were guilty.
16	Can you recall a single such statement?
17	A I know I must have read some statements, to that
18	effect, but I cannot recall them.
19	Q Why do you say you know you must have read some
20	statements to that effect?
21.	A Well, I am pretty sure that I have.
22	Q Let me ask you why are you pretty sure that
23	you read statements to that effect?
24	A I think it is more that I feel I have.
2 5	Q Although you have not reached a firm opinion,
26	before you were called to court as a prospective turor

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1	before you even anticipated that this was a possibility,
2	did you have an opinion, tentative as it might have been,
3	that the defendants might be guilty based on what you read
4	in the paper?
5	A No, sir, I did not.
6	Q Did you have any opinion at all?
7	A You mean as to their guilt or innocence?
8	Q That's correct.
9	A No. sir. I did not.
10	Q Did you wonder in your own mind as to who might
11	have killed these people if these defendants or any of
12	them didn't?
13	Did you wonder in your own mind?
14	A oh, yes.
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5a-1 1	Q In wondering, did you reach any tentative
. 2	feelings or opinions or conclusions?
3.	A No, sir.
4	Q And you feel at this point that you have a
5	completely open and impartial mind, and your judgment in
6	this case if you are one of the jurors would be completely
7	fair and based solely on the evidence here in court and
·8	not upon anything that you have been previously exposed
9	to?
10	A Yes, sir.
11	MR. REINER: Thank you very much.
12 .	THE COURT: Mr. Shinn.
13	MR. SHINN: Yes.
14	
15	VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MRS. HINES
16	BY MR. SHINN:
. 17	Q Mrs. Hines, did you read or hear about Mr.
118	Kanarek?
19	A I beg your pardon?
20	Q Did you read or hear about Mr. Kanarek?
21	A I am afraid I don't know who he is.
22.	Q You don't know Mr. Kanarek?
23	A No, I don't.
24	Q Were you present in court when Mr. Kanarek
25	was introduced as Mr. Manson's attorney?
26:	A Oh!

5a-2	Q That is Mr. Kanarek.
2	A I'm sorry. Well, I could not catch all
3	the names at that time.
4	Q You/not read or hear nothing about Mr.
- ; 5	Kanarek last week or
6	A I know something came on the television
. 7	last night, but I turned the water on in the kitchen
.8	full force and I could not hear it.
9	Q Something came on, you say Mr. Kanarek's
10	face came on TV?
11	A I had gone in the living room to see if
12	Mr. Manson's attorney was still on.
13	Q And you did not recognize him sitting right
14	before you today?
15	A Oh, I recognizedhim. I could not have told
16	you his name.
17	MR. SHINN: Oh, I see. Okay, thank you.
18	THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek, any questions?
19	MR. KANAREK: No, your Honor, thank you.
20	· •
21	VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MRS. HINES
22	BY MR. STOVITZ:
23	Q Mrs. Hines, is it?
24 .	A Yes.
.25	Q What part of town do you live in?
26	A Highland Park.
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5a-3 i	ବ	That is between downtown Los Angeles and
2	the Pasadena	area, is that right?
3	A	Yes.
4	Q	And how long have you lived in the Highland
5	Park area?	•
6	A	Three years.
7	Q	What does your husband do?
8	A	He is a power engineer.
9	Q	A power engineer?
10.	A	Yes.
11	Q.	For whom?
12	A	Continental Insurance Company.
13	Q Q	Have you ever been employed?
14	A.	Yes, I am now.
15.	Q	What are you employed as?
16	A.	Dictaphone and teletype operator.
17	ું ર	For whom?
. 18	A	The same company as my husband.
19	Q	And what part of town do you work in?
20	A	East L. A.
21	Q	East Los Angeles?
22	A	Yes, sir.
23	ବ	Do you have any children?
24	. A	No, sir.
25	Q	How long have you lived in Los Angeles?
26 .	. A.	Oh, about eight years.

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Now, do you think that if you were selected as a prospective juror in this case that you could promise the Court that you will absolutely, unequivocally put out of your mind anything that you heard, read or saw about this case, and you will decide this case solely on the evidence that you hear and see in the courtroom?

A Yes, I believe so.

Q Do you have any doubts whatsoever that you can do that?

A No, sir.

MR. STOVITZ: We have no further questions.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MRS. HINES
BY THE COURT:

Q Mrs. Hines, you heard me tell the panel when you first came into court that in every criminal case a defendant is presumed to be innocent, did you hear that?

A Yes, sir.

Q And do you understand that that presumption lasts until such time as the People are able to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, if they are able to do so, do you understand that?

A Yes.

Q Now, if they are not able to do that, are

45a-5 you willing to vote for an acquittal? -- if the People are not able to prove 2 guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? If the People are not able to prove guilt 4 beyond a reasonable doubt are you willing to vote for 5 6 an acquittal? ' Yes. sir. 7 On the other hand, if they are able to 8 prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt are you willing to 9. 10 vote a verdict of guilty? 11 A. Yes, sir. 12 Do you know of any reason why you could not 13 be fair and impartial in this case? 14 No, sir, I don't. 15 THE COURT: All right, I'm going to ask you to 16 go back into the courtroom at this time, Mrs. Hines. 17 Thank you very much, and will you refrain 18 from discussing with anyone, including your husband 19 and the other prospective jurors, and especially the 20 press, but everyone, what has gone on here in chambers? 21 MRS. HINES: Yes. sir. 22 THE COURT: All right, thank you. 23 (Mrs. Hines leaves the chambers of the Court.) 24 MR. FITZGERALD: We will challenge the juror for 25 bias, and her exposure to prejudicial pretrial publicity, 26 your Honor.

	1	MR. REINER: Join.
ini.	2	MR. SHINN: Join.
•	.3	MR. STOVITZ: We will oppose the challenge,
	4	your Honor.
	5	MR. KANAREK: Join.
	Ġ	THE COURT: Which side are you joining, Mr.
	7	Kanarek?
	8	MR. KANAREK: I am with Mr. Fitzgerald.
	9 .	THE COURT: For a moment you had me worried.
	10	The challenge will be disallowed.
	11	Are you ready then to go back into court
	12	and continue any additional voir dire of Mrs. Hines?
	13	MR. STOVITZ: Yes, your Honor.
•	14	THE COURT: My notes show that after the voir
	15	dire as to her is completed the next peremptory challenge
	16	will be with the defendants.
	17	Well, it is time for our recess at this
	18	time, we will then resume in open court.
6 fls.	19	(Recess.)
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(The following proceedings were had in open court in the presence and hearing of the prospective jurors, all defendants and all counsel, including the deputies District Attorney being present.)

THE COURT: All parties and counsel are present.

MR. FITZGERALD: Could we approach the bench?

THE COURT: All right. All parties and counsel are present; all the prospective jurors are in the jury box.

(The following proceedings were had at the bench out of the hearing of the prospective jurors:)

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, I have Mr. Caballero, Richard Caballero, a member of the Bar, here under subpoena and I also have subpoenaed Paul Caruso and Jerry Cohen of the Los Angeles Times.

I wonder if your Honor could order them back to a date certain.

They are subpoensed here in connection with the proceedings under the 1538.5.

THE COURT: What 1538.5?

MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor indicated that your Honor was denying the motion without prejudice, and for me to take it up at a future time. Your Honor will probably recall.

THE COURT: I said I would entertain the motion during the course of the trial.

MR. KANAREK: Right.

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THE COURT: If the People sought to introduce evidence which was contended had been obtained by means of some illegal search or seizure.

We did not continue the motion for any fixed date. The motion went off calendar.

MR. KANAREK: However, I wish to have continuing jurisdiction over these people. I believe that they --

THE COURT: But there is no time set. How can I order them back?

MR. KANAREK: What I say is this, I am willing, your Honor, to make the subpoena, let's say, six weeks from now.

otherwise, the defendant is going to be denied -- these people are going to be conveniently, like in South America or in Europe on vacation -- one of them is on vacation now conveniently.

THE COURT: I am not going to order them back to something that is not even on the calendar, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, we are being denied due process because I believe they will not be available for subpoena.

Now, it will not be inconvenient; it will not be inconvenient. This is a very serious matter.

We have reason to believe, your Honor, that there has been a conspiracy going on; that it did go on in connection with Susan Atkins alleged confession and the taking of her before the Grand Jury; that the District

Attorney's Office participated in it. 1 THE COURT: What does all of this have to do with a 2 1538.5 motion? 3 MR. KANAREK: It has to do this, if I may have the 4. statute I will show the Court. 5 THE COURT: Just tell me. 6 MR. KANAREK: Under Subsection 2 -- if I had the 7 8 statute --Fire 1 2 1 MR. STOVITZ: Would your Honor please ask the witness 9 be ordered back to, say, July 27th, and counsel can give us 10 points and authorities. 11 12 I am completely in the dark. We do have the jury panel here; we can get on with the prospective jury 13 14 selection. 15 Mr. Caballero is the only witness that 16 responded. He is the only one I see back in court. 17 MR. KANAREK: That is agreeable, your Honor, also 18 Mr. Caruso called. I don't want to interfere with his practice of law. He is in West D. 19 20 If your Honor could order a body attachment --21 THE COURT: I am not going to take that up at this 22 time, Mr. Kanarek, there is no motion on the calendar. 23 You subpoensed these witnesses in --24 MR. KANAREK: I subpoenaed them because of the 25 apprehension I have, your Honor. 26 They will not be available for process; that

they will not be available when we need them. That is what my apprehension is, that there was misconduct, there was some \$90,000, your Honor, that changed hands in connection with Susan Atkins! activity.

Since your Honor is asking me --

THE COURT: Now you are getting off into some subject. I have no idea what you re talking about, you started out by talking about a 1538.5 motion.

MR. KANAREK: That's correct.

THE COURT: There is no such motion pending.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor indicated he would entertain it during the course of the trial.

We have all the papers here before the Court; we can reinstitute it at this point.

The point is to maintain jurisdiction over these particular witnesses so that they don't flee the jurisdiction.

THE COURT: I have no proof of service on Mr. Caruso. Where is the proof of service?

MR. KANAREK: As far as Mr. Caruso is concerned, the process server has not returned it to me. I represent to the Court that this is so.

If your Honor will let me have the statute for just a moment I will show your Honor why it is pertinent.

MR. SHINN: May I say something, your Honor? THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SHINN: I think these witnesses -- if I get my 1 motion to suppress, which I filed with the Court, and it 2 was continued to a later date --3 THE COURT: That is not what I said, Mr. Shinn, 4 don't misquote me. 5 The motions went off calendar. 6 MR. SHINN: Not the motion to suppress, your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Are you talking about the 1538.5? ĸ MR. SHINN: No, I am talking about my motion, and 9 I think Mr. Kanarek in conjunction with my motion and his 10 motion with these witnesses, the identical witnesses, your 11 Honor. 12 THE COURT: What are you saying? I don't understand 13 what you are saying. 14 MR. SHINN: I have the motion to suppress. 15 What about it? THE COURT: 16 MR. SHINN: Your Honor said to continue it to 17 a later time. 18. THE COURT: I don't recall what I said. Are you 19 saying there is now a date set for your motion? **2**0 MR. SHINN: No. 21 I don't recall any such date either. THE COURT: 22 23 24 2526

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MR. SHINN: There is no date certain, your Honor, but I believe I discussed this matter with Mr. Bugliosi and he wanted to try to get all these motions heard before the trial starts.

THE COURT: Do you have a copy of the subpoena on Mr. Caballero?

MR. KANAREK: No, but he is in court, your Honor, and he is responding.

THE COURT: But I want to know why I'm being asked to order him back.

MR. KANAREK: He is necessary as a witness, a key witness to the 1538 motion.

> There is no 1538 motion pending. THE COURT:

MR. KANAREK: You said you would entertain it during the course of the trial.

THE COURT: It went off calendar and it has never been reset.

MR. KANAREK: You indicated you would hear it during the course of the trial;

THE COURT: There is nothing pending.

MR. KANAREK: If your Honor wishes, I can set it for a date certain.

What I am saying is that the man is here, and if what we are really interested in, your Honor, is expediting this case; the man can be told to come back on a date certain. In the meanwhile, we can do whatever the

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Court wishes as far as setting a date.

The Court stated, and I accepted the Court's representation, that it would be heard during the course of the trial.

THE COURT: You had better go back and read exactly what I said, because that is not precisely what was said.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor said he would entertain a motion during the course of the trial.

THE COURT: You haven't given me the slightest indication of what connection Mr. Caballero has with any 1538.5 motion.

MR. KANAREK: May I have the Penal Code, your Honor?

THE COURT: That won't tell me what connection Mr.

Caballero has with the motion.

MR. KANAREK: I would be able to delineate it with particularity if I may see the Code.

THE COURT: We are not going to take it up now. We are in the process of picking a jury.

If you want to raise it in chambers where we can discuss it a little more fully, we will do so, but I am not going to interrupt our selection of the jury at this time with something that isn't pending on the calendar

MR. KANAREK: What I am saying, your Honor, is that I have an apprehension that these people will not be available.

THE GOURT: I suggest that you resubpoena him.

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Notice it for some date.

MR. KANAREK: He is here now. The prosecution is willing -- Mr. Stovitz is -- he has enunciated that it is agreeable with him that he come back on the 27th.

Let's ask him to come back on the 27th, your Honor.

THE COURT: For what purpose?

MR. KANAREK: Then we will maintain jurisdiction over him.

THE COURT: For what purpose?

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor is forcing me to say
this: But I believe there has been subornation of
perjury, that this indictment is improper, that it comes
about by subornation. I think that Mr. Einstoss and
have
the District Attorney's Office / conspired with Mr.
Caballero -- your Honor is forcing me to say this because
your Honor won't order him to be brought back --

THE COURT: You should have brought this up before trial.

MR. KANAREK: No. Habeas corpus lies. Even after a 995 motion one can get habeas corpus.

I don't want to belabor it. It is our belief that Mr. Einstoss and the District Attorney's Office conspired with Mr. Caballero and Mr. Jerry Cohen, the conspiracy that involves Mr. Schilling, for money, for \$90,000, in lorder to obtain this indictment, in

order for certain matters to occur, and I am saying that these are matters of --6a fls. **:9** 2 -19 .25

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THE COURT: If you are attempting to attack the Grand Jury indictment, that should have been done before trial.

MR. SHINN: Your Honor, there is also this: I did try to attack the Grand Jury indictment with my motion to suppress, and I believe a 995, your Honor, and Judge Lucas, on my 995 motion, told me --

THE COURT: one moment.

Mr. Kanarek, I am not going to order back a witness who has been subpoensed in for no proceeding on the calendar so far as I can see.

MR. KANAREK: May I put it this way: He is a defense witness that we want for the trial, like any defense witness.

May I put it that way, your Honor?

THE COURT: Show me your proof of service.

MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, he is here in court.

THE COURT: I have no reason to believe that he won't be available.

MR. FITZGERALD: Just let him sit here.

MR. KANAREK: I don't wish to inconvenience him.

The process server has not returned the subpoena to me, your Honor.

Now, your Honor, as I say, I wish to cooperate with him, he is a practicing lawyer; I am more than willing to have him ordered back on a day certain.

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I have an apprehension that he will not be available when we need him precisely. Then somebody is going to say that we haven't been diligent in getting him.

He is here, your Honor, and I believe that we have the power --

THE COURT: You didn't tell me that you wanted him as a defense witness in the trial proper. You said something about a 1538.5 motion.

MR. KANAREK: I need him as a defense witness during the trial proper.

THE COURT: What date do you want him ordered back?

MR. KANAREK: Whatever date is convenient. July 27th?

THE COURT: It is not my convenience. I don't

care whether he comes back or not.

MR. KANAREK: Very well.

May I ask him, your Honor? May I look at the calendar just a moment, your Honor? Just a half a minute?

THE COURT: All right.

We are going to proceed now.

MR. KANAREK: Yes, sir.

(Mr. Kanarek leaves the bench and then returns.)

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, the prosecution -
THE COURT: Just give me a date, Mr. Kanarek. I

don't want to prolong this.

MR. KANAREK: All right. July 27th.

THE COURT: All right.

Will you ask Mr. Caballero to come up here? 1 We don't have to do this in the presence of the jury. 2 MR. KANAREK: Yes, sir. Yes, your Honor, that is why 3 we are at the bench. (Mr. Caballero approaches the bench.) 5 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Caballero. 6. MR. CABALLERO: Good morning, sir. 7. THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek tells me that he has sub-8 poenaed you in here for today. 9. MR. CABALLERO: Correct. 10 THE COURT: You will not be required here for today, 11 and he wants me to order you to come back on July 27th. 12 MR. CABALLERO: I have five matters in Pomona on that 13 day, your Honor. 14 THE COURT: It apparently doesn't make much difference 15 to Mr. Kanarek what day it is, so why don't we make it a 16 date convenient to Mr. Caballero's calendar. 17 MR. KANAREK: Yes. Very well. 18 MR. CABALLERO: Thank you. May I just get my calendar 19 for a second? 20 THE COURT: All right. 21 (Mr. Caballero leaves the bench and then 22 returns.) 23. 24 MR. CABALLERO: What about July 30th? No, there is no July 30th. 25 26 MR. KANAREK: Yes, there is.

MR. CABALLERO: Yes. All right, July 30th? THE COURT: You are ordered to return to this court-room on July 30th at 9:00 a.m., July 30th, 1970. .3 Marie Carlotte State .25·

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MR. CABALLERO: Mr. Caruso called on the telephone and I took the call. He is engaged in Department D in Santa Monica. He wants to know if it is necessary for him to come down here? He would like to be excused.

He has been subpoensed. He made himself available for subpoens, as I did. He has not been evading any process.

THE COURT: Will he be present on July 30th?

MR. CABALLERO: I am sure he will, certainly.

THE COURT: I am not going to be involved in that if he hasn't been subpoensed.

MR. KANAREK: He was subpoenaed.

MR. CABALLERO: No, he was subpoenaed.

MR. KANAREK: Yes.

THE COURT: Will you inform him that I will issue a body attachment and hold it until July 30th at 9:00 a.m. for Paul Caruso.

MR. CABALLERO: Yes. Thank you.

MR. KANAREK: Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Caballero.

THE COURT: Are we'ready to proceed, gentlemen?
MR. FITZGERALD: Ready.

(Whereupon all counsel returned to their respective places at counsel table and the following proceedings occurred in open court within the presence and hearing of the prospective jurors:)

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THE COURT: Do you wish to inquire further, Mr. Fitzgerald?

MR. FITZGERALD: No, your Honor, I don't have any questions of the prospective juror.

I pass for cause.

THE COURT: Mr. Reiner?

MR. REINER: Thank you, your Honor.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MRS. HINES
BY MR. REINER:

Q Mrs. Hines, I asked you quite a few questions in chambers so I will not go into many questions at this time, but there are a number of matters that I just wanted to cover very briefly here.

Now, first of all, irrespective of what you have viewed here in court with respect to the conduct of Leslie Van Houten, or what you may have read of the conduct of Leslie Van Houten, or what you may subsequently see with respect to the conduct of Leslie Van Houten, will you, nonetheless, base your judgment solely and entirely upon the evidence in the case and not allow your interpretation of her conduct here in court to influence your judgment?

A Yes, sir.

Q So that if it appears to you that Leslie Van Houten wishes to be convicted if any member of the

.1	Mr. Bugliosi	asked Mrs. Roseland on Monday?
2	A	Yes.
3	ବ	Can you remember most of them?
4		Did you follow them as he was asking
5	Mrs. Roseland	those questions?
6	A	Yes.
7	Q	Let's start off with any organizations
8	that you have	belonged to.
9		Do you belong to any organizations that
10	have as one o	f their beliefs the suppression of the
11	death penalty	?
1,2	A.	No, sir.
13	Q	Do you belong to any religious groups that
14	might have th	at as one of its beliefs?
15	. .	No, sir.
16	Q	As a matter of personal preference, do
17	the People ha	we any obstable to overcome in your mind
18	by way of con	wincing you that the death penalty should
19	be invoked in	this case if there is a conviction of
20	first degree n	mrder?
21	A .	No, sir.
22	Q:	Going to the question of the guilt of
23	the defendant	s, Mrs. Hines, you understand that the
24	People must p	rove their case first. Do you understand
.25	that?	
26	A	Yes, sir.

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Q All right, now, assume for the moment that in our proof for this case we do not produce any confession by any particular defendant.

Do you have any prejudices in your mind that before you would convict someone of first-degree murder that you must have a confession introduced?

A No. sir.

Q All right, assume again on the question of guilt that we do not produce any eye witness to a particular murder, do you have any prejudices in your mind that before you would convict somebody of first-degree murder you must have at least one eye witness present?

A No. sir.

Q Do you have any prejudices against circumstantial evidence?

A No. sir.

Q You understand that if the Court tells you that the jury may consider circumstantial evidence in arriving at a verdict, that that constitutes legal evidence just the same as direct evidence.

Do you understand that?

A Yes, sir.

Q You have heard the illustrations of circumstantial evidence so far as they go, the cookies and the footprints in the sand?

. You heard those explanations?

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7-2	1	"A Not those two, but I heard the last one.
	ż	Q Which one was that?
	3	A About the TV being stolen.
	4	Q oh, the TV being stolen, all right.
	.5	Assume for the moment that you saw me write
	6	on the blackboard; that would constitute direct evidence
	7	that I wrote on the blackboard.
	8	You understand that?
	9	A Yes.
	10	Q Assume that you did not see me write, but one
	11	moment you saw there was no writing on the blackboard and
	12	the next moment you saw there was writing on the blackboard,
Ä	13	and I had chalk dust on my fingertips.
	14	That would be circumstantial evidence that I
•	15	wrote on the blackboard, you understand that?
	16.	A Yes, sir.
	17	Q And if they could trace my handwriting to that
	18	blackboard writing, that would be additional circumstantial
	19	evidence; do you understand that?
	20	A Yes.
	21	Q Of course, in the nature of things, sometimes
	22	some circumstantial evidence is stronger than other types
	23	of circumstantial evidence, you understand that?
	24	A Yes.
	25	Q In this particular case do you have any
	2 6	prejudice as far as psychiatric testimony is concerned?

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A	No.	sir

Q You are not going to believe the testimony of a psychiatrist just because he is a psychiatrist, right?

A Right.

Q And you are not going to disbelieve him just because he is a psychiatrist?

A That's right.

Q Now, Mrs. Hines, with relation to the doctrine of the rule on criminal conspiracy, you have heard the explanation that Mr. Bugliosi gave to Mrs. Roseland?

A Yes, sir.

Q Were you able to follow that explanation?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you have any prejudices against convicting a person of first-degree murder on the doctrine of criminal conspiracy?

A No. sir.

Now, assume for the moment that you and your fellow jurors have voted for a verdict of first-degree murder, and you do hear evidence, say, in the penalty trial, and then you are going to go back and deliberate, and the rest of the jurors say to you, "Well, you are a secretary, you should take notes."

You take notes, and then they say, "You are going to be the foreman of this jury," and you are going to have to sign the verdict."

1	And you and your fellow jurors vote for the
2	death penalty. Would you be able to sign that verdict?
3	A Yes, sir.
4	Q Assume for the moment that you are voting on
5	the death penalty for Leslie Van Houten, this 19 or 20-
6	year-old young lady over here.
7	You and your fellow jurors vote that you
-8	should invoke the death penalty on Leslie Van Houten.
9	Would you be able to sign the verdict on that?
10	A Yes, sir.
11	Q Let us assume that, considering the question
12	of the death penalty, you are of the frame of mind that
13	one of the defendants whom you voted for first-degree
14	murder did not actually perpetrate the fatal blow in this
15	case.
16	He, himself, did not, or she, herself, did not
17	actually kill any person.
18	Can you say to yourself that you could under
19	certain circumstances vote for the death penalty for that
20	particular individual?
21	A Under certain circumstances.
22	Q You could?
23	A I believe so.
24	Q All right, now, Mrs. Hines, in weighing all of
25	the things that you know about this case, everything that
26	you might have heard or seen and read, weighing your own

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personal background, if you were on trial in this particular case would you choose someone in your frame of mind to serve on this jury?

A I think so.

Q And bearing in mind that the People are seeking 12 fair-minded jurors, if you were the District Attorney in this case would you choose someone in your frame of mind?

A I think so.

Q Is there anything at all, whether counsel has touched upon it in their questions or not, that you care to relate to us now that might touch upon your so-called frame of mind with respect to this case?

A I cannot think of anything.

All right, you understand, then, do you not, Mrs. Hines, that in the event that you are selected as a juror in this case you will be with the 12 people or 11 people around you for many, many days and months to come, you understand that?

A Yes, sir.

Q If by any chance you had a disagreement concerning something as immaterial as ordering breakfast or lunch or dinner, you would not let that in any way influence your verdict, right?

A No. sir.

Q You would be able to put aside all sorts of petty differences you might have. You would not be able

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to watch the news; perhaps in watching the TV you might want to watch one station and somebody else may want to watch something else.

You would be able to put those petty differences aside and concentrate on this case only, is that right?

A Yes, sir.

In the event you do go back to the jury room and you were of a particular frame of mind, and the rest of the jurors were of a different frame of mind, you would be willing to discuss the evidence over again, wouldn't you, and change your mind if you felt it was wrong. Is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

MR. STOVITZ: Mrs. Hines, thank you very much.
People pass for cause.

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THE COURT: Will counsel approach the bench, please?

(The following proceedings were had at the bench out of the hearing of the prospective jurors:)

THE COURT: I just had the Clerk bring in a note that Mrs. Lee, Juror No. 4, gave him, I want to give you an opportunity to read it before you exercise another peremptory.

I will read it into the record. Then you can look at it individually if you want to.

It is dated July 10th, 8:05 a.m., addressed to me here at the court. It starts out:

"Your Honor, I feel compelled to advise you upon reflection of the questions put to me over the past three days, my response is altered. I have had increasing doubt of my ability to render or impose the death penalty if such a termination becomes necessary."

Signed Mary Lee.

Now, in view of this if you want to inquire further before exercising your peremptory, because it may conceivably turn out that someone will want to interpose a challenge for cause, and if that should be allowed, the jury box should be filled out before anybody has to exercise a peremptory.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, if I may, may the record reveal on behalf of Mr. Manson, your Honor, it is our

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position that this is a typical example, this is a precise example of what has occurred here has denied Mr. Manson a fair trial, a fair trial in violation of the due process laws of the 14th Amendment and the equal protection laws, in that it is my belief that the real reason this woman is supposedly changing her mind in that particular purported request is because she wants to be off the jury because of hardship.

Therefore it is my request that we have a hearing in connection with this matter and that this be done in chambers outside the presence of the other jurors because it is my belief there will be a chain reaction, the domino theory or whatever way you want to denominate it, that it will go through all of the jurors and we and Mr. Manson will be deprived of fair jurors.

It is a way of death orienting this jury, getting people on the jury who are visible to the prosecution, where the juror being a person of intellect recognizes there is a way to get off this jury, and that is by making statements similar to the ones she has given to this Court.

It is my belief -- I say, my position is that this is error.

I ask for a mistrial.

MR. STOVITZ: I will submit the matter, your Honor. I oppose the motion for a mistrial.

THE COURT: Well, the motion for an evidentiary

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hearing, if that is what it was, by Mr. Kanarek, is denied.

The motion for mistrial is denied.

You are not obligated to do anything as a result of this note if you don't want to.

Let her sit there. I don't see any challenge for cause that could be sustained as the basis of what she said in this note, even if one has been made, and none has been made so far.

So I am not going to excuse her.

But I just call this to your attention because I thought you should know about it in case you did want to inquire further before anyone had to exercise a peremptory challenge.

MR. KANAREK: May we then have it in chambers so there isn't -- we are having a hard enough time getting a jury.

THE COURT: I have no objection to that. Very well.

If you want to go back in chambers and inquire of this woman before we go any further --

MR. STOVITZ: We oppose that, your Honor. It would be a complete waste of time.

Mr. Bugliosi can ask this juror two or three questions. We would either exercise our peremptory or show the Court she is now of a frame of mind where she could never impose the death penalty under any circumstances.

If she is of a frame of mind where she would impose it under certain circumstances we would then use our peremptory.

It is as simple as that.

We do not feel we have to take the time of the Court to recess and go back into the chambers.

MR. KANAREK: It is my position, your Honor, this is denying Mr. Manson a fair trial because the other prospective jurors are going to hear what she is going to say.

It doesn't take much to add 1 and 1 and get 2, and they are going to figure out this is a way to get off the jury.

MR. STOVITZ: I submit the other jurors have not used this excuse.

They accentuated their hardship, if anything, but they never used the death penalty as an excuse to get off the jury.

MR. KANAREK: It is now happening, your Honor.

THE COURT: You don't know that, Mr. Kanarek, any more than I know it, or anybody else.

MR. KANAREK: Out of an abundance of caution -Pearl Harbor did not strike until it struck -- I am
saying why take a chance by creating prejudice and error
in the minds of the other jurors, your Honor.

It is my request it be done in chambers.

A few minutes is going to save perhaps much much more time. THE COURT: All of this panel has heard questions regarding the death penalty. There is nothing new about that. There is no automatic right to have these things in chambers. I see no reason for this now. MR. KANAREK: At this particular time --7b fls. THE COURT: Let us proceed, gentlemen. .20

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7-B-1	(The following proceedings were had in open
<u> </u>	court in the presence and hearing of the prospective
	jurors:)
	THE COURT: Do any of the defendants counsel wish
	to inquire further?
	MR. FITZGERALD: No. your Honor.
	MR. REINER: No. your Honor.
•	MR. SHINN: No. your Honor.
,	THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek?
1	MR. KANAREK: No, thank you, your Honor.
1	THE COURT: Do the People wish to inquire further?
1	MR. STOVITZ: That's right.
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1	VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MRS. LEE
1	BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
. п	Q Mrs. Lee, I have already questioned you about
1	this area of the death penalty. With your indulgence I
- 1	would like to ask you a few more questions.
· i	Is that all right, ma am?
2	A Yes.
2	Q I am interested in your state of mind as of
2	this particular moment. You understand that?
2	A Yes.
. 2	Q Would you say that your particular state of
2	mind at this moment is that you have a general opposition
2	to the death penalty?

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25 26 A Yes.

Q Would you say, Mrs. Lee, that your general opposition to the death penalty is of such a nature that it would automatically cause you to vote against the death penalty for these defendants irrespective of the evidence in this case?

MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer.

MRS. LEE: I think so.

However, my objection is not to the death penalty itself, but rather my involvement in making a decision in that direction.

Q BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Now, you feel that your opposition is of such a nature that you would be unable to sign a verdict of death against these defendants?

MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, your Honor.

MR. FITZGERALD: Improper voir dire examination.

MR. KANAREK: Join with Mr. Fitzgerald, your Honor.

THE COURT: I think the question is ambiguous, Mr. Bugliosi.

The objection is sustained.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Let me elaborate a little on it, your Honor.

Do you feel that your opposition to the death penalty is of such a nature that regardless of what evidence we offer in this case against these defendants you

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could not find it within yourself to sign a verdict of death?

MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer.

MRS. LEE: I think this may be the case. I am absolutely not positive, but I have that fear.

Q BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Let me ask you this, Mrs. Lee, and I will tell you in advance it will be a long question. I think it is the type of question that will require some reflection on your part before you answer it.

Now, you understand there might be two trials here, the guilt or innocence trial, and the penalty trial.

You understand that?

A Yes.

Q If these defendants or one or more of them are convicted of first-degree murder, there will be a penalty trial, and only during the penalty trial will you be permitted to pass on the question of life imprisonment or death.

Did you understand that?

A I didn't until now.

Q All right, let me take it step by step.

The first trial is called the so-called guilt or innocence trial in which the only issue for the jury to decide is whether these defendants are guilty or not guilty of the murder charged against them.

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Do you understand that?

A Yes.

Q During that first trial the jury is not permitted to consider or discuss the question of the death penalty because the death penalty is not involved.

Do you understand that?

A Yes.

Now, if these defendants or one or more of them are convicted of first-degree murder, there will follow a second trial called the penalty trial, and at that trial it will be up to the jury to decide whether the punishment should be life imprisonment or death.

Do you understand that?

A Yes.

Q A question I have to ask you is this, and as I say, I think it will require some thought on your part:

Is your general opposition to the death penalty of such a nature that it might prevent you from being completely impartial on the separate issue of guilt or innocence because you realize that if you voted for a verdict of first-degree murder you would be forced, as it were, to thereafter consider the question of the death penalty.

Do you think there is any chance of that happening?

Did you understand my question?

1	A Yes, I understood the question.
2	Q You can see it requires some thought.
3	A Yes, it does.
4	Q Do you want to take a few moments? Take your
5	time.
6	(Pause.)
7	A The answer is yes, I think it would impair my
.8	judgment.
9.	Q on the separate issue of guilt or innocence?
10	A Yes, on the first issue.
11	Q The fact that you might later have to consider
12	the death penalty might prevent you from being totally
13	impartial on the separate issue of guilt versus innocence?
14	A Yes.
15	MR. BUGLIOSI: Thank you very much for your candor.
16	MR. FITZGERALD: May I ask the prospective juror a
17	question?
18	THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Fitzgerald.
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VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MRS. LEE			
BY MR. FITZGERALD:			
Q If you took an oath to listen to the evidence			
and to carefully review it, the guilt phase of the trial,			
would you do that?			
A I would make every effort to do so.			
Q I take it that you would be able to listen			
to the evidence that you heard from the witness stand,			
correct?			
A Yes.			
Q And I take it that you would be able to			
discuss that evidence with your fellow jurors in the jury			
room, would you not? A Yes.			
A Yes.			
Q And you are now saying that you feel that			
you would be unable to convict anybody of first degree			
murder because of some feelings you have?			
Å Yes.			
Q When did you first discover that you had			
feelings in this regard?			
A Last evening.			
Q Now, do you think that that is true in			
every case you ever heard of where the death penalty was			
an issue?			
A I don't quite understand.			
Q As you sit there now, is your frame of mind			

1	such that in no case whatever that you can imagine could
.2	you impose the death penalty?
3	A I could not.
4	Q In any case?
5	A In any case.
6	Q In any case you can imagine ever, not this
7	case, any case, if someone were on trial here for 100,000
8	murders, a million murders, you would not be able to
9.	impose the death penalty?
10	MR. BUGLIOSI: I object to that question. It is
11	improper voir dire, your Honor.
12	THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
13	MR. FITZGERALD: I have nothing further.
14	THE COURT: Anyone else?
15	MR. REINER: No questions.
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17	, VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MRS. LEE
18	BY THE COURT:
19	Q Mrs. Lee?
20	A Yes, sir.
21	Q We are not concerned here with bare
22	possibilities, because many things are possible.
23	They may be highly unlikely, but they are
24	still possible.
25	I am going to ask you again the two
26	questions I put to you originally about the death penalty.
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1 go to your state of mind now and whether or not you would 2 be able to do one thing or another. . 3 Do you understand? 4 A Yes. 5 Now, the first question goes to the so-called 6 guilt phase of the trial and has nothing to do with the 7 imposing of the death penalty. It simply goes to the 8 question of whether or not you can be impartial in making 9 a determination on the question of guilt? 10 Do you understand that? 11 A Yes, I do. 12 All right, the question is this: 13 Do you entertain such conscientious opinions 14. regarding the death penalty that you would be unable to 15 make an impartial decision as to any defendant's guilt 16 regardless of the evidence developed during the trial? 17 Would you be unable to be impartial? 18 A. Yes, sir. 19 Do you believe now that you would be unable? Q 20 I do. Α 21 Do you have any question about that? 22 Q A No, I have no question about it. 23 24 Q. Now, let me ask you the second question. 25 Now, this does go to the question of 26 penalty, and relates to the second phase of the trial, if

These things are not based on bare possibilities.

there is one, and you understand the question by its very 1 nature assumes necessarily that there has been a conviction 2 of murder in the first degree; otherwise there would be 3 no penalty phase, and the question is this: 4 Do you entertain such conscientious opinions 5 regarding the death penalty that you would automatically 6 refuse to impose it without regard to the evidence in 7 the case? 8 Would you automatically refuse to impose it? 9 A Yes, sir. 10 Without regard to the evidence in the case? 11 Q 12 A Yes, sir. 13 Is there any question in your mind about Q 14 that? No, sir. 15 A 16 You have no mental reservations at all about O. 17 the answers to these questions you have given me? 18 No, sir, because there is sufficient doubt A 19 in my mind at this time, and it has not diminished since 20 I discovered it. 21 Well, you don't have to explain to me why 22 you arrived at these conclusions. 23 All I want to know is whether or not in 24 fact they are conclusions and you have no doubt about them? 25 No, sir, I have no doubt. A 8 fls.

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THE COURT: All right. Do counsel wish to inquire further?

MR. FITZGERALD: No. your Honor.

MR. REINER: No. your Honor.

MR. SHINN: No.

MR. KANAREK: No.

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The People move to excuse Mrs. Lee for cause on two grounds: Actual bias under 1073, Paragraph 2, of the Penal Code; and also implied bias under 1074, Subdivision A of the Penal Code; and on the basis of the Supreme Court case of Witherspoon vs. Illinois.

MR. FITZGERALD: We will object to excusing the juror for cause.

We don't feel that she is biased as counsel points out, and to exclude her would deprive the defendants of a fair trial under the equal protection and due process clauses; and with respect to Witherspoon, we don't think her remarks, taken in toto, are unambiguous and unmistakably clear.

MR. REINER: Join.

MR. SHINN: Join.

MR. KANAREK: Join.

THE COURT: The challenge is allowed.

Mrs. Lee, you are excused.

MR. REINER: May I inquire? Is the Court ruling on

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both of the grounds put forward by the People?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. REINER: Then the Court is allowing the challenge for cause on the basis of the Witherspoon objection?

THE COURT: Yes, on all grounds.

I will ask the parties and counsel to come back in chambers and we will call the next prospective juror in.

(The following proceedings occurred in chambers, all counsel and defendants being present:)

THE COURT: All parties and counsel are present.

MR. FITZGERALD: Your Honor, before another juror comes in, I have an objection that I want to register to the questions you asked the prospective jurors in terms of the death penalty.

You asked the jurors two questions. The second question you asked them is: Is your opinion concerning the death penalty such that you would automatically refuse to impose it? But you never asked them if their conscientious opinions concerning the death penalty are such that they would automatically impose it.

THE COURT: Why don't you ask it?

MR. FITZGERALD: But the problem is that that is just as great a constitutional bias as the reverse of that proposition is an indication of constitutional bias.

It seems to me that if the Court is going

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to ask the questions in connection with the death penalty, that the Court afford the defendants equal protection of the law and ask the reverse of that question.

I don't think that it is incumbent upon counsel to ask that question.

When your Honor asks a question it comes with the authority of the bench, the authority of the Judge, and it makes it look as though the Court will only exclude jurors who are anti-capital punishment but will accept jurors that are pro-capital punishment.

MR. STOVITZ: Without agreeing with counsel's reasoning, unless the other attorneys object to the Court asking this question, we will stipulate to the Court asking the question, to save time.

THE COURT: You don't have to stipulate. I can ask it whether you stipulate or not.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I have a question, your Honor.

THE COURT: Certainly no counsel is precluded from asking it.

MR. FITZGERALD: I understand that.

THE COURT: If you want to find out the answer, ask the question.

MR. FITZGERALD: I understand.

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MR. BUGLIOST: I have a question that I would like to ask, and I tried to ask it and there was an objection and it was sustained, and I think this question, from my experience in death penalty cases, is the most penetrating question that I have been able to come up with to ascertain a juror's state of mind with respect to the death penalty, and I works both ways, it is not a pro prosecution question, it is not a pro defense question, it works both ways.

The question is simply this, and it is not a yes or no situation, it is the type of question that really has the juror tell everyone what he feels about the death penalty:

Are you in favor of retaining the death penalty in the State of California or would you rather see some other form of punishment substituted for it?

That question there puts the juror on the spot and he has to come up and say, "Well, I like the death penalty."

If he says that, then the prosecution might say, well, that is a juror we want.

On the other hand, a juror will frequently say, "I really am not in favor of the death penalty but inasmuch as there is no life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, I would be willing to return a verdict of death."

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Now, that is a very illuminating answer for the defense.

It works both ways. It is a beautiful question, and it requires not just a yes or no answer, but a narrative, and I think that question and the answer given thereto would satisfy Mr. Fitzgerald's problem, because what we really find out is --

THE COURT: I don't think he has any problem. If he wants to know the answer, all he has to do is ask the question.

MR. FITZGERALD: Just so long as the record is clear that I have requested the Court to ask the question.

I think, as I pointed out, that counsel vis-a-vis the Court there is a significant difference in the authority with which we respectively ask questions.

THE COURT: I am not making an order, Mr. Fitzgerald, I am asking questions. The juror is sworn to tell the truth. They are not going to tell any more truth to me than they are to you.

MR. REINER: I would disagree with that.

MR. FITZGERALD: But I am an advocate. When I stand up, these jurors know I am a defense lawyer.
But your Honor is a Referee. Your Honor is supposed to go straight down the middle and be fair and impartial.
You are supposed to be scrupulously fair and impartial.

THE COURT: What has all this to do with it? You

are talking about an answer to a question that anyone 1 can ask. 2 MR. FITZGERALD: I am talking about your position. .3 Certainly when a Referee in a basketball 4 5, game says something in respect to the game --THE COURT: I am not saying something. I am asking 6 7 them questions. 8 MR. FITZGERALD: I am saying that your obvious 9. lack of asking a question about their bias in favor of 10 the death penalty --11 THE COURT: I don't ask a lot of other questions 12 that I can ask too. That is not the only question I don't 13 ask. 14 MR. STOVITZ: I can't see counsel's reasoning 15 at all. I just thought it would expedite it if the 8b fs. Court asks the question. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

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THE COURT: The simple answer is that if anyone wants to ask the question, all they have to do is ask it. They don't need my permission, they don't need anybody's permission. If they want an answer, all they have to do is ask the question.

MR. FITZGERALD: We would all concede that if your Honor doesn't ask the question and if counsel doesn't ask the question, a juror could sit on this case who automatically, in every case, would impose the death penalty, and that is obviously massively prejudicial.

THE COURT: I don't agree. There are many other questions that are asked to elicit his state of mind as to whether he can be a fair and impartial juror, and so forth.

MR. REINER: Notwithstanding the People's position on this matter, Mr. Bugliosi, on another type of question the other day also took the same position that Mr. Fitzgerald takes now and that I take now, and that is that where the Court questions on one side of a proposition, he must ask the corollary.

My recollection is that Mr. Bugliosi objected when the Court just asked the question whether a person would be willing to acquit under certain circumstances, and that the Court should ask whether they would be willing to convict under certain circumstances, and that the Court shouldn't leave it up to Mr. Bugliosi to ask the question.

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I think that is what Mr. Fitzgerald is saying. If your Honor asks a question about the ability to interpose the death penalty, your Honor should balance it with the contrary question rather than requiring counsel to balance it.

THE COURT: Those questions, as you know, are asked under the rule of Witherspoon.

It has been held, since Witherspoon, repeatedly that those questions and those alone are to be asked on the part of the Court, and there has never been any intimation that I know of that the Court is compelled to go farther than that -- of course, depending on responses -- that the Court is compelled to go farther than that.

The only proviso is that the response be unmistakably clear before the juror is excused by virtue of his answers to those questions.

Let's go on, gentlemen.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Just a brief statement for the record.

I am not reversing my position at all. I am not opposing Mr. Fitzgerald. I think his position that the stature of the person asking the question is very relevant. So, I am not in opposition to what Mr. Fitzgerald is asking the Court to do.

I was simply observing, I think, a substitute situation which would be very beneficial to both the prosecution and the defense.

I think it is relevant as to whether an attorney 1 or the Court is asking the question. 2 I have nothing further. 3 THE COURT: In a voir dire examination? MR. BUGLIOSI: As Mr. Fitzgerald says, jurors realize 5 that the attorneys are representing conflicting interests, 6 whereas the court is and should be totally impartial. Ż. THE COURT: But these answers aren't given in secret. 8 Everyone hears the answer, regardless of who asks the They are not writing these out on notes and 10 secreting them some place. The answers are being given in 11 open court. 12 What difference does it make who asks the 13 question? 14. The only relevant inquiry is is the juror 15 telling the truth, not who asks the question. . 16 All right, gentlemen, let's get on. Let's call 17 in the next prospective jurgr. 18 (A new prospective juror enters the courtroom.) 19 THE COURT: Good morning, sir. 20 MR. DAWSON: Good morning. 21 THE CLERK: The prospective juror's name is 22 Alva K. Dawson; A-1-v-a, D-a-w-s-o-n. 23 24 25 26

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Q Other than that, is there anything that would keep you from serving?

A I don't think so, no.

Many years ago I had angina. I still carry nitroglycerine tablets.

Q There would be a doctor either in the hotel or on ready call at all times.

A Well, that would take care of that problem.

Q All right, sir.

I have asked the other prospective jurors the questions regarding the death penalty. Have you had a chance to think about those questions and your answers to them?

A Yes, sir.

Q All right.

I am going to ask you the same questions, then.

Do you entertain such conscientious opinions regarding the death penalty that you would be unable to make an impartial decision as to any defendant's guilt regardless of the evidence in the case?

A No, sir.

Q Do you entertain such conscientious opinions regarding the death penalty that you would automatically refuse to impose it without regard to the evidence in the case?

8c-3 Α No. sir. 1 2 Q. On the other hand, are you of the opinion or are your beliefs such that you would always impose 3 the death penalty in any first degree murder case? 4 5 Could you repeat that again? 6 Well, have you heard what has been discussed 7 about the fact that in a murder case there may be two phases to a case, that is, the guilt phase --9 A Oh, yes. 10 -- and then --11 The sentence. 12 -- if there is a first degree murder convic-13 tion, a penalty phase? 14 Yes. 15 Are your beliefs such that if there was a 16 conviction of murder in the first degree you would, 17 regardless of the evidence that came out during the 18 trial, always vote for the death penalty, or would you 19 consider the evidence and then make up your mind as to **2**0 whether you would vote for life imprisonment or the 21 death penalty? 22 I would consider the evidence. 23 All right. 24 I would. 25 Now, I want to ask you some questions as 26

to what you may have learned about this case over the

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	2.	A Yes.
	3	Q Have you lived in Los Angeles County
	4	continuously since last August?'
	5	A Yes, sir.
	6	Q Do you subscribe to a daily newspaper?
,	7	A Yes, sir.
	8	Q Do you read it regularly?
	9	A Yes, sir.
	10	Q What paper is that?
	11	A The local Huntington Park paper.
•	12	Q Do you watch television news reports?
_	13	A I hardly ever watch TV. I really don't
	1,4	have time. I have quite a few other things to do.
,	15	Q Do you listen to the radio?
	16	A Yes.
	17	Q Do you listen to the news on the radio?
	18	A Yes.
•	19	Q Before you came into this case as a prospec-
	20	tive juror, did you know the names of any of the victims
	21	in these alleged crimes?
	22	A Not very well. I don't follow these cases.
	23	Q Well, did you know any of them?
d fls.	24	A No, sir.
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Q Did you ever hear of the name Sharon Tate? 8D-1 1 A Oh, yes, I have heard of her, yes. 2 Q Any of the others? 3 I am talking now about the victims, not the 4 defendants. The victims. 5 Yes, I have heard of her, and Bianca, or some-6 thing like that. I have heard of them. 7 Q La Bianca? 8 Α La Bianca, yes: but those are the only ones I ġ remember. 10 Q Now, before you came into the case, did you 11 know any of the names of any of the defendants in this 12 case? 13 A Yes. 14 Who did you know? 15 Manson, and the girls names were mentioned in 16 the papers, but I didn't follow it too much. 17 Do any of the female defendants i names stand 18: out more than others to you? 19 A No. sir. 20 Did you ever read or hear anything about how 21 these killings were accomplished, any of the details about 22 what happened? 23 Α No. I didn't read. I wasn't interested in it. 24 It wasn't my business. Did you ever learn anything that made you 26

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believe that these defendants were connected with the alleged crime other than the fact that they had been arrested and brought before the Court to stand trial?

A That is all.

Q Do you have any opinion at this time, Mr. Dawson, as to the guilt or innocence of any of the defendants?

A No, sir.

Q Do you believe that you would be able to put aside whatever you know about the case and decide it solely on the evidence that comes in during the trial?

A Absolutely.

Q Do you know of any reason why you could not be fair and impartial to both sides?

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A No. sir.

THE COURT: Do you wish to inquire, Mr. Fitzgerald?
MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, sir.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MRS. DAWSON
BY MR. FITZGERALD:

Q Do you have a bias in favor of the death penalty, Mr. Dawson?

A Not necessarily.

Q When you were a bailiff, sir, did you work in a criminal department in the Superior Court?

A Yes, sir.

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1	Q Here in this building?	,
2	A Yes, sir.	
3	Q What department?	,
4	A 21. The numbers have been changed.	
5	Judge Doran, was my permanent judge at that	
6	time, William Doran.	
7	Q During what period of time were you a bailiff,	
, 8	sir?	
:9	A I started to work in 1926 for the County, and	
10	I worked in the civil courts for a while, then I went out	
11	to the subdivisions, and probably in 1928, 129, I came to	
12,	work inside the criminal courts as a bailiff, and I worked	
13	about two or three years, and then I went back to the sub-	ľ
14	divisions.	
15	I worked in the jail, too, part of the time,	
16 '	as a turnkey.	
17	Q You say you were a bailiff for a total of	
18	three years?	ŀ
19	A Approximately.	
20	Q And you were employed by the Los Angeles County	ŀ
21	Sheriff's Office?	
22	A Yes.	
23	Q How long were you employed by the Sheriff's	
24	Office, Mr. Dawson?	
25	A From '26 to the last day of 1942. August of '26	-
.26	Q TO 1942?	1

. 1	
1	A Yes. I resigned to go back in the service, the
2	Merchant Marines.
3 :	Q During that period of time, Mr. Dawson, I take
4	it that you had been with a great number of juries, at the
. 5 (time you were a bailiff?
6	A Yes.
7	Q You locked them up?
8.	A Yes.
9	Q And you would be with them when they would be
10.	sequestered?
11	A Yes. I spent over a month with one that was
12	sequestered.
13	Q And I take it you were a bailiff with jurors in
14	cases in which death penalty verdicts were returned?
15	A No. I never was.
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8e-1	1	Q Because of your connection with law
2.	2	enforcement, Mr. Dawson, do you feel you kind of are
,	3	biased in favor of the prosecution?
	4	A No.
	5	Q Do you think that in spite of your back-
	6	ground you could acquit somebody charged with a felony
	7	offense?
•	8	A I certainly would if they didn't produce
	9 .	the evidence of guilt.
	10	Q Do you think this publicity has influenced
	11	you any?
	12	A No. I haven't consumed much of it. No,
	13	it hasn't.
	14	Q What do you know about this case based
	15	on the publicity you have been exposed to, sir?
,	16 ,	A Nothing but that they had been arrested for
	. 1 7 `	murder. That is about all.
	18	As I said before, I don't read these
	19	cases. I have too many other better things to read.
	20	Q How old a man are you, Mr. Dawson?
	21	A I am 73. I will be 74 next February.
	22	MR. FITZGERALD: I have nothing further.
	23	THE COURT: Mr. Reiner?
	24	MR. REINER: Yes, sir.
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4 1	YOIR DIRE EXAMENATION OF MR. DAWSON
. 2	BY MR. REINER:
3.	Q Mr. Dawson, during the time that you were
4	a bailiff in the criminal courts, did you ever work as
5	a bailiff in a case that called for the death penalty,
6	irrespective of whether the jury actually returned a
7	verdict of death?
8	A I don't recall one, no.
9	Q Then you have never worked in a murder case
. İO	as a bailiff that you can recall; is that right?
11:	A No, I have not.
12	MR. REINER: I have no further questions.
13	THE COURT: Mr. Shinn?
14	MR. SHINN: I have no questions.
1,5	THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek, any questions?
16	MR. KANAREK: No questions, your Honor.
17	THE COURT: All right, Mr. Stovitz.
18	MR. STOVITZ: Yes, sir.
19	
2 0 .	VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MR. DAWSON
21	BY MR. STOVITZ:
22	Q Mr. Dawson, do you draw a pension from the
23	Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department?
24	A No, sir.
25	Q Or from Los Angeles County?
.26	A No.

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8e-3	1	Q Did you know a Clifford Crail who was a
	2	bailiff back in those days and later joined the District
	3	Attorney's Office?
	4	A Well, I think he was in the D.A.'s Office
	5	when I was a bailiff.
	6	Q Because you did once work for the Sheriff's
	7	Office, Mr. Dawson, do you feel any allegiance to law
	8	enforcement?
	9	A Well, I believe in respecting the law and
	1Ó	assisting police and enforcing the law.
	11	Q Do you feel it is just as much the enforce-
	12	ment of the law in returning a verdict of not guilty if
	13	the evidence was insufficient?
	14	A That's right.
	15	Q You have seen police officers make mistakes;
	16	is that right?
	17	A Yes. I made them myself.
	18	Q They say that is why they put erasers
	19	on pencils; is that right?
	20	A Yes.
	21	Q Mr. Dawson, bearing in mind everything you
	22	have heard about the case, and bearing in mind everything
•	23	that you might think about the case, do you think you
	24	could put aside rumor and decide this case solely on the
	25	facts?
•	26	A Yes, sir.

8e-4 Suppose you were with the other jurors in the jury room and the jurors started to talk about the length of the girls' hair and the length of Manson's hair, and wondering which is longer, Manson's hair or the girl's hair. Would you be able to remind the jury that they are supposed to concentrate on the evidence and not on the hair? Oh, I would be able to do that, yes, but 8f fls. 9 I don't know whether I would or not. . . .

Would you try to impose your will on the jurors Q. 8F-1 1 and say, "Now, listen, I was once a bailiff and you have got 2 to do things this way"? Would you do that? 3 4 Oh, no. 0 You understand that you would be just one of 5 12 jurors? 6 Ÿ That's right. Q And if you were on trial here, Mr. Dawson, 8 and you knew your frame of mind, would you want somebody in 9 your frame of mind to sit in judgment on you? 10 A Yes. 11 12 Q. You would? 13 Α Yes. MR. STOVITZ: I have no further questions. 14 15 Pardon me. 16 Do you know anyone presently that is in the 17 District Attorney's Office? 18 I believe that J. Miller Leavy, or Joe Carr 19 might be the only ones old enough to still have served 20 before the War. 21 No, I don't know anybody. 22 Abe Nathanson has just retired, and Mr. Crail Q 23 has retired. They are all retired now. 24 A Yes. 25 MR. BUGLIOSI: May we have just a moment? 26 THE COURT: Yes.

(Mr. Bugliosi and Mr. Stovitz confer.) **8F2** 1 MR. STOVITZ: Thank you. No further questions. 2 THE COURT: Will you refrain, Mr. Dawson, from .3 discussing with anybody what has gone on here in chambers? 4 MR. DAWSON: Oh, yes. 5 THE COURT: All right, sir. You may go back into 6 the courtroom. 7 8 MR. DAWSON: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Thank you. 9 10 Anything else, gentlemen, before we go back into open court to continue any voir dire with respect to 11 Mr. Dawson? 12 13 All right, we will go back in then. 14 (Whereupon, the following proceedings occurred 15 in open court, all counsel, defendants and the prospective. 16 jurors being present:) 17 THE COURT: All parties and counsel are present, 18 all of the prospective jurors are in the jury box. 19 Any further questions, Mr. Fitzgerald? 20 MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, your Honor. 21 22^{\cdot} VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF ALVA K. DAWSON BY MR. FITZGERALD: 23 24 Mr. Dawson, I believe you indicated to us that 25 for a considerable period of time you were employed by the

Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office.

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1	A Around about 15 years.
2	Q During that 15-year period with the Sheriff's
3	Office, you worked as a bailiff in the courtrooms and you
4	also worked out in the Sheriff's substations; correct?
5	A Yes, sir.
6	Q And when you worked out in those Sheriff's
7 .	substations, Mr. Dawson, you were actually a patrol officer,
8.	I take it?
.9	A Yes, sir.
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9-1	i	Q On a beat in those days?
	2	A Yes, sir.
	3	Q Now, is your connection, your long
	4	connection with law enforcement going to influence you
	5	in arriving at a verdict in this case?
	6	A No, I don't believe so.
	7	Q Do you think that if a police officer
	8	should be called to testify in this case that you would
	9 ·	give his testimony greater weight just because he was a
	10	police officer?
	11	A No, sir.
	12	Q Do you think that if the occasion arose
	13	and if it was necessary to critically analyze a police
	14	officer's testimony you would be able to do that?
	15	A Absolutely.
	16	Q If the circumstances warranted do you think
	17	you could disregard the testimony of a police officer?
	18	A Yes, sir, yes, sir.
	19	Q Do you think because these defendants are
	20	charged with something they are more likely to be
	. .21 . :	guilty than innocent?
	22	A No, sir.
	23	Q Would you have any problem in applying the
_	24 ·	law of presumption of innocence?
•	2 5	A No.
	26	Q Wouldn't you have any problem at all

9-2	1	requiring the prosecution to prove the defendants' guilt
	2	beyond a reasonable doubt?
.	- ; 3	A No, sir.
	4	Q You would not sit there and say "Well, I've got
	5 · ્	a suspicion they are guilty, or maybe they are guilty, so
	. 6	I'm going to convict them"?
	7	A No, sir.
	8	Q. You would actually hold the prosecution to
	9 .	their burden?
	10	A Absolutely.
•	11	Q I take it you've got the courage to acquit
	12	them?
	13	A Yes.
	14	Q If you had a reasonable doubt?
	15 ·	A I do.
	16	MR. FITZGERALD: Thank you, sir.
	17	THE COURT: Mr. Reiner.
	18	MR. REINER: No questions.
,	19.	THE COURT: Mr. Shinn?
	20	MR. SHINN: No questions.
:	21	THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek?
	22	MR. KANAREK: No questions.
	23	THE COURT: Mr. Stovitz?
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VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF MR. DAWSON BY MR. STOVITZ:

Q Mr. Dawson, in the event that I was to ask every one of the questions that Mr. Bugliosi asked the other jurors, especially of Mrs. Roseland, would your answers be substantially the same?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you think, aside from the fact of your law enforcement background -- do you think where they might vary in any respect whatsoever?

A No, sir.

All right, now, the so-called \$64 question is, putting yourself in the position of the defendants, knowing your frame of mind, putting yourself in the position of the prosecuting attorneys in this case, knowing your frame of mind, do you feel that you would be satisfied with a jury of your frame of mind to sit on this type of case?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you belong to any organization whatsoever that has as its objective the suppression of the death penalty in California?

A No. sir.

MR. STOVITZ: I have no further questions. Pass for cause, your Honor.

THE COURT: The defendants may exercise a joint

1	peremptory challenge.
2	MR. FITZGERALD: There is no unanimity of opinion.
3	There will not be an exercise of a excuse me.
4	MR. REINER: Your Honor, it is my understanding
5	that the peremptory challenge is with the People at this
6	time.
7	The last challenge was for cause. It was
8	not an exercise of a peremptory.
9 .	THE COURT: I did not understand you, Mr. Reiner.
10	MR. REINER: The last peremptory was with the
11.	People. They did not exercise a peremptory challenge.
12	They exercised a belated challenge for
13	cause with respect to Mrs. Lee.
14	I believe the peremptory is still with the
15	People at this time.
16	THE COURT: No, the next peremptory is with the
17	defendants.
18	MR. FITZGERALD: There is no unanimity of opinion.
19	There will not be an exercise of a joint peremptory
20	challenge.
21	Patricia Krenwinkel will accept the jury
22	as now constituted.
23	THE COURT: Mr. Shinn?
.24	MR. SHINN: Miss Atkins accepts the jury as
2 5	constituted, your Honor.
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1	MR. KANAREK: I accept the jury as now constituted,
2	your Honor.
3	MR. BUGLIOSI: May we approach the bench, your
4	Honor?
_ }	THE COURT: Very well.
5	MR. STOVITZ: Perhaps, your Honor, it is so close
6	to the noon hour, I think the discussion will be rather
7	extensive.
8	Perhaps your Honor would want to take the
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10	noon récess as far as the jury is concerned?
11	THE COURT: Come to the bench, gentlemen, and let's
12	find out what the subject matter is.
13	Then I will make the determination.
14	(The following proceedings were had at the
15	bench out of the hearing of the jury:)
16	MR. BUGLIOSI: I want to come up to the bench
17	for this reason, strictly in fairness to the defendants:
18	There is a good possibility that we might
19	accept this jury as it is presently constituted.
20	Now, there are two problems: No. 1, Mr.
21	Reiner's problem on the number of peremptories.
22	THE COURT: What problem?
23	MR. FITZGERALD: May I interrupt? Could we conduct
24	this in chambers with the defendants present?
25	THE COURT: I think probably it should be done that
	way. I wanted to find out first if this is what you
26	The territory of white the white it with the district and the last the

wanted to talk about, because we still have ten minutes to go. I don't like to waste the time by simply arbitrarily dismissing everybody until I found out what it was you wanted to talk about.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Fine.

THE COURT: All right, let's go into chambers. We will take it up. If we don't finish we will take it up after lunch.

I will recess, however, -- I don't think I will do that. We will just go to 12:00 and then we will recess.

We will go into chambers.

(The following proceedings were had in open court in the presence and hearing of the prospective jurors:)

THE COURT: I will ask counsel and the parties to come into chambers.

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(The following proceedings were had in the chambers of the Court out of the hearing of the prospective jurors, all defendants and their counsel being present,
Mr. Bugliosi and Mr. Stovitz being present:)

THE COURT: All counsel and all of the defendants are present.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Yes, your Honor, in requesting this conference either at the bench or in chambers, I want the record to reflect that it is activated by only one consideration on Mr. Stovitz's and my part, that is fairness to these defendants.

There is a distinct possibility that the prosecution might accept the jury as impaneled.

Now, the only problem with that is that

Mr. Reiner still has a point as to whether there should be
more peremptories.

I am not saying whether it is right or not, but I think it has considerable merit.

THE COURT: Before we get beyond that point, I have heard nothing from Mr. Reiner in the way of a request for 1 additional peremptories.

MR. BUGLIOSI: In other words, Mr. Stovitz and I did not want to announce we will accept the jury as impaneled. They have already apparently accepted the jury.

Then if we accept it, the bell is already rung, and it is kind of difficult to unring a bell.

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THE COURT: Mr. Reiner has always been capable of speaking for himself, and I heard no request for additional challenges.

MR. REINER: If I might, Mr. Bugliosi.

As I indicated to the Court earlier, my view is it would not be timely for me to make a motion until both sides indicated they no longer chose to exercise any more peremptory challenges, to avoid the Court telling me that although I might have some challenges, if I were patient and wait until all the other parties had exercised their challenges, perhaps that objection to a prospective juror might be eliminated, and I might not need additional challenges.

So, as I indicated to the Court, when counsel have all indicated they intend to exercise no more challenges, then I would request additional challenges, if at that time I felt there were objectionable jurors in the box.

THE COURT: If you have some motion to make, you'd better make it, because you may not have another chance. ν

MR. REINER: Very well, then, I will make it.

I would move for additional peremptory challenges;
I would move for unlimited peremptory challenges because of
the problems we face in this particular case, which I need
not enumerate because we are all familiar with them.

I would at least request 15 more peremptory challenges to bring our position up to where it would be

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were we not joined with other defendants.

THE COURT: Are you telling me that if I grant you an additional peremptory challenge that you will now exercise ℓ it?

MR. REINER: I can represent to this Court that based upon my judgment as to the prospective jurors, if I had an additional peremptory challenge right now, I would certainly exercise it.

I am not satisfied in my mind with the jury as it is presently constituted.

MR. BUGLIOSI: May I insert at this point the second reason for calling this conference, which is somewhat related to what Mr. Reiner just said.

From my trial experience, I have been confronted with this type of situation many times, where the defense will say, "We are satisfied with a jury as impaneled," and they don't exercise a peremptory challenge.

They don't mean what they say: they say that because they are almost positive that the prosecution is going to exercise a peremptory, and this will give them, the defense, an opportunity later on to actually start excusing jurors.

THE COURT: Everyone who ever tried a jury trial knows there is a certain amount of poker playing that goes on in the exercise of peremptory challenges, and that is exactly what is going on here now on behalf of the

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defendants.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Mr. Stovitz and I in our position are activated by fairness.

If the defense is under the assumption we are not going to accept this jury, and this is why they are reserving peremptories, and then we do accept the jury, they might be caught, as it were, with the jury with which they are really not satisfied.

THE COURT: Well, that is too bad.

MR. FITZGERALD: I resent the inference. Also, I know what I am doing. I resent the inference that, first of all, I would risk somebody s life based on some foolish little tactic.

Secondly, I resent the implication, if it is there, that I don't knowwhat I am doing.

I have been in these courts for a considerable period of time, your Honor, and --

THE COURT: Mr. Fitzgerald, I think you all know exactly what you are doing.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I don't mean to imply -- I think you are extremely competent, Paul, and you know that.

I am just saying, no matter how competent any attorney is he may have very strong notions about something, for all I know. I cannot read your minds, you may feel we are not satisfied with this jury.

Now, if we say we are, the bell is rung, one or

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more of you may not be happy with this jury.

I want to place you on notice at this point we might well accept this jury.

As you can see, there could be no other conceivable reason for Mr. Stovitz and I doing this other than interest for the fairness of the trial for these defendants.

Certainly it is not beneficial to us to tell you in advance we might accept this jury.

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MR. FITZGERALD: I assume every time the People have an opportunity to exercise a challenge, there is a possibility they might accept the jury.

THE COURT: I certainly hope you assume that.

MR. REINER: Your Honor just a moment ago indicated the exercise or disinclination to exercise a particular challenge is a matter of poker playing between counsel.

I say it may be. I don't dispute on occasion it may be.

Your Honor indicated that in terms of the defendants, without indicating which defendants, apparently assuming all defendants were doing that.

I don't know where your Honor would get the idea I am playing poker. I don't have any chips and I haven't had any for a long time.

of knowing what goes on in your mind or what has gone on in your mind, but it would appear to me that there at least is a possibility, let's put it that way, that the defendants have by, I don't know whether by agreement or by what, have elected not to exercise any joint challenges and to have one defendant exercise all of its peremptories in order to put the Court into the position of being faced with what you conceive to be an issue and which I do not conceive to be an issue at all in the law, so this point

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can be raised on appeal at the point for denying the defendants a fair trial.

I think that is a very real possibility.

I am not accusing anybody of anything. I am just saying based on what I have seen, based on the nature of the exercise of the challenges and the failure to exercise them so far, this is a possibility in my mind.

Now, I think it will fail because the law is clearly against you, and the courts have repeatedly said what the defendant is entitled to is a fair and impartial trial, and that is all he is entitled to.

The fact that he does not get as many peremptories in a joint trial as he would in a separate trial, it is simply not a denial of any constitutional or statutory right, and he has no cause to complain because of that.

So I merely say that as an expression of what I see, I am not saying that it has happened here, but I say it appears to me that it would be rather coincidental that the way the challenges have not been exercised, that is, the joint challenges have not been exercised, and the way that the individuals have been exercised, it appears to me to be a rather remarkable coincidence.

MR. REINER: Very well, your Honor, your Honor has completely changed the tenor of his remarks with that

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last remark.

Your Honor indicated earlier that your Honor wasn't suggesting anything, just indicating a possibility in a world where anything of course is possible.

Then your Honor concluded his remarks by talking about a remarkable coincidence to clearly indicate it is his view this is simply a characle going on between defense counsel.

THE COURT: Those are your words. Are you telling me it isn't?

MR. REINER: I most assuredly indicated to the Court it is nothing of the sort.

I suggest your Honor perhaps is the only person in the courtroom that even suspects it as a possibility.

The prosecution, who are no friends of mine or of the defense, certainly do not suspect that as a possibility.

What is going on is so clear a blind man could see it. I am trying to exercise peremptory challenges as I think they should be exercised professionally, whether my judgment is good, bad or indifferent, I am faced with a problem with my client and the other defendants who don't want to have any exercised, and then I am faced with the insulting remarks of the Court, that this is a remarkable coincidence to set up the Judge.

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It is insulting --

THE COURT: That is not what I said. You have a remarkable capacity for going beyond what is said and misstating what is said.

Now, are you contending that the jury as now constituted is not fair and impartial?

MR. REINER: I am contending that the jury as presently constituted is unacceptable to me.

THE COURT: You did not answer my question.

MR. REINER: I will go further. I will say, yes, in my opinion the jury is not fair and impartial because your Honor has made incorrect and improper and wrong rulings on our challenges forcause.

Your Honor has seated jurors in this case who have indicated they cannot be impartial.

Your Honor has then gone on and extracted and I use the word "extracted" advisedly, extracted promises from them, notwithstanding the particular attitude and assumptions with which they came into this case, that they would put aside all they know and believe and will follow your Honor's instructions.

This is contrary to recommendations of the Reardon Report which of course is not binding authority, but which is perhaps the most persuasive authority in the country today that this is what a trial judge should not do in matters involving high publicity.

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THE COURT: Well, I have been extremely careful to eliminate from this jury anyone I thought had any bias with regard to these defendants or this case, and, as you very well know, there is no one sitting on that jury now that has ever heard of any confession or read about it.

And I have been very careful to see that all of those people have been eliminated.

I have been very careful to interrogate them with respect to their views on whether they can be fair and impartial as a whole, and so have counsel.

Now, if you are saying at this moment,

Mr. Reiner, that there is some person on that jury who should

be challenged for cause, I would like to hear who it is and

on what ground.

MR. REINER: Well, your Honor, I have challenged the particular jurors for cause. I have previously stated the grounds. I have argued them, and your Honor has denied the challenge. We are talking about renewing them. I can do that as well and restate the arguments. I am sure your Honor is not interested in that being done, but when your Honor talks about the jurors are fair and impartial, it is simply a matter of value judgments on your part and mine.

There are jurors on that case, whether in fact they are impartial or not, there are jurors on that case who have said that they believed coming into this case, and believe at this very moment that the defendants or some

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of them are probably guilty, and your Honor has said by his rulings, your Honor has indicated that that is not a sufficient basis for a challenge for cause, if they will promise to follow their duty and base their decision on the evidence in this case.

THE COURT: I think that is a misstatement of the record, Mr. Reiner.

MR. REINER: Is your Honor saying that there are no jurors seated presently who have not --

THE COURT: I am saying that what you said is a misstatement of the record, and as far as I am concerned, and as far as I am able to determine that is a fair and impartial jury as it sits there now.

MR. REINER: What is fair is a matter of opinion.

THE COURT: All of the defendants except your client still have peremptory challenges left. If they disagree with that, they can make an additional challenge for cause, if they don't agree with that.

The fact that you exercised your five individual peremptories is no ground for giving you any additional peremptories.

MR. REINER: Granted, that what is fair and impartial is something upon which we may differ.

However, I would say this, and I don't believe I am misstating the record when I put it in one sentence, presently seated on that jury are a number of jurors who have said that they presently have an opinion that the

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defendants are probably guilty, but notwithstanding that opinion they will try to put it aside and they will base their judgment on this case solely on the evidence.

THE COURT: I think that is an absolute misstatement of the record, and I ask you to show me any reference in the record to anybody now sitting on that jury that has said that.

Now, we are going to recess at this time. You have to 1:45 if you want to point out some reference.

My recollection is there isn't anyone who has made that statement who is now sitting on that jury.

MR. REINER: Just off the top of my head I can recall Mr. Baer yesterday --

THE COURT: Don't try to paraphrase what he said. Get the transcript and show me exactly what he said.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Could we recess until 2:00, since we very well might accept this jury?

THE COURT: All right, 2:00 o'clock. We will recess until 2:00 p.m.

MR. STOVITZ: I will be absent this afternoon. Mr. Bugliosi will be here.

MR. FITZGERALD: We have no objection.

THE COURT: All right, we will recess until 2:00 p.m.

(Whereupon, a recess was taken to reconvene at 2:00 p.m., same day.)

1	LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, FRIDAY, JULY 10, 1970
2	2:05 P.M.
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4	(The following proceedings occurred in chambers
5	all parties and counsel present:)
6	THE COURT: All parties and counsel are present.
7	Before we resume with the other matters,
8	Mr. Kanarek, I have here a letter that I just opened about
9 '	three minutes ago. It came in the mail from someone named
10	Cathy Decker, Dayton, Ohio, who says she has to get in
11	touch with you or Mr. Manson.
12	So, if you want to take her name and address,
13	you are welcome to the information.
14	MR. KANAREK: Thank you, your Honor.
15	THE COURT: You are welcome to read the letter also.
16	MR. KANAREK: May I read it now? Would it be
17	imposing? May I read it now with Mr. Manson, just in
18	case?
19	(The Court hands a document to Mr. Kanarek.)
20	(Pause while Mr. Kanarek reads the document.)
21	THE COURT: Well, let's proceed.
22	Are you through with the letter?
23	MR. KANAREK: I am through for the moment, yes.
24	Thank you.
25	THE COURT: I will hand it to the clerk and I will
26	ask the clerk to keep it, and anytime you want to look at
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it or copy it, you may do so. 1 MR. KANAREK: It is part of the permanent record of 2 this case; is that correct? 3 THE COURT: No. It is a letter I received from an 1 unknown person in Ohio addressed to me. Since they requested 5 the opportunity to contact you or Mr. Manson, I am simply 6 giving you an opportunity to copy her name/address off the 7 letter so that if you are interested in communicating with 8 her, you may do so. 9 I don't know who it is. I have no idea who this 10 person is. 11 MR. KANAREK: Thank you. 12 I have one other request, and that is that the 13 letter from Mrs. Lee this morning, may that be a part of 14 the permanent record in this case? The actual letter which 15 your Honor read into evidence? 16 THE COURT: Yes. 17 MR. KANAREK: I gather that all of the jurors' 18 19 letters are being made a part of the permanent record? 20 THE COURT: Yes. I gave them the clerk and the clerk retains them. 21 22 They are all filed. THE CLERK: 23 They are all exhibits? MR. KANAREK: 24 THE CLERK: They are not exhibits. They are filed. 25 26

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THE COURT: All right, anything further before we resume?

MR. KANAREK: Yes, just a couple of points, your Honor.

one was that the District Attorney represented that by today we would have the other 26 or 27 of these District Attorney news releases.

I haven't been handed them. It was represented to me I would be given them today.

Another point is, your Honor, I understand Mr. Bugliosi on television today has stated that some dramatic event is going to occur.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I did not say that.

MR. KANAREK: That is what I have been told, Mr. Bugliosi stated.

MR. BUGLIOSI: That is hearsay, sir.

THE COURT: All right, let's get on with it, gentlemen.

Does anybody have anything further to add with respect to the question of peremptory challenges?

MR. REINER: Yes, I have one I must make, your Honor.

Your Honor asked me to review the transcripts over the lunch hour, and cite to him the page and line number. I suppose, of any particular juror where there was a question of that juror that supported my position, or at least the position that I took that there are jurors in the box at the moment who have indicated that they have

1	formed and presently hold opinions that the defendants, or
2	some of them, are probably guilty.
.3	I, of course, do not have my transcripts
. 4	available in the courtroom.
5 ,	We have so far, 17 volumes, and I take my
6	transcripts home, as do most counsel.
7	I have yesterday 's transcript here in the
ķ	courtroom.
.9	I asked the clerk to inquire of your Honor if
10	I might use your Honor's transcripts and sit here in the
11	courtroom to review your transcripts in the courtroom.
12	The clerk informs me your Hohor declined to
13	allow me to read your transcripts.
14	THE COURT: Don't blame it on me, Mr. Reiner. You
15	were given a copy of the transcripts in this case so you
16	could use it.
17	Now, if you choose not to bring it with you,
18	that is your problem.
19	I declined to let you use my transcript for
20	the simple reason I was using it.
21	MR. REINER: I am sure your Honor cannot be serious
22	in indicating that he expects counsel
23 [.]	THE COURT: Don't make remarks like that, sir, or
24	you will find yourself in trouble.
. 25	MR. REINER: Very well.
26	THE COURT: Because I don to make any remarks in this

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proceedings that are not serious.

MR. REINER: I might indicate then it has not been my practice to bring every volume every single day.

THE COURT: Why didn't you try to borrow some from the co-defendants or the prosecution?

MR. REINER: They were not available, your Honor.

Your Honor's were available. I thought that is why I tried to borrow your Honor's.

The sum and substance of it is that over the lunch hour I, not having access to the transcript, I did not get the citations your Honor requested; I do not presently have them. My position is exactly the same.

THE COURT: What is that?

MR. REINER: There are presently seated in the box jurors who have expressed that they have formed an opinion and presently hold the opinion that the defendants or some of them are guilty.

Nonetheless, the Court has had them promise they would set aside their views and they would decide the case on the evidence.

My position is a person who takes that position is not impartial, and therefore, I do not feel we have an impartial jury.

That is separate and apart from my desire to have peremptory challenges to exercise with regard to those persons who may technically qualify as impartial

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jurors, but of whom I have some doubt, and I wish to use my judgment to have them excused.

THE COURT: I disagree with you, and I again state that in my opinion the 12 people who are in the box are fair and impartial, have not been exposed to, if at all, if they have been exposed to pretrial publicity at all, it has been in a minor way.

They have no knowledge of any confession, either by reading it or hearing about it.

They have exhibited after very intense questioning by the Court and all counsel the ability to be fair and impartial.

I don't think you could find 12 people who are more qualified to sit.

You may find 12 who are just as qualified.

I just find no basis whatever for any challenge for cause as to any of those 12, notwithstanding your remarks.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I would like to state my position is we are accepting this jury only because we have, in effect, and I say this legally, I mean in a sense, we are forced to, in a sense of it is my position that Mr. Manson has been denied equal protection of the law and due process of the law; that by the process of attrition — we are taking this jury not because we don't believe that they are all, including Mr. Dawson — we challenge him for cause and all of them for cause, but we are taking it only

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because we are only going to get the same carbon copies by the nature of this process.

It is a process of attrition where the prosecution has the advantage, to the denial of equal protection and due process with the questioning of these jurors as to the death penalty.

As to Mrs. Lee, for instance, it is noteworthy that the prosecution accepted the jury, or is going to accept this jury at a time when Mrs. Lee, the last black member was eased out.

We are not accepting this jury because we believe that the jurors are fair and impartial; we are accepting because we have no alternative.

We can go ahead and exhaust our five peremptories, go through the mechanics of it, and we will get the same result because of the nature of the process that is being used here, and Mr. Manson is being denied a fair trial.

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When your Honor states that these people haven't read the confession, I submit that they are saying it to get on the jury.

There are people on that jury who are bent upon conviction, but there is no way of beating the process because of the procedures that the Court has followed in this case, has instituted. There is no way of beating it because, as I say, we call it the domino theory or the reaction, whichever way you want to denominate it, the chain reaction, but those jurors who want to be on this case know what to say.

How are you going to prosecute those people for perjury? The whole thing is meaningless to those people.

THE COURT: I don't know what you are talking about, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: Well, when they say they haven't read the confession or they haven't seen anything, your Honor, the publicity has been so pervasive, your Honor, that we can assume --

THE COURT: You are saying that you have 12 people in the box now all of whom are lying? Is that what you are saying?

MR. KANAREK: No.

What I am saying is this, your Honor, what I am saying is that they want to be on this jury, they want to be on this jury so they know how to make the

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answers. They are sophisticated in getting on the jury.

The people that are candid, the people that were candid are off the jury. All we have now is the self-serving declarations of these prospective jurors, and there are people on there who, I submit, I believe, were not candid with the Court, if I may put it that way, to get on this jury. They want to be on this jury.

This has been structured by the prosecution.

We have 28 news releases.

Somehow, maybe some of these people think

Somehow, maybe some of these people think that there is going to be some kind of benefit to them by being on this jury.

So, we just have ingrained in this whole procedure nothing but a violation of due process and equal protection so far as Mr. Manson is concerned, so that no matter what happens here we are not being given a fair trial.

So, by not exercising our peremptories, it isn't because we accept this jury as being fair and impartial.

I just want to state that.

THE COURT: I can't agree with you, Mr. Kanarek.

I think these people are telling the truth. I don't
believe that any of them have evidenced any unusual desire
to be on the jury.

They are leaving their jobs, their families,

whatever they are doing. They are aware that they are 1 making a sacrifice. 2 3 4 5 recognize their duty. 6 7 8 9 but I think that it is --10 11 12 13 to be excused. 14 12a fls16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

I have seen nothing to persuade me that they are anxious to be on this jury. They are simply doing it because it has to be done. They have been called and they That is the way I see it. MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, I wish I could agree with the Court, your Honor. I wish I could agree THE COURT: A number of them have expressed the opinion that they would rather not serve but are not asking MR. KANAREK: May I ask your Honor which ones? THE COURT: I don't remember. MR. KANAREK: I don't recall that.

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THE COURT: I don't remember by name, Mr. Kanarek, but this has been said. As to which particular one said it, I have no record of it.

You have a transcript as well as I do.

MR. KANAREK: Very well, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything further, gentlemen?

Well, as it now stands, just before noon, before we came in here, the defendants had passed for cause. It was the People's next peremptory,

At that point, the People asked to have a conference, and that is what we have been having ever since.

Now, are we ready to go back into court?

All right.

MR. REINER: I don't think your Honor has ruled on the motion for additional peremptory challenges.

THE COURT: The motion will be denied.

MR. KANAREK: May I make this legal point?

It is my position that because of your Honor's interpretation in connection with the peremptory challenges, there is a denial of equal protection of the law under the 14th Amendment because, your Honor, let us say that we had a hundred --

THE COURT: You haven't asked for any additional peremptories.

MR. KANAREK: No. I am not asking for any additional peremptories, your Honor.

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THE COURT: What are you talking about?

MR. KANAREK: I am making a legal argument because after five we would be -- as I say, it is six of one or half a dozen of the other -- and --

MR. REINER: Through the Court, perhaps I might request of Mr. Kanarek that he exercise some of his challenges.

THE COURT: State your objection, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: I have stated it.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Could the Court take the bench perhaps five minutes from now?

THE COURT: Five minutes from now?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Yes.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KANAREK: I have another request.

THE COURT: Are you planning to leave?

MR. BUGLIOSI: I have to make a phone call.

THE COURT: Let the clerk know when you are ready.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Thank you.

MR. KANAREK: As your Honor knows, so far as the challenge to the jury panel is concerned, I have here the papers for the challenge to the jury panel, which would be deemed to occur before any jury is sworn.

MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, that is correct.

It is relevant in this portion of the proceedings.

We don't want the jury sworn unless we can

extract a stipulation from the other side that the panel may be challenged after they are sworn because the law provides that the challenge must be heard before the jury is sworn.

MR. REINER: And may we further indicate that before the jury is sworn I intend to renew a motion for a change of venue.

perhaps we can do that by approaching the bench. I don't intend to go into lengthy argument because I don't anticipate it will be granted, but at the conclusion of the examination of the jurors, and prior to the time that they are sworn, it is appropriate, and I think mandatory, that the motion be made.

MR. SHINN: I have various other motions on, your Honor, that were filed, before the jury is sworn in, written motions.

THE COURT: You mean that you would file? What is keeping you?

MR. SHINN: I will file them, your Honor, before the jury is sworn, for a change of venue, a motion for continuance.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, if I may, for your Honor, perhaps, to consider on the equal protection argument, in connection with the peremptories, there is a case, an old case which I am sure your Honor has read many years past, called the Sleepy Lagoon case, where there were 23 defendants —

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about.

MR. KANAREK: These are the grounds constituting the challenge to the petit jury, your Honor, which your Honor indicated that he would like to have previously.

THE COURT: Yes, I would certainly want to see them.

MR. KANAREK: There were just a couple of words, a few words, of interlineation that I wish to make. So, if I may give that to the Court perhaps at the recess, the afternoon recess?

THE COURT: But the point I am concerned with now is what about your challenge to the panel?

What are you going to offer in support of that challenge, so I can rule on it?

MR. KANAREK: Very well. I have it here, your Honor.

I offer the transcripts in the case of People vs. Powell and Smith, the transcript of June the 28th of '68, and also the transcripts --

THE COURT: Do you have these transcripts?

I don't have them.

MR. KANAREK: The District Attorney previously indicated they have them here in court, and as a mechanical proposition, I thought that they had them here in good faith, and I don't care whose copy your Honor reads, but the transcripts of August 7th of '68 to January 31st of '69 before Judge Peracca in the case

of People vs. Powell and Smith.

Those transcripts, your Honor.

THE COURT: How many transcripts does that consist of?

How many pages?

MR. BUGLIOSI: The transcript itself, your Honor, due in great part to Mr. Kanarek's effort, is 36,000.

THE COURT: I have no intention of reading 36,000 pages.

Now, if you want to extract portions of that transcript?

MR. KANAREK: I am referring just to the challenge to the jury panel, your Honor.

Judge Peracca received --

THE COURT: Never mind about Judge Peracca.

I understood that you and the prosecution were going to agree on certain portions of these transcripts which are relevant to any challenge to the panel.

I have no intention of wading through 36,000 pages of transcript, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: There is not 36,000 pages, your Honor. There is from August the 7th of '68, basically, with that one other transcript of June the 28th of '68, through January 21st of '69.

That is not 36,000 pages of transcript.

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THE COURT: Do you mean to tell me that four or five months every day were devoted solely to this?

MR. KANAREK: Essentially, yes, your Honor.

May I point this out? You see, that is one of the mechanical problems we have in courts of law. This involved a statistical analysis, a detailed study.

We may, at first blush, think that that is an inordinate amount of time. However, at those proceedings, there was Judge Peracca, there was Charles Maple of the Public Defender's Office, there was myself, and there were representatives of the District Attorney's Office.

We went into in-depth analysis of the procedures in the Jury Commissioner's office. And when you consider that the Court is in session maybe three and a half to four hours a day, and you consider also that there were periods of time here when we did analyze, as a result of print-outs that were done in connection with machines, computing equipment, and when you consider that —

THE COURT: You are going to have to submit a brief in which you set forth clearly what you have been able to stipulate to with the prosecution.

I am not about to embark on an exploration through the transcript in that other case without knowing what, if any, stipulations have been arrived at with respect to that transcript and what portions pertain to the issues that you are attempting to raise by means of