## SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT NO. 104

HON. CHARLES H. OLDER, JUDGE

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CHARLES MANSON, SUSAN ATKINS, LESLIE VAN HOUTEN, PATRICIA KRENWINKEL,

Defendants.

164

No. 4253156

REPORTERS' DAILY TRANSCRIPT Friday, January 8, 1971

APPEARANCES:

For the People:

VINCENT T. BUGLIOSI, DONALD A. MUSICH, STEPHEN RUSSELL KAY, DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS

For Deft. Manson:

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For Deft. Atkins:

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For Deft. Van Houten:

MAXWELL KEITH, Esq.

For Deft. Krenwinkel:

PAUL FITZGERALD, Esq.

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MURRAY MEHLMAN, CSR., Official Reporters

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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, FRIDAY, JANUARY 8, 1971 9:06 o'clock a.m.

(The following proceedings were had in open court in the presence and hearing of all the jurors, all counsel with the exception of Mr. Hughes being present; the defendants not being physically present:)

THE COURT: All counsel and jurors are present.
You may continue, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: Thank you, your Honor.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

Mr. Darrow has returned; perhaps his return will help somewhat.

We were speaking last night about alibi. That word, alibi, has some sort of a romantic tone to it. We hear about it all the time.

Actually, without that word, getting to the substance of what it means, the principle is that historically when someone was not present at a crime, that this was a complete defense, and then, speaking of motivation of the prosecution -- whatever that might be worth, by putting in a conspiracy count, this undermines the principle that a person not being present where something occurs is not responsible for what occurs there.

MR. BUGLIOSI: That is a misstatement of the law, your Honor.

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MR. KANAREK: I have not finished, your Honor; I have not finished.

THE COURT: Don't attempt to instruct the jury on the law, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: I am not attempting to. As a matter of fact, your Honor is not giving an alibi instruction. I am not attempting at all, I am merely alluding --

THE COURT: Don't misstate the law.

MR. KANAREK: I am not. I haven't finished.
Before I uttered a word, practically, Mr. Bugliosi was
standing up.

THE COURT: You are attempting apparently to instruct the jury on the law of alibi.

MR. KANAREK: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Don't do it, sir.

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MR. KANAREK: There is no question that what we are doing is not -- we are discussing the law and the various principles of law and how they may mesh with each other.

What we are saying is, there is another principle of siding and abetting.

Aiding and abetting also requires criminal intent. There has to be criminal malice and criminal intent.

So the jury is the one, the jury decides whether or not there is any criminal knowledge and criminal intent, whether it be conspiracy or whether it be aiding and abetting.

And we think that the weakness of what the prosecution has suggested here is implicit in the fact that they have injected this conspiracy charge. That they, as far as these seven counts of murder are concerned, they cannot rely upon the seven counts of murder by themselves, because even though the Court will instruct us on aiding and abetting, the prosecution still has filed its conspiracy charge.

So, again, the motivation and the reason for it is significant because there is no case. The evidence clearly shows that Mr. Manson is not guilty of anything.

And so they bring in this conspiracy charge.

Now, in this regard, I would like to, if I

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may, suggest some language for the consideration of all of us.

"May it please the Court, the conspiracy here charged and specified and the acts alleged to have been committed in pursuance thereof and with the intent laid, constitute a crime the atrocity of which has sent a shudder through the civilized world.

"All that was agreed upon and attempted by the alleged incitors and instigators of this crime constitute a combination of atrocities with scarcely a parallel in the annals of the human race."

MR. BUGLIOSI: I am objecting to this, your Honor. I don't know what he is reading.

MR. KANAREK: May I continue, your Honor? THE COURT: The objection is overruled.

MR. KANAREK: Ladies and gentlemen, what I have just read to you is an argument that was made, the beginning of an argument that was made, and I think it is, in substance, the argument that has been made in this court, it is an argument that was made by John A. Bingham who was a special judge advocate after Abraham Lincoln was assassinated, and we probably all remember it, we remember the name of Mary Eugenia Serrat, who was charged with conspiracy.

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This gentleman started off his address with words that are the words that we have read. This was done in 1865. And this argument was an argument that began an argument the result of which, that is, the entire trial, caused this lady, Mary Eugenia Serrat, to be convicted of conspiracy.

As we all know, she ran a boarding house in Washington, D.C. She was alleged to be a conspirator.

The circumstantial evidence of that conspiracy was the fact that the lady happened to be on the wrong side of the Civil War. She had Southern sympathies.

The prosecution in that case brought in all kinds of circumstantial evidence to show that she was guilty of conspiracy.

She was convicted of conspiracy. Historians and legal scholars, almost from the time she was executed, to today all agree that she was guilty of nothing.

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She was guilty of nothing except that she was -- she was part and parcel of a situation that -- that was part of the times.

The war between the states had just ended,

Abraham Lincoln had just been killed and scapegoats were
necessary.

This crime had been called the crime of this century, and many people argue that in the last century the killing of Abraham Lincoln, that was the crime of that century, and it is documented, we can if we wish — if we wish we can read the history of that case, and the comparison is dangerously fascinating, dangerously fascinating how that lady how that lady was found guilty of conspiracy.

She wasn't -- she wasn't at the Ford Theatre where Abraham Lincoln was shot on that day, I think it's in April of '65, on a Friday. She was not there, but she was found guilty of conspiracy, and the circumstantial evidence was their Southern sympathies.

No alibi defense was available for her because she was a conspirator, and so she was found guilty.

There was a man, one Lou Weichman, a man who was at the boarding house who was a friend of hers, and the other people at the boarding house, a person who was strangely analogous to the position of Linda Kasabian in this case. I am sure we remember the story of that trial.

He testified because he was in the boarding house,

he was in the boarding house, he was threatened explicitly and implicitly, and his testimony was given and death resulted, death sentences resulted.

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And, as I say, the analogy, the analogy is strangely -- strangely significant because the prosecution -- the prosecution in this case, we can put ourselves back to the time after the Civil War when Abraham Lincoln was shot and the great love -- the great love that Abraham Lincoln engendered in people created an atmosphere where we have to solve this crime, like the police officers in this case, not going out and letting the chips drop where they may, they are going out to prove first, as happened in the case of Mary Serrat, they had already decided that Mary Serrat was guilty of conspiracy to commit murder to kill Abraham Lincoln, and so they went in and they filled up the gap.

The gap was that they did not have any evidence, so they substituted matters for evidence. They substituted hysteria. They substituted coerced witnesses. They substituted people who had some kind of a stake in testifying, and they got the result they wanted, and the result that they wanted is a blot on our history and will be a blot on our history forever.

Now, in this case -- in this case the pressure is similar. Of course, it is not the killing of a president, but there are seven murders here which have engulfed the world because of the horrendous publicity, and so we have the

1 crime of the century.

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We have the pressure to get a result.

Does this have any significance?

Does the fact that law enforcement is out there and doing what they are doing in the way they did, does that have any significance?

We have been in this trial -- we have been in this trial now for some months. We don't know -- we could make some estimate, I don't know what the financial expenditures are in connection with this trial.

The prosecution would have us propose to go on to a penalty phase which may take many, many thousands or whatever it may be, hundreds of thousands more dollars.

We have the pressures -- the pressures put upon us that are most unusual. They are pressures -- they are pressures that defy comparison with any other case.

So these are circumstances — these are circumstances that we must consider in deciding this case.

As perhaps we have mentioned before, certainly the case against Mr. Manson is circumstantial; the prosecution not even alleging that he was present. So if two reasonable can inferences/be made, one pointing to guilt and one pointing to innocence, we know what the result is, the law says that that equals not guilty.

Now, if at the same time that we can bring in a verdict that our conscience indicates is the correct verdict,

and at the same time show the world that despite — despite all the pressures and the horrendous publicity that a person in this country and in this state can get a fair trial and can be exonerated when the evidence shows he is not guilty, what would be more beautiful, what could be greater than to get this message across to the rest of the world, when our way of life is being attacked everywhere, on every continent we are being given a hard time.

If we can discharge our responsibility and do what the law says and at the same time create around the world an attitude towards this country and the administration of justice in this country, it seems an opportunity that we should not let slip by just — just because there are horrendous pressures to get a guilty verdict at any cost.

And we suggest that what the prosecution has done in this case in connection with the way they have framed the charges shows the weakness of the case because the alibi, and this is not just an alibi wherein, you know, in the classical alibi case, the prosecution alleges that the person did it,

So the word really doesn't have the connotation that it does in many cases.

The prosecution doesn't even allege that Mr. Manson was present, and the prosecution's evidence, if we may, the prosecution's evidence speaks eloquently.

We have here People's Exhibit 9.

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Look at that knot. Could one person -- could one person have tied up Leno La Bianca? You have seen Mr. Manson, could one person have tied up Leno La Bianca with Mrs. La Bianca in the house like that?

This we will have in the jury room. There is a little blood in this picture but it's not -- it is not the kind of pictures that some of the others are.

Look at that knot, those of us who may have had some experience in the service in connection with the tying of knots, look at that and consider the size of Mr. La Bianca,

We have other pictures, there will be other

Mr. La Bianca, we suggest, was a man about the size of Officer Gutierrez, certainly in that range,

Could Mr. Manson have done this by himself? Could he have tied up -- could he have tied up this gentleman all by himself while Mrs. La Bianca was there?

The record clearly shows she was not tied up. the telephones were not out, the guns were present.

4-1 And so, I think that we could go on, which we are 1 not going to do, we are not going to read directly from the record, in connection with Linda Kasabian's drug involvement. This goes to her credibility. There is no question about it. We understand, I am sure, all of Linda Kasabian's, all of her propensities towards the taking of drugs. We suggest that there is great probability of these 9 hights, of these nights, whether she was there or whether she wasn't there, that it was one of those times, one of those many thousands of times, that she has smoked marijuana. 12 And marijuana is an hallucinatory drug. Marijuana, 13 LSD, whatever. Do we believe that she was free of any influence 14 Because that goes to her credibility. of drugs? 16 Another aspect that is significant -- and this is. we think, circumstantial evidence that shows the fact that 18 Linda Kasabian was, when she was in there tying up, helping 19 Tex Watson tie up Mr. La Bianca, she was committing murder, 20 and she has told us she has not committed any murders.

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But she is more specific. She is more specific.

Even though the rest of the world knew about what happened

Mr. La Bianca -- we think her thong, the thong that she says she doesn't know what happened to it -- Page 6503 of the 2 transcript. Volume 44: 3 "Now, you later came to learn that the people in the house next door to Harold True had passed 5 away; is that right? "Yes. "Pardon? 8. "Yes. 9 "When did you learn that the people who 10 lived next door to Harold True had passed away? 11 "I believe I learned it when I was in 12 Florida. 13 "You learned it when you were in Florida? 14 15 "Yes. "The day after, the second night you went 16 back to the Spahn Ranch; is that right? 17 "Yes. 18 "And all that day you heard nothing about 19 anyone having passed away in the house next door 20 to Harold True? 21 22 "No, I didn't hear anything." Now, if there was a conspiracy, if what this 23 24 -- if this had taken place, would the people be talking 25 about it? Would there be some conversation about it? 26 This is evidence in connection with Linda's

credibility, if nothing else.

"The next day you heard nothing about --Ì no one discussed anything about the people in 2 the house next door to Harold True passing away; 3 right?" And this is Linda Kasabian saying: "And it wasn't until sometime in October of 1969" -- there is a "A" here. I guess the reporter Ż this seems to be an aswer, but actually there is a clerical mistake on the reporter's part at Line 5 on Page 6504. The "A" that is there is obviously not a part of ÌØ the answer. 11 12 13 14 15. 16 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 .**26**.

Let me read that again, and I will say it with 1-1 Ì. precision for the record, because you don't have the benefit of the transcript. I represent, on the record, this is a clerical error on the part of the transcribers that typed up the transcript: II Q The next day you heard nothing about -- no one discussed anything about the 8 people in the house next door to Harold True 9 passing away; right?" 10 Then this Line 5 has a "A" here, which is Ľ obviously an error. 12 "And it wasn't until sometime in October 13 of 1969 that you found out that anyone next door 14 to Harold True had passed away: is that correct --15 "Yes." 16 That is her answer at Line 8. 17 Do we believe that? The propensities of people 18 being what they are, do we believe that this is possible? 19 After what happened the night before the second 20 night, Linda Kasabian is saying that no one spoke about it. 21 No one spoke about it. 22 IIA. Yés, 23 11 Q -- Mrs. Kasabian? 24 TrA. Yes. 25

"I see.

"Now, did you do anything in connection with the person at Venice, the person in that wrong apartment, when you found out about the killing in the apartment or the house next door to Harold True?

"Did you tell anybody that that person or persons, whoever it might be in the wrong apartment, were in danger of death?

"No."

Now, for whatever that might be worth, that is also in the record.

Now, then, we take the transcript and we go to Page 6607 in Volume 45.

The question is -- the question was asked of Linda Kasabian -- and this has to do with Linda Kasabian is coming back to Los Angeles in connection with retrieving her daughter from the juvenile court.

The question at Line 17:

"When you came back to Los Angeles, Mrs. Kasabian, to get your daughter, you knew that you were involved in seven killings, is that correct?

. "Yes, I guess so."

Now, that means, that means that she knew of seven killings when she came back to Los Angeles.

By her testimony, she didn't get to Miami until

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after she had been back in New Mexico having come to

California. We all remember about the matters involving the child.

So, clearly, Linda Kasabian is not telling the truth because she says she didn't know about the La Biancas passing away until she read about it in Miami.

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And there is a definite reason that she is imposing this block in her mind, this self-imposed block, this desire not to talk about it, this desire not to say it, and this actual overt lack of telling the truth that she did in this courtroom.

Because five and two is seven, clearly, and these people had passed away, and she knew it.

And that is because she was personally involved. That is because she was personally involved.

Maybe in the Tate residence she took the knife and led the people around, or something like that. We don't know. We know her knife was found inside of that house. And she may not have actually engaged in any physical stabbing herself in the Tate home. Her knife does not have blood on it.

But at the La Bianca home, Linda Kasabian was personally involved. At the La Bianca home, Linda Kasabian tied up Mr. La Bianca, and Linda Kasabian doesn't want to remember; doesn't even know about the La Bianca killings until she gets to Miami, she says.

But her testimony shows that this is not so, because she knew about -- she says:

"Yes, I guess so" -- she knew about seven killings when she came back to Los Angeles in connection with obtaining her child.

Page 6478 of the transcript, Volume 44.

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It is clear that Linda Kasabian wasn't -- it wasn't until the springtime, these many, many months, and this is why we think that the transcript has great significance.

"And do you know what kind of a gas station it is?

"Yes.

"What kind of a gas station is it?
"Standard."

This is at Page 6478 in Volume 44.

"And directing your attention to this gas station, between the time — between the time of your arrest and today have you been to the gas station?

"Yes.

"And when did you go to that gas station?
"In the springtime sometime, I'm not sure
of the day or the month. It was after I had
the baby.

"Well, can you tell us what month it is?

"Yes, I believe it was about a week or so after I had the baby, yeah.

"And directing your attention to the gas station, did you go to that gas station in the presence of any other people since you have been arrested?

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"Yes

"And in the presence of what individuals did you go to the gas station?

"There were two police officers, I don't remember their names, a woman and a man, and there was Mr. Bugliosi, and I believe Mr. Gutierrez was there and Mr. Patchett, and my attorney, Mr. Fleischman.

"I think that is all.

"And you opened up the top of the toilet bowl and, lo and behold, there was the wallet?

"No."

"Is that right?

"No."

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Now, why do they wait until April in connection with this matter concerning the wallet?

Does that have any significance? Does that have any significance?

Here we have a situation in which we have Linda Kasabian, in the presence of all those people, all those people are present.

Linda Kasabian has spoken of immunity and all of that with everyone that has to do with law enforcement, and she is taken to the gas station, and she says this is the gas station, and she agrees with them that this is the gas station.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I don't know what he is saying, your Honor, but he can't get away with remarks like that.

That is false testimony. He is testifying.

MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor --

MR. BUGLIOSI: He says we took her out there and told her something.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, we suggest this is what happened.

MR. BUGLIOSI: You are not suggesting. You are making a statement of it.

THE COURT: The objection is sustained.

The jury is admonished to disregard Mr. Kanarek's last statement.

MR. KANAREK: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, we

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heard the testimony in this courtroom. We know -- we are saying that -- and when we say that we are saying that, we are saying that this is not in the record, we are not saying that these are the exact words in the record, and we know it, and this is an attempt on the part of the prosecution to color and to make it look like I am saying something that I am not.

We know that I am not. I read the record here.

We are entitled to make inferences from the record in connection with this case, and the inference that we make it that Linda Kasabian was told that that is where the wallet is, and that is the inference that we make, and we believe that it is a correct inference.

She is taken into a gas station. The only thing that we have in evidence by way of a picture in connection with that gas station is the tank itself.

We are saying on the record right here that in connection with the prosecution's interrogation of Linda Kasabian that they had pictures of the men's restroom which they didn't offer into evidence. We say that.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I object, your Honor.

MR. KANAREK: We infer that, and I will say how we can infer it.

THE COURT: The objection is sustained.

You are going beyond the record, Mr. Kanarek.

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'The jury is admonished to disregard that last statement.

MR. KANAREK: Well, if I may have a moment, your Honor.

We suggest this is, in fact, what happened, and the way we can do it is this way:

We have a Standard station here, which is People's 66.

The Standard station on this picture, ladies and gentlemen, on this picture, we clearly see two restrooms in the Standard station.

You can't read the words "Men" or "Women," but clearly there are two rest-rooms there; and we certainly know, in our experience, there are two restrooms in a gas station of this type.

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We know that Mr. Bugliosi interrogated Linda Kasabian with other pictures of the rest-room. That is in the record. With other rest-room pictures.

We say on the record, with the court reporter taking it down, that we may infer that those other pictures are, in fact, pictures of the men's rest-room. We are saying that with the court reporter taking it down.

MR. BUGLIOSI: This is completely improper, your Honor.

May we approach the bench?

THE COURT: It is speculation, and it is not in the record, Mr. Kanarek, and you are not permitted to make that statement.

MR. KANAREK: I can make that inference, your Honor.

THE COURT: It is not an inference.

It has to be based on some evidence in this

MR. KANAREK: Then I will state what the evidence is.

THE COURT: The objection is sustained and the jury
is admonished to disregard that statement.

Confine your argument to the evidence in this case.

MR. KANAREK: Well, I shall. I shall.

This is evidence in the case, ladies and gentlemen of the jury.

We know that the prosecution interrogated

Linda Kasabian in connection with pictures of the restroom other than People's 70, which merely shows the tank,
which merely shows the tank inside the rest-room.

We know that the prosecution interrogated with those other pictures.

We know that the .rest-room -- that the Standard station has two rest-rooms.

We argue and we ask that the inference be made that the reason that the prosecution didn't offer those pictures into evidence is because, in fact, they are of the men's room.

MR. BUGLIOSI: It was his objection, your Honor, during the trial that kept those pictures out.

I would like to approach the bench on this.

He continually goes beyond the record. He is making false statements.

May we approach the bench?

MR. KANAREK: Mr. Bugliosi is saying something that is not true.

MR. BUGLIOSI: May we approach the bench?

THE COURT: Yes, you may approach the bench.

(Whereupon all counsel approach the bench and the following proceedings occur at the bench outside of the hearing of the jury:)

MR. BUGLIOSI: It was his objection on the

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grounds of no foundation that those pictures were kept out.

And there is nothing on those pictures that says it was the men's rest-room.

"He is making a vicious statement in front of the jury that he knows is false.

MR. KANAREK: Then let's get the record.

THE COURT: What do you mean by "let's get the record"?

MR. KANAREK: Let's get the record and see.

THE COURT: If there is some part of the record that you want to refer to, refer to it.

MR. KANAREK: No, your Honor. He is making a statement that is untrue.

THE COURT: You are doing the same thing that you have done repeatedly in the course of your argument, and that is going beyond the record.

MR. KANAREK: I can make an inference, your Honor.

THE COURT: You may not make an inference that is a representation of fact which is not disclosed by this record. You may not make that kind of an inference, which is not an inference at all, but simply a bald misrepresentation.

MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor --

THE COURT: Let's not prolong this.

The objection is sustained.

I caution you again, sir. All you are doing

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is hurting your own case when you make these kinds of statements.

MR. KANAREK: Then I say that we are being denied a fair trial.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I think the jury may believe some of these preposterous lies.

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MR. KANAREK: I ask to refer to the record.

THE COURT: Point it out in the record.

MR. KANAREK: He is the one making the objection.

THE COURT: You are the one that made the misrepresentation.

MR. KANAREK: No, it is not a misrepresentation.

THE COURT: Point out to me in the record where you contend you are right.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Those pictures were kept out because there was no foundation.

Nowhere does it say "Men's rest-room."

THE COURT: I don't want to hear any more argument.

MR. KANAREK: That is in the record.

THE COURT: If you want to refer to some point in the record, you are free to do so.

MR. KANAREK: Let's get the questioning of Linda Kasabian. Let's take that record. I would like to look at it and show you.

THE COURT: What does Linda Kasabian have to do with it?

MR. KANAREK: He interrogated her using these pictures.

THE COURT: Now we are getting off into something else.

MR. BUGLIOSI: He is telling the jury these are other pictures of the men's rest-room. They do not say

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"Men's rest-room."

MR. KANAREK: They are the men's rest-room and Mr. Bugliosi knows it.

THE COURT: Now you are switching again. You are as slippery as an eel.

MR. KANAREK: It is in the record.

THE COURT: The objection is sustained.

I don't want to hear any more about it.

(Whereupon all counsel return to their respective places at counsel table and the following proceedings occur in open court within the presence and hearing of the jury:)

The objection is sustained, ladies and THE COURT: gentlemen.

Let's proceed. Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: Ladies and gentlemen, if we may, I think we all recall that Linda Kasabian had -- when Mr. Bugliosi and the prosecution was interrogating Linda Kasabian, he interrogated and showed to Linda Kasabian pictures. There is no question about it.

We have here People's 67, which is a Standard station.

We have here People's 70, which is the tank that purports to be the tank of a -- pardon me, I'm sorry -- the tank of a toilet. It shows the tank of a toilet.

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We have here another picture, People's 66, which is of the Standard station.

I think we will recall, and if there is any question about it the Court will certainly read it to us, that in connection with -- in connection with the interrogation of Linda Kasabian, there was used pictures that are pictures other than the pictures that we have here, and more specifically, the inside of a rest-room type pictures, if you want to put it that way, other than People's 70, other than People's 70.

We say that the inference could be made, we say that the inference could be made that those pictures are pictures which involve the rest-room that Linda Kasabian was never in.

And the reason we say that is this. The prosecution wasn't limited, wasn't limited, to Linda Kasabian in connection with this wallet matter. The prosecution wasn't limited at all.

There was Police Officer -- well, at least one police officer who came to the scene when the wallet was purportedly found on December the 10th, 1969, which is two days after December the 8th, 1969, when the Grand Jury indictment came out, we have the people that we have just spoken of, we have Mr. Bugliosi, Mr. Gutierrez, Mr. Patchett and Mr. Fleischman. Those people.

"And in the presence of what individuals

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"did you go to the gas station?"

Those are the people that she went to the gas station with.

Now, we would all agree that People's 70 is the inside of a rest-room.

So, Linda Kasabian had to go inside of a rest-room in order to accomplish something as far as this trip is concerned.

All we are given, for some strange reason, all we are given is the tank, the picture of the tank.

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We are not given the surroundings of this tank, we are not given --

MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, this is improper argument, he knows that.

THE COURT: What is improper about it?

MR. BUGLIOSI: There were other photographs of the interior of that restroom which he objected to and that is why they are not in evidence.

He is making misrepresentations to this jury.

MR. KANAREK: Then I ask to be sworn.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Let's look at those photographs then.

MR. KANAREK; I ask to be sworn then, your Honor.

THE COURT: The objection is sustained. The jury is admonished to disregard Mr. Kanarek's remarks.

Get on with it, Mr. Kanarek.

MR, KANAREK: Mr. --

THE COURT: I don't want to hear any more argument from you, sir.

Continue your argument to the jury.

MR. KANAREK: Then may I approach the bench, your Honor?

THE COURT: No necessity for that. We already discussed it.

MR. KANAREK: Then may/be sworn, your Honor? He has accused ---

THE COURT: Proceed with your argument if you have any

argument, Mr. Kanarek.

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MR, KANAREK: We may put it this way, this picture of this tank does not show the whole restroom, and we say that the reason — the reason that this does not show the whole restroom is because of the fact that a connection with the interrogation of Linda Kasabian, Men's restroom pictures were used.

This is what we asked to be inferred.

Now, what I am saying is, what I am saying, those of us that are on the jury are the ones to decide fact questions. We say that when we look for instance, we look at the great documentation of the stab wounds.

There is great documentation, great precision is made in connection with the passing away of the seven people that passed away; great detail in that part of the case is made.

We get to other parts of the case, and it fritters out into nothingness, because although there is plenty of photographic capacity, there is plenty of photographic capacity to take pictures, that we have here People's 67 and People's 66, there was likewise photographic capacity to take the insides of this restroom and show — show us the rest of this restroom, and show us — show us maybe the other restroom, whatever restroom this may be.

The fact of the matter is that that kind of documentation was not made, and we suggest that the reason

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25 26 that that documentation was not made is because this matter concerning the wallet, forgive the expression, smells.

We have stated that before: It may be that is an indelicate word, but it does. It does, ladies and gentlemen, because of what we have spoken of before,

There has got to be a reason why in the crime of the century there isn't the detail in connection with this restroom.

And the reason that there isn't this detail in connection with this restroom and the adjacent restroom, and all of that, is because of the fact that Linda Kasabian was taken there in the presence of these law enforcement officers after having been briefed about it. and then she says this is the place where she -- this is the place -this is where Linda testified she placed the wallet.

For what it might be worth, for what it might be worth, this is the posture of the evidence. situation which tells us that there is some purpose in not closing in on it and documenting a very, very important matter, because this wallet is a wallet that was supposedly taken from the La Bianca home, and we know what Linda Kasabian told us happened in connection with that wallet.

And when this is done, somebody is putting us on. Somebody is putting us on, and if there is any question, if there is any question about the interrogation as to whether any other pictures were used, I am sure that Judge Older will

read back to us every bit of that testimony. ľ Now, as we go forward I think we see the reason 2 why the prosecution has not documented the restroom the way 3 perhaps it could be documented. We asked them the next ٠4. question at Page 6480: Š. ng. Mrs. Kasabian, directing your Ġ attention to that particular gas station when Ż you came in there the wallet wasn't there? 8 nA. No. **9**: II O And before you went in there you 10 had told somebody about where the wallet was? . 11 HA. Yes. 12 Now, how long before you went to the 13 14 gas station or were taken to the gas station did you describe the wallet to anyone after you were 15 arrested? · 16 TIA. I didn't catch all of your question." 17 The question was reread. 18 "THE WITNESS: I believe I described it 19 to my attorney. 20 21 And then when was it that you described it to your attorney? 22 I'm not sure at which meeting. 23 There were a number of meetings that they 24

came to talk to me. It was near the beginning

when I first got to jail."

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1	That would be in December or certainly yes,
.2	in December of 1969:
3 .	"Q And which attorney was it that
4	you described it to or was it both?
5 :	"A. It could have been both.
, <b>6</b>	ng And in what month did you describe
7	the location of the wallet?"
8	Looking at that question:
9	"Q And in what month did you describe
10	the location of the wallet?
11 ,	Location of the wallet?
12	"A You mean in the toilet tank?
13	"Q Yes.
14	"A. I don't know. I just know it was
15,	near the beginning when I first got to jail.
16.	uQ And when did you first come to
17	Los Angeles from New Hampshire?
18	"A. The first part of December.
19	"Q How soon after you came to
20	Los Angeles did you describe it?
21	"A. I don't know, not very long after.
22	"Q How many weeks?
23	"A. I don't know.
24	"Q Was it two weeks, a month?
25	"A. I don't know, Mr. Kanarek.
26	"Q You don't remember that time?
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ua. No:"

So there is some evidence that we can use in connection with deciding this case.

We suggest that matters pertaining to the wallet are matters that are just unbelievable.

The police officer who supposedly came to that gas station is not brought to this courtroom. You don't have to go to Alabama to get him, and you don't have to -- you don't have to go to Albama to get Mr. Fleischman either.

So, for what it may be worth, we feel that what has occurred in connection with this testimony has some significance.

Now, we have a --

Now, literally, when we go through this transcript in connection with Linda Kasabian, we have tried to pick the highlights of testimony wherein she has been less than candid, wherein she has stated — stated — made statements which we think indicate a lack of truthfulness on her part.

It so permeates her testimony that there are just -- there is just a succession of highlights.

When we say highlights we are talking about, to use the word, jillions, just -- the way sometimes we use that word.

There are so many highlights, and there are so many -- there are so many instances of Linda Kasabian's

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lack of candor, and 'testifying to matters affecting her ĺ credibility, that there is difficulty in determining which are the highlights, and there is one aspect of it. Page 3 7,121, Volume 51, by Mr. Kanarek: II Q Mrs. Kasabian, did you go into the 5 truck the day after you saw Tex, and take anything -6 out of that truck? 7 . IIA. Yes, I did. , 8 ΉÓ What did you take out of the truck? 9. I took some money and a knife," İΟ Now, remember this is after she has testified --`11 this is way up at Page 7,122, this is after Linda Kasabian 12 has testified concerning what she took from the truck and 13 her motivations for going to the Spahn Ranch, which on direct 14 examination was vastly different than on cross-examination: 15 nO. What did you take out of the truck? 16 IIA. I took some money and a knife. · 17 υQ And how much money did you take out 18 of the truck, Mrs. Kasabian? 19 II A About \$5,000. 20 μQ And your state of mind was such that 21 you knew that that money belonged to whom? 22 At that time I believe that it belonged 23 to everybody." 24 .25

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Now, we have Linda Kasabian who has her -- she has been to the Spahn Ranch one day.

There may be sort of in connection with what the people at the Spahn Ranch talk about, and which happens, I gather in commune life from time to time, is that everything belongs to everybody.

So Linda Kasabian, is she being candid with us, because the test of credibility is candor, straightforwardness.

Now, when she says that at the time I believe that it belonged to everybody, she is trying to convey to us that in the time she met Gypsy, she says, the day before, in that short period of time she had adopted what she wants us to believe is the philosophy of the people who lived at Spahn Ranch, namely that everything that they had, like testimony concerning dune buggies and everything else, that everything belongs to everybody.

And so she is telling us -- is she telling us the truth in the answer to that question:

> "And your state of mind was such that you knew that that money belonged to whom?

At that time? I believe it belonged  $A^{R}$ . to everybody."

Is that a true statement? Did Linda Kasabian. when she took that money out of the truck, did Linda Kasabian believe that that money belonged to everybody?

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We suggest that she did not.

We suggest that her state of mind is a fact, just like the desk there in front of the bench. The fact that desk is in front of the bench, that is a fact.

Her state of mind is a fact, and she is enunciated to us a fact, as a fact, when in fact, we know this is untrue.

"At that time I believed that it belonged to everybody."

"G Mrs. Kasabian, before you ever saw Gypsy or come out to the Spahn Ranch you knew of the existence of that \$5,000, right?

"A Yes." -- and again we must look at it in the context, in the context of this, this is after some days where she had the opportunity earlier to tell us about what she took from the truck, and did not mention anything about this:

"And you knew that \$5,000 belonged to Charles Melton, is that correct?

"A Well, it belonged to him but it was for all of us.

"3 Well, that \$5,000, your state of mind told you was \$5,000 that Mr. Melton had received from an inheritance, is that correct?

"A Yes.

"Q And you knew that that money was in

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"the truck, is that correct?

"A Yes.

"Q You stole that money before you ever saw Mr. Manson, is that correct?

"A Yes."

And so she tells us once again, once again, when Linda Kasabian is in a corner and has no other alternative, then she tells us the obvious.

She tells us the truth at that point.

"Q Mrs. Kasabian, the time -- the very first time that you saw Mr. Manson" -- I will go back and start again.

first time you saw Mr. Manson, your motive and your intent and your purpose was to go and ask Manson to take you into the hills and hide you because you were afraid of the wrath of your husband and Mr. Melton because of the money you took, is that correct?

"A I don't know if I asked him to hide me."

That is her answer to that question.

"Q You were present in Mr. Manson's presence after you had taken this money, this \$5,000, correct?

"A Yes.

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"Q And your purpose and your intent of being in Mr. Manson's presence was to try to get yourself hidden from Mr. Melton and your husband, is that correct?

"A I guess so. I'm not really sure." At lines 6 to 7 she states:

"I don't know if I asked him to hide me."

Line 15 she says:

"I guess so, I'm not really sure."

Line 16:

"You are not sure?

"A I am not sure if I asked him to hide me.

"Q My question is as to your state of mind, Mrs. Kasabian, your thinking, your purpose?

"Your purpose was that you wanted to be somewhere where your husband and Mr. Melton couldn't get at you, right?

"A I guess so."

And if we take ourself out of this courtroom, take ourselves out of the occurrences of this courtroom and try to put ourselves into the human situation that is involved there, there is no trial going on, Linda Kasabian meets a boy that she likes, Mr. Watson, she knows she has

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\$5,000, she wants to give this \$5,000 to Mr. Watson, so what does she do? She comes back over to the Spahn Ranch, and naturally when that money is gone, who do Mr. Melton and Mr. Kasabian think has the money? Obviously they think Linda Kasabian does because Linda Kasabian is no longer in the vicinity of the truck and no longer in the Topanga Canyon area.

So if take ourselves and transpose ourselves into that human situation, and if we consider the relationship of the people, we suggest that there is some probability that Linda Kasabian went to that ranch not because of Mr. Manson and what a fantastic man he was, supposedly and all of that.

She went to the ranch for the reason that Linda Kasabian has motivated herself throughout her lifetime, because at a particular time and place it was very very good and convenient for Linda Kasabian to do what Linda Kasabian wants to do.

We see that throughout. We see that throughout the case, that Linda Kasabian gets what Linda Kasabian wants.

She has managed to do this throughout these many years since she has left home.

And so there is no question, it would seem like, that Linda Kasabian is going to the ranch for the purpose of hiding out. This is her purpose:

uQ. Your purpose was that you wanted to be somewhere where your husband and Mr. Melton 2 couldn't get at you, right? 3. шĀ. 4 I guess so. ΪÍQ. When you say you guess so, you mean 5 yes, don't you? You know so? б  $\mathbf{A}^{n}$ I am not sure. I really don't know. 7  $\mathcal{Q}^{tt}$ What is unclear in your mind about 8 9 that? Why do you tell us that you don't know? If A If I went there to hide? 10 "Ş 1Í Yes. H" I don't understand." 12 Now, we then come to the next question, and 13 we think that the panorama of these proceedings is such that 14 we can make another inference. 15 Her next question, and then we go into her 16 being a witch, and about drugs, what drugs did to her, 17 18 and so forth. We suggest, and the jury of course, the jury 19 decides whether any of these suggestions have any merit. 20 We remember Dr. Skrdla and Dr. Deering 21 22 testifying -- testifying that Dianne Lake had a drug-23 induced psychosis, and we remember, we remember the testimony of Dr. Deering about Dianne Lake. 24. 25 They took a case history; they took a case history of Dianne Lake. They didn't see Dianne Lake; they 26

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didn't see her when she actually -- when she actually was in this drug-induced psychosis type of state.

They saw her many months later, actually, just prior to the time of coming here to testify in connection with matters pertaining to whether she could take the witness stand and testify.

So they took these histories of all of the people involved, and they came to the conclusion that Dianne Lake had a drug-induced psychosis.

What we suggest is that certainly when we get into the witch story of Linda Kasabian, when we understand that she thought she was a witch, when she was -during this period of time, we suggest there is great probability that Linda Kasabian was, in the throes of a drug-induced psychosis.

THE COURT: We will take our recess at this time, Mr. Kanarek.

Ladies and gentlemen, do not converse with anyone or form or express any opinion regarding the case until it is finally submitted to you.

> The court will recess for 15 minutes. (Recess.)

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THE COURT: All counsel and jurous are present.

You may continue, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: Certainly. I think we would agree that Linda Kasabian had a fantastic drug intake.

Certainly we have -- we can make the inference that because of the stab wounds that are involved in connection with these people, we can certainly infer what we have alluded to before, that these wounds being so many are of a very personal nature, and I think we can, taking the testimony of Dr. Skrdla and Dr. Deering, which is in this record, we can certainly feel that there is great probability that Linda Kasabian had a drug-induced psychosis during these periods of time.

And the reason we say that, the reason we say that is from the evidence, from the evidence which we can have read back.

She thought she was a witch.

For instance, I mean these -- without -- and going into detail what Linda Kasabian stated, any of it can be read back to us. But there is such a volume of it, it's like an ocean, it's like a mountain, it's there.

And we remember all of her statements,

And she did say she was Yana the Witch. She stated -- she stated the types of things, the types of questions, and she answered the types of questions in such a way that it could almost be like one of the doctors taking

a case history.

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Now, these doctors evidently in connection with this type of diagnosis that was made by Dr. Skrdla and Dr. Deering, these doctors make their diagnoses based upon case histories, and the fact that Linda Kasabian didn't end up in a hospital or something of that type, that is coincidental because Dianne Lake ended up in Patton after she was arrested.

Dianne Lake became a subject of conservatorship, and we have seen and heard about, in this courtroom,
in this connection with the events which occurred at or
about the time she was arrested.

And the doctors, when they examined her,
Dianne Lake, as we certainly -- certainly snyone of us
would say, when she was on that witness stand that she -that she made a good appearance, and what words she
uttered were words that -- at least they were one right
after the other.

They seemed to have a certain amount of cohesion to them.

But that does not mean that the doctors did not say she had a drug-induced psychosis some months before. It would be during the summer of 1969. And really, what we are interested in, of course we are interested in the credibility of a witness as he or she sits on the witness stand, but aren't we also interested

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in the ability of that witness to perceive matters at the very times that we are speaking of?

Now, for what it may be worth, for what it may be worth there are two aspects of Linda Kasabian's intake that are significant.

One is the nature of these wounds, the nature of these wounds.

It appears to be like we said, a very personal type of wound, and we could certainly infer that the people or persons who inflicted those wounds were under the influence of some drug, some narcotic, some chemical in their body, driving them to do what they did.

Is this unreasonable? Is this unreasonable in the context of these proceedings?

Is this unreasonable in the context of the type of drugs and chemicals that Linda Kasabian has taken into her body continuously for many years, and she says she took it only once during the time she was at Spahn Ranch.

She smoked marijuana thousands of times, but in connection with LSD only once.

This is the circumstance, and the circumstance is that if she took it, if she took it all of those years before, and she had this course of conduct, there is no reason why she would not have that course of conduct during the month or so that she says she was at the Spahn

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And it is very reasonable to assume that these wounds were inflicted by drug-crazed individuals and by drug-crazed people, and they are very personal.

And certainly Mr. Manson, the prosecution states, wasn't even present -- the prosecution states that he wasn't even present during the time that any of these events took place.

Now, directing our attention -- let's direct our attention first to some comments of Dr. Deering.

For instance, at page 17,619:

"Q And can you think of what effect this would have upon the words that she uttered from the witness stand? What effect would this have upon the workings of her mind, generally, the flashback?"

Let's go back one question:

"Q No, we don't all respond the same way,
I will certainly agree to that.

"But is it medically possible for a person who had the kind of exposure to LSD that Dianne Lake had to have that LSD, the intake of LSD, that she has consumed, affect her when she is on the witness stand?

"A It is possible."

So certainly what we are saying, that certainly the doctor would make the same kind of answers in connection

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with Linda Kasabian:

"Q And can you think of what effect this would have upon the words that she uttered from the witness stand? What effect would this have upon the workings of her mind, generally, the flashback?

"A As I mentioned before, it is a sensory sort of thing, a sensation sort of phenomenon, seeing things, hearing things, feeling things, smelling things.

"Q And so, it is possible for someone to have this kind of feeling and not let the person around or the people around him or her know that they are having it?

"A Yes, just as it is possible for a schizophrenic to hear voices and people around are not aware of them."

And we will recall that Linda Kasabian testified,

I'm sure that we will recall she testified for instance in

connection with the part of her body felt detached from herwhere she was, actually physically.

In her mind she thought her body was detached. She thought, without going into all of that, we certainly remember what Linda Kasabian said about what effect these things had on her mind, on her thinking.

Well, what does that mean in this context?

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The doctors say that some of these things can affect the person actually while they are on the witness stand, and it would be -- it would not be observable to us.

In other words, a person -- the purport, we suggest of what we are alluding to here, and if somebody else thinks differently, certainly the record is here and we may have -- there may be differences of opinion about this, but we think that this record does show that this intake of drugs has the effect, has the effect of -- has the effect -- it affects the credibility of the person as he or she sits on the witness stand.

With what Linda Kasabian has taken into her body, this is certainly a factor that we must consider in connection with credibility.

We would probably do that anyway, if we did not have the benefit in this record of Dr.Deering and Dr. Skrdla.

So we have the effect of credibility as the person is on the witness stand, and then we have the added effect of the perceptive ability of the person at the time that the alleged events are occurring, the two days, the time at the ranch, the time that Linda Kasabian -- the times that Linda Kasabian has testified to.

For instance, this next question:

"Q So, while Dianne Lake was on this witness stand, Doctor, it would be possible for her to be

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"having some kind of reaction due to LSD intake that she had, and it wouldn't be conveyed to us, right?

"A It is possible."

And then, now:

"Q You spoke with Miss Lake for about an hour and fifty minutes, is that correct, Doctor?

"A Yes."

Now, he spoke -- we spoke -- maybe it's practicing medicine without a license, I don't know, but we spoke in this courtroom, all of us heard a lot more than an hour and fifty minutes concerning Linda Kasabian.

We got a case history in her regard, as far as she was concerned that was much more extensive than that which Dr. Deering got from Dianne Lake.

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And so, for whatever that may be worth, here the doctor, based upon this hour and fifty minutes, has told us, no question, after studying the records and speaking to her, that she had what he called a drug-induced psychosis back at some earlier time.

Then he also told us that there is a difference between a neurosis and a psychosis.

Dr. Skrdla also discussed various matters involving the workings of the human mind.

So, for what it may be worth, there is no question but what this is a factor to be considered, not only in connection with these actual crimes alleged, but also in connection with credibility.

And the interesting thing is that since the Court is going to tell us that Linda Kasabian is an accomplice as a matter of law -- as a matter of law -- it means that Linda Kasabian is deemed to be a person who has done certain things that we know about in this courtroom. She has been a participant in certain things that we know about in this courtroom.

Now, the prosecution in this case is going to - I mean, we think this is a possibility -- speak to us again. That is an actuality. But the possibility is that in connection with this matter of drugs, as to Linda Kasabian, the prosecution may have some words to say.

And it would seem like that what we might --

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what we would ask and request is that when we are listening to the prosecution, that each of us be sort of a committee of one to see what answers or what points with Mr. Shinn or Mr. Fitzgerald or Mr. Keith or myself, perhaps, what points would we raise to counter? Because we don't have another opportunity to speak after the prosecution speaks.

And if we could think of the prosecution's comments in that regard, it might be helpful to come to some kind of a realization as to the worth or the merits of whatever the prosecution may be saying.

At page 17,623.

"Now, did Miss Lake tell you, Doctor, that she, sometime during the summer of 1969, was living at Spahn Ranch?

"Yes."

Now, that could be Linda Kasabian talking.

"And did she tell you that at some time during the summer of 1969 she relocated and lived elsewhere?

"Yes."

Now, in Dianne Lake's case, Dianne Lake went to the desert. In Linda Kasabian's case, she fled the State of California after participating in seven murders.

Now, again looking to see if there is any kind of similarity. Page 17,624.

"Did you ask her about her taking of

r •	} • 1	"LSD?
	2.	"A Yes.
	3	"Q What did she tell you concerning
	4	the taking of LSD during the year 1969?
	5	"Well, she said, as to the use of
	6	all the drugs, the marijuana, the LSD, that at times
=	7	they were used fairly heavily and at times they weren'
5	.8	used at all; that as I recall, she said she had only
,	.9	taken the drugs a few times in the month of September
6a 1	£1s. <sub>10</sub>	and October of 1969."
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Lake, who the record reveals is a very suggestible girl, takes a very small amount of drugs, she says, at times that are important to what goes on in this courtroom. Similarly, Linda Kasabian, another prosecution witness, says she only took LSD once during times when she was present, supposedly, at times that are important in this courtroom.

"THE WITNESS: You asked about the ranch.

It was a place called the canyon. I believe that is where they were staying.

"In the summer of 1969?

"Yes.

"Does it say what canyon?

"No. Just the canyon.

"She said she was living there in the

canyon?

"Yes.

"I don't see where I made the notes.

"Well, here is the use of drugs. I

am sorry.

"Marijuana made me laugh. I could smell better and see better. ""

And I am sure that we will recall that Linda Kasabian stated that under LSD she had God-realization. She stated this was one of the effects.

Well, what does that mean? What does that
mean in connection with the credibility of Linda Kasabian?

She testified as to many things that she
allegedly saw and that she allegedly thought of while
she was under the influence of LSD and while she was

"Just answer that question, if you would, Doctor.

"I don't see where it is here.

"However, I think that is what she told me, that she had only used it a couple of times during that time.

"You told us that she told you she had used it several times?

"Yes.

under the influence of marijuana.

"During that period of time that you said was September and October; is that right?

"A Yes."

Then the next question:

"Now, do you have an opinion, Doctor, as to whether or not it is possible for a person who ingests LSD for a long period of time to have, as a result of that ingestion of LSD, delusions?

"I think it unlikely, except when under the influence of drugs, unless one is schizophrenic to start out with."

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"Except when under the influence of drugs." Delusions.

Now, what does that mean?

A delusion, I think we will agree, is where the mind perceives facts that don't exist.

For instance, when someone steps out of a 13story -- at the 13-story level, and thinks that they are just stepping off of a curb. They are under a delusion, and they get killed, because their mind tells them that a certain set of facts that is there are facts consistent with stepping off the curb, when, in fact, it is 13 stories up, and they perish.

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Now, the people -- we can certainly feel there is some probability that the nature of these deaths is such that drugs were involved, that drugs were involved, and if drugs were involved, there is some probability that the people who had ingested those drugs were under the influence of some kind of a false delusion. For whatever that may be worth.

But this is what the doctor tells us. And this principle certainly applies to Linda Kasabian when we consider the drug-oriented life that she has led.

"Well, would you explain that, Doctor?

"Well, people turn to drugs because of anxieties, inner problems; and certainly severe mental illness is a cause of great discomfort to people.

"I think that people who are basically schizophrenic or schizoid do turn to drugs often, and I think this often does uncover a basic underlying schizophrenia.

"But I think the delusional part, if one had it, would be schizophrenic and not due to LSD.

"Does the literature that you have studied, Doctor, reflect that under the influence of LSD a person, a subject, may lose touch with reality such that they may assume certain things to be factual

"under the influence of LSD when, in fact, those facts don't exist?

"Yes. I think this is a sensory thing. Visions, hallucinations, are unreal, but to the person under the influence of the drug, they may seem very real."

So, what it boils down to is that there is great probability, there is great probability that on these nights, and other nights, that Linda Kasabian was under the influence of drugs, and while under the influence of drugs Linda Kasabian did whatever she did.

And so, not only is there this as more than a possibility, we urge, but actually a probability, and there is also the fact of her inability to perceive, her inability to react, the delusional nature of whatever was going on in her mind.

And these are matters which are in the record here, and which I am sure that Judge Older would have read back to us if any of us have any question concerning whether or not these matters are as we are relating them.

"They may."

I am sorry. Referring to the last question.

"They may." That is the answer.

"They may."

Let's get the question again so that we get the context.

"And a person may act on a certain set of facts which the person thinks is, in reality, 2 occurring, based upon what their particular mind 3 may see while under the influence of LSD? They may. "One might kiss a vision, for example. 6c fls. 7 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18. 19 20 22 23 24 2Š.

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And this is Dr. Deering speaking.

"Q And one might step out of a window of some height, thinking it was just one step to the ground; is that correct?

"Yes.

"Does this phenomenon also occur by way of flashback, the same effect?

"It can.

"Now, Doctor, as you sit there on the witness stand, can you tell us --

"First of all, let me withdraw that and ask you another question.

"Do you have an opinion, Doctor, or do you have enough information, have you been given enough scientific information, enough scientific data, so that you can have an opinion as to whether or not Dianne Lake was psychotic in August, September, October, November and December of 1969?

"Continuously psychotic?

"Psychotic?"

This is the question:

"Psychotic?

"A I have said she was."

In other words, based upon, and we all remember, certainly, the gist of what occurred in connection

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with Dianne Lake, we all remember that -- and Dr. Deering says she was psychotic.

Now, a psychosis, as the doctors have told us, is a major mental disturbance. And that is what the trial is all about, the testimony from the witness stand.

We have 19,000 -- 20,000 -- pages of it.

And so, when we integrate this factor into what we have to consider here, we must come to the conclusion, when we have our principles of reasonable doubt, burden of proof, and all of that, we must come to a conclusion that certainly, certainly, these are matters to be considered. These are matters which are of great significance in connection with the credibility of these witnesses.

Now, the prosecution is going to say, is going to tell us, the prosecution is going to tell us and they are going to emphasize that in connection with the corroboration of an accomplice, that that corroboration need only be slight.

The word "slight" is in there.

Now, what is slight?

And I am sure that the prosecution, although they didn't talk about the law in their first address to you, there is some probability that they will discuss the law in their closing argument because some of these matters have come up. So, they are going to argue that only slight evidence is necessary to corroborate a witness who is an

accomplice.

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Of course, everything else comes into play.

The fact that the witness, that there is this aspect of corroboration, that doesn't mean that we forget everything about credibility and everything that we have discussed.

As a matter of fact, it makes the credibility factor more and more intense as far as a deficit, from the prosecution's viewpoint, as far as the prosecution's viewpoint in this case is concerned.

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Because if -- let's say someone had no mental problems, had no drug intake, had nothing, just a plain old witness as far as drug intake and schizophrenia, or whatever it might be. Let's say that is never brought up in the trial. Let's say that that happens. Then the rule of corroboration as to a witness such as that is something that has more significance, because the only thing you have to worry about is in connection with the witness being an accomplice. That is all you have to worry about because there is no mental problem in the hypothetical case we have spoken of.

But in this case, not only do we have the fact that the person is an accomplice as a matter of law, we have the added credibility factors that we have spoken of.

So, these are matters that probably should be given some consideration in view of the fact that the prosecution has the burden to prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty.

And there are some grave questions here that involve not only the witness Linda Kasabian, but other witnesses.

Now, the prosecution is going to say, they are going to emphasize and they are going to harp on the fact that the corroboration has to be slight.

Well, what is slight in the context of a

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particular case is up to the jury to decide.

What is slight in connection with a person who has no mental problem, a person who has no credibility problems, other than being an accomplice, that is one thing. But it is something completely different as to what is slight, we think, when you have a witness like Linda Kasabian, because of the factors of the matters that we have spoken of.

Now, Linda Kasabian has told us, she gives these fantastic statements which defy -- defy -- reason.

At page 6934:

"Directing your attention to the time that you say you were in an automobile and you heard conversation concerning killing -- is that correct?

"Yes.

"On the second night.

"Now, at that time, Mrs. Kasabian, had you forgotten about the events of the previous night?

"I am not sure. I don't remember thinking about them."

Now, remember, Linda Kasabian tells us that she was at the Tate residence. She tells us that she knew all about everything from TV. She tells us that she was there and she saw it all. And she tells us she doesn't

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remember thinking about what had occurred on the previous night.

Is that reasonable? Can we believe, can we use the testimony of a witness, whatever her thinking and motivation may be, who could forget the type of thing that we have spent six months here talking about?

If she couldn't think about it, couldn't remember it in the space of a few hours -- this is what she says -- if this is so, is that significant in determining her credibility?

"That is, you don't remember, on the second night, thinking about the events of the previous night?

"Right.

"Is that correct?

"Yes."

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Kasabian?

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Now, there was some colloquy then at page

"Having in mind, Mrs. Kasabian -- you say you left the Spahn Ranch on this night, and you went to Pasadena, you say.

"Now, when you left the Spahn Ranch on the night that you went to Pasadena, did you have in mind, as you left the ranch, what had occurred the previous night?

"Yes, I think I did."

On the previous page she tells us that she didn't -- "That is, you don't remember on the second night thinking about the events of the previous night?"

And she said "Yes" at page 6934.

At page 6935, she says, "Yes, I think I did."

Does this kind of testimony, is there any
significance to it in determining the credibility of Linda

These are the questions, these are some of the questions that we have to answer in connection with determining her credibility.

Now, there is in Linda Kasabian's testimony, there is in Linda Kasabian's testimony and throughout her testimony, a certain, I don't know what the best way is to describe it, but there is a certain what we have spoken of as identification with the prosecution.

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Now, here, we have here some physical evidence, we think, which is something that we should talk about briefly.

Here we have this People's Exhibit 70. Pardon me. People's Exhibit 241. This is the thong.

And we have here, these are the wires that we all have heard testimony about concerning the La Biancas.

Now, there is the fact of these exhibits, the presence of these exhibits, which again, we think, we should be aware and careful about in connection with the rule on corroboration, because these are powerful exhibits. That is, they are emotional exhibits.

And when we realize the damage to human beings that have occurred because of these exhibits, we may, all of us being flesh and blood people, we may view them with a perspective that is different than what our intellect tells us is the approach that we should take.

Because there is nothing, nothing, nothing to connect these exhibits with Mr. Manson.

There is nothing to connect him with these exhibits because there is this law of corroboration, and in view of what we have spoken about up here, it is an important protection, it protects all of us, all of us, from inflammatory evidence.

Because these pieces of evidence, being the evidence showing and having been connected with the

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physical appearance of Mr. and Mrs. La Bianca, and there being no question that these are the results of criminal agency, there is nothing to connect them to Mr. Manson.

The fact of the matter is that we can't even add them to our chart because there is nothing whatsoever except for the thongs which are in evidence.

These thongs are in evidence. And when we look at what the prosecution has done here to torture, to torture an equation as to these thongs, we realize that Mr. Manson is a person who had no connection with it.

Because the thongs that they have introduced into evidence here are no different, are no different than the thongs that we see all around us in the streets of Los Angeles.

And this isn't just idle chatter. Linda Kasabian's thong is not here.

This is Linda Kasabian's thong, the thong that bound Mr. La Bianca, the missing Linda Kasabian thong.

This is what it is.

Now, the prosecution would have us believe otherwise. But the fact of the matter is that the appearance -- take those thougs when you are in the jury room and try to make your eye a microscope and look at the cross section, look at the cross section, and see whether or not, whether or not, the prosecution could have run a biopsy, so to speak, a microscopic study.

And maybe they did.

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So, when we are deciding this case, this particular exhibit, this particular exhibit, No. 241, is an exhibit which has been -- because the Coroner has to remove the exhibit from the body in order to perform whatever work he has to perform, this exhibit is the exhibit, People's Exhibit 9; this was there.

And when we are discussing this in the jury room, thinking of the size of Mr. La Bianca and Mrs. La Bianca being present in the house unbound, no part of her is bound.

Could Mr. Manson have done this?

And again, there is not a reasonable inference. The law of circumstantial evidence says if there is a reasonable inference, one direction, and another reasonable inference the other direction, we must take that which we declare to be innocence.

But in this case it's not even reasonable.

The prosecution -- the prosecution reaching for a result that they want in this case is epitomized in these two exhibits, People's 241 and People's 9.

Come to think about these wires, Mr. Watson is supposed to be a man who operates dune buggies, works on dune buggies.

You might think about the cutting of this wire.

Is that a professional job? Is that done by somebody -
People's No. 239 -- is that done by somebody who works

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around wires, who works around dune buggies, works around generators and all of the wires that come off of the electrical system that connects the electrical system of an automobile to other parts of the automobile, with the lights, and whatever?

This is the factor to be considered.

This is Exhibit 228.

Was this done by someone -- was this done by someone who is sophisticated in connection with automobiles and the fixings of automobiles and the fixings of electrical systems?

We know from the prosecution's evidence, from people who are not accomplices, that Mr. Manson is a person who is a talker. Evidently he is not very mechanically minded. He talks a lot.

Now, we get into a -- I suppose all of us at some time or other, all of us at some time or other have some kind of a moral obligation in connection with Vietnam.

Now, in what we are speaking of now, we do not -- we do not accept the statement that Mr. Flynn supposedly said that Mr. Manson said.

First of all, first of all we feel that that tape recording, purported tape recording purporting -- purporting to substantiate Mr. Flynn -- the whole subject matter surrounding that -- the whole atmosphere surrounding that speaks of fraud, over-reaching.

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It speaks of an attempt to create an artificial
-- an artificial rehabilitation of a witness because we
must remember we are dealing -- we are dealing with people
who are sophisticated. They know the law.

I am speaking now of law enforcement and the prosecutors.

It is like the case of Mary Eugenia Serrat.

The conspiracy, the guilt is decided in advance, and then
we have to fill in the gaps.

And so in connection with this purported tape recording that was presented here, the context of these proceedings, we can certainly assume that this is a staged type of authentication.

But over and above that, over and above that, because we don't have any opportunity to speak to you again, after the prosecution speaks, I suppose all of us have some kind of a moral feeling about Vietnam, whatever it may be, and the prosecution is going to say, "Well, the defense spoke of this and therefore -- therefore, well"-

I'm sure that we don't have to get into specifics of it, but the general tenor is going to be, "Well, why will we speak about -- why will we speak about this statement if we don't believe it happened?"

Well, because in these discussions we feel that we should discuss matters, and we can discuss matters without the necessity of authenticating or believing or saying that

something happened.

But just for the sake of argument, kind of discussing, we owe it to you after six months of incarceration that the jury has been in, I think we have the duty to speak candidly.

It is a very unique group of people that will devote themselves to this kind of work for this kind of time and for this kind of pay.

So I think that we have an obligation to speak, and the fact is, and I'm sure we all have the moral obligation to talk about the Vietnam War.

And again, this purported statement as to Mr. Manson, this purported statement about responsibile for the killings, kind of thing.

Let's look -- let's look at the tape recording itself.

On page 12,679, we think --

"VOICI: All right now, did you ever hear him say anything about the Tate killing or anything like that?"

That is the voice on the tape, and of course this is not -- this is not a tape of Mr. Manson, we all agree, this is the tape supposedly of Mr. Flynn.

And again, Mr. Flynn, although we don't -- we don't feel that Mr. Flynn, for whatever his reasons may be, he is not the type of witness that Mr. Jakobson was.

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Mr. Flynn was right on the scene. I mean, Mr. Flynn during this period of time was right there at the ranch, if there was any kind of a conspiracy, if we have spoken about how he went to jail and he attributed that to Mr. Manson and all of that, but then, in connection with this question:

"All right, now, did you ever hear him say anything about the Tate killing or anything like that?

"Well, sort of, you know. He never mentioned anything to me about it, you see, but I know at one time I came in the kitchen, you know, I was doing some heavy work outside."

And we heard all of what was said on this tape, and the Court will allow us to listen to it, actually hear the voices.

But the thing that is significant here is the time.

Page 12,680:

"Well, I can't recall too well whether it was before or after the raid, you know."

This is what the tape says.

Now, whatever, this statement at this time that this tape is made speaks of -- he doesn't know whether it is before or after the raid.

Now, this tape was purportedly made in December

of 1969, which was prior to the time that Mr. Manson, that Mr. Manson -- it was prior to the time that Mr. Manson and everyone came to this court, and prior to the time that the court proceedings started, and prior to the time obviously that Juan Flynn testified in this courtroom.

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Now, Juan Flynn at the time that he testified in the courtroom concerning this, and when he was here he stated, he made this statement occur very close to the time of the incidents.

In fact, he makes the statements, as we have spoken of them, he makes the statements a couple of days, which would be before the 16th, because if these events happened on the 8th through the 10th, when he is in court testifying of talks about a couple of days afterwards that he heard this.

When he says what he purportedly said on the tape, he says he doesn't know whether it's before or after the raid.

So after the raid would be after June, or after August 16th, which would be -- which would be of course a lot more than just a couple or a few days after the date involved.

Now, again, looking at the reasonableness, and forgetting -- forgetting what we allege, what we state is synthetic evidence because -- because of all the matters surrounding my being called to come down there and be Mr. Flynn's attorney.

MR. BUGLIOSI: That is a misstatement, your Honor, there is no evidence on that.

MR. KANAREK: It is a fair inference, your Honor.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. The jury

is admonished to disregard that statement.

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MR. KANAREK: The inference, we suggest, can be made, the inference can be made certainly that in connection with Mr. Flynn, Mr. Flynn said that he wanted to get into jail. Then after he wants to get into jail, he gets out of jail.

And Mr. Flynn did not ask to remain in jail.

These are circumstances that we can consider in this case.

Supposedly he wanted to go to jail. We think -we think that this wanting to go to jail was synthetic, synthetic; that it was calculated to attempt somehow or other to get me in connection with Mr. Flynn.

That is a circumstance. We can consider that or we can reject that.

The fact of the matter is that the prosecution in connection with -- for instance -- having Mr. Flynn, asking Mr. Flynn certain questions about my telling him not to say anything.

Well, in connection -- not to discuss it and so forth -- this is what lawyers do in connection with just -this is part and parcel of legal advice that lawyers give people throughout the Western world every day of the week.

The prosecution tried to get the implication, but they did not pursue it, if we will remember.

The prosecution let it drop, let it die after the statement was made and Mr. Kanarek told him not to say anything.

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But the prosecution did not pursue it as to what case Mr. Kanarek told him not to say anything.

The prosecution did not pursue it as to whether Mr. Kanarek told him not to say anything in connection with the Tate-La Bianca case or whether Mr. Kanarek told him not to say anything in connection with the matter he was purportedly in jail for.

And if there was any kind of impropriety, it is a cinch that it would have been laid out here in spades.

And so we can reasonably infer that this is especially, in view of the intensity of the prosecution and law enforcement in these proceedings, this was a matter which was laid out here. It was the kind of situation which was created, and the architects of it were law enforcement and the prosecution.

Mr. Flynn asks to go to jail, and without any reluctance Mr. Flynn leaves jail.

So his fear, his great fear is a synthetic fear. Those are the circumstances. Those are much more important, those circumstances, we suggest, are much more important than the words uttered.

The same way that the circumstances are much more important than the words that were purportedly uttered on this tape.

First of all, the Court is going to instruct

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us that an oral admission or a purported oral confession must be viewed with caution.

This is what the Court is going to instruct us.

And there is a real reason for it because of
this kind -- this kind of charade, this kind of practice
that the District Attorney and the prosecution have done in
this case in connection with Mr. Flynn, that purported

admission and confessions must be viewed with caution.

And of course when people speak about killings, in the context of our life today, we are responsibile for those killings or these killings, and all of that, and the inability of a person, the inability of a person to be a phonograph, the inability of the other person to be a tape recorder, because this is not a tape recorder of Mr. Manson. This is a purported tape recording of Mr. Flynn.

And the repetition, and so forth, when Mr. Flynn has this antagonism towards Mr. Manson, the fact of the matter is that what is said here, what is purported to be said here are words that we have to look at.

We are not suggesting that we not consider it, but we say that after considering it, after looking at all of the circumstances and all of the motivations of the prosecution in this case, all of what the prosecution has done in terms of, for instance, Dianne Lake, we only have the iceberg, the small iceberg out of the water that we have spoken of, whether there was a recording about the crime of

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the century, the gas chamber and so forth.

These are the kinds of circumstances that we must consider exist in connection with these purported statements that attributed to Mr. Manson.

The fact of the watter is -- the fact of the matter is that Mr. Flynn --

Mr. Flynn, if this had occurred, if this had occurred to anyone of us, what would we have done in the circumstances? What would we have done if we had heard these words, even though Mr. Flynn was not Mr. Jakobson, like we said, he may not have all of the attributes of Mr. Jakobson or the attributes of Mr. Jakobson.

The fact remains that if this kind of statement had been made by Mr. Manson, Mr. Flynn would have done something about it long before, long before the discussion that he supposedly had with Officer Steuber.

And we also must recall Mr. Flynn's motivation, Mr. Flynn's motivation, his trying to get Mr. Manson.

For instance, when he said from the witness

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stand here, he says that he did not tell it to the police officers, he says, because he wanted to bring it here, right here, meaning that he wanted to -- that he was hardly Dr. Noguchi or Dr. Katsuyama, as far as being an

He wanted to bring it right here to the courtroom, he says.

objective witness was concerned.

And the fact of the matter is that Mr. Flynn is motivated in connection with what he says in this courtroom.

Can we believe what is said here? Was there any reason for Mr. Flynn to be motivated when he uttered these statements that he supposedly uttered to Mr. Steuber.

These are some of the factors that we have to consider. We have to consider the fact that he was getting paid money.

He was getting paid by these literary people.

All of these go to determining whether or not -- whether or not these purported statements have any significance.

Then on top of it all, and it makes an interesting problem in logic, in applying the law to the fact, is this a confession?

When somebody says, as we have spoken of, when somebody says they are responsible forkilling, is it a confession?

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Is that a confession? Because in order to be a confession it has to stand on its own feet. It must be a statement that where the declarant, the person saying it, the defendant, if you will, makes statements that include all of the aspects of the crime.

There must be premeditation. There must be -to be first degree murder, we all agree it has to be
premeditated.

There must be ascertained people.

There must be malice aforethought even though the prosecution tells us aforethought is an ancient word, that it is an ancient word, and we should not use it any more.

But the Court is going to make it part of our instructions.

There has to be malice aforethought.

And so certainly a statement that "I am responsible for the killings" just as a nice, logical problem, segregate that statement, take it away from this case, just look at it.

Because a confession - we know what a confession is. A confession is where somebody says that
"I did this and I did this and I did that
and I thought about it and then I went out and I bought the
gun and I went and did this, that and the other thing and
I went over there and I did this, and I did that."

It gives the details; that is a confession.

Now, I am sure the prosecution is going to argue that this is a confession.

But we suggest as a nice little problem in logic, after applying the law to the evidence, that this is not a confession, even taking it for the purpose of

argument at its face value.

It is significant in this tape, I read this over, and I don't see anything in this about the venereal disease, for instance. Well, maybe that is not an important point.

Mr. Flynn would have us believe the venereal disease aspect of things of quite important to him.

Page 12,681:

"VOICE: He wanted you to go down there to the creek and make love to the girls there, okay?

"VOICE: Yes."

No statement about the venereal disease that he was afraid he was going to get, and he won't do it and all of that.

What does that mean? We don't know. This is a factor to be considered.

Mr. Flynn in this courtroom evidently made statements which are statements that indicate supposedly his state of mind in connection with the people at the Spahn Ranch.

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Is that a factor that is significant?

People that are part and parcel -- officers that were with Officer Steuber and people that have taken-- there are people who have taken a place, and taken the witness stand in this case, Brooks Poston, Paul Watkins.

They were, again, they were people who could have been brought to this courtroom to authenticate whatever Mr. Flynn had stated, whatever Mr. Flynn had stated in the presence of Mr. Manson.

May we suggest this, why would this statement be made once by Mr. Manson? Is there some kind of a hidden activity there?

These people were as close as could be. These people were as close as people could be, out there at the Spahn Ranch, the area was small.

So the question that we have to decide is, looking at all of the circumstances, looking at the law, looking at what the prosecution has done in connection with Mr. Flynn and what they have done in connection with me personally as to Mr. Flynn, can we say that these circumstances are such that there is any veracity in what is supposed to be the statements of Mr. Manson?

Now, you will remember undoubtedly that during the course of this trial the Court -- we have spoken of previously -- the Court has made, and we repeat it by way of emphasis -- the Court has made admonitions that this

language be used only against Mr. Manson; that this is supposedly circumstantial evidence, the prosecution is going to argue circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy.

Now, we feel that with the volume of words that the prosecution has put in in connection with Helter Skelter and all of that, the prosecution will probably, when they speak with you, argue concerning this circumstantial evidence of the conspiracy.

Now, they may go into the transcript and show certain points.

Again we draw what we think is an analogy in connection with what happened about a century ago in connection with the death of Abraham Lincoln.

That lady -- the circumstantial evidence was her feelings towards the South.

Here we have Mr. Manson's -- Mr. Manson's feelings towards Helter Skelter, towards the Beatles and all of that, that is supposedly the circumstances that prove that there was a conspiracy.

Now, this is going to be a question that I am sure the prosecution is going to advocate, and it is a question that we have to think about.

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And what we suggest is that focus be made upon oriminal intent. Because the Court is going to give us: several instructions on criminal intent.

And the instructions on criminal intent are going to say that there must be a concurrence of act and intent.

In other words, you can't bootstrap, you can't bootstrap intent.

You can't go back and turn something into criminal intent if there was no criminal intent. They both must concur at the same time.

For instance, if someone goes into a store, into is a supermarket, and let's say that the person puts in his pocket a package of gum. And let's say that we are convinced; as the triers of fact, as 12 judges -- 16 judges -- 17 judges 15 - let's say that we are convinced as the triers of fact that when the person took this gum there was no criminal intent, it was done inadvertently. This is very very possible. Without thinking about stealing it.

Mow, then, then the person leaves the supermarket and dogsn't pay, doesn't pay for the gum. Didn't know he had 21. It in his pocket.

At some time later on this person realizes he has got the gum in his pocket.

Now, that gum doesn't belong to him, but now he has the knowledge and the intent. And at that point, maybe out in the parking lot or driving down Crenshaw Boulevard, or

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wherever it may be, he then remlises he has got the sum,

At that point, when he exercises the dominion and control over the gun, with knowledge of its presence. at that instant he has committed the thuft. Decause it is the personal property of another and he has an obliquion not to take the personal property of another.

But there was no original intent when he did the act back in the supermarket.

Now, by the sume token here, there was no criminal intent as to what hr. Danson stated in 1967, 1968, 1969, or at any time, in connection with Helter Skelter or any of that. There is no showing of any criminal intent.

And the fact of the satter is that the prosecution well knows that there is no criminal intent in the statements that hr, hanson has made,

If there was going to be any kind of original conspiracy in connection with those words uttered, we would have crooks Posten. Paul Watkins, Charles Hanson, Juan Plynn, we would have those people at the same time talking about it. That is what we would have if there was a conspiracy.

But you don't have a conspiracy unless you have people discussing the criminal objective in their mind, and the object of this considercy is what is set out in the indictment.

The object of this conspiracy is murder. This is

what the prosecution has alleged.

overt acts — and those will be in the jury room with you; all of that will be in the jury room — there is no allegation — you know what are the overt acts that they allege: someody walking in somewhere, like the Tate residence or the La Diance residence. Those are the overt acts they are relying on.

If there were any overt acts in connection with Helter Ckelter, why don't they allege that panel? Why don't they allege that panel? Why don't they allege some language involving helter Skelter or the Beatles, or that Wr. Manson bought the Beatle record with the idea of Belter Skelter, starting a race war?

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They don't allege the overt acts that have any-thing to do with what words they have uttered in this courtroom.

The overt acts are trivia.

The overt acts involve matters that have nothing remotely connected with Helter Skelter or with anything that has to do with matters that the prosecution has dwelt on at great length.

There is nothing inthis record to snow that when Mr. Manson discussed his philosophy of life, there is nothing to show any criminal intent on the part of er. manson.

when Mr. menson discussed how endidred should be reised, there is nothing there whatsoever to show any criminal inpent on the part of Mr. Manson.

when in, hanson discussed about girls being on the streets, and this and that, as far as their -- westever their sexual activities may have been, there is no showing of any criminal intent on the part of ir. Manson.

And so, whet we have to do is, in analyzing this evidence, try to find some criminal intent.

and then you no it, when you take these transcripts name and to through them and try to find -- we take them home, because we know that Mr. Bugliosi, we know the prosecution, in their final numbration, is goin, to bring up points involving this case, herefully, so we try to find out what is down there that they adjut conceivably argue, because

during the opening argument, as we have alluded to before, the prosecution did not mention anything about the law, did not apply any of the evidence to the law, so what we are trying to do, we have to play -- we have to do a little guessing here.

We have tried to guess. We have tried to go through the transcript with a microscope and a fine-tooth comb, to try to find any criminal intent on the part of Mr. Manson in connection with the utterances that are attributed to him, and it is not -- it is not -- there. It is just not there.

We wouldn't be saying it now, because when we finish, then we would no longer have the power to address you, and if there were any criminal intent there, we would try to lay it out on the table, because the only way that we can come to a proper resolution of this is by discussing it backwards and forwards. And we suggest that it just isn't there.

We have gone over Brooks Posten, we have gone over Paul Watkins. Now, I know this will probably relieve us, but we are not going to read in detail from Mr. Posten and Mr. Watkins' testimony, but we have been through it, and if we are wrong, if we are wrong, I am sure the prosecution will inform us in their final argument to you that we are wrong. But we could find nothing.

It was the same kind, it was the same kind of

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language that Mr. Jukobson told us about, as far as Brooks ľ Posten and Mr. Fathing were concerned. 2 THE COURT: Will counsel approach the bench, please? 3 (Whereupon, all counsel approach the bench and 4 the following proceedings occur at the banch outside of Š the hearing of the jury:) 6 THE COURT: Are you about to conclude your argument, 7 Mr. Kanarek? 8 MR. KANAREK: No, your Honor. THE COURT: You vill conclude today. 10 MR. KANDREK: Pardon? 11 THE COURT: I say, you will conclude today, in 12 accordance with yourrepresentation to the Court yesterday? 13 · MR. KANAREK: Rut, your Honor --14 THE COURT: No buts about it. .15 MR. KAMAREK: I understand the Court's order, but I 16. want to make the record. 17 THE COURT: There is no record to be made. 18: MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, we believe there is a record 19 to be made. 20 It is our belief and we do allege that it is a 21 violation of due process, in this sense of the word --22 THE COURT: You represented to the Court yesterday 23 that you could not finish yesterday, that you would complete 24 your argument today, .25 MR. KANTREK: I know. 26

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THE COURT: And in accordance with your representation, I granted you the extra day.

Now, I am telling you that I expect you to conclude your argument today.

MR. KANAREK: Right; but --

THE COURT: Three days ago you said you would conclude it in three days.

MR. KANAREK: I understand.

I am saying that in our position in the context of this --

THE COURT: Make it brief, because we are about to recess for lunch.

MR. KANAREK: It is a violation of due process, of the 14th Amendment, and equal protection for the Court to impose the order that the Court has in this regard. And we are, of course, following the Court's order, we are doing it because we do not wish to be cut off --

THE COURT: You have made your point.

We are going to recess at this time.

MR. KANAREK: Thank you, your Honor.

(Whereupon, all counsel return to their respective places at counsel table and the following proceedings occur in open court within the presence and hearing of the jury:)

THE COURT: We will recess at this time, ladies and gentlemen.

Do not converse with anyone or form or express . 1 any opinion regarding the case until it is finally submitted to you. 3 The Court vill recess until 1:45. (Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m. the Court was in **.5**, ' recess.) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23· 24 -25 26

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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, FRIDAY, JANUARY 8, 1971 1 ' 1:55 P.M. 2 THE COURT: All counsel and jurors are present. You may continue, Mr. Kanarek. 5 Thank you, your Honor. MR. KANAREK: 6 Mr. Fitzgerald, when he spoke to us, told us what an accomplice is but it is such an important part of 8 this case that probably it bears repetition. 9: An accomplice is one who is liable to be prose-10 cuted for the identical offense charged against the defen-11 dant on trial. 12 Linda Kasabian was a defendant in this very case. 13 To be an accomplice the person must have knowingly 14 and with criminal intent aided, promoted, encouraged or 15 instigated by act or advice or by act and advice the 16 commission of such offense. 17 Must have knowingly and with criminal intent aided, 18 promoted, encouraged or instigated. 19 And so the court is telling us that those words 20 are equated to Linda Kasabian in this case. 21: MR. BUGLICSI: Your Honor, that is a misstatement of 22 the law. 23 MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, this is CALJIC. 24 THE COURT: Just a minute, if you want to discuss the 25 atter come to the bench.

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. 26 (whereupon, all counsel approach the bench and the following proceedings occur at the bench outside of the hearing of the jury:)

MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, you indicated back in chambers that you weren't going to tell the jury or instruct them on the law of accomplice.

He certainly doesn't have that right, if you are not going to do it.

THE COURT: You mean as to the definition?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Yes.

Because I think the attorneys, under the law, with the Court's indulgence, can discuss the law that the Court is going to give and try to apply it to the facts, as long as they don't misstate the law.

But here he is giving law that the Court is not going to give.

What he is trying to do --

THE COURT: I know what he is trying to do. He is trying to indoctrinate the jury as to the basis or the reason she was found to be an accomplice when, as a matter of fact, it could have been for one or more than one reason.

I know exactly what he is trying to do.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Yes, right. And it is extremely harmful to the prosecution.

THE COURT: The only reason that the jury is informed that she is an accomplice as a matter of law is on the

question of corroboration.

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The reason that the Court arrived at that conclusion is immaterial so far as the jury is concerned. That is, the reason that the court arrived at the conclusion that she is an accomplice as a matter of law. That is a finding that the Court makes, and that brings into play the corroboration rule automatically without any finding by the jury as to whether or not she is an accomplice.

But for you to go behind that and try to tell the jury what reason the Court based its conclusion on I don't think is proper.

MR. KHMREF: I am not saying that.

If I may say, this is by way of argument.

This is not different than any other argument.

The word "accomplice" is not sitting there in a vacuum. It is a word which we have a right to define, just like we have a right to define "house" or "courthouse" or "man" or "dog" or anything.

THE COURT: But you went beyond that. You said -I forget exactly what the words were -- but you were purporting to tell the jury my thought process in arriving at
that conclusion.

ME. KMYREK: That is not so.

MR. BUGDIOSTE Right.

I was looking at the jury, and they were taking

some very heavy notes on that. In fact, he was telling the jury that the Court 2 believes that Linda lied on the witness stand. 3 MR. KANAREK: No. 4 MR. BUGLIOSI: By implication he is telling them that. THE COURT: What are you trying to do, Mr. Kanarek? What are you trying to do? Let's get to the point. MR. KANAREK: I am trying to make argument without 8 being interrupted. 0 I might say, it is a violation of our right to a 10 fair trial, equal protection of the law. 11 THE COURT: Mr. Bugliosi has a right to make an 12° objection, just as you made objection to his argument. 13 MR. KANAREK: Mr. Fitzgerald read this exact definition 14 when he was arguing. It is a violation of equal protection . 15 when I am not --16 THE COURT: He didn't say what you said. 17 . MR. KANAREK: He said --18 THE COURT: Don't tell me what he said. And I know 19 what you said. 20 You have gone beyond what he said considerably. 2Ì MR. KANAREK: Mr. Fitzgerald is here, your Honox you 22 can ask him. 23 My recollection is that he used the same jury 24 instruction. 25 MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, this matter is so serious 26

that --

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THE COURT: Incidentally, there is an error in your declaration.

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MR. FITZGERALD: What is the error?

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THE COURT: The error is obvious.

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MR. FITZGERAID: I talked to the reporter and the

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reporter informs me of the same thing, but I learned that

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after the document was executed.

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Furthermore, it wasn't brought to my attention

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that it was incorrect by anybody, including the Court.

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THE COURT: Are you telling me, Mr. Fitzgerald, that you really believe that I said that, the statement in

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your declaration?

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MR. FITZGERALD: Yes.

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THE COURT: I don't believe that.

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MR. FITZGERALD: Well, when I quote to you what you said yesterday to Mr. Kanarek, I can make it abundantly clear that you told counsel that they could not argue the

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law

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MR. BUGLIOSI: You have to look at it in context, because they were misstating the law.

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MR. FITZGERALD: But that is irrelevant, actually.

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The reason that you know it is wrong is that I decked with the court reporter.

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THE COURT: The reason that I know it is wrong?

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pont be ridiculous.

MR. FITZGERALD: I told the court reporter, and the court reporter went in and told you.

THE COURT: Mr. Fitzgerald, your statement is absurd.

I know what I said. I don't have to check with the court
reporter to know what I said.

As a matter of fact, I have said to the contrary a dozen times during the course of the arguments, and you know it.

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MR. FITZGERALD: I don't know.

THE COURT: Then you tell me you think I really said that? I just don't believe it, Mr. Fitzgerald.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Anyway this matter is so serious, it goes to the very heart of Linda Kasabian's credibility.

He is implying that you reached the determination that Linda lied on that witness stand and I would ask the Court to instruct the jury to disregard his entire last statements about this.

Very, very serious, I saw five or six jurors write down what he was saying.

THE COURT: I don't want this to go on all afternoon, Mr. Kanarek. You are making what you know to be improper statements in front of this jury.

MR. KANAREK: This is not so, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, I am going to sustain the objection. You know what instructions I am going to give with regard to accomplices and corroboration.

You can relate those instructions to the evidence in the case as I have told you you could on a number of occasions, and I have told all counsel that a number of times during the course of the argument. There cannot be any misunderstanding as to what I have said.

I don't think it is proper for an attorney to attempt to paraphrase an instruction when he does so inaccurately and incompletely.

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I don't think what you are trying to do now, in effect implying to the jury that I made a finding that she is not credible, or I made a finding of anything but the bare fact she is an accomplice as a matter of law.

Those findings, if they are to be made, are to be made by the jury, the finding that you are implying that I made.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Will the Court please instruct the jury then to disregard his remarks about Linda?

THE COURT: All right, well -- read what was said.

(Whereupon, the reporter read the record.)

MR. BUGLIOSI: He is telling the jury --

THE COURT: That is not a necessarily correct definition of an accomplice. It is incomplete in the first place; it is misleading.

In any event, Mr. Kanarek, what is it you are trying to get at? They have been told that Linda Kasabian is an accomplice as a matter of law. That is for the purpose of corroboration.

There is no point -- what is the point of trying to define what an accomplice is?

MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor --

THE COURT: The instructions that they were to be given fully cover the points they are required to know.

MR. KANAREK: If I may answer in response to that.

On the basis of equal protection of the law

under the Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Bugliosi has stated and ľ I believe it is on the record that as far as final arquments go your mind should have the wings of a bird, and you 3 should be able to --4 ' THE COURT: Oh, Mr. Kanarek --5 MR. KANAREK: Yes, and your Honor is being very 6 technical. THE COURT: That is the kind of argument I would 8 expect from a first-year law student. Let's get to the point. 'n. What is it you are trying to say? ŲĎ. MR. KANAREK: What I am saying is, your Honor, is 11 interfering with our final argument with these very point-12 less objections by Mr. Bugliosi. 13 Your Honor's systaining them is a violation of . 14 equal protection. 15 THE COURT: Apparently you are not going to answer my 16 I will sustain the objection and we will go on question. 17. to something else. , 18 What he said is so ambiguous, I don't know what 19 it means. 20 MR. BUGLIOSI: He says the Court is equating this to 21 Linda Kasabian's testimony. 22 THE COURT: Мо 23 MR. BUGLIOSI: That is the language she used, that the 24 Court is equating this language to Linda Kasabian's 25

testimony.

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THE COURT: Read that part.

(Whereupon, the reporter again reads the record.)

THE COURT: What words is he referring to?

MR. BUGLIOSI: "With knowledge and criminal intent" and all that.

He read the instruction on accomplice, which the Court is not even going to give, and then he goes on to say that the Court is telling us these words apply to Linda Kasabian's testimony, meaning that the Court has made a determination that Linda had all of these things, knowledge, criminal intent, even though the prosecution has said she did not have knowledge, for instance, on the first night, that the Court does not believe the prosecution, that the Court has found her to be an accomplice and, in effect, the Court believed that Linda lied on the witness stand.

THE COURT: How am I going to admonish them?

MR. BUGLIOSI: That the Court just admonish the jury
to disregard the last remarks of Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: I object to that.

THE COURT: You want to continue your argument,

Mr. Kanarek; I'm going to sustain the objection. I am going
to admonish the jury to disregard your last remarks.

(The following proceedings were had in open court in the presence and hearing of the jury:)

THE COURT: The objection is sustained. The jury is

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admonished to disregard Mr. Kanarek's last remarks, to which the objection was interposed.

You may continue, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: May we state this, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, we have been in this courtroom and we heard what is going on.

We represent to you that Mr. Fitzgerald read those words to you, the same words were read to you by Mr. Fitzgerald, and there was no objection and there was nothing that we just had --

THE COURT: That is incorrect, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: Mr. Fitzgerald just read --

THE COURT: That statement is not so. Let's get on, sir.

MR. KANAREK: May I say this, ladies and gentlemen, once again the jurors decide the facts in this case, decide the case.

The jurors decide the case. We say if we are incorrect, and those of us, then, those of us on the jury decide it.

We say that Mr. Fitzgerald enunciated what I have read off of this paper.

THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek, perhaps I misunderstand you. So the jury will not be confused, Mr. Fitzgerald did not state to the jury that portion as to which the objection was sustained.

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MR. KANAREK: I am saying, your Honor, that what I read off of this paper Mr. Fitzgerald -- and Mr. Fitzgerald confirmed it to me -- he just told me he did.

THE COURT: The jury will take my remarks for what they are. I don't know what Mr. Kanarek is saying, but if it is contrary to that, you will disregard it.

MR. KANAREK: In any event, Mr. Fitzgerald reconfirmed it.

In any event, ladies and gentlemen --

THE COURT: It is immaterial whether Mr. Fitzgerald confirmed it, reconfirmed it, or did not confirm it at all. Mr. Kanarek.

Let's not belabor the point. I sustained an objection to certain remarks. That objection was a good objection and the jury was admonished to disregard the remark as to which the objection was sustained.

Now proceed with your argument.

MR. KANAREK: We all remember, I'm sure, this picture, but I don't believe -- I don't believe those of us on the jury have seen these pictures yet, although they have been alluded to.

These are pictures of the saloon and what is called the Rock City Cafe, concerning which there was bestimony.

And we think that here is a very, very poignant example of why it is desirable to consider the evidence,

because this panel that has helter skelter on it, this panel is in the place, according to the prosecution testi-2 mony, where Mr. Flynn lived, in Volume 114, at Page 12,826, 3 actually it begins earlier. 4. And this is People's 261 for identification, and 5 there is interrogation made at Page 12,824, and I believe б this interrogation is of Officer Gutierrez, and at Page . 7 12.824: 8 Do you know if anyone was living 9 in the trailer at the time that you went out there .10 on November the 25th, 1969? Ţ  $\mathbf{A}^{\text{tf}}$ Yes, sir, the person that I spoke 12 to. 13 #Q Who is that? 14 "A Mr. Juan Flynn. 15 "Q Was he living there with anyone 16 else? 17 I don't know, sir. I didn't ask 18 him. 19 I didn't see anybody in the trailer. 20 And then: 21 <sup>II</sup>Q I show you People's 261 for 22 identification. Do you know what that photograph 23, depicts? 24 "A Yes, sir. 25 "IQ What is that? 26

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. 1	u A	This photograph depicts a
<b>2</b> .	picture of a cabinet door with some various	
3	writing.	· .
·4	11Q	There was this cabinet door?
5	Â <sup>II</sup> ,	This cabinet door was inside
6	that trailer.	
7	· "Q	The trailer that you just mentioned?
. 8	, and the state of	That I just mentioned.
9	"And it was in the mitchen. It was a	
. 10	cabinot doo	<b>%</b> •
11	, nQ	You saw this writing here that is
12	on this photograph, you saw the writing on the	
13	cabinet doo	r? .
14	"A	Yes, sir.
15	"Q	Inside the trailer?
16	n A	Yes, sir.
17	"Q	on November 25, 1969.
18	A <sup>n</sup>	That is correct, sir.
19	nQ.	You didn't take this photograph?
.20	A.	No, sir, I did not.
21	n'Q	Does this photograph appear to
22	be an accur	ate and fair representation of the
<b>23</b>	way the cab	inet door looked on November the
24	25th, 1969?	
. 25	"A	Identical, sir."
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So, we have Juan Flynn, having the heart of the People's case right in his own living quarters.

They have brought this issue into the case. They have brought Juan Flynn into the case. And so, for whatever that may be worth, for whatever that may be worth, for whatever that may be worth, this panel is where Juan Flynn is living. And on these two days, two the days that we are speaking about, there is nothing from Juan Flynn concerning Helter Skelter or anything that is supposed to go to the heart of the conspiracy.

instructions that denominate the 8th through the 10th, as they do, as we will have in the jury room, and for what it may be worth, if you look at this door, the Helter skelter door, and if you look at the Long Horn Saloon and the Rock City Cafe, not only was there nothing about this that was covert, nothing about it where anybody tried to make a big deal about hiding it, we can reasonably infer that maybe it had something to do with some attempt at a night club or some attempt at some kind of entertainment, or whatever it may be, of these kids at this Spahn Ranch, and we know that there is place that says "Donations For Helter Skelter," and various — we know that that is in evidence.

So, for whatever it may be worth, we feel that we can make this kind of inference that this had something

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to do with people coming up there, whatever, in connection with some kind of entertainment, whatever went on at the Spahn Ranch.

and this being right in the area, right in the area, Juan Flynn lived right in this area, that is depicted by these pictures. So, for whatever that might be worth, it certainly appears that this Helter Skelter coming down, and all of that, is a figment of the prosecution's imagination as far as any kind of a conspiracy and any kind of a black-white war, and anything that we have heard about in this courtroom.

Now, the prosecutor in this case has built, they have built a thought on assumptions, statements, considerations based upon what one person said, what another person said, and so forth and so on.

They have used possibilities, insinuating, insinuating possibilities that this could have happened or that could have happened.

The favorite words that they use are words that require assumptions to be made, inference upon inference upon inference, in order to project the particular viewpoint that they wish us to have.

We are supposed to be in this courtroom for matters that do not involve myths. We are supposed to be in this courtroom on matters that involve something that is solid, something that is concrete, something that isn't, in

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fact just a myth or a figment of a particular prosecutor's imagination.

The conspiracy and all of that is something that is dreampt up, is thought about, at the time that they decide they are going to get Mr. Manson, as witness the way that the prosecution and the way that law enforcement has done what they did in this case.

There is no question about it, they had a preconceived notion, a preconceived idea, based upon Mr. Manson's
appearance, and also because of, perhaps, what some of us
might deem improper activities going on at the Spahn Ranch.

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We have testimony that Mr. Manson, on the one hand Mr. Manson is a deity; they have, on the one hand, tried to portray Mr. Manson as the Savior, as Jesus Christ, and on the other hand he is the devil and he is a killer and has the power to turn people into robots, into automatons. This is beyond belief.

I believe Mr. Manson is really made of -- I suppose his temperature is 98.6 like all of ours, he has normal blood pressure, he has normal this and normal that. They have tried to portray Mr. Manson as a kind of person that can pull strings in the human mind. Because they wish a certain viewpoint to prevail.

They have presented, they have tried to substitute some kind of a fantasy for proof.

The so-called conspiracy and all of that, all of that conspiracy, all of that is the figment of the imagination.

There is no showing of any conspiracy here.
There is no showing of any criminal intent.

Now, as far as some of these matters are concerned, we have, for instance, felony murder. We have felony murder that the Court is going to instruct us on.

Mr. Manson was with Stephanie Schram.

We can get away from all of the Helter skelter and we can get away from all of the philosophy of life, all of that, we can remove ourselves from that, and the nitty-

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gritty of it was that Mr. Manson was with Stephanie Schram, a prosecution witness that the prosecution could have asked, in detail, as to Mr. Manson's activities on the days in question.

The prosecution chose not to do that.

The prosecution, furthermore, in this case is coming to us in connection with some -- they will probably -- we can only foresee it, because of certain jury instructions that we believe will be given, that they are going to argue some kind of a felony-murder theory.

Now, we all know that the law of felony-murder is that if there is an intent, if there is a desire on the part of someone when they enter a dwelling to commit a petty theft or commit a felony, then, at the instant that someone goes through that door, they have committed the particular crime we call burglary, for instance. A burglary is committed the instant the entry of the door is — the instant that takes place.

For instance, if someone decides to hold up a bank and they have a note in their pocket that says, "Give me all your 20's." They go through the door, and while they are standing in line, they change their mind. They are still guilty of burglary, because the instant they went through the door they had that intent. That is burglary.

Now, if during that process someone passes away, dies, because of what happens, this is called felony murder,

because in the process of these events a person passed away. l, The law says this should be deemed felony murder. It is a type of constructive intent. But the person has to intend to commit the burglary or the felony, or whatever, when someone goes through that door. 

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.  And the same goes for robbery, and whatever the particular offense.

The Court is going to give us the details of it.

But the fact of the matter is that Mr. Manson had no criminal intent in connection with these matters.

Mr. Manson, and the evidence clearly shows,
Mr. Manson had ideas that involved his emotions. It involved
Stephanie Schram.

Now, that is, as we have said, we believe this is nitty-gritty type of evidence. She was there, she was at the raid. She was there with Mr. Manson at these times that we have spoken of.

And so, when the prosecution argues the felonymurder theory to us, if we would think in terms of some of
the arguments that possibly co-counsel or myself might
make, this might be helpful in resolving what we have to
resolve, because as we have said, we can't speak further.

Now, where we speak of, all of us, I suppose, have at times made statements to the effect, all of us, to the effect that we or I am responsible for the killings in Viet-Nam; without belaboring it, I am sure that all of us at some time or other have made that kind of statement.

Now, when we look at the people at Spahn Ranch, whether we agree with those people or not, the fact of the matter is they are acutely aware of what is going on in the world.

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Mr. Flynn was very, very much, as far as his personality and his very being is concerned, he was very much influenced by what happened in Viet-Nam.

We remember that from his testimony here. He wouldn't even discuss it. He wouldn't even discuss it.

And so, we suggest that any kind of conversation that occurred at Spahn Ranch in which anyone was involved with this kind of language, "I am responsible for the killings," and all of that, where we have two or three words, so to speak, maybe a sentence or two that comes at us in the courtroom here, it appears to have a quality and it might appear to have superficially an importance that is absolutely beyond any kind of real significance, because we have all made those statements.

I have made that statement that I feel responsible for the killings in Viet-Nam, and we read columnists, we hear it over the radio, over TV, how there are great numbers, perhaps millions of people in the United States, who feel responsible for the killings. And you take someone like Juan Flynn taking a statement of this type and put him in an atmosphere, whatever atmosphere in connection with whatever it may have been, with journalists and what-not, this type of statement is a statement that is the kind of statement that we have the very, very important and proper rule on circumstantial evidence, that if there are two reasonable interpretations concerning evidence, that we must

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25 26 use that interpretation which seems reasonable.

The fact of the matter is that in connection with that statement we have all of the other infirmities.

The Court is going to instruct us about oral admissions and oral confessions. And in no stretch of the imagination is it a confession to anything. If it ever was uttered, it was nothing more than a mere statement in passing.

And the fact that the prosecution focuses upon it indicates, indicates, the nothingness of the evidence in this case.

Because, as we say, if there was a conspiracy or anything like that, there would be conspiratorial evidence before us.

Now, we have a situation in connection with the people at the Spahn Ranch.

Now, we have said -- it is regrettable that these children -- we may, I suppose -- we have heard this certainly right here in this courtroom about these children going out and going on garbage runs.

In fact, these children are, regrettably, regrettably, are somehow or other, for some reason or other, not part of the main stream of American life.

Now, whether any of us are responsible for that or not, the fact is that they have rejected the main stream of our life. They have decided, for whatever their reasons

may be, to do certain things.

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They are living on garbage literally. Literally. This isn't just a statement being made in a vacuum. We know this is true.

These children are rejected by their parents. These children have been rejected by society, for whatever the reasons may be, whether we are at fault or whether they are at fault. The fact of the matter is that these types of individuals exist in our society.

And what it boils down to, what it boils down to, and I suppose what this case boils down to, is that through the machinations of what has been done in this case, we have this unbelievable confrontation, this unbelievable confrontation between groups of our society.

We have the confrontations on the campuses, we have the confrontations on the streets, we have confrontations.

We have had enough confrontations. We have had enough confrontations. And the way to avoid confrontation and the way to avoid going on and on and on with this particular approach to a solution, the criminal court is no place, is no place to carry out these types of confrontations. These types of confrontations should be carried out in the halls of our legislatures, these confrontations should be carried out in classrooms where they are discussed.

They shouldnot be carried out where someone

is made a target the way Mr. Manson has been made a target. Because that is what this litigation is.

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Why do we have this intense interest? Do we have any idea how many dollars per month are spent on this side of the courtroom?

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It's incredible. Just think of the salaries alone that must be spent in order to -- in order to -- in order to have just the personnel here.

This particular confrontation is going on and on and on. This jury, all of us in this courtroom have the power to end that confrontation, and the way to end that confrontation is with a result that the evidence dictates, and that is to find Mr. Manson not guilty on all of these charges.

Thank you very much for the attention you have given me.

THE COURT: Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Keith?

MR. KEITH: May we have a brief recess?

THE COURT: All right.

We will take a recess at this time, ladies and gentlemen. Do not converse with anyone or form or express any opinion regarding the case until it is finally submitted to you.

The Court will recess for 15 minutes.

(Whereupon, there was a recess after which the following proceedings were had in the chambers of the Court out of the hearing of the jury, all counsel with the exception of Mr. Hughes being present:)

THE COURT: All counsel are present.

Did someone want to speak to me?

MR. KEITH: Yes, your Honor, yes, your Honor. I would respectfully request that I be permitted to start

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Monday morning when the jury is fresh. I have two reasons for making this request.

One, my argument is going to be less than a day and I prefer not to have tobreak it up over the weekent.

Secondly, with all deference to Mr. Kanarek, I think the jury has been pretty well inundated in the past week --

THE COURT: Seven days.

MR. KEITH: -- seven days with his argument, and I can infer or will infer that they probably won't care to listen to any further argument this afternoon, and they might not be too receptive to what I have to say.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Even next week there is going to be that problem for me.

THE COURT: Well, we don't need to prolong it.

Does anyone have any objection to recessing now?
MR. BUGLIOST: No objection.

MR. FITZGERALD: No objection.

MR. KANAREK: No objection.

MR. SHINN: No objection.

THE COURT: It is now five minutes to 3:00. At the most you would get in an hour, perhaps a little bit over an hour.

so we will adjourn until Monday.

Now, Mr. Fitzgerald has filed two motions that have been noticed for 9:00 o'clock on Monday, so I assume

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counsel will want to argue on behalf of the motions or are you submitting them, or what?

MR. WIEZGER LD: I don't anticipate much argument at all.

THE COURT: You have a right to argue! I am not suggesting that you don't.

MR. FITTGURALD: I will submit it.

THE COURT: Well, I think perhaps I should call the motions as long as they have been noticed for 9:00 o'clock, I will call them.

In the meantime if you decke you want to argue, fine.

If you decide you don't munt to argue you can say

MR. FITTGERALD: All right, time.

TEL COURT: and that will be all right, too.

court every Cay, I think every Cay, to far this week every day.

They are set for 9:00, but I try to get the word around that I want them here at 8:45.

of those dates, because accorning get here later and defendants are not here.

not start enduty at 9:00 elelock. I am trying to make sure

that we do.

If it is the attorneys tardiness that results in any delay or is going to result in any delay, where I know that he knows the matter was set earlier, as it was this morning, I just trail it over to the next day rather than delay the start of this trial.

I bear in mind what you said the other day,
Mr. Fitzgerald, that you and the other defense counsel are
anxious to expedite the matters, and I think this case
clearly should take preference over other matters, including
arraignments.

Now, you say less than a day, Mr. Keith. MR. KEITH: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: What about your estimate, Mr. Bugliosi?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Between two and three days. I think I
can probably get it done in two days if I get two full days.

THE COURT: That takes us through Wednesday.

MR. BUGLIOSI: If he goes through late Monday I would like to put it over to Tuesday morning. It depends on when he finishes.

THE COURT: Then it appears that the jury will be ready for instruction the latter part of the week.

Are there going to be any other requested instructions?

MR. KEITH: Mr. Bugliosi and I have been working on that mere presence instruction.

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THE COURT: That is a matter you can take up Monday morning.

MR. KCITH: I gave him my draft.

MR. BUGLIOSI: It was a very fair draft, I have to say.

THE COURT: It seems to me People vs. Durham seems to
be a fairly safe statement.

MR. KEITH: I virtually flourishly copied it.

THE COURT: I think it is fair to both sides, it is a complete statement as far as I can see.

MR. BUCLICST: The only problem is it tends to focus on aiding and abetting. There has to be some addendum for that instruction to let the jury know this only pertains to aiding and abetting and has no applicability to the conspiracy instructions.

Otherwise, they may just say, "This is it."

THE COURT: As a matter of fact, there is a statement in the Durham part, I don't know if it was in Mr. Keith's requested instruction, but there is a statement in the Durham opinion that it is possible for a person to be an aider and abettor without ever having joined the conspiracy.

MR. KEITH: I put that in the redraft. I also even said you don't have to be present at the scene of the crime to be a conspirator. I thought that covered it.

THE COURT: I am reading from it now, it says one may aid or abet in the commission of a crime without having previously entered into a conspiracy to commit it.

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MR. BUGLIOST: I can't quarrel with that. I certainly can't quarrel with that. But it just doesn't -- it just is not clear that that paragraph, that the Court just read, conveys that I am trying to convey.

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THE COURT: I think I understand what you mean.

What you are saying, you want the jury to understand the

two separate theories of liability.

THE COURT: Why didn't you say so? I don't see any objection to saying that.

MR. BUGLIOSI: That paragraph, although it is a true statement, might cause the jury to believe that that is the instruction, right there, and even though conspiracy is involved, they are still bound by that instruction, so if we can just add another paragraph saying this instruction only pertains to the theory of aiding and abetting, it has no applicability to the instructions on conspiracy which you have received earlier.

MR. KEITH: Well, that is all right me, because you are practically saying --

Let me put it this way:

Presence at the scene can be considered on the issue of whether you are a conspirator. Conspirator or not, not it is/enough to make one a co-conspirator, but it is evidence that can be considered.

I 've got that. Mere presence is not enough, but

it certainly may be considered along with other evidence. : 1 But I gave you the draft. 2 NR. BUGLIOSI: Yes. 3 MR. KEITH: Don't losé it. 4 MR. BUGLIOSI: No. I've got it somewhere. I put it Ś. in my briefcase. 6 THE COURT: Where is the jury now, Mr. Murray? .7 THE BAILIFF: They are in the jury room now, your 8 Honor . 9 THE COURT: There is no necessity to bring them down. 10 They have been admonished and we haven't done anything since they have been admonished. 12 THE BAILIFF: They are in a real good mood now. 13 THE COURT: Is it agreeable, gentlemen, we adjourn 14 right here in chambers until Monday morning at 9:00 o'clock. 15 MR. FITZGERALD: Yes. 16 THE COURT: Without bringing the jury back in, they 17 have been admonished. 18. MR. FITZGERALD: Yes. 19 MR. KANAREK: Sostipulated. 20 MR. SHINN: So stipulated. 21 MR. KEITH: So stipulated. **Ž**2 THE COURT: We will adjourn then until Monday morning 23 at 9:00 a.m. 24 (Whereupon, a recess was taken to reconvene Monday, 25 January 11, 1971 at 9:00 a.m.) 26