## SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT NO. 104

HON. CHARLES H. OLDER, JUDGE

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff.

VS.

CHARLES MANSON, SUSAN ATKINS, LESLIE VAN HOUTEN, PATRICIA KRENWINKEL,

Defendants.

No. A253156

REPORTERS' DAILY TRANSCRIPT Thursday, October 15, 1970 A. M. SESSION

APPEARANCES:

DONALD A. MUSICH, STEPHEN RUSSELL KAY, and a state state of the state

For the People:

VINCENT T. BUGLIOSI, DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS

For Deft. Manson:

I. A. KANAREK, Esq.

For Deft. Atkins:

DAYE SHINN, Esq.

For Deft. Van Houten:

The course of the second second second in the

RONALD HUGHES, Esq.

For Deft. Krenwinkel:

PAUL FITZGERALD, Esq.

VOLUME 127 JOSEPH B. HOLLOMBE, CSR.,

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MURRAY MEHLMAN, CSR., Official Reporters

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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, THURSDAY, CUTOBER 15, 1970 1 2 9:00 A.M. 3 · 4 (The following proceedings were had in the 5 chambers of the court out of the presence and hearing of 6 the jury, all counsel being present:) The record will show all counsel are 7 THE COURT: 8 present. At the request of Mr. Bugliosi the letters 10 purportedly written by Susan Atkins will be marked as 11 Special Exhibits. 12 THE CLERK: 8 and9, your Honor? 13 THE COURT: What was the first one? 14 THE CLERK: The first letter is 265. 15 THE COURT: Let's change that. We will strike that and make it Special Exhibit 8, and the second letter, one 16 17 which apparently was addressed to Jay Stevenson, will be 18 9, and the third one which is apparently addressed to 19 Dear Kit will be Special Exhibit 10. These exhibits will not be in any event shown 20. to the jury. 21 22 The previous marking, 265, for the first letter from Susan Atkins to Roni Howard will be stricken in 23 24 view of the new designation. 25 Now you gentlemen, I think, arrived at a

, stipulation yesterday with respect to the foundation of

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these letters.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Yes, your Honor. May it be stipulated that Special Exhibits 8, 9 and 10, three letters, were in fact written by Susan Atkins?

MR. SHINN: So stipulated, your Honor.

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I take it from that that any objections THE COURT: as to foundation are waived?

MR. BUGLIOSI: So stipulated.

MR. SHINN: That is correct.

MR. BUGLIOSI: That is correct, your Honor.

MR. KANAREK: I guess, just out of an abundance of caution, though, your Honor, I am sure we are all agreed that any use of these letters whatspever is being objected to by the rest of the attorneys, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Fitzgerald, and myself, based upon the Sixth Amendment right to confront, and right to effective counsel as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and on hearsay, relevancy and materiality.

THE COURT: Are you joining in the stipulation as to foundation?

MR. KANAREK: I have no power to join in it, your Honor.

What I am saying is, conceptually, this is not being offered against Mr. Manson, but we object on the Aranda-Bruton principle ---

THE COURT: Let's not play games, Mr. Kanarek. What I want to know is: Are you going to object to the foundation when it is offered by the People?

MR. KANAREK: Well, no, I am not going to object on that specific ground.

I just want to make it clear, your Honor --

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THE COURT: Just get to the point, Mr. Kanarek. I want a straight answer to a straight question.

MR. KANAREK: Yes. As I view it -- maybe your Honor can clue me in if I am wrong --

THE COURT: You were here yesterday, you sat through the entire proceedings. The purpose of the stipulation was to obviate the necessity of calling in witnesses to lay the foundation for the admission of these letters, assuming any or all of the letters or any portion or all of the letters are admissible.

MR. KANAREK: Yes.

THE COURT: You are not waiving any objections to the admissibility of the letters.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Or Aranda, or relevance, or anything like that.

THE COURT: That's right.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Just the foundation.

THE COURT: Mere foundation.

MR. BUGLIOSI: That these letters were, in fact, written by Susan Atkins.

MR. KANAREK: Yes. All right.

THE COURT: Do you join in that stipulation?

MR. KANAREK: I will join in that stipulation.

THE COURT: Do you join, Mr. Hughes?

MR. HUGHES: Yes, I join, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Fitzgerald?

MR. FITZGERALD: I join. 1 THE COURT: In other words, there are no foundational 2 problems with respect to the letters; but all other objec-Ş 4 tions are reserved. MR. FITZGERALD: Correct. 5 MR. SHINN: That is correct. б MR. HUGHES: Yes. 7 g. THE COURT: Very well. Let's take up the first letter first. That 9 would be the one from Susan Atkins to Roni Hughes. 10 Which one is that? 11 12 MR. BUGLIOSI: The one that starts out. "Hello." . 13 THE COURT: All right. 14 MR. KANAREK: Your Honor misspoke. Your Honor means Roni Howard? 15 16 MR. BUGLIOSI: That is actually her name. MR. HUGHES: I would prefer that she be known by 17 her alias. 18 19 THE COURT: Well, whatever her name is. That is Special Exhibit 8. 20 And Special Exhibit 9 is which one? The one 22 entitled "Dear Joe"? MR. BUGLIOSI: Yes, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: And Special Exhibit 10 is the one that 24 starts out "Dear Kit." 25 26 MR. BUGLIOSI: Right.

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THE COURT: All right.

We will start with Special Exhibit 8.

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MR. MUSICH: Your Honor, there are some typographical errors in the typing, and the underscoring, that appears in the typed copy.

THE COURT: Then we are in no position to do anything. We have to have an accurate work copy to start with.

MR. MUSICH: Well, there are misspellings.

THE COURT: Doesn't the government ever require competent typists?

MR. BUGLIOSI: The answer is no. I have seen them leave entire paragraphs out of dictation. It is unbelievable.

THE COURT: Does anyone ever get fired for incompetence?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Not if they work for Civil Service.

MR. FITZGERALD: I didn't know you were going to do them so I had my secretary type them up and there are some differences between them, slight differences.

I will give you copies of mine if you like.

MR. MUSICH: I think we should go over them and if there is any discrepancy or argument, check the original.

I tried to take them off of photostatic copies which were somewhat legible and I tried to compare them to the original I had access to at that time.

I did not have access to all the originals.

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25 26 (Off the record discussion.)

(Recess.)

(Off the record discussion.)

THE COURT: Back on the record.

All counsel are present.

We have now made the necessary corrections in the working copies of these three letters, Special Exhibits 8, 9 and 10, so that they conform with the originals, and we are about to start the process of attempting to edit out, if it can be done, any incriminating statements relating to the co-defendants.

But before we start, Mr. Bugliosi, in order to place this thing in its proper context, would you, in effect, make an offer indicating what the purpose of these letters would be and how they fit into the case.

MR. BUGLIOSI: All right.

I believe Roni Howard testified yesterday, your Honor, that she disclosed to the police, I believe on November 17th, 1969, what Susan Atkins had told her previously in early November.

Subsequent to that, she testified that the case broke in the newspapers.

Subsequent to its breaking in the newspapers, she testified that she wrote a letter to Miss Atkins requesting a response.

In mid-December, 1969, she -- she testified

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**fis.**  that in mid-December, 1969, People's 265 -- strike that Special Exhibit No. 8 was written to her by Susan
Atkins in response to her request to Susan Atkins that
Susan Atkins write her a letter.

Special Exhibit No. 8 contains several incriminating statements that the prosecution alleges tends to confirm that Susan Atkins did, in fact, have a conversation with Roni Howard about the Tate murders, No. 1; and No. 2, the letter tends to indicate that when Susan Atkins made this statement to Roni Howard it was not in jest that she was very serious about what she told Roni Howard.

So, we are offering this letter, Special Exhibit No. 8, which admittedly is hearsay, as admissions against Susan Atkins, coming in only as against Susan Atkins and not coming in against any of the co-defendants.

All references in the letter, direct or indirect, that could in any fashion whatsoever be considered by the jury against the co-defendants should be deleted in conformity with the Aranda and Bruton cases.

Now, there are two other letters, of course, your Honor, Special Exhibit 9 and 10, written by Susan Atkins to two private individuals outside Sybil Brand. Special Exhibit No. 9 was written to a Jo Stevenson on December the 13th, 1969.

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THE COURT: Do you intend to call Stevenson?

MR. BUGLIOSI: No, your Honor, since there has been a stipulation as to who wrote these letters.

In other words, there has been a stipulation that Susan Atkins wrote the letters. I don't think it is necessary to call Stevenson or Jo Fletcher to authenticate them.

THE COURT: Should the stipulation include a further stipulation that a letter was sent and received by any particular person?

MR. BUGLIOSI: I was thinking of that yesterday. I would request that stipulation.

MR. FITZGERALD: There is no way we can tell if it was received.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Right, I really don't think it is necessary. In fact, even if she had written a letter to herself, it still would be admissible, especially Exhibits 9 and 10, it is my information, were censored by the Sheriff's Office who in turn --

THE COURT: Let's not leave that other subject quite so soon.

MR. BUGLIOSI: All right.

THE COURT: What is the evidentiary effect of a letter where there is a stipulation only as to having been written by the defendant Atkins but no evidence that it was ever sent or communicated to anybody else; query,

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first, is it a letter at all?

MR. BUGLIOSI: In Special Exhibit No. 8 we already have testimony that Roni Howard received it.

Then we have her further testimony that Sadie shouted out to her from about 14 feet away ---

THE COURT: I am speaking about 9 and 10 now.

MR. BUGLIOSI: About 9 and 10.

I think the defense should stipulate that 9 and 10 were sent by Susan Atkins, whether they were received or not is something else.

I think there should be a stipulation as to that. We can call the Sheriff's Office to testify that these were outgoing letters of Sadie Glutz, and they were censored.

MR. FITZGERALD: You see, the thing is that when an inmate of either one of the jails writes a letter, he writes a letter, leaves it open, affixes a stamp on it.

On the inside flap he writes his or her name, the booking number and the location, and turns it in.

That inmate never receives notification as to whether it was sent or not.

I would guess in the regular and ordinary course of business that most of the letters are sent, but whether a particular letter actually gets out --

Some of these letters are censored; some of them are excised; some of them are returned to the inmate.

We don't have any information that these letters were actually sent. If we could get information that

they were actually sent then we would be in a better position to stipulate, and probably we would stipulate. We just don't know.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I don't think it is that important a point as far as the prosecution is concerned.

MR. MUSICH: Your Honor, just for the record, as far as the letter of December 13th of which we do have photocopies, I believe that it is part of the special exhibit, the envelope of that particular letter with the address and with the stamp on it, I would suggest as an officer of the Court and counsel the mere writing of the letter with the addressing and the return address and stamp, et cetera, clearly shows the intent for it to be sent through the mails.

It is more than likely that it was in fact released and permitted to go through the process of the mails.

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MR. HUGHES: Of course it is possible she wrote this letter, addressed it, had it in her bunk and someone else took it and deposited it.

That is possible.

MR. KANAREK: Because of the sensitivity of the Sheriff, your Honor, to these -- to Miss Atkins, there is a great probability the letter never went out.

The way those people think, there is a great probability this letter never left the custody of the Sheriff's Department, because in their mind this is vital to the prosecution, and I would say you can almost bet on it.

THE COURT: Is there some way of proving that it was mailed?

MR. BUGLIOSI: We are trying to locate Kit Fletcher right now. I believe that Kit Fletcher will testify that she actually did receive this letter.

We located friends of Kit Fletcher who will testify that Kit did receive letters from Sadie Glutz.

THE COURT: My question is whether or not there is any way of indicating or showing whether the letters were sent out of the jail?

MR. BUGLIOSI: I guess we would call the Sheriff's Office.

MR. MUSICH: There is no doubt we can put on testimony regarding the jail procedure, the censoring and

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the ordinary course of business, the letters would have been photocopied and have been forwarded on to the United States Mail.

Whether this particular letter was, we can assume only by inference of the letter, the stamp, the fact that it was photocopied, that it was forwarded and sent.

MR. SHINN: I think, Vince, anyway you have to bring the officer in.

THE COURT: I am just raising the question as to what the evidentiary effect would be of what appears to be a letter if there is no evidence that it was ever communicated.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Even assuming it was not communicated, it in no way would be helpful to your client, Days.

MR. SHINN: I am speaking of the fourth amendment. You would have to bring the officer in to find out whether or not he authorized the making of copies of letters, or if he is supposed to read for the security reasons and send it out.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The officer is not the one who determines the law, Judge Older will apply the law, not the officer. His testimony is irrelevant.

MR. SHINN: We have to find out what his duties are.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I will stipulate these letters were censored by the Sheriff's office.

I will stipulate to that.

5a-3 Censored to what extent? MR. SHINN: 1 MR. BUGLIOSI: That they photographed the letters. 2 Are they looking for evidence to turn 3 MR. SHINN: over to the District Attorney's office? Is it their job 4 to do that, or just for security reasons to find out --5 MR. BUGLIOSI: Security reasons. б Okay, but not to gather information. MR. SHINN: 7 MR. BUGLIOSI: No, but they did in fact turn it over 8 9 to us. THE COURT: You don't have the originals of 9 and 10, IÒ is that right? 11 MR. BUGLIOSI: No, I don't, your Honor, no, I don't. 12 There is another point, your Honor. 13 MR. KANAREK: 14 THE COURT: And the photocopies were made by the Sheriff's Department. 15 16 MR. BUGLIOSI: Yes. THE COURT: Don't they make those photocopies as 17 they go out, is that the purpose of the photocopying? 18 -5b fls<sup>19</sup> MR. BUGLIOSI: That's right. 20 21 22 23 24 25

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MR. FITZGERALD: No, all letters that go out of the Jail are not photocopied. That would place an enormous burden on the taxpayers of the County.

Only in particular cases are letters photocopied and that is generally speaking when the District Attorney asks the Sheriff to photocopy letters of particular inmates.

This is in my experience and I suggest -MR. BUGLIOSI: Almost by definition you have to be
right, they cannot photostat every letter over there, they
would have to have five large photostat machines with 20
people working around the clock.

MR. KANAREK: I think the case of Lucille Miller, which is in today's paper, I'm sure your Honor has read it, I think it is right on point as to all three of these letters. I would make a motion under 1538.5 of the Penal Code because at that time Roni Howard was an agent of the prosecution. Her state of mind — she was there to get written evidence which is very analogous —

THE COURT: There is no evidence whatever that she was an agent of the prosecution.

MR. KANAREK: Pardon?

THE COURT: There is no evidence whatever that she was an agent of the prosecution.

MR. KANAREK: That is a fact question. That is why I move under 1538.5 of the Penal Code, I move for an evidentiary hearing because I believe that Roni -- even you

take Mr. Bugliosi's present statement wherein she was working with the police, she instigated the correspondence to get something back from Sadie.

She is a sophisticated person who is very knowledgeable.

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 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Kanarek, let's not waste any time on that with respect to Miss Howard. I have heard her testimony. There is no evidence whatever that she was an agent for anyone.

Now, if you want to talk about the other two letters as to which there has been no evidence at all yet other than a stipulation as to foundation, that is snother matter.

MR. KANAREK: What I am saying is, your Honor, that her protestation -- that isn't the point -- the point is that in connection with this letter, we are entitled to a 1538.5 evidentiary hearing because Mr. Bugliosi says she instituted correspondence at this time in order to get a letter back. And you can make the inference that she did that because she wanted something in writing under Sadie's own handwriting; and you can make the inference that this was done to aid law enforcement, as a result of law enforcement's request.

THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek, we are just going around and around. If you have some evidence that she was an agent, of course you have a right to offer that evidence, but there is none now. So, let's not waste any time on that.

Now, if you want to talk about the other letters, that is another matter.

MR. KANAREK: The same thing applies. The Miller

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case just came down --

THE COURT: "The same thing" is simply a statement that there is no evidence.

Now, if there is some evidence, or if you are objecting, or if there is going to be an objection on the ground of unreasonable search and seizure, then that question will have to be dealt with.

MR. KANAREK: I think it can be eliminated as hearsay in any event, your Honor. Those last two letters certainly are not admissions. They are not admissions and they are not confessions.

MR. SHINN: Your Honor, I don't see anything in the letters that would aid the prosecution, your Honor.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Then why do you have an objection?

MR. SHINN: Just for the record.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Just for the record?

MR. KANAREK: We live by the law. This is a law and order era, supposedly.

MR. SHINN: I have a few cases that state the Fourth Amendment does apply to letters.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Before we get into that, why don't you stipulate that Sadie did send these letters?

The fact that she wrote them is the crucial thing. The fact that she wrote them is the whole ball of wax. That is the incriminating thing, that she sat down and she wrote these letters.

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MR. KANAREK: But there is nothing in them.

MR. BUGLIOSI: That is something else.

MR. FITZGERALD: That is not true.

Exhibit 9, if believed, would tend to corroborate Roni Howard.

I can see where the prosecution wants the letters in evidence.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Yes. But I am saying that there should be a stipulation that Sadie not only wrote these letters but she sent them.

If you are going to stipulate that she wrote them, that is the incriminating thing. It is not incriminating to add that she sent them.

MR. KANAREK: It is a Miler type of thing, where they are the active -- they had someone in the jail.

MR. BUGLIOSI: You are missing the point.

MR. FITZGERALD: I am not missing the point,
Mr. Bugliosi; I would be willing to stipulate if I knew
that were the fact.

But I hesitate ever to stipulate to things that I don't know.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Ask Sadie. Ask her, "Did you send these letters?" If she says, "No," then maybe we will put on evidence. But I don't see why that is an issue.

MR. FITZGERALD: At best, all Sadie can say is that in the regular course of business over there at Sybil Brand

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she turned these in to be mailed. 1 MR. BUGLIOSI: All right. We don't care for more than 2 that. 3 MR. FITZGERALD: That is all we can possibly stipulate 4 to. Š MR. BUGLIOSI: Ask her about it. б MR. FITZGERALD: If we talked to her and she said 7 that is the fact, we would be happy to stipulate to that. There is no problem of that. MR. BUGLIOSI: I think that is all that is relevant. 10 that Kitt Fletcher and Jo Stevenson got the letters. 11 THE COURT: Do you want to check that point at this 12 time? 13. 14 MR. KANAREK: I don't know if I can enter into that 15 stipulation, your Honor. (Whereupon, all defense counsel leave the 16 Court's chambers.) 17 (All defense counsel return to Court's chambers.) 18 MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, the prosecution has 19 decided that we do not intend to offer into evidence 20 Special Exhibit No. 10. 21 **22** MR. SHINN: That is the sympathy letter? 23 THE COURT: That is the "Dear Kitt." MR. MUSICH: There is nothing really incriminating. 24 MR. BUGLIOSI: There are incriminating things in 25 there, but for various reasons we have decided not to offer 26

it into evidence. So, now we are talking about Special Exhibit No. 9 only. Have you spoken to Miss Atkins? MR. FITZGERALD: Yes. I wonder if I might do this off the record? THE COURT: Very well. (An off-the-record discussion was had.) 18. 

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MR. FITZGERALD: It is my understanding that the People intend to introduce into evidence what has been heretofore marked Court Special Exhibits 8 and 9.

8 relates to a so-called letter that was transmitted not within the United States mail system, but surreptitiously within the jail system allegedly from Susan Atkins to Roni Howard.

People's Exhibit 9, or Special Exhibit 9, is a letter entitled Dear Jo.

It is my understanding, your Honor, that the evidence will show that this was censored by the Sheriff, and a photocopy of the letter was secured before the letter was actually placed into the United States mail system for delivery to the addressee.

We contend that such an interception process, whereby the letter is censored and photocopied violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution in that it is an illegal search and seizure, in that it violates the correspondent's right to privacy.

And in that regard I would concede, arguendo, that the Sheriff or any duly constituted custodial official has the right and perhaps in some cases they may even have the obligation to censor mail, particularly when it relates to security and escapes and attempted jail breaks and that sort of thing.

But it appears that in this case the Sheriff

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25 26 photocopied the letter in order to secure evidence that one of their inmates, Sadie Glutz, true name Susan Atkins, and I think that when it is not directly related to any security problem it is in fact a search, and I think -- well, for the purposes of this objection I will state that to my knowledge there was no search warrant for any letters from Susan Atkins to any other person.

THE COURT: What about where an inmate is well aware that his mail will be censored?

MR. FITZGERALD: People vs. Edwards, interpreting United States vs. Katz enunciates the so-called reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine, and it would seem that there is a direct reference, I believe, in No. 9 --

THE COURT: That is right, the last sentence of the first paragraph.

MR. FITZGERALD: "So I don't want to say anything about it because of the censor."

It would appear that that is strong evidence that Miss Atkins did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

I am not grounding my argument on the reasonable expectation of privacy grounds.

I am arguing that in any event the Sheriff does not have a right to accumulate evidence against one of the inmates not related to some security procedures or some security problem in the jail.

MR. SHINN: I join in Mr. Fitzgerald's argument. 1 MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I would join with the 2 exception that I don't concede that the jail people have 3 any right to censor mail, period. That is my position. 5 Otherwise I join in Mr. Fitzgerald's statements. 6 I don't think that anybody -- whether someone is in custody 7 or if someone was on bail --8 THE COURT: You think the jail should be run more 9 like a university where there is no security proceedings. 10 MR. KANAREK: No, your Honor, I think that the 11 people that are in jail are entitled to the presumption of 12 innocence. 13 This jail has in it predominantly unsentenced 14 people, and we are losing our cool. 15 We are becoming paranoid, and we are losing 16 that presumption of innocence, otherwise I agree with Mr. 17 7a fls. Fitzgerald. Ì8 19 20 21 23 24 25 26

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THE COURT: There is no presumption of security though, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: Well, I disagree, I mean most respectfully, with the Court. I think that is part of our problem in this country today because we are forgetting some of the basic --

THE COURT: Would you do away with locks and bars and some of those precautions?

MR. KANAREK: No, your Honor, I wouldn't, but I say under the bushel basket of security a lot of untoward things are done, and I don't believe these unsentenced people should be treated this way.

There is a presumption of innocence.

THE COURT: Unfortunately for your position,
Mr. Kanarek, I understand the present law to be otherwise.

MR. KANAREK: I don't believe it is, if I may -THE COURT: Do you care to cite some authority?
MR. KANAREK: Yes, in re Miller.

THE COURT: I am familiar with that, it has nothing to do with the facts of this case.

MR. KANAREK: That is the Lucille Miller case which I don't have the benefit of the actual --

THE COURT: The situation stated by Mr. Fitzgerald is the law. I don't think the letters are inadmissible on the ground stated.

Now, they may be inadmissible for some other

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reason, but on that basis I don't think they would be inadmissible.

MR. KANAREK: I think the burden is this, your Honor, since Mr. Fitzgerald has enunciated a Fourth Amendment right, then I enunciated, I think it is fair to state, based on 1538.5 we are entitled to an evidentiary hearing, not just chit-chat or representations.

THE COURT: Perhaps the People are willing to stipulate that the letters were obtained by the jail censor.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I will stipulate to that.

THE COURT: I assumed that was the fact when Mr. Fitzgerald commenced his argument.

There seems to be no question about that.

MR. KANAREK; Yes, but there is a big question as to whether this letter ever got out of Sadie's locker. That is part of the evidence.

They have the burden, you see, under -- since there is no warrant, the burden shifts to them to prove it.

If it is still in the locker, we are not stipulating this ever left the locker, the fact that she said this, intended to get to the censor, does not mean it ever did.

So they have the factual --

THE COURT: I think the People will have to lay a foundation at least as to that portion, as to where they got the letter, as to No. 9.

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8 was obtained from whom?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Roni Howard.

THE COURT: From her directly?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Roni Howard apparently gave the letter to Wes Russell.

MR. HUGHES: I think there is a big question on that.

MR. FITZGERALD: We are talking about No. 9.

MR. BUGLIOSI: 9, as I understand it, was censored by the Sheriff's office.

THE COURT: You will have to prove that. You will have to offer evidence on that in order for the Court to rule on Mr. Kanarek's objection.

As he says, it might have been taken from her personal effects rather than as a result of censorship.

MR. MUSICH: Even assuming that, arguendo, I feel the law in this area, the Fourth Amendment search and seizure laws cannot in any way apply to a jail inmate.

THE COURT: You may be right. I would like to see some authority on that particular point.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The landmark case is Lanza vs. United States, 370 United States 139, 82 Supreme Court 1218, where the --

THE COURT: What year was that case?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Lanza I think was 1961 -- 1961 rings a bell with me on Lanza.

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That is a landmark case.

THE COURT: That was based upon the New York prison official electronic interception of a visitor's room conversation between a witness and the prisoner's brother.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Lanza held that the Fourth Amendment incorporated into the Fourteenth simply was not applicable to inmates of jails or prisons; that the usual array of federal and state constitutional rights as guaranteed to non-incarcerated citizens do not apply once a person enters the jail.

People vs. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223 at Page 248, the Court said and I quote:

"Except only insofar as concerns consultation with his attorney in a room designated for that purpose, a prisoner has no right of privacy in a jail."

Then there are several other cases, People vs. Dinkins, 242 Cal. Ap. 2d, Page 902 and 903.

In that case a letter written by the defendant from a Long Beach jail was censored and introduced into evidence.

The Court held this was proper, and they cited approvingly Stroud vs. United States, 251 U.S. 15, the Birdman of Alcatraz.

The Court said certain letters were offered in evidence at the trial containing expressions tending to

establish the guilt of the accused. These letters were written by him after the homicide and while he was an inmate of the penitentiary at Levenworth.

They were voluntarily written and under the practice and disciplines of the prison were turned over ultimately to the warden who furnished them to the District Attorney.

In this instance the letters were voluntarily written, no threats or coercion were used to obtain them, nor were they seized without process.

They came into the possession of the principals in the penitentiary under established practice.

Under such circumstances there was neither testimony required of the accused, nor was there unreasonable search and seizure in violation of constitutional rights.

MR. KANAREK: But interestingly enough, without looking at it, the Miller case involves the same general --

MR. BUGLIOSI: Miller says the same thing.

MR. KANAREK: But Miller was reversed by the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Not on that ground, this party was an agent of the police and should have advised Miller of her constitutional rights. Miller still holds there is no right of privacy in Jail.

I am told it was not reversed on that ground, but on the ground that an agent had to give rights.

MR. FITZGERALD: We cannot base it on the Los Angeles Times.

THE COURT: Are you going to offer any evidence, Mr. Bugliosi, as to where the letter was obtained?

MR. BUGLIOSI: If the Court feels that it is necessary.

THE COURT: Well, I think it is. I think that the People have the burden of showing at least how the letter was obtained, that is, whether it was forcibly extracted from the defendant's person in some manner, or whether it was acquired during a censorship process, or acquired in some other manner.

I have no idea how it was obtained.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Mr. Fitzgerald just spoke to Miss Atkins. She is not even alleging that someone took it forcibly from her.

MR. KANAREK: She doesn't have to. The burden is on you, Mr. Bugliosi.

MR. SHINN: She doesn't recall mailing it.

MR. FITZGERALD: I think it certainly would be helpful if you did lay the foundation because we would like to ask

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the Sheriffs some questions as to whether or not a special hold was put on her mail, whether there were directives from the Los Angeles Police Department or the District Attorneys Office to hold and photocopy her mail, particularly, and the other defendants in the case.

I think our record would be much stronger were that the case.

THE COURT: I don't know if you would be able to go into all of that. All that they are asked is what they did with one letter. That seems to be going beyond the scope of the direct examination.

MR. FITZGERALD: I would anticipate it will be very short, and furthermore you received the letter from somebody, it got in your possession somehow.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Right, unquestionably it came from the Sheriff's Office, I will stipulate to that.

THE COURT: I will reserve any ruling on the motion under 1538.5.

The People's case is still open. Presumably Mr. Bugliosi will offer some additional evidence on that subject, and then when he rests the defendants may offer evidence in their behalf if they wish, and then the Court will ultimately rule on it.

The motion will remain open at the present time and we will go on to something else.

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MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, what about the motion --

MR. BUGLIOSI: Before you go any further, is the Court going to rule on the issue of whether the Fourth and Fourteenth apply to prisoners in jail.

MR. KANAREK: The Court is going to rule on the whole motion.

THE COURT: I am not called upon to make that kind of a ruling.

I want to hear what the evidence is first with respect to this motion, then I will rule on this motion.

MR. BUGLIOSI: It is the People's position that it does not apply, no matter how they got it.

We will put on evidence of how they got it, but irrespective of how they got the letter, apparently under Lanza and Stroud, it is admissible -- and Lopez.

THE COURT: It is conceivable that it was acquired in some other way entirely, that it was not acquired in the jail at all.

In other words, it is not enough to say it doesn't matter how you got it. That may be true if it was acquired in the jail; it may or may not be true.

Suppose it were acquired in some other manner.

MR. MUSICH: The problem is whether or not we can find the actual person who photocopied this particular letter. It might be just in the ordinary course of

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THE COURT: That is one of the problems of being a prosecutor.

All right, gentlemen, let's get on.

MR. HUGHES: I think there is another problem that is with letter 8, the chain of custody of that letter.

Roni Howard at page 13,814, Volume 126 of the transcript, says when asked by Mr. Shinn "What did you do with this letter later?"

She said "I gave it to my attorney."

And she indicated in other testimony that that was the last that she ever saw of that letter until the police showed it to her.

MR. BUGLIOSI: In any event she positively identified the letter.

MR. HUGHES: But it leaves the implication from what she said in my mind that this letter leaving her -- that it went to her attorney, and from where it went from there, as if it were stolen from him -- or stolen from her.

THE COURT: I don't see any difficulty there. She has personally identified the letter.

MR. HUGHES: Suppose the police had broken into her attorney's office and stolen it. That is possible. I doubt that is how it happened. I believe probably Mr. Russell gave it to the District Attorney.

I believe we may have that problem.

THE COURT: I don't see any problem at all with 1 respect to that. 2 Let's get on to Special Exhibit No. 8. 3 MR. KANAREK: Well, then, your Honor, as far as 4 the 1538.5 goes, as to this, as to Roni Howard being an 5 agent -б THE COURT: We don't have to go over it again, Mr. 7 Kanarek, it's been stated very clearly, it's on the record. 8 Now it won't be on the record any more if we clutter the 9 record up by saying it all over again. 10 Special Exhibit No. 8, gentlemen, first sentence 11 any comment? 12 MR. FITZGERALD: Well, this obviously refers, Judge, 13 to something -- well, all right, I will withdraw the 14 15 comments. No comments on sentence one. 16 MR. KANAREK: My position is it is hearsay, your 17 Honor, sentence No. 1. 18 THE COURT: Sentence No. 2, we are talking now about 19 Bruton-Aranda, Mr. Kanarek. 20 MR. KANAREK: Only on Bruton-Aranda, not on the ŻΙ hearsay aspect? 22 THE COURT: That's right, you may reserve all of 23 those objections. 24 MR. KANAREK: Very well, certainly. 25 MR. FITZGERALD: No. 2 is all right also. 26

1 THE COURT: No. 3? 2 MR. FITZGERALD: 3 is all right. 3 THE COURT: No. 4? MR. FITZGERALD: 4 is all right. 5. MR. KANAREK: Well, yes, your Honor. 6 THE COURT: What about the next one? Ż. MR. BUGLIOSI: The next one should be deleted, no 8 question about it. 9 MR. FITZGERALD: Beginning "my attorney is going to 10 go on insanity." 11 THE COURT: That should be deleted? 12 MR. BUGLIOSI: You said the next one. 13 THE COURT: I am talking about "my attorney is going 14 to go on insanity." 15 MR. BUGLIOSI: I don't know. 16 MR. MUSICH: It might, arguendo, imply a fabricated 17 type of defense, and it might also imply commission of the 18 offense. 19 MR. FITZGERALD: It might also imply that she made 20 up the story to Roni Howard as part of her grandiose 21 insanity scheme, so it is one of those equivocal statements 22 that cut several ways. 23 MR. BUGLIOSI: Why don't we just delete it. MR. FITZGERALD: Why don't we just leave it? 25

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MR. SHINN: Leave it in, I have no objections.

THE COURT: I don't think the editing process leaves a great deal of discretion to the Court as to whether a statement stays in or out, just because you don't happen to like the looks of it.

The editing process is to delete those statements which tend to incriminate either directly or indirectly a codefendant.

I cannot see that this one does.

MR. SHINN: I agree with the Court.

THE COURT: And therefore it should stay in.

MR. FITZGERALD: That is not true, however, with the next one. I think that has to go out in toto as well as the following sentence.

MR. KANAREK: Up to the rest of that paragraph.

MR. FITZGERALD: It begins "Yes, I wanted the world to know 'M. '"

I believe that obviously refers to Manson.

THE COURT: I believe the balance of that whole paragraph should go out.

MR. BUGLIOSI: It doesn't refer to Roger Maris, I will tell you that.

THE COURT: Because the last sentence wouldn't mean anything.

MR. BUGLIOSI: \_\_mhe Court wants to take out, then, "Yes, I wanted the world to know 'M,' it sure looks like

they do now," and then the next two lines also --THE COURT: Yes. MR. KANAREK: Of course that is in the Herald Examiner today, it so happens, regrettably. MR. FITZGERALD: What about the first sentence of the next paragraph? MR. BUGLIOSI: Definitely will have to be deleted, the second line. 8, Ц 

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MR. BUGLIOSI: The second line.

THE COURT: The first sentence will be deleted.

MR. SHINN: Completely? Or are you going to put down, just say, "There are no strangers to me," or delete it?

MR. BUGLIOSI: The whole sentence.

MR. SHINN: The cases that I have seen in the past, in a case like that, they just put down "There are no strangers to me," or delete it.

MR. FITZGERALD: I have some difficulty because, actually, the sentence is unintelligible, at least from my establishment frame of reference.

THE COURT: It is also in the disjunctive.

She is not saying "There are no strangers to me," she is saying "There are no strangers to me or M. That is, between us we know everybody."

MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, the Court indicated --

THE COURT: That is what she is saying.

That's right. MR. FITZGERALD:

MR. BUGLIOSI: The Court indicated that the only issue here is Aranda or Bruton. Actually, I think we can delete other sentences apart from Bruton and Aranda if there is a stipulation.

Will that be all right? If there is a stipulation between the prosecution and defense counsel, if certain words or sentences should go out, apart from

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## Aranda and Bruton?

MR. KANAREK: In the Virginia Graham statement -- or was it the Roni Howard statement -- she testified about "the other man" and the Court definitely made it "a man."

MR. BUGLIOSI: No, I don't agree with that.

THE COURT: Let's not go back to that.

MR. KANAREK: Very well.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I mentioned that because with this first line here, even assuming you take out "or 'M'," even if you assume the rest is not an Aranda problem, certainly the defense and prosecution can stipulate to removing the whole line.

FITZGERALD: I offer to stipulate that you can remove the whole first sentence of the second paragraph beginning with the word "in" and ending with the letter "M."

MR. BUGLIOST: Okay.

MR. SHINN: I will object to that.

I think we should put in place of "M" the word "deleted."

THE COURT: It changes the meaning of the sentence.

I don't consider it to be of great moment.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Not only that, but it violates Aranda.

Aranda says you can't let the jury fill in the blanks, if you fill in the blanks and it would implicate the co-defendant.

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THE COURT: I think the next four sentences are all right.

MR. KANAREK: No, your Honor. I can't agree, because this is what Mr. Bugliosi is putting in in connection with his theory of the case. This is foisted upon Mr. Manson, all of this ego thing, "All ego must die."

You look at Juan Flynn's testimony in connection with Mr. Manson. Aranda says it cannot be used if there is any way that it can hurt a co-defendant. All of that goes to philosophy.

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THE COURT: I see nothing in there that would in any way implicate any co-defendants.

MR. KANAREK: Because of the other matters that Mr. Bugliosi has brought out.

THE COURT: Simply because one defendant has used the same words that another defendant has used, under different circumstances, that doesn't mean anything.

MR. KANAREK: They are talking about acting in concert, about a conspiracy.

THE COURT: Where is the implication?

MR. KANAREK: The type of words that are used.

"The only thing that dies is the ego. All ego must die anyway, it is written. Yes, it could have been your house, it could have been my father's house also."

This substantiates by this declarant Mr. Bugliosi's case against Mr. Manson where he claims, the prosecution even had Juan Flynn testify --

THE COURT: That isn't the testimony.

MR. KANAREK: Yes, it is.

May I show your Honor the language in the Aranda?

THE COURT: I have seen it a hundred times in the last two weeks, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: It must be deleted if it can be used in any way against the defendants.

THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek, don't waste time repeating

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the same things. I know that.

Show me where the implication is?

MR. KANAREK: I am telling it to the Court.

THE COURT: You are just citing Aranda to me.

MR. KANAREK: All right.

I am telling the Court.

When she puts down this kind of philosophy, which is the very philosophy that Mr. Bugliosi referred to in his opening statement, and which he has put evidence on-

MR. BUGLIOSI: There was nothing in my opening statement about killing the ego.

THE COURT: The opening statement is not evidence.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I didn't refer to it in my opening statement.

MR. FITZGERALD: I think I can illustrate the problem graphically and get to exactly what Mr. Kanarek is talking about.

If you refer, your Honor, to the sentence at the end of that train of thought that goes as follows: "Life has no boundaries and death is only an illusion," Mr. Bugliosi is going to put on evidence later in this case that Mr. Manson said frequently that death was simply an illusion.

And that is what Mr. Kanarek is talking about. He is saying that they are actually going to put some of these words as coming out of Manson's mouth at some point

in the case. And your Honor's rejoinder apparently is: Susan Atkins and Charles Manson shared common beliefs. 8c-1

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THE COURT: That was the comment that I made, yes.

Let's hear from the People.

Suppose you started and deleted everything in that paragraph down to the sentence beginning with "I am not going to fight this"?

MR. BUGLIOSI: No, your Honor. I would hope the Court would not.

THE COURT: What would be lost?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Well, it is exceptionally important that we have in here, among other things, "It could have been your house, it could have been my father's house also." I definitely want that in.

That goes towards the intent to kill, the intent to commit murder.

MR. MUSICH: Also, "In killing someone physically you are only releasing the soul. Life has no boundaries and death is only an allusion."

Clearly, that shows some premeditation, some intent, some feeling as far as killing a person, which requires specific intent, which requires the intent to kill. A person who has no qualms about it certainly has the premeditated intent and malice for murder.

MR. KANAREK: If she were on trial by herself, yes, but this, inferentially and circumstantially, because of the other evidence that the prosecution is putting before the jury, this inveighs against Mr. Manson, just as Mr.

Fitzgerald pointed out.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I don't see how you can say that.

MR. KANAREK: Mr. Bugliosi has said how unique this case was, that he has never heard of things like this before.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I haven't.

MR. KANAREK: That's right.

MR. BUGLIOSI: With respect to the second and third line, "In the word kill, the only thing that dies is the ego. All ego must die anyway, it is written."

I anticipate that Mr. Manson will even testify that way on the witness stand, if he does testify, and that there will be other evidence, perhaps, indicating that this was a philosophy of his.

Now, query whether Aranda really excludes it.

THE COURT: Of course, you have alleged a conspiracy and you have attempted to prove that there was a Family.

MR. BUGLIOSI: To play it safe, why don't we exclude those two lines, indicating "The only thing that dies is the ego. All ego must die anyway, it is written."

That is Manson's philosophy there.

I am not saying that it violates Aranda, but there is a possibility that it does. I am not stipulating that it does, but I will stipulate that it can be deleted.

However, the next line --

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MR. MUSICH: Excuse me. May I comment in that regard?

I think the crucial factor are the words "it is written." I don't think the other statements are.

Just "it is written."

MR. BUGLIOSI: I am not aware of Mr. Manson writing this.

MR. MUSICH: There might be something in that statement, "It is written," whether it is in the Bible or scriptures or in a hippie magazine or in Manson's diary. That is possible. But I can't see how you can delete anything further than that. This is something personally written. It is something about her personal feelings. It has got nothing to do in any way, by innuendo or anything else, it can't float over and be connected with some other evidence.

MR. BUGLIOSI: It is a statement of her own belief, that she went there that night, and it could have been your house or anyone else's house, everyone was going to die.

This in no way implicates Charles Manson. We are charging Susan Atkins with seven counts of murder, and we have to prove that she had a premeditated intent to kill, and this goes toward that issue right there.

MR. KANAREK: Mr. Bugliosi is going to argue that this fact situation is unique, it never happened before and never will happen again. I can hear his argument to the jury now.

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 MR. MUSICH: That is only argument, Mr. Kanarek. We are only concerned with the evidence before the jury, and so far as this evidence going also before the jury, to connect the other evidence to incriminate your client, I can't see how words out of the mouth of Susan Atkins written here on paper about her feelings about "killing someone is only releasing the soul" and "life has no boundaries and death is only an illusion" can in any way be connected with your client.

MR. KANAREK: Because of the very thing that the Court has pointed out and Mr. Fitzgerald pointed out, that there is evidence to be connected up and show the whole philosophy.

MR. FITZGERALD: You are going to put these words in Manson's mouth.

MR. KANAREK: No question.

MR. BUGLIOSI: "Death is only an illusion" will be put in Manson's mouth. So that will have to go out.

But where she says "It could have been your house, it could have been my father's house," I think that definitely should stay in.

MR. KANAREK: You have got to remember, Mr. Bugliosi, you have got other evidence. These matters that you are going to put before the jury are going to be against Miss Atkins and Mr. Manson by independent witnesses.

THE COURT: I am going to make a decision. We are

going to strike out that entire paragraph down to "I am not going to fight this." 8e fl. <u>io</u> · 15 16. 

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MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, may I be heard?

THE COURT: You have been heard, everybody has been heard, and I finally have to make a decision, and that is what it is going to be.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, the prosecution is very cooperative and agreeable and joins with the defense on several of these lines, but this one line, your Honor --

THE COURT: It isn't a question of being cooperative,

Mr. Bugliosi. It is a question of whether or not there

can be effective deletion or whether or not it will be

indirectly incriminating. And I believe it can, because of

the unique nature of this case and the theories advanced,

and I am sure what will be the argument and also the evidence

of other witnesses as to statements made by Mr. Manson.

MR. BUGLIOSI: We are not going to put on any evidence that he said it didn't make any difference what house they went to. We are not going to offer any evidence of that. In fact, my argument, as I envision it, will be that these two homes were specifically picked out by Mr. Manson for a particular reason: One home he had already been to; and the other home was next door to a home where he had been to.

So, your Honor, I don't intend to argue that.

THE COURT: I think the second sentence might stay in.

MR. BUGLIOSI: That is what I was referring to, just that sentence right there.

MR. SHINN: What sentence?

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MR. KANAREK: That is just another way of saying the same thing.

MR. BUGLIOSI: It refers to her premeditated intent to kill.

THE COURT: That sentence may stay in.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, it shows the complete willy-nilly abandoned malignant heart. This goes to the very philosophy that he says Manson has.

MR. FITZGERALD: The next bad one is "'M' does not care."

"Insanity is reality and not caring." There appears to be nothing wrong with that.

"When you truly love you do not care about anyone or anything, you just love." That appears all right.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Let's take it a sentence at a time.

The Court is going to strike "insanity is reality and mt caring"?

THE COURT: No. I am backtracking, Mr. Bugliosi.

So far, in that paragraph, everything is stricken except "Yes it could have been your house. It could have been my father's house also."

The following sentence is stricken.

The sentence after that is stricken.

The sentence after that is stricken.

Then the next sentence that will remain in is "Insanity is reality and not caring. When you truly love you

do not care about anyone or anything you just love." Then the following sentence will be eliminated. MR. FITZGERALD: Right. ,3 . 14 

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THE COURT: What about after that?

MR. MUSICH: I don't have a period. Is there a period after "love" and before "M"?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Yes.

MR. FITZGERALD: The next sentence --

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, if I may, just briefly?

This means it could have been the jurors'
house, it could have been your house, it could have been
my father's house. It could have been the jurors' house,
and Mr. Bugliosi is going to argue that.

THE COURT: If that is what the statement says, that is what it says.

MR. KANAREK: Then that will inculpate Mr. -- if this were Mr. Memson's statement, it would be different, your Honor.

THE COURT: We have gone by that one. You may make your objection at the proper time.

MR. FITZGERALD: Now, the sentence after "'M' does not care," that goes "I know this to be the truth," you don't know whether that is referring to "'M' does not care" or if that is referring to "if you truly love you do not care about anyone or anything, you just love."

THE COURT: I think the next three sentences have to come out, otherwise there will be an ambiguity.

MR. FITZGERALD: The next two sentences have to go

out, your Honor.

THE COURT:

I take it, you would leave "I am not going to fight this. I will let my attorney do that."

That is right.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, if I may say this? This sentence about "it could have been my father's house" means that she is following Mr. Manson's instructions. I mean, this is a very, very -- this is a very, very -- it isn't the number of words that comes out that count, your Honor, it is the thought.

THE COURT: I can't agree with you, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. SHINN: Your Honor, are we doing this just temporarily and then will argue about the complete thing later?

THE COURT: Yes. You are not waiving any objection.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Does the Court want to recess now?

THE COURT: Yes. We will recess now until 2:00
o'clock.

(Whereupon at 12:01 p.m. the court was in recess.)