SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT NO. 104

HON. CHARLES H. OLDER, JUDGE

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.

Plaintiff.

Vs.

CHARLES MANSON, SUSAN ATKINS, LESLIE VAN HOUTEN, PATRICIA KRENWINKEL,

Defendants.

No. A253156

REPORTERS' DAILY TRANSCRIPT Tuesday, January 12, 1971

APPEARANCES:

For the People:

VINCENT T. BUGLIOSI, DONALD A. MUSICH, STEPHEN RUSSELL KAY, DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS

For Deft. Manson:

I. A. KANAREK, Esq.

For Deft. Atkins:

DAYE SHINN, Esq.

For Deft. Van Houten:

RONALDYHUGHERYXESC.

For Deft. Krenwinkel:

MAXWELL KEITH, Esq. PAUL FITZGERALD, Esq.

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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, TUESDAY, JANUARY 12, 1971 9:23 A.M.

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(The following proceedings were had in the chambers of the Court out of the presence of the jury and the defendants, all counsel with the exception of Mr. Hughes being present.)

THE COURT: All counsel are present. It is twentythree after, Mr. Shinn. Did you have some problems?

MR. SHINN: Your Honor, I got stuck behind stalled cars on the Hollywood Freeway and I had a hell of a time getting around them.

THE COURT: All right,

Yesterday I indicated to Mr. Fitzgerald I would permit him to reopen for the limited purpose of reading or stating the excerpts from the court opinion that he had apparently intended to during the course of his argument, when an objection was made by the People and the Court sustained it.

Is that still your intention, Mr. Fitzgerald?

MR. FITZGERALD: Yes. I was going to ask the Court's guidance. I think it was very fair of you to reopen; I will listen to whatever suggestions anybody has.

THE COURT: From what you said I assumed that you had intended to read an excerpt from some opinion to the jury.

MR. FITZGERALD: Right, that is correct, in connection

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with the accomplice rules.

I have it and it is very short; it should not take more than about 30 seconds.

THE COURT: And I thought I would simply preface it by telling the jury that during the course of your argument you had been stopped by reason of an objection which the Court sustained, and that on further reflection I believe that you should have been permitted to read that excerpt.

I am going to let you do that now so you can complete your argument in the way you intended to complete it.

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MR. BUGLIOSI: Mr. Kay and Mr. Musich have something to say, your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. KAY: We would ask the Court to read, before Mr. Fitzgerald does, what Mr. Fitzgerald has to read to determine if it is in conflict with the instructions that are being given. If it isn't, there will be no objection, but if it is?

MR. FITZGERALD: No objection to that.

(Mr. Fitzgerald hands a document to the Court.)

MR. FITZGERALD: That is right out of the motion that I filed.

IIR. KAY: That would be all, just that one paragraph?

IIR. FITZGERALD: That is all.

THE COURT: Actually, you did read this, didn't you?

MR. FITZGERALD: No. I didn't finish it, that is all.

THE COURT: Let me get my copy of the transcript. Maybe you didn't finish it. Idon't know.

MR. FITZGERALD: My understanding was that I didn't finish it.

It is Page nineteen thousand eight --

I don't have my volume of the transcript with me.

MR. BUGLIOSI: You read the whole thing. You read the whole thing, Paul.

MR. FITZGERALD: Can I see your transcript?

MR. BUGLIOSI: You got every word in, even down to the

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MR. FITZGERALD: Can I compare it here with my motion?

I stand corrected.

THE COURT: All right. It appears on Page 19,342, Lines 7 through 13, that you did, in fact, read all of the statement that you just showed me this morning that you intended to read.

So, I take it from that that takes care of the matter.

MR. FITZGERALD: It does, and I apologize to the Court.

It certainly wasn't my intention to mislead the

Court.

THE COURT: No. I understand.

MR. FITZGERALD: Inasmuch as it was stated in toto to the jury, there is no necessity, and I am perfectly willing to say so, for me to re-read it.

I wonder, the only lingering doubt I have in my mind, your Honor, is whether or not there was an objection and it was sustained, and the only lingering doubt I have is as to whether or not the jury attaches any significance to that?

They weren't admonished to disregard what I said but, of course --

THE COURT: That's right. Because as far as you went, I didn't think that it was improper.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Then you said another word, Paul, and I

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thought you were going to keep on, and that is when I objected.
You said "his."

THE COURT: The objection was sustained, but there was no admonition.

MR. FITZGERALD: Right.

Of course, they are fairly sophisticated people, and they have been with us a long time, and they have heard an awful lot of objections and they have heard an awful lot of them sustained, and I guess they know what that means.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I would ask that it not be raised again, your Honor. It places undue emphasis on it.

I am not a hundred per cent convinced that, really, it is proper to read from an opinion.

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THE COURT: Actually, the objection was not to what was said but the fact that you were going on to read from something.

MR. FITZGERALD: That I was reading.

THE COURT: So I don't think they understood.

There was nothing to indicate that what you had said
was improper or that the objection was being sustained
on that ground. It was just that you were reading from
something, and you didn't indicate what it was, and
the People made an objection which was sustained to any
further reading.

I don't think anything further needs to be done.

Now, I have a requested special jury instruction from Mr. Keith.

MR. KEITH: Yes, your Honor,

THE COURT: What is the next number, Mr. Darrow.

THE CLERK: I think the last number was 126, but did you mark some subsequent to that, Judge, that you have in your possession?

THE COURT: Yes.

There is a 127 and a 128 that was submitted by Mr. Keith.

THE CLERK: This would be 129.

THE COURT: This would be 129.

MR. KEITH: Very well.

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This requested instruction, your Honor, is offered in place of a previous instruction that I requested be given, and that instruction is before you and it is numbered 127.

I will move to withdraw that requested instruction.

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. KEITH: And in place and instead of instruction 127, offer 129.

129 is an expansion of 127.

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THE COURT: What about 128?

MR. KEITH: No, I am not going to withdraw 128.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Same objection, your Honor. He is still talking about mere presence, the same identical --

MR. KEITH: I will submit the matter. We have argued it at some length.

MR. BUGLIOSI: All right.

MR. KANAREK: I would like to join in this request for a special jury instruction, your Honor.

The jury can infer that Dianne Lake; they can remove her testimony, and then you have mere presence. That is as to Leslie Van Houten.

Leslie Van Houten is merely present. If they delete Dianne Lake's testimony --

THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek, /you wait a minute, I have not read the instruction yet. I cannot read while you are arguing.

MR. KANAREK: I apologize, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Well --

MR. BUGLIOSI: Same objection, your Honor. As Mr. Keith said, we argued this in depth yesterday. It is the same instruction.

MR. KANAREK: Just a small point if I may, your Honor,

The point is, if we excise Dianne Lake, for instance --

MR. BUGLIOSI: Oh, if we excise a witness! statement!

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Please, let's get on with the argument.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I invoke the protection of the Court? If we -- if I may use the expression, the English word, excise, without Mr. Bugliosi climbing on my back --

THE COURT: I see your point.

MR. KANAREK: The point is there is mere presence, and to use the prosecution's own mere speck — you are entitled to your instruction on any theory of the case — and Mr. Keith, for all I know, may want to argue that mere presence — and Dianne Lake is not to be believed — or something, and then you cannot consider that testimony, then you have mere presence.

MR. BUGLIOSI: What about Linda Kasabian's testimony; that does not make Leslie Van Houten merely present. They went to the scene of the crime.

MR. KANAREK: All that Linda Kasabian's testimony shows concerning Leslie Van Houten is that she was there, period.

She does not show anything about Leslie Van Houten except more presence.

MR. KEITH: If they don't believe Dianne Lake, I don't have any worries, because I don't think Leslie Van Houten is going to be convicted.

MR. BUGLIOSI: As a matter of law she shouldn't be if there is no corroboration.

1 2 trial. •5 6 7 Kasabian ---10 11 mere presence. 12 13 14 application whatsoever. 15 16 17 "**j**8 mere presence instruction. 19 20 instruction? 21 MR. FITZGERALD: Yes. MR. SHINN: Yes. 23 MR. KANAREK: Yes.

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MR. KANAREK: Well. it's very unusual for Mr. Bugliosi to agree, and he is agreeing because he does not want this instruction in there, to deprive the defendants of a fair

Mere presence, regardless of what we say in this case, the jury could neglect or reject Dianne Lake, and then you would have mere presence, even assuming that Linda

THE COURT: All right, I have your argument in mind.

MR. BUGLIOSI: In a robbery case, you can say the victim. the teller, if you reject the teller's testimony, there is

THE COURT: I am going to refuse 128. That is the accessory instruction. I don't think that has any

MR. KEITH: May I respectfully dissent from your Honor's opinion without going any further?

THE COURT: All right. Now, as to 129, that is the

Are all of the defendants requesting this

THE COURT: I am inclined to give this one.

MR. BUGLIOSI: That is not what the Court ruled

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yesterday; I know the Court did not rule --

THE COURT: I have not seen this instruction until this morning.

MR. BUGLIOSI: This is the same thing we were talking about yesterday, mere presence. There is no evidence.

THE COURT: I understand. If there is no evidence, the jury won't, like in many other cases, have anything to apply to it; it won't be applicable.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Doesn't the instruction have to be predicated on the evidence?

THE COURT: It is a correct statement of the law.

MR. EUGLIOSI: What about A and B, robbing a bank under that theory, you can say if the jury doesn't believe the victim's, the teller's testimony, then the robbers won't be present at the bank.

This mere presence is in regard to a specific situation where someone is found caught at a scene and they are just there and they are not doing anything and they are not co-conspirators; they are not doing anything.

When someone goes to the scene of a crime and actually confesses to stabbing and wiping out fingerprints, and you give an instruction like this, that just confuses everyone.

Even by the statement of Dianne lake, she says she was stabbing and wiping off fingerprints. If we say we disbelieve Dianne Lake and Linda Kasabian, you would have to

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give the mere presence instruction in every case. "Let's overlook and disregard the testimony of the victims."

MR. KANAREK: That is improper argument to the Court, Mr. Bugliosi.

MR. BUGLIOSI: If there was conflicting testimony in this case, let's say someone testified that Leslie Van Houten was just caught unexpectedly at the scene of the crime.

MR. KEITH: I may well argue that.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I agree you can argue that, but to have an instruction there has to be some evidence that she was merely present, and there is no evidence that she was merely present.

MR. KEITH: I can draw inferences from what occurred.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Of course you can argue, but when the Court gives an instruction on it, to my knowledge it has to be predicated on some evidence.

I always thought that; I always thought that was the law.

MR. KEITH: I always thought inferences were in a sense evidence.

MR. BUGLIOSI: You can argue inference, but when you give an instruction there has to be some evidence to support it.

an inference is not evidence. There is just no evidence that she was merely present.

MR. KANAREK: Linda Kasabian said she was merely

present, Mr. Bugliosi, and Dianne Lake is a girl who at that time had a drug-induced psychosis by two of your witnesses.

MR. KEITH: I am not concerned with Dianne Lake's mental state.

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MR. BUGLIOSI: As far as I know in that case mere presence should be given in every single case there is, if we disbelieve the testimony of the victims, then the defendant was only present.

THE COURT: I look at it somewhat differently, Mr. Bugliosi, as not being a mere presence instruction in the sense that it is suggesting that there was mere presence; but it is simply in explanation of the aiding and abetting rule.

MR. FITZGERALD: Exactly.

MR. BUGLIOSI: It is an exception to the aiding and abetting rule where there is evidence to support it.

THE COURT: No.

MR. KEITH: I can argue she did not aid and abet; that stabbing -- I have been through this.

MR. BUGLIOSI: You don't even have to be at the scene; you can be playing badminton --

MR. KEITH: I put that in there at your request.

THE COURT: This instruction says, it starts out by saying that mere presence is not enough, but the next sentence goes on to say that such evidence may be considered along with other evidence in determining guilt or innocence.

To me that is merely an explanation of the aiding and abetting rule.

MR. BUGLIOSI: In my mind it is no explanation at all.

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This is an exception to aiding and abetting where there is some evidence to support it and I ask the defense attorneys, where is there one particle of evidence to show she was only present at the scene of the crime.

MR. FITZGERALD: Any time you predicate liability on aiding and abetting, the mere presence instruction is a proper instruction.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I have tried over 100 juries, where mere presence was never given in any case I have ever been on,

MR. FITZGERALD: I have tried 67 cases where it's been given.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I don't believe you.

MR.FITZGERALD: I don't believe you either.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I'm telling you I don't believe you.

MR. FITZGERALD: I don't believe you either.

THE COURT: All right, gentlemen, let's stop the colloquy.

MR. BUGLIOSI: This instruction is completely improper because there is no evidence to support it, No. 1. No. 2, it's very very confusing, especially when the aiding and abetting instructions themselves say you don't have to be present at the scene.

The very aiding and abetting instructions the Court is going to give the jury, are going to say you don't have to be present at the scene, and then to come

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25 26 around and say "Well, if you are present it doesn't mean anything" --

MR. KEITH: It doesn't say that.

THE COURT: I don't think you are even reading the instruction, Mr. Bugliosi.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I read the whole thing. This came out of the Durham --

THE COURT: I understand that, but I think you are looking at it in a different light. In fact I can see aspects of it that are considerably helpful to the prosecution. I think it is a matter of the way you read it.

MR. BUGLIOSI: It is an exception to the aiding and abetting rule.

THE COURT: You seem to have a tunnel vision on that particular point. It says a good deal more than that. It does not suggest to anybody that there was mere presence. To me it is simply an explanation of the general rule of aiding and abetting.

We have many instructions that are not predicated on evidence. It isn't simply because they state a rule of law with an explanation attached to it, or as part of the instruction so the jury can understand what the rule is.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The instruction on vicarious liability for crimes committed after the conspiracy, there is no evidence of that in this case, and the Court said "I'm not

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going to give that instruction; there is no evidence --"

THE COURT: For example, if the jury were to believe that Leslie Van Houten was present, and stabbed a dead body, as she said, I think this instruction would be helpful. Otherwise the jury might have some question as to whether or not she really participated in a crime.

MR. BUGLIOSI: This instruction here says mere presence is not enough.

THE COURT: Look at the next paragraph.

However, mere presence of a person at the scene of a crime if it is for the purpose of assisting in its commission, where such person shares the criminal intent, is sufficient to establish aiding and abetting.

The latter paragraph I think definitely aids the prosecution theory, namely, that any of the defendants could be guilty of aiding and abetting or of conspiracy.

The two are not the same.

MR. BUGLIOSI: This is an extremely dangerous instruction, especially in view of the fact that we are predicating liability against Mr. Manson and Susan Atkins on vicarious liability; that they don't even have to be present at the scene of the crime and they are still guilty.

And then an instruction like this comes along and says that even if you are present at the scene of the crime, if you are not doing anything -- of course there is this other paragraph in there.

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I think it is a dangerous instruction, your Honor, and it is not in CALJIC. That does not mean it is invalid because it is not in CALJIC, but I think the significance of the fact that it is not in CALJIC is to illustrate that it is a far out instruction; that it is an extremely far out instruction to cover a situation where the District Attorney's Office actually improperly charges someone with a crime improperly.

Someone is caught at the scene of the crime and the District Attorney comes along and says "Well, we are going to nail you anyway."

And this instruction protects that type of individual.

But normally we don't prosecute people who are just present at the scene of a crime.

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MR. KEITH: Well, you did this time.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Well, not according to what your client told Dianne Lake.

Mere presence, your Honor, is not even mentioned,
I don't think, in Witkin, I don't think it is even mentioned
in --

THE COURT: Well, suppose that, then, -- we have two aiding and abetting instructions --

MR. BUGLIOSI: Right.

THE COURT: -- suppose a sentence were added to the second aiding and abetting instruction, which now reads:
A person aids and abets in the commission of a crime if he aids, encourages and promotes, et cetera. Suppose a sentence were added to that instruction to the effect that it is not necessary for a person to be present at the scene of a crime to aid and abet in its commission.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Or whether present or not.

THE COURT: Doesn't that answer your objection to this requested instruction?

MR. BUGLIOSI: No, because this is saying you don't even have to be present and you can be an aider and abettor, and this one comes along and says even if you are present and you are standing there and not doing anything.

THE COURT: It is just an explanation of the rule.

The mere presence, as the other instruction indicates, is not enough. It also requires criminal intent.

It is just another facet of the same rule, as I read it.

In other words, I think all of your objections are covered in the two aiding and abetting instructions.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I don't think so.

It is going to necessitate a long argument on my part.

It is an extremely confusing instruction. It is not in CALJIC, it is not in Witkin, it is not in Perkins, it is not in Fricke. It is a far-out situation.

MR. KANAREK: And it is not in Pilgrims' Progress either.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I know what mere presence is. I teach

aw. It deals with someone caught on the scene.

As a classical example, A and B are walking down the street and they confront C. B, on the spur of the moment, commits a crime on C, robs or stabs him to death. A is merely present at the scene of the crime. He has no duty to intervene and stop B.

To cover a situation like this where the very person who wants to invoke mere presence tells Dianne Lake that she is stabbing someone at the scene and wiping out fingerprints?

MR. KANAREK: You can argue that. You can argue that.

In these various chamber discussions you have said --

MR. BUGLIOSI: Just a moment. Mr. Keith is the one

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MR. KANAREK: Yes.

And you have always said "A mere speck of evidence," and all that.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Where is your speck of evidence?

MR. KANAREK: The speck is -- there is more than a speck.

Linda Kasabian has stated that she was asleep part of the time, and part of the time she may have heard and part of the time she may not have heard.

As to Leslie Van Houten, for instance, she has stated that Leslie Van Houten, if you take Linda Kasabian's testimony, Leslie Van Houten is nothing but just physically present. And as for that matter, so is Susan Atkins merely present, if you forget about some of the way-out arguments that you have made.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The two aiding and abetting instructions that the Court is going to give, Mr. Keith can argue those. He can say there has to be criminal intent and there has to be knowledge, and he can say in this case, if you disbelieve Dianne Lake, my client was only at the scene of the crime and didn't do anything and, ergo, she is not an aider and abettor.

MR. KANAREK: By the same reasoning, you can argue that it doesn't apply.

THE COURT: I don't like the term "mere" presence.

I think the word "mere" is suggestive of something that

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25 26 doesn't belong there.

MR. KEITH: I will agree to strike "mere."

THE COURT: If that is taken out, what about Mr. Bugliosi's statement, Mr. Keith?

Isn't the balance of what you are trying to cover in that requested instruction contained in the two aiding and abetting instructions? And if not, what is missing?

In other words, this instruction emphasizes the word "merc."

MR. KEITH: I am really not too happy with the word "mere" but it was in the instruction.

THE COURT: I think, at best, the instruction is merely explanatory. It is another way of saying what has already been said in the other two instructions. But is there any necessity to say it again?

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The reason that --

THE COURT: One at a time.

MR. KEITH: I intend to argue to the jury, unless I am, of course, stopped, that if she were just there, without criminal intent, even if she had knowledge of what was going on, that she was caught in a trap, so to speak.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Right; and she is not an alder and abettor.

MR. KEITH: And she is not an aider and abettor.

MR. BUGLIOST:

MR. KEITH: And even though she may have stabbed someone after someone was dead, that is not a crime for which she is charged.

I agree.

THE COURT: That is what the first one says: Who either directly and actively commits the act constituting the events and who knowingly and with criminal intent.

In other words, it is in the conjunctive.

MR. BUGLIOSI: You can argue, looking at that instruction, that your client is not guilty of aiding and abetting. But when you come up with a particularized instruction on mere presence, there has got to be some evidence.

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MR. KANAREK: There is some particularity about intimidation of the witness as to Mr. Manson. It is a violation of the 14th Amendment rights and due process for your Honor not to give this instruction.

THE COURT: I don't even understand what you are talking about.

MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, just being present is not --

THE COURT: What does this have to do with the other instruction about Mr. Manson?

MR. KANAREK: He is making improper argument to the Court. He talks about particularizing. Well, Mr. Manson has been particularized in connection with the so-called movement of his hand while Linda Kasabian was on the witness stand. He has been particularized.

THE COURT: That is incorrect. There is no such instruction that I intend to give.

MR. KANAREK: It says "such as intimidation of a witness."

THE COURT: Naturally, in order to cover that situation, it has to be made sufficiently definite so the jury knows what you are talking about, that is, the principle involved, but the specific situation has not been pinpointed.

MR. KANAREK: Well, then, instead of "mere presence," your Honor, only being present, or something like that.

THE COURT: I am going to refuse requested instruction

129. I think it is fully covered in the other aiding and abetting instructions, and there is no argument that I can see or that I have been directed to by counsel that could not be made under the existing instructions just as well as could be made under the requested instruction.

MR. KEITH: Very well, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, gentlemen. I think it is time to resume.

So you will be commencing first, then.

Mr. Fitzgerald will not.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The Court is not going to give any instructions about accessory after the fact?

THE COURT: That instruction is refused.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Thank you.

(Whereupon, the following proceedings occur in open court. All jurors present. All counsel present. Defendants absent.)

THE COURT: All counsel and jurors are present.

You may commence your argument, Mr. Keith.

MR. KEITH: Thank you, your Honor.

May it please the Court, all of learned counsel --I embrace you all, figuratively, not literally -- ladies
and gentlemen.

Linda Van Houten is not guilty of the offenses charged against her.

I mean, I hope to show you this, and I am

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convinced I am going to be able to show you this. Even if you believe Linda Kasabian and Dianne Lake, the two chief witnesses who involve Miss Van Houten, I feel that, after our analysis of this case, after our talk together, you will be with me regarding her innocence. Now, I am not going to shout, and I am not going to wave my arms, I am not going to raise the flag, and I am not going to use purple prose. Sherlock Holmes. I get through here.

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What we are going to do together, ladies and gentlemen, is to analyze the evidence involving Miss Van Houten carefully and diligently. We are going to draw inferences, we are going to make deductions, just like This is what we are going to become before 4c-1

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We are going to make extensive use of certain instructions that will be given you by the Court concerning the applicable law in this case, particularly the law of circumstantial evidence, and how you are to view circumstantial evidence, which is most important and most significant in connection with determining Miss Van Houten's guilt or innocence.

Now, before getting underway, and at the outset, I want to tell you that I am here before you with very mixed emotions. I am proud -- as you know, I have been appointed by the Court to represent Miss Van Houten -- and that makes me very proud. But, nonetheless, I am very much an interloper.

This is Ronald Hughes' case. Unfortunately I never had the pleasure of meeting him. But he has been with you, he was with you here for many months, and I am sure he is still with you here in spirit.

I don't know what the Court has told you about his tragic disappearance, but I am sure you will agree with me, and with everybody else with whom I talked, that he did not deliberately disappear.

This is his case, ladies and gentlemen, and don't you forget it.

I just hope that what I am going to say to you today will be what he would have said if he were here.

There is another misgiving that I have about being

here, and that is that you have been here all these months during this trial, sharing many experiences with other counsel, and although probably none of you have ever spoken to them other than, perhaps, a cursory "good morning" or "good evening" there must have arisen between you and other counsel a sort of a bond, a communion, if you will, a

rapport, an identity, that I can't share because I came on

the scene just a few weeks ago.

And I fear, I know it would be something subconscious, but the subconscious within us is often very
strong, and realizing that I have the responsibility of a
human life — and such a responsibility is never easy, it is
nerve-wracking, it is anxiety-producing, as I am sure you
realize — I fear that perhaps subconsciously you may listen
to me with less attentiveness and less receptiveness than
you might with other counsel simply because you have shared
with them this many months, experience of this arduous
trial.

I wouldn't blame you if you have that reaction.

I hope you don't. It is subconscious.

I am going to do the very best I can, and I must exhort you, and I ask you to fight with me for Miss Van Houten, because I believe, on the strength of this record, thatshe does not deserve to be convicted of the charges against her.

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25 26 Incidentally, I might tell you, or I should tell you, that I am not going to be very long. I am sure you will be happy to hear that.

I am not going to be very long because the evidence involving Miss Van Houten, at best, I say, is modest; and modest is using a conservative term.

I am handicapped also, ladies and gentlemen, in another respect. I never saw one witness, as you know.

And the witnesses in this case, I understand, were perhaps unusual, to say the least.

Naturally, as you have heard from other counsel, their credibility is very much in issue in this case. It is crucial. Particularly in the case of Leslie Van Houten.

As you will be instructed, and as you have heard from other counsel, the appearance of the witness on the stand is important, is an important consideration in evaluating credibility. Their demeanor, the manner in which a witness testifies, how they look, how they react.

This is something that the cold record doesn't reflect and, therefore, I can't give you my impressions of the flesh-and-blood appearance of the witnesses, particularly Linda Kasabian and Dianne Lake, because I am going to restrict my talk to them alone because as I read this record, they are the only witnesses that have anything to say about Miss Van Houten.

So, since I have not seen those two young ladies,

you are going to have to help me, and I beg that you do so.
You help me in determining how they testified, their demeanor; their appearance.

Now, I will give you a little outline, the beginning of the chapter headings, so that you will be able to follow me, perhaps, more easily.

First, the first chapter, I am going to talk about Mrs. Kasabian and Miss Lake. Not nearly as extensively as other counsel, simply because their testimony and their credibility has been discussed and rediscussed and rediscussed, and I see no great need for me to further read all of their testimony or analyze it in great depth, all of it.

I am, though, going to analyze with you, very closely, I hope, their testimony as it relates to Dianne Lake -- excuse me -- Miss Van Houten. And that isn't extensive.

Chapter 2, I am going to discuss with you about what I call the robot theory of murder espoused by the prosecution. I am going to discuss the robot theory of murder in conjunction with the law of first and second degree murder and, incidentally, conspiracy.

And then we are going to talk -- Chapter 3 this will be -- I am going to talk to you about the elements of conspiracy in the abstract, but in some depth, because it is a complex, complicated concept. It is not easy for legal scholars to understand. Even the justices of Supreme

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Courts struggled with the doctrine for many, many years.

And then I am going to talk to you -- this will be Chapter 4 -- about the testimony of Dianne Lake and Linda Kasabian.

I am not going to talk about their credibility in Chapter 4. In Chapter 1 we are going to talk about credibility.

So, when we are analyzing the testimony of Dianne Lake and Linda Kasabian as it involves Miss Van Houten, we are all going to assume, just for the sake of argument, that what they said was basically true. But there will be many exceptions to that, I can assure you, because we are going to analyze their testimony from the record in the light of the law of conspiracy that I would have previously discussed with you, and we are going to discuss it in particularity in the light of the law of circumstantial evidence, and how circumstantial evidence should be viewed by you, and we are going to draw inferences from the testimony of those two young ladies, we are going to make deductions, and we are going to determine, as a result of this analysis, whether reasonable inferences can be drawn from their testimony pointing toward the innocence of Miss Van Houten.

Now, next, I am going to discuss with you -- and I made separate chapter headings of this -- we are going to discuss with you the law of miding and abetting.

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and apply its principles to the testimony of Dianne Lake.

Then, the next chapter, Chapter 6, I was going to discuss the corroboration. In other words, does Dianne Lake's testimony corroborate the testimony of Linda Kasabian insofar as it may concern Leslie Van Houten?

If we find it doesn't, if we find it is insufficient, then I submit to you, that Miss Van Houten must be acquitted. She has to be, virtually, as a matter of law.

But rather than make separate chapter headings out of the subject of corroboration and the subject of aiding and abetting, I will probably interweave the two problems because they are closely connected and it is difficult to separate these two issues without being terribly redundant.

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Then I am going to conclude with a talk about another famous conspiracy case that was tried, oh, some 10 or 12 years ago and received almost equal if not more notoriety than this case.

I am going to read in my final conclusion a paragraph or two from that decision which I believe contains ringing language, language none of us should ever forget.

Now, Linda Kasabian -- I did not see her, as you know -- I have read her testimony.

As you know by now, his Honor is going to tell you that Linda Kasabian is an accomplice as a matter of law, and he is also going to tell you that you must view her testimony with distrust because she is an accomplice.

Mr. Fitzgerald read to you language from a Supreme Court decision of this state which you may have forgotten because he read it to you some time ago. Since then you have been hearing over a solid week of argument from Mr. Kanarek.

So I think it bears re-reading. The name of the case I am reading from is People vs. Wallin, W-a-1-1-i-n; it is contained in Volume 32, California 2d, Page 803, and I am reading at Page 808.

Before reading, as you know, the testimony of an accomplice has to be corroborated. We will discuss that

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later, but this is just a parenthetic statement so you will understand this excerpt with greater clarity. I am reading:

"The statutory requirement of corroboration is based primarily on the fact that experience has shown that the evidence of an accomplice should be viewed with care, caution and suspicion, because it comes from a tainted source, and is often given in the hope or expectation of leniency or immunity."

Of course, that is just what Linda Kasabian got, immunity.

So I ask you very sincerely, ladies and gentlemen, to bear that quotation in mind throughout your deliberations in this case.

That is a decision of the Supreme Court of this State, it is not me and it is not my brethren.

We all know that Miss Kasabian is a willing victim of drug abuse. We know of her sexual promiscuity.

But I am really not so concerned with those two areas of her experience as I am with her character.

Although certainly drug abuse and sexual promiscuity have a bearing on her character, and I also believe that drug abuse has a bearing on her credibility in the sense that I am at a loss to understand how anybody who has taken all of the narcotics and all of the dangerous drugs she has can be expected to have the ability to perceive, the memory and ability to articulate from the witness stand

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what she saw and heard and what she remembered, even remotely as effectively as someone who has not partaken, as Er. Kanarek puts it, of these mind-changing drugs.

I read the testimony of the two psychiatrists who appeared in this case. They seem to think that the effects of LSD when taken in heavy amounts are transitory.

I wonder, ladies and gentlemen. We know of our own experience there are too many people who have completely gone around the bend, if you will, from excessive experiences with hallucing genics.

Yet here she is, this State star witness in this case.

But apart from her use of drugs, which has been hammered away at in this case by other counsel, I am almost more concerned with her character as a person.

The drug abuse shows weakness. But there is also something else -- and so does the sexual promiscuity -- but there is something else more sinister that I got from the record about this little girl's character.

I can infer from the record and I wonder if you don't already infer it from the record that Miss Kasabian is a kind of a sinister person in a way.

She always seems to land on her feet, no matter what she does, and she never has been above, from what I gleaned from this record, practicing fraud, deception, burglary, theft, in order to get what she wants, and she does

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Look at this case, charged with all of these counts of murder and conspiracy, and she is free, at liberty, home wherever she lives, doing whatever she wants to do.

She told you during her testimony that she was a little girl lost in the forest trying to find her way out.

Now, as I have noted, this girl seems to get what she wants, and if she was a little girl lost in the forest, I can only paraphrase Sir Winston Churchill as "some forest."

I suggest to you that that statement -(A jurg indicates he cannot hear.)

THE COURT: I think some of the jurors are having difficulty.

MR. KEITH: Excuse me, I thought I was speaking louder. As long as Mr. Hollombe doesn't raise his hand I feel I am speaking loudly enough. I have got a stuffy nose.

THE COURT: There is a microphone near to you.

MR. KEITH: I suggest to you ladies and gentlemen — thank you for raising your hand, sir — I suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that her characterization of herself as a little girl lost in the forest was a falsehood, and a deliberate falsehood. That is not Linda Kasabian,

And I suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that if she attempted by her demeanor on the witness stand, and I don't know this for sure because I did not see her, well,

20,765 I kind of inferred from the record I read, if she attempted from the witness stand to lend the impression to you that she was just a little girl lost in the woods trying to find her way out, that this was a facade, and that she was committing a fraud on you as jurors and triers of the fact in this case.

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Because, if I ever read about anybody who was not a little girl lost in the woods, it is Linda Kasabian. I find her, from a reading of the record -- oh, she may have been under the domination of someone else for a period of time, at Spahn Ranch, but I found her from a reading of this record wily, opportunistic and frightfully resilient. She bounces back every time, no matter what she does.

And when we speak of Miss Kasabian's credibility, we speak of course also of her testifying here, which she did, in expectation of immunity which she received at some time during the course of this trial.

I read you what the Supreme Court has to say about a witness who testifies from expectation of immunity and, further, I think it brings into play probably the strongest of human motives, of human drives, self-preservation, ladies and gentlemen, there is no stronger human drive.

I don't think I need expound upon self-preservation, what it can do to us.

It can turn timid men into heroes in wartime and often has.

It can change physically weak men into strong men in times of crises.

Self-preservation can turn law abiding citizens into thieves, we know this.

Self-preservation can turn honest people into

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liars.

Ladies and gentlemen, judging from Linda's character, Mrs. Kasabian's character, as I formed it from this record because, as I believe it to be, and I trust you believe it to be the same, she has ample capacity in her character to deceive, and coupled with that capacity, ladies and gentlemen, I suggest to you she was driven by the very strongest of human motives to deceive, and that is what I have discussed, self-preservation.

Now, Mr. Fitzgerald told you, and I'm going to repeat it, you will be instructed that if you find a witness has been deliberately false as to his or her testimony as to one material part, you are entitled under the law to disbelieve all her testimony.

I want you to remember this not only now while I am talking to you, but, and while Mr. Bugliosi is talking to you, because as you know he has another opportunity to speak, and I would like you to remember that rule of law throughout your deliberations when you are evaluating the credibility of Miss Kasabian.

And I made mention of this because if you think that she falsely characterized herself on the witness stand, then I feel you ought to disbelieve her entire testimony.

Dianne Lake, ladies and gentlemen, the case against Leslie Van Houten is spread thin, it rests, if at all, very very precariously, solely on the testimony of this

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little girl, as we see later in our discussion.

This is it, ladies and gentlemen!

Without Dianne Lake I submit to you the prosecution has no case against Leslie Van Houten because, as you now know, even if you believed Linda Kasabian you cannot convict anybody of anything on the strength of her testimony alone. It has to be corroborated, and the only so-called corroborating evidence of Linda Kasabian's testimony against Leslie Van Houten is contained in the testimony of Dianne Lake.

As I told you at the outset, we are going to discuss corroboration later, but I am telling you now that is the prosecution's case.

Dianne Lake! Who is she, ladies and gentlemen? She has been discussed at length earlier in these proceedings by other counsel during their arguments.

We know who she is. She is a drug addict.

In late 1969 she was adjudicated by the Superior Court of the County of Inyo -- this is after a judicial proceeding, ladies and gentlemen -- as a gravely disabled person, and that does not mean physically disabled; that is mentally, gravely disabled.

She was committed, as you know, to a State - Mental Institution.

She was diagnosed there by presumably competent personnel as a schizophrenic.

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We know she did not tell the truth to the Grand
Jury of this County when she was under oath. She was told
before the Grand Jury of this County that she would not be
prosecuted for perjury.

To me the very worst thing of all, she was told by Sergeant Gutierrez, before her testimony before the Grand Jury -- I may be mistaken, I believe it was before the Grand Jury -- she was told she'd better come up with some answers or else.

This is a mentally ill 16 or 17-year-old girl, ladies and gentlemen, and this is the girl on the testimony of which the case against Leslie Van Houten stands or falls:

I shouldn't have put it in that way because I am going to show you that even if you happen to believe this little girl, the case against Leslie Van Houten still falls.

But that is the prosecution's spot.

Something else too, ladies and gentlemen, as you remember from the testimony, and this is important, as you remember from the testimony, Leslie Van Houten is supposed to have made certain statements to Dianne Lake, oh, at Willow Springs or Barker Ranch, I cannot remember which, which statements Mr. Bugliosi has characterized as a confession.

I respectfully dissent from Mr. Bugliosi's opinion as to what these statements were.

In my opinion they were no more a confession than

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the man in the moon, but we will go into that later.

But what I am getting at is this:

You will be instructed by the Court that any evidence of oral admissions or oral confessions from another, related by someone on this witness stand, ought to be viewed by you with caution.

And this is a general rule of law, ladies and gentlemen, this is not limited to somebody who has been the victim of drug abuse, somebody who has been mentally fll, somebody who has been threatened.

This applies even to a police officer who gets on the stand and purportedly relates an oral admission or confession.

There is nothing mysterious or sinister about the reason for this rule of law, ladies and gentlemen, it is simply that a matter of common experience, most of us cannot remember what somebody said to us yesterday or the day before or ten minutes ago and relate it accurately.

And yet an oral admission or an oral confession is obviously damaging to the person on trial, and here is somebody on the witness stand getting up and relating something damaging or allegedly damaging that may have been said a year ago.

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And since it is a matter of common experience, and nobody remember what anybody said from day to day, practically, thus the rationale of an instruction of this rule of law that you should view that kind of testimony with caution.

So the prosecution in this case, ladies and gentlemen, is going to ask you in their closing argument, in effect -- in effect, -- the prosecution is going to ask you to convict Miss Van Houten of two counts of murder and a count of conspiracy to commit murder, on the basis of the testimony of Dianne Lake alone.

A 16 or 17-year-old girl who has been threatened, who has committed — I wouldn't say perjury — but who has lied under oath, who has been adjudicated mentally ill, and a very fundamental part of whose testimony should be viewed by you with caution.

To me, and I trust to you ladies and gentlemen, a conviction based on her testimony is indefensible.

It is frightening. Don't do it!

We are going to leave Dianne Lake; we will be back to her, but not in the same context.

We are going to talk for a few minutes about what I have called in my chapter heading "The Robot" -- robot theory of murder, as advanced by the prosecution.

I am going to tell you in a little bit why they advanced that proposition.

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But first I am going to read to you the law as will be later given to you by Uis Honor on deliberate and premeditated murder.

I am going to read it because it is important when you listen to me in discussing Mr. Bugliosi's robot theory:

"All murder which is perpetrated by any kind of wilful, deliberate and predmeditated killing with malice aforethought is murder of the first degree.

"The word 'deliberate' means formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and --"

And I think you understand now what I am getting at. Going on:

"And weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action. The word 'premeditated' means considered beforehand.

"If you find that the killing was preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to kill, which was a result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation" -- remember this, other conditions, not

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just heat of passion, but other conditions precluding the idea of deliberation --

"It is murder of the first degree.

in units of time the length of the period during which the thought must be pondered before it can ripen into an intent to kill which is truly deliberate and premeditated. The time will vary with different individuals and under varying circumstances. The true test is not the duration of time but rather the extent of the reflection. A cold, calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in a short period of time, but a mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it include an attempt to kill, is not such deliberation and premeditation as will fix an unlawful killing as murder of the first degree.

"To constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing and the reasons for and against a choice" -- remember that --

"And, having in mind the consequences, he decides and does kill."

Having in mind the consequences, mind you, he decides to and does kill.

While I am at it, I am going to read the

instruction of murder in the second degree.

"Murder in the second degree is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. When there is manifest an intention, unlawful, to kill a human being but the evidence is insufficient to establish deliberation and premeditation."

I think the key words are where there is manifest an intention, unlawful, to kill.

Now, the prosecution has repeatedly characterized the female defendants in this case and Mr. Watson as robots, zombies, automatons --

I think automatons is wrong. I'm quite sure it is automatons, with all due respect.

On one occasion he characterized the female defendants and Mr. Watson as mindless -- mindless robots.

Now, he is not doing this, ladies and gentlemen, just to turn a clever phrase or to embellish his argument, or as a figure of speech.

He's got something in mind. He is a very brilliant man, Mr. Bugliosi, and he's always got something in mind. He's always got a purpose; he doesn't do this out of hand.

I don't have to tell you what robots and zombies are; they are mindless; they don't have any minds; they cannot think; they cannot take alternatives; they cannot make decisions; they have no opinions; they can only

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And of course the prosecution has alleged vigorously that it is Mr. Manson who is the button pusher; he is directing all of the robots.

I don't know about Mr. Manson, but I will tell you why I think, and I can infer this, that the robot theory of murder was advanced by Mr. Bugliosi.

I would suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that the concept of young girls with no discernible motive whatsoever, killing people they have never even seen before or heard of, is such enormity that it is impossible for any of us to believe and accept, so the only way he is going to get you to believe these female defendants and Mr. Watson, were engaged in wrongdoing, is to try and convince you that they were under the total domination of somebody else; that they had no mind left, their minds were totally controlled by another person.

In other words, I don't think any of us can believe that this could have happened if it did happen.

From this record, ladies and gentlemen, and from all the reams of testimony you have heard about the domination over the Family, and I guess there must be something to it, certainly Mr. Bugliosi wouldn't have harped upon it if he did not think there was something to it, and I told you why.

And I get this from this record: I think the

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relationship, according to the prosecution between Manson and the Family, and Watson and the three female defendants in particular, is far deeper than, say, father to daughter and employer-employee, captain and pilot.

There is something very mystical, almost occult, about it.

And again, I am not using words to hear myself talk, because there are some illustrations in this record of that very thing.

This record discloses over and over again that all of these girls at the ranch believed Manson was God, really believed it!

The record discloses that the girls obeyed his commands without any conscious questioning at all; that no one ever interrupted him. He is the only one that ever had any opinions on any subject.

Either Ir. Bugliosi said or the record said, and I'm not sure which, on August 8th the climate at the ranch was such that no girl would disobey any instructions of Manson.

This is what Mr. Bugliosi inferred from that record, or it may have been actually testimony in the record. It doesn't make any difference.

Leslie Van Houten told Danny De Carlo, Manson knew all and saw all and was God.

Danny De Carlo says Tex Watson never gave an

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opinion on anything; that he went around with a blank stare.

But Linda Kasabian testifies that up to a certain point she thought Manson was God.

And the most striking example of mind control of all was the testimony that Susan Atkins was told by Manson to go to Brazil to get a coconut, and she started out of the door!

If you believe the prosecution theory, and that is it, ladies and gentlemen, these female defendants and Watson were extensions of Mr. Manson as if they were his additional arms and legs.

Now, if this is so, ladies and gentlemen, and it may well appear to you to be so from the evidence, these female defendants just cannot be convicted; they cannot be guilty of premeditated murder as I told you about.

For that matter they cannot be guilty of conspiracy to commit murder.

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First degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder are thinking man's crimes. You've got to think; you've got to weigh; you've got to decide; you've got to plan.

You've got to be aware of the consequences, the alternative; you have to sit down and talk about it and make up your mind.

These people did not have any minds to make up, according to Mr. Bugliosi.

As a matter of fact, ladies and gentlemen, I very seriously doubt from this record that these girls here before you, even had the mental capacity to harbor aforethought, which, as you know, is an element of first and second degree murder.

If you don't have malice aforethought, you are not guilty of murder.

Now, malice aforethought has been described, at least in connection with killing somebody, has been described as having the specific intent to kill them.

As Mr. Bugliosi pointed out, such intent can often be inferred from the circumstances of the killing, and that is the way he argued.

Look at this, anybody that did all these things had to have malice aforethought because it's obviously anybody who did this intended to kill the victims.

But intent takes thought. When you have an

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intent to do something you decide to do it.

I don't know whether any of these defendants, these female defendants, if they are automatons, can form a specific intent to do anything, much less kill somebody.

Now, scmebody had that intent -- somebody had

And is it so far-fetched, ladies and gentlemen, to determine, to find that there was something very much in the nature of a transferred intent in this case?

And mind you, I am just carrying on Mr. Bugliosi's own thoughts about the robot theory of murder.

Certainly we can all understand that someone who was extremely intoxicated from drugs or alcohol might be unable to form an intent to kill somebody even though they do it.

And we can all understand and agree that someone who is extremely mentally ill may be robbed of his or her capacity to form an intent to kill even though they do it.

And the reason people in such a state cannot form an intent to kill is their decision making power is inoperative; they are robbed of it.

It doesn't work any more. They are too drunk to know what they are doing. They are too mentally sick to know what they are doing. They cannot form an intent.

Then why can't that same rationale, ladies and gentlemen, be applied to this case?

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.25 26 I am not suggesting that the evidence does not seem to support it; that the female defendants were drunk or heavily under the influence of drugs, although it could be.

I am not suggesting necessarily they were so mentally ill that they could not understand and appreciate.

what they were doing, could not form an intent to kill, could not have malice aforethought.

Dut I do suggest, bearing all of the circumstances in mind and bearing in mind Mr. Bugliosi's argument, that each of the minds of these girls and Mr. Watson were totally controlled by someone else.

So not only did they not have the capacity to premeditate, they did not even have the capacity to form an intent to kill somebody, assuming they did kill anybody.

It sounds like a horror show, doesn't it, where you have the mad scientist and his assistant, Igor, exchanging brains between people.

But this is not science fiction, ladies and gentlemen, this is real life, and this is something that according to the prosecution happened, and if it did happen -- and this is not the first time, it has happened down through history -- Rasputin comes to mind off-hand, I'm sure there are many many other examples not recorded by history.

If this happens, bearing in mind the possibility

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of drug abuse, bearing in mind the possibility of mental illness and bearing very much in mind not only the probability but the certainty of mind control, absolute, these girls are not guilty of anything. They can't be. They did not have the requisite intent. Any crime has to be accompanied by a criminal intent. If you don't have it within yourself, you cannot form that intent, you are not guilty.

This is his argument. This is his baby, Mr. Bugliosi's.

And if you are intrigued with his argument, if you accept it, if you adopt it, then you must acquit the female defendants, no question about it.

I am not through with this concept -- I thought I was, but there are some constructions that I think you ought to consider.

THE COURT: Mr. Keith, we will take our recess at this time.

Ladies and gentlemen, do not converse with anyone or form or express an opinion regarding the case until it's finally submitted to you.

The court will recess for 15 minutes. (Recess.)

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THE COURT: All counsel and jurors are present.

You may continue, Mr. Keith.

MR. KEITH: Thank you, your Honor.

I am still on the same subject that we were discussing at the time of the recess.

In connection therewith, I am going to read to you two more basic principles of law concerning the manner in which you must view circumstantial evidence, because I feel that these instructions are germane to the issue of the robot theory of murder.

I am reading:

"The specific intent with which an act is done may be manifested by the circumstances surrounding its commission, but you may not find a defendant guilty of a willful, deliberate, premeditated murder of the first degree unless the proved circumstances not only are consistent with the hypothesis that he had the specific intent to kill a human being with malice aforethought which was the result of deliberation and premeditation as those terms are defined elsewhere in these instructions, but are irreconcilable with any other rational conclusion."

Now, isn't it rational, ladies and gentlemen, to conclude that these homicides, if they were committed by any of these female defendants, were done as a result of

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their minds being substituted with the mind of somebody else? With their minds being so dominated by somebody else's that they were robots, just as Mr. Bugliosi says? That they were Zombies?

I am going on with this instruction:

"Also, if the evidence as to such specific intent is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the existence thereof and the other to the absence thereof, you must adopt that interpretation which points to its absence.

"If, on the other hand, one interpretation of the evidence as to such specific intent appears to you to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to accept the reasonable interpretation and to reject the unreasonable."

Now, ladies and gentlemen, if there are two interpretations of the evidence -- I am not reading now -- one pointing to innocence of first degree murder and the other to guilt, then, according to the basic principles of criminal jurisprudence, you must accept that instruction which points to innocence of first degree murder.

And that is what I have been arguing right here:
That the female defendants didn't have the capacity to
premeditate, to deliberate, as those terms have been defined,

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because of a mental disability, in effect, caused by someone else. Then you must adopt that construction of the evidence even though you might find a reasonable interpretation of the evidence pointing to their guilt -- one interpretation innocence, one interpretation guilt -- you are duty bound to only accept the interpretation pointing to innocence and adopt that interpretation when you are viewing circumstantial evidence.

And this case is based primarily on circumstantial evidence, ladics and gentlemen.

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So, if you find that it is reasonable for these female defendants not to have formed an intent to kill, not to have deliberated, not to have premeditated — with their own minds, mind you, not somebody else's mind but their own minds — you have got to acquit.

And the exact same thing applies to the circumstantial evidence instruction concerning second-degree murder.

If there are two reasonable interpretations, you have got to adopt the reasonable interpretation pointing to innocence.

In other words, if you find it is reasonable that these girls couldn't form a specific intent to kill because they were mindless, couldn't possibly decide to kill anybody, no matter what short a span of time it might take to form some intent, they were disabled from doing so, because they weren't operating under their own minds, you can't find them guilty of second-degree murder, assuming you believe that this is a reasonable interpretation of the evidence. And it is a reasonable interpretation because Mr. Bugliosi, advanced this very argument, and he is not going to argue something to you that isn't reasonable, ladies and gentlemen.

Now we are going on into/discussion of conspiracy.

Now, conspiracy has been described by a legal scholar as the most dangerous toy in the prosecution's

nursery. And believe me; it is,

You might be interested to know that the concept of conspiracy was developed, and I will give you one guess, it was the Star Chamber, ladies and gentlemen. That is where the doctrine arose, back in the 17th Century.

I even know the name of the case, but it is immaterial.

The law of conspiracy has been criticized by legal scholars and even Supreme Court justices.

It is not a simple doctrine. It is complex.

It requires, as you will find out, more than one intent.

It requires two intents.

Now, Mr. Bugliosi gave you an example. He tried to make the concept easy for you to understand, and he tried to tell you how it was proven by circumstantial evidence, because seldom do you find direct evidence of a conspiracy, unless one of the conspirators actually testifies, and then you don't necessarily have sufficient proof.

But he told you about A and B robbing a bank.

They came in together and they had guns and they both held;

up the teller, and they both left together.

And obviously, from that example, A and B were conspirators, because they were acting in concert, in unison.

And it appears that way on the surface, doesn't

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But it isn't necessarily so.

Let's suppose that A, in this example, was an idiot. Let's suppose A is a lunatic. Let's suppose he is a mental defective. Let's suppose he is so drunk he doesn't know what he is doing, or so full of drugs he doesn't know what he is doing.

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The gist of a conspiracy is an agreement. Under such conditions. A may not be able to agree to anything. He might not even know his own name.

Let's suppose A is unconscious. You can commit a crime when you are unconscious, except it is a complete defense.

Let's suppose A is hypnotized, not acting under his own will power. Let's suppose A is a mindless robot.

Now, let's suppose A is coerced into robbing the bank with B. That is a defense.

In other words, B says to A: If you don't rob this bank with me, I am going to kill your wife and children.

That is a defense. Sure, he agrees, but he agrees under duress. Such an agreement isn't an agreement.

If we were talking about civil law, it would be unenforceable.

Now, under the conditions that I have outlined, A isn't a conspirator because he was never capable and never did enter into an agreement freely and voluntarily.

As Mr. Fitzgerald pointed out, the very gist of a conspiracy is the agreement. You have to agree. And when you agree to something, you intend to agree to it.

And when you agree to a criminal conspiracy, you not only enter into an agreement, but you agree to carry out its objects, its terms, conditions, purposes.

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As we will see in this discussion, it takes two intents to be a conspirator. You not only have to agree or intend to -- excuse me -- to intend to agree, and do agree.

And the conspiracy to commit first degree murder, you have to enter into an agreement intentionally with the requisite intent to commit first degree murder by premeditation and deliberation.

There are a lot of hurdles to overcome before you can be a conspirator to commit first degree murder.

Now, obviously, to be a co-conspirator, you must be aware of the nature of the project, the object of the conspiracy to be accomplished, and having such knowledge, you must intend to agree, and you agree.

And you agree to do what? To participate in the carrying out of the ultimate object of the conspiracy.

I suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that a mindless robot would be hard put to enter into a conspiracy of any kind, particularly a conspiracy to commit premeditated murder.

Now, I am going to give you some examples. We are going to use Λ and B.

You probably won't want to invite them to Christmas dinner either, along with Mr. DeCarlo, because they are not going to be very nice people, but I am going to show you that they aren't conspirators.

Now, A and B -- let's say A and B get on a bus by mistake, and in the bus there are 12 members of the Mafia and they are on their way to murder a rival gang.

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And they do so. They rub out the rival gang right before A and B's minds.

I say "minds," I have got "minds" on the brain.
Right in front of their eyes.

And A and B applaud because they don't like this rival gang either. They are a bad bunch.

But A and B are not conspirators even though they are there and even though they liked what they saw, because they had no knowledge of what was going to happen.

They didn't enter into an agreement. They were along for the ride by mistake.

Now, we can even assume that A and B, during the bus ride, overhear some conversation and they find out what is going on. They have knowledge of what is intended by the Mafia gang.

They are still not conspirators because they didn't enter into any agreement to participate in the joint venture, even though they know about it, they see it happen, and they approve of it.

I will go still further.

Let's suppose A and B, after the rival gang is rubbed out in front of their eyes, wipe off some finger-prints.

We are using the same hypothesis that we used before.

They find out about it, they like what they saw, they clap their hands. They never entered into any agreement,

though, to participate in this joint venture of wiping out the rival gang.

And suppose, after the killings, A and B wipe off some fingerprints.

They are not conspirators. They never agreed to participate in these killings.

Let's suppose A and B, after the rival gang is all dead, pump a couple of shots into the dead bodies.

They are not conspirators either. They didn't enter into any agreement.

Because the people were already dead, they didn't kill anybody or aid in killing anybody.

Here are some other examples.

A, B and C agree to commit a burglary, but B and C, unbeknownst to A, agree to commit murder. They all go out together, A, B and C, and lo and behold, B and C, with no help and no knowledge from A, commit the murder.

A is not liable for the murder, even though he is there, because he never entered into any agreement to help commit it, and he never did commit it. He didn't participate Lack of an agreement.

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What I am getting at, what I am trying to strive to convince you of, is the absolute necessity for an agreement. It is the sine qua non of a conspiracy. Without it, you don't have one.

I know you don't have to -- I am well aware that the prosecution does not have to prove a conspiracy necessarily by words of agreement. It can be proven -- I am not saying proven beyond a reasonable doubt -- but he could still prove a prima facie case, as it is called, by showing conduct and activity from which you can infer a conspiracy.

We will go into that later. I am giving you some examples to stress the agreement and the intent aspect of a conspiracy.

Now, getting back to these examples. We will go back to A, B and C again,

You see, we have A, B and C agreeing to commit a burglary, and B and C agreeing to commit murder, but A doesn't know about it.

Let's suppose that at some time in the course of the events, A finds out what B and C intend to do. He has knowledge, and he doesn't do anything to stop it, but he doesn't participate either in the commission of the murder.

Now, he knows about it. He doesn't do anything to stop it. But I submit, he is still not a co-conspirator in

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the crime of murder because he didn't enter into an agreement by words, conduct or otherwise.

All he was was present. That is not enough to make a conspirator.

As the Court will instruct you, mere association with co-conspirators isn't sufficient, as a matter of law, to render an individual libel for the object of the conspiracy.

And the purpose of that instruction is obvious. We don't have guilt by association in this country. You have to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt.

Now, it has been written by a famous legal scholar, his name is Harno, H-a-r-n-o, he wrote the textbook on criminal law, at least when I went to law school, and this is an excerpt from a law review article contained in 89 University of Pennsylvania Law Review. The page number escapes me. But he says this, Mr. Harno:

"To prove a conspiracy" -- I am quoting now -- "To prove a conspiracy, it must be shown that the accused had knowledge of it. But mere knowledge or even the approval of an unlawful design are not of themselves sufficient."

This is what I have been getting at in these examples.

"The evidence must establish that there was a unity of intent on the part of two or more

"persons to accomplish the ends char

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Knowledge and approval, association, even all three, aren't enough. You have to show an agreement, an intent to unite in a common object.

Here is an actual case that was quoted in that law review article, or discussed, I should say. It is an older case.

This is the way it goes:

A, who had a grievance against C, told B that he would whip C if someone would pay his fine.

They were always whipping people a hundred years ago instead of beating them up.

B -- listen to this -- I will start over.

A, who had a grievance against C, told B if he would whip C, someone would pay his fine, that is, B's fine.

B told A he didn't want anybody to pay his fine, that he. B, had a grievance against C and would whip him at the first opportunity.

B then whipped C.

A did not assist B, but after the assault, A expressed his approval.

The Court said there was no conspiracy because } there wasn't any agreement, and went on to say that mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of an act without cooperation or agreement, or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute the crime of conspiracy.

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Just as I have been saying.

Well, that is enough of the law of conspiracy.

I just want to leave you with the thought that this is not an easy crime to prove, particularly beyond the reasonable doubt.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, we are going to go into the testimony of Linda Kasabian as it refers to and mentions Leslie Van Houten, and we are going to analyze it — and it is not very long, so don't worry — in the light of what we know now about the law of conspiracy, and also in the light of the basic circumstantial evidence instruction.

I have read to you a couple, two, circumstantial evidence instructions -- one, I believe -- but this is the basic one, when we analyze Mrs. Kasabian's testimony in the light of the law of conspiracy and in the light of this instruction that I am about to read to you, which is all important.

I don't know whether I have already said so, but it is just as important as the law of reasonable doubt.

Don't think I am conceding that what Mrs. Kasabian said is so, or that you should believe it. We are only assuming, arguendo, for the sake of argument, that what she said might be true.

And when we discuss her testimony as it relates to Leslie Van Houten -- and others, for that matter -- we are going to be drawing inferences and we are going to be

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25° 26 making deductions, just like Sherlock Holmes.

Now, here is this basic principle of criminal law. I am reading.

"You are not permitted to find a defendant guilty of any crime charged against him based on circumstantial evidence unless the proved circumstances are not only consistent with the theory that the defendant is guilty of the crime, but cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion."

Now, you have heard that before. This is a different one. Going on.

"And each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish the defendant's guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

"Also, if the evidence as to any particular count is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to a defendant's guilt and the other to his innocence, it is your duty to adopt that interpretation which points to his innocence and rejects the other which points to his guilt."

We discussed that heretofore. But that paragraph which I have just read cannot be emphasized too much, and I am sure you will hear it again from me, and, of course, you are going to hear it from his Honor.

Going on:

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"You will notice that the second paragraph of this instruction applies only when both of the interpretations appear to you to be reasonable. If, on the other hand, one of the interpretations appears to be reasonable and the other to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to adopt the reasonable interpretation and to reject the unreasonable interpretation."

Now, I am going to try to show you, to the best of my ability, ladies and gentlemen, that any interpretation after analyzing Linda Kasabian's testimony pointing toward guilt, is unreasonable. But even if it were reasonable, if there is an interpretation or an inference pointing to innocence, you still have got to reject the guilty interpretation and it is your duty to accept the innocent interpretation.

Here is another -- I am going to read another sentence over again in this instruction. It is in the first paragraph.

"And each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish the defendant's guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt."

We are going to talk about that, too, that sentence, which is also very significant.

Now, for the sake of convenience -- you heard me talk about a set of circumstances -- for the sake of

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convenience, and perhaps somewhat arbitrarily, I envision four sets of circumstances in this case as it applies to Miss Van Houten.

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The first set of circumstances -- and I will call this Scene 1 -- is what happened in the bunk house on the second night, August 9th.

That is the bunk house scene.

Now, the second scene, which I will call Scene 2, is this tortuous car ride throughout Los Angeles County with the seven people in the old Ford.

Scene 3 is the scene outside the La Bianca home on Waverly Drive where Manson is supposed to have gone in the La Bianca house and tied some people up. We will talk about that, too.

And the fourth scene, if you can call it a scene, revolves around the testimony of Dianne Lake as it concerns Miss Van Houten.

Now, within each of these sets of circumstances are a variety of facts. I am not saying admitted facts. Don't misunderstand me. But to me, in this particular context, a fact can be a word, it can be a reaction to a word, it can be a lack of a word that should be there that isn't, it can be conduct, it can be reaction to an event or a particular act, it could be a lack of reaction or lack of conduct where you might expect somebody to do something and they don't.

That is a fact -- at least by my interpretation -- from which we can draw an inference. It may be a fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to

establish guilt. And if each fact isn't proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must acquit. 6. . 10 12. **ļ**7 8 . 20 25. 26 -

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We go to the evidence.

This is Linda Kasabian's direct testimony. testimony on direct examination, we will start at Page 5197 of Volume 32 of the daily transcript, Line 4. This is August 9th;

"Then Charlie came in and called Katie and Leslie and myself aside and told us to go get a change of clothes and meet him in the bunk house, which we did."

Who did? It doesn't say.

Did he give you any specific nG. instructions in addition to that?

Yes. He told me to get my driver's license."

This is ilr. Manson telling Linda Kasabian to get her driver's license.

Page 5198;

 $\mathfrak{G}_{\mathfrak{U}}$ So this is Mr. Manson, then, telling you, Katie and Leslie Van Houten, to get a change of clothing and meet him in the bunk house.

Yes.

nO. Did you in fact get a change of clothing and get your driver's license?

> uA. Yes, I did.

пŲ. And then you went to the bunk house? 11 A. Yes."

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Now, she doesn't say anything else -- she doesn't say anything about anybody else getting a change of clothing, just Linda Kasabian got a change of clothing.

Remember something, Leslie Van Houten, it is undisputed, was not present the night before, and for all we know, from this record, never knew anything about what happened the night before.

You have to bear that in mind, of course.

All right, I will go on at Line 9:

"Q And then you went to the bunk house.

¹¹A. Yes.

"Q When you arrived at the -- strike that.

"When you say the bunk house, are you referring to the bunk room, the one that you pointed out on this map where Danny De Carlo was?

"A. Yes.

"Q So bunk room and bunk house are interchangeable in your mind?

"A. No, it's the same room."

And then at Line 23:

"Q After you arrived at the bunk house was anyone else there?

"A Yes, Clem and Charlie and Sadie and Tex and I know I, myself, was there, and I don't know if -- I don't remember if I walked with somebody there or not or if I want by myself, but

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"eventually we were all there."

Who is "we"?

That is the first question. This is what I am talking about, these facts that create a set of circumstances did they prove them beyond a reasonable doubt?

According to this answer, Leslie was not even there.

She does say, "Eventually we all were there."

What does "eventually" mean, sooner or later?

It's just as reasonable to infer that it was later as far as Leslie Van Houten is concerned, as sooner.

It is a reasonable inference from this testimony that we have already seen that Miss Van Houten did not hear anything of the ensuing conversation.

We will go on.

"Q Do you recall how everyone was dressed?"

That is a question.

"Would you repeat that, Mrs. Kasabian, who was present inside the bunk house?"

There is some colloquy. Let me start again. I confused you.

"Question" -- at Line 15:

"Who was present inside the bunk house?

"A. Well, I cannot remember the exact
faces that were there at the moment I walked in,

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"but eventually" --

Again this word "eventually", and I am not nitpicking, ladies and gentlemen, this is serious --

"But eventually we were all there which was myself, Charlie, Leslie, Katie, Sadie, Tex and Clem."

When did Leslie get there? It doesn't say. Eventually she did.

Now, going on:

"Q Did Er. Manson say anything to you and the others, once you were all together in the bunk house?

"A. Yes, he did.

"Q What did he say?

"A He said we were going to go out again tonight. Last night was too messy, and that he was going to show us how to do it."

What does that mean, ladies and gentlemen, to somebody who was not around the night before? Assuming Manson said this.

Number one, we don't even know if Miss Van Houten heard that, if she did not get there until eventually, whatever that means.

And, secondly, does that show that she entered into a conspiracy then to murder somebody?

Can't we infer that even if she heard that remark,

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even if she heard it, she would not understand what it meant?

Bearing in mind she was not present the night before and bearing in mind from this record she did not know anything about what happened the night before.

Going on:

"Q Did anyone say anything when Mr. Manson said this?

"A. Not at the moment.

Did Tex say anything inside the bunk house?

"A. At one point he said that we needed better weapons; the weapons we took last night were not effective; they weren't good enough."

Well, number one, who heard him say that?
Linda did. Linda Kasabian, apparently, if he said it.
I will go into that.

But where is the evidence that Leslie Van Houten or anybody else in the bunk house heard him say that?

And furthermore, I don't believe he ever said it, and I will tell you why.

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 The man with the blank stare; he never voices an opinion; he never has anything to say, only follows orders.

To him Manson is supposed to be God. What is he doing at this point? He is criticizing his God. He is telling him, he is saying "God, you gave us lousy weapons last night."

Do you think Watson said that? Of course he didn't.

Gertainly, this is an important statement. Each fact -- that is a fact -- each fact was essential to complete the set of circumstances. It must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Don't you have a reasonable doubt, ladies and gentlemen, that Watson said that? He is the man that doesn't say anything.

Going on:

"Q Did you see any knives or guns inside the bunkhouse?

"A Yes, I did.

"Q What did you see?

"A I saw two long swords, that is all I recall.

"O Do you recall whether any of the persons in the bunkhouse picked up any of these swords?

"A No. I didn't see anybody.

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"Q Did you eventually all leave the bunk-house?

"A Yes.

"Q Did you leave as a group?"

Well, that question was withdrawn by Mr.

Bugliosi:

") Did you all leave the bunkhouse at approximately the same time?

"A Yes.

"Q Where did you all go from there?

"A We went to the car.

"Q What car did you go to?

"A The same car we took the night before,
Johnny Swartz' car." And so on.

That is the end of the bunkhouse scene, ladies and gentlemen, as I have termed it, and that is the set of circumstances, and it's an important scene in this case.

And is there anything in that scene that would lead you to believe that at that time Miss Van Houten agreed to enter into a conspiracy to commit first degree murder after all of the instructions I have read to you about that subject?

There is absolutely no showing in that scene that Miss Van Houten agreed to do anything except by her conduct again in the car.

Cannot we infer from that scene -- cannot we

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draw a reasonable inference that Miss Van Houten did not at that juncture enter into any conspiracy to commit murder?

No. 1, we don't even know whether she heard any of these purported statements.

No. 2, perhaps the most ominous of the statements, that I seriously doubt was ever made, and I suggest that you should have not only a reasonable doubt that it was made, but you should reject it, I suggest, ladies and gentlemen, it would be unreasonable to infer from the bunkhouse scene that we have just discussed that Miss Van Houten agreed to do anything other than to get in the car.

Remember the examples I gave to you. This does not show knowledge; it doesn't show approval; it doesn't show anything as far as she is concerned.

Now we go to the car ride scene. Here we go, we are on our way, page 5211, Volume 33:

"O Did you see any knives or guns or anything inside the car?

"A No, not at first.

no Did you at any time while you were inside the car see any knives or a gun?

"A Yes.

"Q When?

"A Later in the journey there were two tknives under the seat?

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^{II}Q. Pardon?

Yes.

Two knives?

 $\mathbf{A}^{\mathbf{n}}$ Yes, two knives under the seat."

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Well, we know, according to this evidence that

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Miss Van Houten got in the back seat.

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Here were two knives under the front seat, so

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any knowledge of them; that anybody told her about any

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it's reasonable to infer if there were two knives that she did not see them because there is no evidence that she had weapons being in the car.

Now, on page 5234 of the transcript, Linda Kasabian testified that she had no idea that she was going that there was going to be any killing on the first night; that she had thought she was going on a creepy-crawly mission, and on the second night she knew what was going to happen, she says.

Linda Kasabian thought on the first night she was going on a creepy-crawly mission. It would appear to me even more apparent from the evidence that Leslie Van Houten had the same state of mind.

If you happen to believe Linda Kasabian's professed lack of knowledge as to what was going to happen on the first night, I'm sure you can believe Leslie Van Houten had even less knowledge as to what was going to happen on the second night. There is no evidence anyone

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told her anything about what was going to happen.

Now, we are driving a car. Mr. Manson alone, he is the only one that gave the directions. The people in the back — throughout this whole car ride up to the La Bianca home, the people in the back seat never said a word the entire time, according to this record.

Manson gave all the directions.

On Page 5247 they stop at a small one-story house.

The houses were sort of close together. There was a small lot in front of it. This is a small one-story house. It appears to be in the middle-class area of the town and the home was not old-fashioned; it wasn't modern.

The home was apparently in Pasadena some place.

Mr. Manson got out. They drove around the block.

Then Mr. Manson got back in the car. This was the first stop at a small one-story house.

We have no idea what was in the mind of Mr. Manson when he got out if he did get out, if he was there at all.

But I doubt if he were there, and if he did get out, that he had murder on his mind or homicide because he is supposed to be the man who has such a vendetta against rich people, the establishment.

Do you really believe he is going to stop in.

front of a small one-story middle-class house in Pasadena

to try and kill somebody?

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He is not interested, according to the prosecution, in killing people of moderate means. He's only interested in killing rich people, if you believe this, members of the establishment.

There is nothing in this record to show what his purpose was in getting out, nothing in the record to show whether if he had a purpose he conveyed it to anyone else in the car.

So they drove off -- no, they don't drive off, excuse me. He gets back in the car and they see a man and a woman, and they look at the man and the woman.

And Manson says on Page 5250 of the transcript,

Manson is supposed to have said — here are the exact words

"He said something like the man is too

big, and he told me to drive on."

Now, you can't draw any inferences from that that will convince you beyond a reasonable doubt of Leslie Van Houten's guilt.

There is no showing, number one, she even heard it.

There is no showing, number two, with all this inference, that she knew what the reference, if any, was.

THE COURT: Mr. Keith, it's 12:00 o'clock. Will counsel approach the bench, please, before we recess?

(The following proceedings were had at the

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bench out of the hearing of the jury:)

THE COURT: I was concerned with one statement you made at the outset of your argument, Mr. Keith, you said in substance that Linda Kasabian and Dianne Lake were the only witnesses against Leslie Van Houten.

MR. KEITH: Oh, yes, Barbara Hoyt testified to her hiding under the bed sheet, yes, I discounted that.

THE COURT: That is a perfectly legitimate argument. I wanted to make sure you did it with knowledge and not in ignorance.

MR. KEITH: I know Barbara Hoyt had her hiding under the sheet.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Do you have any idea how much longer you are going to be?

MR. KEITH: It looks like I'm going the rest of the day.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I would like to start tomorrow, if possible, if he finishes that late.

THE COURT: He has indicated he is going for most of the day.

MR. BUGLIOSI: You will?

MR. KEITH: Yes, so don't worry about it.

(The following proceedings were had in open court in the presence and hearing of the jury:)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, do not converse with anyone or form or express any opinion regarding

the case until it is finally submitted to you. The Court will recess until 1:45. (whereupon, a recess was taken to reconvene at 1:45 p.m., same day.) . ĺO

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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, TUESDAY, JANUARY 12, 1971 2:01 o'clock p.m.

(The following proceedings occur in open court.
All jurors present. All counsel present. Defendants
absent.)

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I address the Court?

THE COURT: All counsel and jurors are present.

Yes, Mr. Kanarek?

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I would like to apologize to the Court, the jury, counsel and co-counsel.

I was at the telephone in the hallway, your Honor. I am sorry.

THE COURT: You may continue your argument, Mr. Keith.
MR. KEITH: Thank you, your Honor.

Ladies and gentlemen, at the recess we were discussing Linda Kasabian's testimony describing this rather unusual, to say the least, automobile ride all over Los Angeles County, seemingly without purpose.

I wasn't discussing it without purpose, but the car ride seems to be without purpose.

And we had gotten to the point where the automobile had parked in front of a middle class house, according to Miss Kasabian, and Mrs. Kasabian drove around the block while Manson was out of the car.

Now, the purpose, again, in analyzing the

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testimony of Mrs. Kasabian in this area is so that we can draw certain inferences from her testimony to determine whether these inferences point towards the innocence of Miss Van Houten or towards her guilt, or both.

And again, I re-emphasize, if the facts developed during this testimony point toward innocence, even if you can draw a reasonable inference that they point toward guilt, you still have to adopt the inference that points towards innocence, assuming it is reasonable.

And I am suggesting to you that there is nothing that we have unearthed in this transcript so far as it relates to Miss Van Houten from which you cannot reasonably draw a deduction pointing towards innocence.

There is no evidence as yet from which we can infer an agreement on the part of Miss Van Houten to conspire to commit murder in the first degree by premeditation and deliberation.

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We have not even found out anything yet from this transcript whereby we can infer that she even knew what was going on or what was planned or what was intended, if anything was.

We were on page 5250, Volume 33 of the transcript, where Mrs. Kasabian is saying:

"He said something like 'The man is too big,' and told me to drive on."

That is approximately where we left off, and then she goes on to say on that same page:

"Charlie told us that when he had walked up to the house" --

This is the small house in the allegedly middle-class neighborhood, and I have already told you I wonder if you should not have a reasonable doubt that that ever happened because according to all the evidence produced by Mr. Bugliosi, Mr. Manson is not interested in middle-class people; he is interested in people of means, people who are members of the establishment.

Why on earth would he bother there with somebody who lived in a small house who obviously would not have the means of some other person who might live in a big house.

But at any rate:

"Charlie told us when he walked up to the house and looked into the window that he saw pictures of children; that he couldn't do it." 1

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Couldn't do what? It doesn't say that he couldn't go in. But he said later on that we should not let children stop us for the sake of the children of the future.

Well, who did he say that to? When did he say it? When was later on? Did Miss Van Houten hear that? What inference did she draw from a statement like that, assuming she heard it, what was her reaction to that statement if she did hear it?

We don't know.

We are left in the dark. That is why I say this evidence is insufficient for an inference pointing towards guilt so far.

Then we go on with the trip, and the next thing, I think, of any significance, which occurs at page 5253 of the transcript where they stop, the group stopped in front of -- according to Mrs. Kasabian -- a modern expensive type home. She saw no people.

Here is what she says:

"It was a big house. I don't know if it was two-story or not. It was sort of an A-frame at the top of a hill."

She is shown a photograph which she identifies and she says that she is pretty sure this is the house in front of which she stopped.

And at page 5255 of the transcript, line 20:

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"Did Manson say anything while you were parked in front of that house?"

And Mr. Bugliosi is referring to the modern expensive type house.

And the answer is:

"He just said that the houses were too $\mbox{,}$ close together."

"Q What happened next?

"A We drove off."

Now, would you think that that happened, that that might be the sort of place Manson might be interested in entering, but he didn't -- either they were too close together, because there were no people around?

So can you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that that incident occurred?

Now, when I'm talking to you I am continuously, as you probably realize, referring to the basic circumstantial evidence instruction and I am going to bore you to death talking about it, but it is totally essential, each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish the defendants guilt has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

So we are discussing these facts as testified to by Mrs. Kasabian not only on the issue of the inferences you can draw from her testimony, but also whether each of these incidents to which she has had reference has been

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established beyond a reasonable doubt in your mind.

And when we are discussing reasonable doubt, naturally, we talk about logic and reason just as we do in discussing the other part of that instruction concerning reasonable inferences.

Now, the next thing that happened on this trip is when they stopped at a church somewhere in Pasadena or San Marino.

And Linda Kasabian says he was going to go in, this is page 5256 of the transcript, line 26:

"He was going to go in" -- referring to Mr. Manson -- "and find a minister or preacher or priest or whoever was in there.

"And he got out of the car, walked to the door, came back and said the doors were locked."

Now, there is nothing in that evidence from which we could draw an adverse inference against Miss Van Houten.

We don't know what Mr. Manson's purpose in going to find a minister was, from this record, and if you can draw a -- or if you want to draw a sinister inference from going to find a preacher, I suggest that you would be erroneous because here is Manson who was supposed to think he is God going to try and kill a minister who is also a man of God.

That doesn't make sense.

I suggest that you should view that testimony and disregard it as having a reasonable doubt to its truth, and also you can view it in the context of this state of Miss Van Houten, as adding nothing to show that she was a conspirator.

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And the next incident of any importance, as I read the record, is the incident following the small white sports car, which occurs on Page 5270 of the transcript and then continues on Page 5273, -74 and -75.

According to Mrs. Kasabian, Manson had planned to kill whoever was driving the small white sports car.

So, I ask you: Don't you have a reasonable doubt as to whether that incident actually occurred?

And remember again, Mr. Manson is supposed to be interested in fomenting a black-white race war by killing members of the establishment, killing rich people.

Now, who drives small white sport cars? In all probability, it isn't somebody that can be placed in that category. Think about it.

As a matter of fact, we don't even know from this record whether it was a Negro or not driving this sports car. Why would Mr. Manson want to kill somebody who, in all probability — and we don't know for sure, but that is a reasonable inference — who, in all probability, wasn't rich, wasn't a member of the establishment?

I suggest there is a reasonable doubt, ladies and gentlemen, as to whether that incident actually occurred.

And going farther, / that evidence, if believed, concerning the white sports car, does that evidence indicate to you that at that time Miss Van Houten

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25 26 had joined a conspiracy? Is that evidence sufficient?

We don't even know whether she heard what Manson said to Mrs. Kasabian, if Manson said anything. She was in the back seat.

We don't know, we don't have any idea, because there is no evidence as to what her reaction was to that incident, assuming it took place for the sake of argument.

All we know is that she was there.

Now, we know from my previous discussion on that subject that to join a conspiracy one not only has to have knowledge but intent, and two intents at that, the intent to agree and the intent to carry out the object of the conspiracy.

So far, I suggest to you, that this evidence is insufficient even to supply knowledge, to provide Miss Van Houten knowledge with the purpose and object of any conspiracy, if any there was, much less to show she actually entered into any agreement for the purpose of carrying out some nefarious plot.

I am very sincere in advising you that I would look upon that incident as described by Mrs. Kasabian with caution because it doesn't fit in with the Manson theories, the Manson philosophy, if you will, as espoused by Mr. Bugliosi, and as shown by numerous witness from the witness stand.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, that is the end of the

20,824 second scene, the car ride. Because then we get outside of Harold True's house. And now we are going into the third scene of this set of circumstances. This is the third set of circumstances.

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I am being arbitrary. You can say the entire panorama of evidence is one set of circumstances. I am just doing this for convenience sake. Here it is at 2:00 a.m. in the morning, approximately, and Manson gets out of the car, according to Mrs. Kasabian, and goes next door.

I don't have to read this. I will synopsize this as quickly as I can, because it has been gone into at length by Mr. Kanarek.

Mr. Bugliosi said 2:00 a.m. in the morning, that is only when the hobgoblins are out.

I can't help thinking that he hasn't met my teen-age daughters. It is early for a lot of people these days.

At any rate, he returns in several minutes, and here we get to the very significant part of the case.

Excuse me. I missed something.

Every one remained in the car when Manson got out. He put something in his pants that Mrs. Kasabian didn't know what it was. He disappeared up the walkway leading to Harold True's house.

That is at Page 5281.

Then he returned in a very few minutes, about as much time as it took to smoke a part of or most of a cigarette.

And then at Page 5288:

"What happened after Mr. Manson returned

"car?

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"A He called Leslie and Katie and Tex out of the car.

"Clem jumped in the back seat with Sadie, and I pushed over on the passenger's side, and I heard bits and pieces of the conversation that he had with Tex and Katie."

Now, this is interesting. She is saying she overheard a conversation that Manson had with Tex and Katie.

I suggest to you that the omission of Leslie is significant.

"What did you hear him say?

"I heard him say that there was a man and a woman up in the house and he tied their hands, and he told them not to be afraid, he wasn't going to hurt them."

Then Mr. Bugliosi very smartly fills in the gap, the omission.

"Did he give any instructions to Tex, Katie and Leslie Van Houten? Did he give them any instructions at all?"

An objection to that question was sustained. Then Mr. Bugliosi goes on.

"Did he say anything else to Leslie, Katie and Tex?"

Now, Mrs. Kasabian, in an answer that I previously

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I am not so sure that was an oversight.

We can certainly infer from that answer that Leslie was not part of the conversation, and that Mr. Bugliosi picked up the omission by including it in a question that he

poses a short time after that answer.

referred to, had Mr. Manson talking only to Tex and Katie.

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:25 Now, Mrs. Kasabian continues.

"At one point he instructed them, for Leslie and Tex to hitchhike back to the ranch" -- I am reading now -- "and for Katie to go to the waterfall."

This is at page 5289.

Well, I find it exceedingly difficult to accept that Mr. Manson, or anybody else, if they are bent on murder and instructing people to commit murder, that they are going to be instructed to hitchhike on the streets at night,

I don't care what Mr. Bugliosi says about 2:00 a.m. There are plenty of people out at night in this County and in that area.

And it seems to me highly unlikely, highly unreasonable, for persons to be instructed to hitchhike after having killed somebody, particularly in the manner that the La Biancas were killed, because if they are going to hitchhike back in the wide open spaces and stand on street corners, they are going to have blood all over their clothes, in all probabilities, and this is not reasonable.

The instruction itself falls of its own weight simply because this is not something -- this isn't an instruction, an order, that anybody would give in the context in which it was given.

Hitchhiking? When you may well be covered with blood? This is madness, ladies and gentlemen, it is insane, and I suggest you have a reasonable doubt that

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that language was ever given or ever spoken.

Now, another interesting point occurred to me.

Mr. Manson is supposed to have returned from the La Bianca house and told these people that he had two people tied up in the house.

Now, we know from the evidence that there was only one person tied up in the house. At least that is what I got from the record. If I am misstating it, I don't mean to, but that is what I glean from the record and from the exhibits. Only one person was tied up, Mr. La Bianca.

Now, why, then, if only one person was tied up, did Mr. Manson say there were two people tied up?

I suggest to you that if Manson went in the house, if he ever did, if he went in there and if he had seen Mrs. La Bianca in the house, he would have tied her up.

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The inference I draw is that Manson only saw one person in the house and only tied up one person. I don't know how he did it, if he did it, because that's a very complicated knot.

I don't know how he did anything like that alone; I cannot understand it, without causing a commotion.

That in itself is not logical.

But what I'm getting at is I don't believe from the evidence that Mr. Manson said, "There are two people in the house and I've got them both tied up."

I don't know what he said, but he could not have saidthat.

If he had known there were two people in he house, maybe he would have tied them both up, so we reach the conclusion, the deduction that he only saw one person in the house and only tied up on person, so we go from that deduction to the next deduction that he didn't say what he was purported to say because he couldn't have; it did not happen that way.

And there is another one that occurred to me:
Can any of you understand or draw any logical inference or
reason as to why Mr. Manson would have gone in that house
alone in the first place?

From the evidence that is in this record he did not know who was living in there; nobody did. Nobody in that group did.

As far as he knew it could have been a house full of professional football players and they would have torn that little fellow limb from limb; how could be possibly have taken the chance of going into this house alone? Something is amiss with this evidence.

No, I'm not trying to be funny, actually, there could have been somebody waiting for him there with a shot-gun, a house full -- oh, any -- anything you can think of could have well have been possible. He did not know who was living there.

And he goes in there and blithely ties somebody up with a very complicated knot, as you will see from the pictures -- you already have.

Something is amiss, ladies and gentlemen.

But if he had a weapon -- and I don't know he did, in order to tie that knot I'm sure it would require two hands, and any weapon he used he would have to put down, and at that time you would think that Mr. La Bianca, who was a bigger man than Mr. Manson, could have just done all kinds of interesting things with him.

But no, there is no evidence in this record of a struggle, which is unusual. It is most curious, and I don't understand why.

I know Mr. Bugliosi gave you an explanation that he bemused these people, but that in itself does not seem reasonable.

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Remember what I said about self-preservation earlier, you are going to fight if you feel your life is in danger, and these people didn't. It is very awry/very curious, ladies and gentlemen.

Now, I am going to continue on with the scene outside of the La Bianca residence, and we get to the nitty-gritty, the very, very significant details.

"Mr. BUGLIOSI: Did he say anything to them?"

I don't know whether he means Tex and Katie, or Leslie and Tex and Katie:

"Did he say anything to them about killing?"

"THE WITNESS:" -- Mrs. Kasabian -- "I'm not positive, but it keeps ringing in my head that he said, 'Don't let them know that you are going to kill them.'"

Well, that is a built-in reasonable doubt, ladies and gentlemen.

Remember, each fact essential to complete a set of circumstances has to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before we can convict anybody.

It is obvious that this is a very important sentence that Mr. Manson is reported to be speaking, and if Linda Kasabian is not sure Mr. Manson said this, how could we be sure?

We weren't there; we should be even less sure.

That is a built-in reasonable doubt. 1 This is an important fact. There is another statement: "MR. BUGLIOSI:" -- this is on Page 5293: IEO. Did Mr. Manson say anything to Tex, Katie and Leslie about fear or panic?" Again Mr. Bugliosi supplied the omission, because Mrs. Kasabian started out by saying he was only 8 talking to Tex and Katie, and now Mr. Bugliosi has got `-9 Leslie in the picture, as any good lawyer should. 10 The answer is: "Yes, I think I heard him 11 say not to cause fear and panic in these people." 12 13. 14 15 16. 17 18. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

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Again, I think -- if she is not sure, how could we be sure? We weren't there. You've got to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that that was said.

And again, the reasonable doubt is built in.
"I think I heard."

You've got to, ladies and gentlemen, I sincerely suggest to you, and submit to you, discount that purported statement by Manson, if for no other reason, simply because the witnesses herself is not sure it was said, and the same applies to the other statement about "Don't let them know you are going to kill them."

Now, after that purported statement was made,
Linda and Mr. Manson and the rest of the troup in the car
is supposed to have driven off, driven away, and anything
else that happened during the rest of the automobile journey
does not apply, it has no relevance to Miss Van Houten, as G
you already know, I'm sure, so I won't discuss it.

But up to this point, and we have covered three scenes now, the bunkhouse scene, the car ride scene and the scene outside the La Bianca residence, can you say beyond a reasonable doubt that Miss Van Houten was a member of a conspiracy to commit first degree murder, knowing what we know about what it takes to be a conspirator, what evidence has to be produced to show that somebody is a member of a conspiracy to commit first degree murder by premeditation and

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deliberation?

I suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that it is reasonable, eminently reasonable to draw the inference that she did not even have knowledge --

She might have had an inkling, I don't care, find that if you want -- but she did not even have knowledge of what was planned if, assuming some dark deed was planned.

From this record how can you legitimately draw a reasonable inference pointing to guilt, even?

She said nothing -- this is Miss Van Houten -- she did nothing; she was along for the ride, that is all we really know so far.

She may or may not have heard some comments.

She may, on the part of Linda -- on the part of Linda Kasabian and Mr. Manson.

She may have witnessed certain conduct on the part of Mr. Manson, but does that evidence in and of itself convince you that she joined a conspiracy to commit first degree murder?

Remember what I said about first degree murder by premeditation, it is a thinking man's crime. You have to weigh the pros and cons all the way, I'm not going to go through all that again. You remember it.

But I want you all to ask yourselves, is the evidence at this point even barely sufficient to establish her as a conspirator, as a co-conspirator?

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There is nothing here to show she agreed to do anything, and, what's more, there is nothing here to show she had knowledge of what is going on and knowledge alone is not enough; you have to agree and agree and agree to commit murder.

And if you are going to infer from this evidence that she was a member of a conspiracy, I am afraid you are going to have to do it by speculation and, as you well know, the law does not permit you or I, and you are the judges, it doesn't make any difference what I think really, you are the judges.

The law does not permit you to speculate.

Mr. Fitzgerald covered that phase of your duties very beautifully.

Now, I have not discussing aiding and abetting yet, although I am about to, in connection with Dianne Lake's testimony, and I haven't done so simply because I feel that—and this applies to anybody, I will put it in the abstract—if you are a conspirator, if you really and truly are a conspirator, you also are an aider and abettor automatically, and I think that Mr. Bugliosi would agree with me, because if you are a conspirator you plan to commit a crime, you agree to commit it, you may instigate it, you encourage it, the same sort of principle applies to aiding and abetting.

You can be an aider and abettor even though you are not there. You have to instigate the crime or

encourage it or do something to facilitate its commission.

And if you are an aider and abetter at this stage, you are also a conspirator and vice versa.

So I deliberately left those principles out of my discussion, and only concern myself with the law of conspiracy as applied to the facts in this case.

Now we arrive at Dianne Lake's testimony.

As I have said before, and I think it bears repeating, the prosecution's case rests largely on her testimony.

If you don't believe her, under the law, I submit to you, the law of this state, there is no case against Miss Van Houten, and she must be acquitted.

But I cannot let things rest there. I have to I feel I have to go into Dianne Lake's testimony concerning
Miss Van Houten because you might -- you just might -- I
hope you don't -- but you just might believe her testimony
regarding Miss Van Houten or parts of her testimony.

And in going over Miss Lake's testimony we will try to use the same analysis that we used for Linda Kasabian's.

What inferences can we draw from that testimony?

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If we can draw reasonable inferences pointing towards innocence, then you must adopt that construction of Dianne Lake's testimony, even though you might draw a reasonable inference pointing toward guilt.

You must be getting sick of this broken record, but again I submit that rule of law, that principle of law cannot be overemphasized, it cannot be repeated enough.

Now, Dianne Lake has Leslie Van Houten telling
Dianne Lake, "Don't let that man see me or let him in
because he has just given me a ride from Griffith Park."

I am paraphrasing to some extent.

Then Miss Van Houten is supposed to have hid under a sheet.

Now, what inferences can we draw from that testimony? Can we not draw an inference, ladies and gentlemen, a reasonable inference that she did -- assuming this is true, assuming this is what was said and what happened, and please don't misunderstand me, I am not conceding this is what was said or what happened, but for the sake of argument only, assuming that happened, what inferences can we draw? Is it not reasonable to infer that the reason Leslie Van Houten -- she is a very pretty girl, as you know -- hid under the sheet and did not want to let the man see her is because she feared for her own safety -- perfectly reasonable, she did not like the guy that gave her a ride back from GriffithPark.

She thought she might get assaulted or something.

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It is more reasonable to draw that conclusion from this incident than to give that incident a sinister meaning.

And even if you want to give it a sinister connotation, if you can also infer reasonably that there is an innocent interpretation that she did not want to be involved with this man, then you have to reject any sinister interpretation you may wish to draw in that incident.

Here we go, Page 16,722. Some time later, not at the Spahn Ranch, but up at the Barker Ranch or Willow Springs, this is at Page 16,722 of the transcript, Miss Van Houten is supposed to have told Dianne Lake that she stabbed someone that was already dead, and that she then wiped fingerprints off of things that were not even thouched.

And she also is supposed to have said at first she did not want to do it, but the more that she did it the more fun it was.

Now, this is not very nice; it isn't very pleasant, if it were said at all.

It's macabre, it's gruesome.

But we are not convicting anybody because they did something that might to you appear or to anybody else appear revolting. We are here to determine whether

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Miss Van Houten is guilty of murder or conspiracy to commit murder.

We are not here to convict the young lady because she did something that is repugnant.

To us now, this is the testimony, ladies and gentlemen, incidentally, that you must view with caution, or ought to view with caution.

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25· 26· Mr. Bugliosi calls it a confession. It is not a confession. I contend it is not even an admission of guilt.

As repugnant to you as you may feel this is, nobody in this world can be guilty of murder or conspiracy to commit murder who stabs somebody after they are already dead. That is it.

I call this the "killing somebody after they are already dead theory of murder" advanced by Mr. Bugliosi.
You can't do it.

We are going to discuss this evidence a little later to determine whether it is corroborative of Linda Kasabian's testimony. But I am telling you right now that that testimony, even if you think it might corroborate Linda Kasabian, is insufficient to convict anybody of first degree murder, second degree murder, or conspiracy to commit murder.

And I think I am going to convince you, I hope to -- I am never that overconfident -- I hope to be able to convince you later on that that testimony cannot, by any stretch of logic, standing alone, convict Leslie Van Houten of conspiracy, simply because it is not corroborative of Linda Kasabian's testimony which, in and of itself, as far as I am concerned, doesn't show Miss Van Houten to be a conspirator.

I am going on with Dianne Lake's testimony.

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She is supposed to have told -- Leslie is supposed to have told Dianne Lake that she hitchhiked back, and that there was a boat there, and that the incident from where she hitchhiked took place somewhere around Griffith Park.

And then, for some reason, Leslie Van Houten was dropped by Mr. Bugliosi.

And later in the proceedings, on redirect examination, Mr. Bugliosi asked Dianne Lake whether Leslie Van Houten brought something back with her on this occasion that she hitchhiked.

And Dianne Lake testified that she came back with some coins, a few of them Canadian coins, a purse, a blouse and credit cards. And that she burned a piece of rope, the purse, the blouse, the credit cards. She even burned her own clothes. That the coins were made up primarily of nickels, dimes and quarters.

And that Leslie said they weren't stolen.

Now, perhaps we are to infer, or Mr. Bugliosi wants us to infer, that these articles, the rope, the purse, the blouse and the credit cards, came from the La Bianca residence.

But I remember very clearly, ladies and gentlemen, his telling you there was no proof of this. It is right in my notes.

Now, if Mr. Bugliosi is going to tell you there

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is no proof that any of those articles came from the La Bianca residence, then don't we all have a reasonable doubt that they came from there?

I think merely posing the question gives us the enswer.

Of course we have a reasonable doubt, if there is no proof.

Proof is the name of the game.

As a matter of fact, the credit cards, if any there were, couldn't have come from the La Bianca residence, and I will tell you why.

If any credit cards had been missing from the La Bianca residence, from either Mrs. La Bianca's effects or Mr. La Bianca's effects, you would have heard about it.

It wouldn't be hard to prove. All you have to do is bring in the son-in-law -- not the son-in-law, the stepson -- or business associate to testify that he had, Mr. La Bianca, had had this credit card and that credit card, and a search of the residence disclosed they were all missing.

In fact, you could bring in a creditor for that matter, saying: Yes, I sent in a statement every month to Mr. La Bianca for a Diners: Club card and, lo and behold, you can't find the credit card. So, we could infer that the credit card that Leslie Van Houten supposedly stole was from that residence.

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Therefore, we can infer that any credit cards that may have been burned by Miss Van Houten didn't come from that residence, or else you would have heard about it.

In other words, we can draw an inference, a reasonable inference, pointing toward innocence with respect to that incident, if it ever occurred, the burning of a rope, a blouse, credit cards and her own clothing, that this was another time, another place, it had nothing to do with the La Bianca homicides.

Incidentally, it turned out, upon cross-examination by Mr. Hughes -- he did an excellent job with Dianne Lake -- I think I ought to read some of it briefly, if I can find it.

Mr. Hughes, on Page 17,177, Volume 146 of the transcript, is talking to, questioning, cross-examining, if you will, Dianne Lake about her memory, and whether or not Sandra Goode was with Dianne Lake on the occasion when Miss Van Houten is supposed to have burned these articles.

"Q Where was Sandy?

"She might not have been there."

Apparently, in previous testimony, Dianne Lake said Sandy had been there.

This is the time that she went out to spend the money, the \$5 or the \$8.

"Where was Little Patti?

"In the middle."

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And then Mr. Hughes asked:

"So, you were having problems with your memory; is that correct?

"I guess so.

"And things that you sometimes think are pretty clear from a year ago are not actually too clear if you think about them; is that correct?

"Some things.

"And just as you are unsure now whether Sandy Goode or Little Patti or Bruce Davis was along on this trip, isn't it true that many other things that happened last year in the summer are also unclear?

"Yes."

This shows, ladies and gentlemen, that young Miss Lake's memory, by her own admission, isn't too clear. And this is the girl that you have got to believe in order to even think about convicting Leslie Van Houten.

And on further cross-examination by Mr. Hughes, when discussing this purse that Leslie Van Houten is supposed to have brought back with her, when, we don't know. But I can assure you it wasn't after the La Bianca homicide.

Question by Mr. Hughes at Page 17205.
"Do you recall now telling him 'also she

"'she with her a purse with change'? "I may have. "Well, which way is it, Dianne? Was it a purse or was it a plastic bag? Do you remember? "It was a plastic sack. "Was it like a Baggie? "I think so. "Could it have been a plastic purse? "No." 10. 11 14 15 16. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

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So, all this was was a plastic baggie. It wasn't any purse at all.

Yet, initially, Dianne Lake testifies that Miss Van Houten brought back with her a purse. Which turns out, after cross-examination, to be a plastic baggie.

Some difference.

She also told Mr. Hughes, in answer to some of his questions:

"Q And is it possible that you are mistaken as to some of the things you testified to here yesterday and today?"

The witness's answer on line 18 at page 17,218:
"It is possible.

"Q" -- BY MR. HUGHES: -- "Is it possible that you are mistaken as to certain things that you have been testifying to yesterday and today? Is that your answer?

TYes. 4

This is the girl from whose testimony you are supposed to convict Miss Van Houten. And she says it is possible that she may have been mistaken about things to which she testified, and about things that may have happened in the summer of 1969. And you are supposed to convict somebody of murder and conspiracy on the strength of that frail testimony.

She also said, in response to Mr. Hughes

1	questioning and the point of reference is the conversa-
2	tions that Leslie Van Houten is supposed to have had with
3	her, or the conversation
4	Do you remember those conversations
5	better now than you did in September, a year ago?
6	"A I don't know.
7	"Do you remember those conversations
8	better now then when they actually took place?
9	"At what point did your memory start
10	getting better for those conversations, Dianne?
11	"When I was in the hospital."
12	And then Mr. Hughes goes on to ask her:
13	"Was something wrong with your memory
. 14	before you went to the hospital?
15	"No.
16	"Did you have shock treatments?
1,7	, t ^t No.
18	"Were you given some sort of memory-
19	improvement drug?
20	"A No.
21	"Did somebody do something to improve
22	your memory while you were in the hospital?
23	"No.
24	"Yet, somehow in the hospital your memory
25	got better; is that what you are telling us?
.26	"It got clearer.
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"Was your memory fogged up for some eason?

"Yes."

I fail to understand, ladies and gentlemen, how somebody's memory can improve with the passage of time.

Perhaps it can. I am not excluding the possibility. But is it a reasonable inference to be drawn that Dianne Lake's memory got better with time? Particularly when she was in the mental hospital?

I mean, if you don't remember something at one point in time, how do you suddenly remember it at some later point in time without the use of some kind of drugs like sodium pentothal? And Miss Lake testified she didn't receive any drugs in the hospital for the purpose of inducing return of her memory.

This is the girl, ladies and gentlemen, upon which the prosecution's case rests against Leslie Van Houten, and we are going to go into why.

THE COURT: We will take our recess at this time, Mr. Keith.

Ladies and gentlemen, do not converse with anyone or form or express any opinion regarding the case until it is finally submitted to you.

The court will recess for 15 minutes. (Recess.)

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THE COURT: All counsel and jurors are present.
You may continue, Mr. Keith.

MR. KEITH: Thank you, your Honor.

I am going to talk with you ladies and gentlemen, having gone over with you the testimony of Dianne Lake as it concerned Miss Van Houten, about other subjects, both very important.

One is aiding and abetting, and the second subject, and I am going to interweave the two subjects, because they are somewhat related, since they rest largely on the testimony of Dianne Lake, they overlap.

Now, we know basically what Dianne Lake had to say about Leslie, that she stabbed somebody after they were dead; she then wiped off some fingerprints, and that she burnt some rope, et cetera.

She hid under a sheet or blanket, Dianne Lake was not quite sure which, as I recall her testimony.

And of course Barbara Hoyt testified that
Miss Van Houten hid under a blanket or sheet, whichever.

We are facing the question what does that evidence really prove to us?

Does that evidence in connection with all the other evidence in the case show that Miss Van Houten was either a conspirator, or aider and abettor, and does it corroborate legally, does it legally corroborate the testimony of Mrs. Kasabian?

Now, as Mr. Fitzgerald eloquently told you, when we were discussing corroboration, we have to remove from the evidence, remove from the case the testimony of the accomplice, Mrs. Kasabian. We cannot consider it and we can only consider the purported corroborating evidence alone and see if that evidence tends to connect Miss Van Houten in this instance with the commission of the crimes charged against her.

This is true in connection with any of the defendants.

Let's say for the sake of argument that there is evidence relating to Mr. Manson that is corroborative of Linda Kasabian's testimony concerning him. That doesn't mean that that testimony is corroborative of all the remaining defendants, and I hope you understand what I mean.

Each defendant -- there must be corroborating evidence against each defendant, not just one.

Now, let's talk about conspiracy for a moment.

Does the evidence of Dianne Lake tend to corroborate -excuse me -- that is a misstatement -- tend to connect

Miss Van Houten with the commission of the orime of
conspiracy to commit murder?

Now remember, ladies and gentlemen, the gist of the conspiracy is an agreement, an agreement to commit a crime.

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In this case the agreement to commit the crime of first degree murder by premeditation and by deliberation.

It should not take as much time to reach the conclusion that the testimony of Dianne Lake does not show that Miss Van Houten agreed with anybody to do anything

The evidence is she stabbed somebody after they were dead, and she wiped off some fingerprints.

This cannot possibly connect her with -- it cannot even tend to connect her -- even tend to connect her and that is the rule, even tend to connect Miss Van Houten with the commission of the crime of conspiracy.

The conspiracy is made. You are guilty of the crime of conspiracy once you agree to joint the conspiracy, once you enter into the agreement plus commit an overt act and, as you know, the overt act does not have to be an unlawful act. It is merely an act in furtherance of the ultimate object of the conspiracy.

In this case it is alleged they took a drive in a car, and wound up on Waverly Drive at the La Bianca residence.

That is not an unlawful act.

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But/is enough for an overt act.

The point I want to get across, ladies and gentlemen, once you agree to commit an unlawful act, and once you do some act, even though lawful, in furtherance

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of the object of the conspiracy, you are a conspirator; you are liable unless you abandon the conspiracy, and that gets into another complex legal subject.

But you can readily see, ladies and gentlemen, that the words attributed by Dianne Lake to Miss Van Houten are not enough to show that she agreed to commit murder, or agreed to commit any unlawful act.

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"I did this, I did that."

That doesn't import an agreement.

So, I suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that not under any theory can Miss Van Houten be convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, simply because Linda Kasabian' testimony isn't corroborated on that subject.

Now, this is not to say that the testimony of Linda Kasabian shows that Miss Van Houten was a co-conspirator.

As far as I am concerned, and I hope you are concerned, her testimony, too, Linda Kasabian's testimony, doesn't show an agreement on the part of Leslie Van Houten to enter into a conspiracy to commit murder.

But I am telling you, even if it did, even if it did so show, even if you believe that her testimony beyond a reasonable doubt proved that Leslie was a co-conspirator, you have got to acquit her of the conspiracy charge. You have to because there is no corroboration of Miss Kasabian's testimony tending to show that Leslie was a conspirator.

And I am not going to say anything more about that.

Now, we have got another problem. Does it tend to show, does it tend to connect Leslie Van Houten -- this is Dianne Lake's testimony now -- does it tend to connect her with the crime of murder as a principal?

And it must tend to connect her with the commission

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of the crime of murder as a principal.

When we talk about principals to the commission of a crime, we are talking about aiders and abettors, people that instigate the crime or encourage it or help out in some way for the purpose of facilitating its fruition.

I contend that this evidence does not show that Miss Van Houten aided and abetted anyone in the commission of a crime.

We are talking about the crimes with which these people are charged, murder, premeditated first degree murder.

At best, it shows, if you want to believe Dianne Lake, at best, it shows she was there.

At best, it shows that she did something after the commission of these homicides that wasn't very nice.

And at best, it shows that she wiped some fingerprints off after the commission of these homicides, which does not make her an aider and abettor.

And I am going to tell you why.

The crime is already over with. The people are already dead.

And when you wipe some fingerprints off, that doesn't facilitate the commission of the crime, ladies and gentlemen. That isn't aiding and abetting.

What it simply means is that Leslie Van Houten, if you are going to believe Dianne Lake, tried to conceal the

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 identity of the perpetrator. And that isn't aiding and abetting. That is something else again.

So, I suggest to you -- I know Mr. Bugliosi is going to get up and tell you she is a knife-wielding harridan that roared in there. We don't even know that she went in there with any weapon, incidentally. There is no evidence that she went in there with a weapon. I am talking about the La Bianca house.

You see, he is laughing at me. I knew he would. Laugh all you want. I may have the last laugh.

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I want you to analyze this evidence. Believe it for the purpose of your analysis. Determine, think about it.

Don't use a broad brush, as Mr. Kanarek has said on many occasions. Think about each item of evidence.

Decide whether that evidence of Dianne Lake corroborates

Linda Kasabian.

Does it tend to connect her, Leslie Van Houten, with the commission? "With the commission," those are the key words, of a crime.

If it doesn't -- and I suggest to you it doesn't because these crimes, if any there were, were already over and done with -- there are a lot of ways you can be an aider and abettor to a crime, whether it be murder or any other public offense without actually physically taking part in it.

Now, I am going to tell you, and I am not scared to tell you, that wiping off fingerprints after the commission of a homicide is a crime if it is done for the purpose of helping the perpetrator of the crime escape detection, escape arrest, escape punishment, and escape conviction. But it is not murder. It is not aiding and abetting a murder. It is something else again.

I am going to try to illustrate what I have said with a Supreme Court case, the same Supreme Court case that I have quoted from previously this morning,

the case of People vs. Wallin, W-a-1-1-i-n. 1 Ź 3 that is certainly improper. 4 5 7 Ŗ, 10

MR. BUGLIOSI: May we approach the bench, your Honor?

. If he is going to start reading from some case,

I don't know what he is going to read; I have no idea, but I suggest we approach the bench.

No objection to approaching the bench. MR. KEITH: THE COURT: All right.

(Whereupon, all counsel approach the bench and the following proceedings occur at the bench outside of the hearing of the jury:)

MR. BUGLIOSI: I don't think, your Honor, that he can start bringing in these cases with factual situations.

THE COURT: I don't know, Let's find out what he wants to do first.

MR. KEITH: In this Wallin case, I discussed this briefly with you. This is the case where --

MR. BUGLIOSI: Max. I think you are talking too loudly.

MR. KEITH: Excuse me?

MR. BUGLIOSI: I think you are talking a little too loud.

MR. KEITH: This is a case where the tenant in an apartment house murdered her little daughter who was spastic, and the landlord helped bury the body, and the landlord was being charged with being an accessory after the fact.

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The murderess' name was a Mrs. Paz.

THE COURT: Are you planning to read from the opinion? MR. KEITH: Yes, I was going to tell them about the facts in the case and then I was going to say the Supreme Court said the murder was completed as soon as the child was killed, and no subsequent acts on the part of Mrs. Paz or any other person were required to be shown in order to establish the elements of that offense, murder.

That is the only sentence I was going to read.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, that is not the law. He cannot just take cases like that. I can bring in ten cases now showing that three years after the body was found the conspiracy was still in existence, and the res gestae --

THE COURT: His theory is something else, as a matter of argument he doesn't have to accept the conspiracy theory. He can argue whatever she did she did after the crime was complete.

You can argue to the contrary, as you have.

MR. KEITH: I did want to read from that sentence. in order to illustrate my argument, and give it more convincing force.

THE COURT: He can analogize the facts of that case to the facts of this case if he wants to.

Of course, you don't have to accept it either and I'm sure you won't.

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MR. BUGLIOSI: Is it possible to do this, your Honor? I am unaware of it.

THE COURT: What difference does it make if he is using a hypothetical example or the facts of some other case?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Because I don't even talk about the facts of other cases --

THE COURT: In enalogy and illustration you can.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I thinkyou can give hypothetical cases and give your own opinion on it, but to insert into this trial what some other court held in a different case is just —

MR. KEITH: This is not just some other court, it's the Supreme Court of California.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The Supreme Court is not the law of this state, that once a body is dead that is the end of the murder.

Now, it is not the law, and Judge Older will not instruct the jury to that effect, that once a body is dead, automatically that is the end of the murder.

THE COURT: It would be improper to argue it unless the case you are talking about is identical to this case, and therefore the same law applies.

MR. KEITH: I am not going into that because you are not instructing on accessory-after-the-fact.

THE COURT: I think by way of analogy to a factual situation that sometimes so far as bringing up a portion of

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the opinion by way of explanation of a particular rule of law -- I think it would be improper to say that here is a case that controls our case.

MR. KEITH: I wasn't going to put it in that manner.

MR. MUSICH: The same rules apply, reading from any article, as rules of law, whether he is going into areas of law or into argument, the fact that he is reading from a Supreme Court case will give it the dignity of that particular statement of the Supreme Court justices, by invendo and by impressing on the jury a fact of law which is not applicable to this case.

THE COURT: I understand him to say that what he intends to do is argue that the facts of that case are analogous to the facts of this case, is that correct, or am I incorrect?

I must say. I was going a little farther than that, I must say. I was going to say here is the Supreme Court saying the murder was complete as soon as the child was killed, and no subsequent acts on the part of Mrs. Paz or any other person were required to be shown in order to establish the elements of that offense.

Then I am going to say, "You see, ladies and gentlemen, here is the Supreme Court saying the murder is all over."

THE COURT: We are not talking about an instruction now, we are talking about analogyzing one situation to

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MR. MUSICH: You are using an analogy regarding a legal principle of law.

THE COURT: The facts of this case are vastly different from what he is stating, and you can argue that.

MR. BUGLIOSI: He is bringing in a statement here that once the body was dead the murder was completed. He is bringing in a fact statement of law.

I don't think you are going to instruct the jury that once the bodies are dead the murders are over with.

THE COURT: I think we are wasting time, I think you can analogize the factual situation there, you can argue what the evidence shows. The jury may believe you, I don't know. Mr. Bugliosi certainly will argue something different.

MR. MUSICH: It might be raising issues that will require additional instructions from the Court.

THE COURT: You are not stating that the rule of law in that case is a rule of law in this case?

MR. KEITH: I don't intend to.

THE COURT: I think we are all talking about the same thing.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I think it's highly improper.

(The following proceedings were had in open court in the presence and hearing of the jury:)

THE COURT: You may continue, Mr. Keith.

MR. KEITH: Thank you, your Honor.

Just as we went to the bench I was going to make an analogy from a Supreme Court case that I just cited and which I read from earlier in that case.

In that case, ladies and gentlemen, a mother murdered her four-year-old spastic daughter and after the little girl had died, this chap Wallin who was the defendant, helped to bury the body of the little girl and he was prosecuted.

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The question really is whether he aided and abetted the murder or whether he committed some other crime.

Remember, he buried the body or assisted in burying the body and he knew what had happened, he knew that the mother had killed her little daughter because she was a spastic and wasn't going to get any better.

And the Supreme Court of our state said this -I won't go into what happened and what the decision was,
but I would like to in support of my argument, that Miss
Van Houten was not an aider and abettor, and that therefore
the testimony of Dianne Lake does not corroborate, does not
tend to connect Miss Van Houten with the commission of any
crime, I would like to support what I tell you so you don't
think I am arguing Keith's theory of the law.

This statement, the Court said at page 807:

"The murder was completed as soon as the child was killed. The murder was completed as soon as the child was killed, and no subsequent acts on the part of Mrs. Paz," that was the mother of the child that killed her daughter, "or any other person," referring to Wallin, the defendant who buried the body, "were required to be shown in order to establish the elements of that offense:"

That is the offense of murder. That is what I'm telling you here. The homicides in the La Bianca home were completed when Mr. and Mrs. La Bianca died, and no further

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acts on the part of Leslie Van Houten could have aided and abetted the commission of those two offenses, the killings of Mr. and Mrs. La Bianca, from the evidence that we have heard in this case.

And I beg you ladies and gentlemen, don't speculate. There is a hiatus between the testimony of Mrs. Kasabian and what Leslie Van Houten is supposed to have told Mrs. Kasabian.

Linda Kasabian leaves Leslie outside the car, the 1959 Ford, outside the La Bianca residence, and the next thing we know about Leslie's participation, if any, is that she is stabbing somebody after they are dead, and wiping fingerprints off.

Now, the question before you is whether that evidence, if believed, is sufficient to corroborate the testimony of Linda Kasabian.

Now, we have already discussed, and I hope we are agreeing, that it certainly does not show that she conspired to do anything; that Leslie conspired to do anything, because it doesn't even purport to show there is any agreement.

But we are concerned with aiding and abetting.

To be an aider and abettor you don't have to agree. You don't have to be a conspirator.

I think if you are a conspirator you are also an aider and abettor, but the converse is not necessarily so.

You can aid and abet without being a conspirator,

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and I will give you an example of that, an A, B, C -- I won't give you an A, B, C, I'll make it more personal, it's more fun that way.

Mr. Bugliosi has planned to murder Mr. Kanarek, sitting there.

At any rate now, he's got this murder down, I mean, to the last ounce, the last minutise of preparation, and here he is, he's in the process of murdering Mr. Kanarek.

And something goes avry, and along comes Mr. Keith, and Mr. Bugliosi says "Hey, Max, I'm having trouble here with Mr. Kanarek, help me out."

So I go up and I help Mr. Bugliosi out, and we succeed in killing Mr. Kanarek.

Now, Mr. Bugliosi is guilty of first degree murder by premeditation, but I am not guilty of first degree murder by premeditation even though I aided and abetted Mr. Bugliosi, because I don't have the requisite --I did not premeditate; I came along and did it on the spur of the moment at Mr. Bugliosi's request.

To be an aider and abettor you have to have knowledge and you have to have criminal intent, but it doesn't necessarily -- and this would have to be exactly the same criminal intent that the actual perpetrator had, as you can see by my illustration.

But remember, to be an aider and abettor you must have knowledge, and you must have criminal intent.

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You don't have to be a conspirator.

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But I repeat, to be an aider and abettor you have got to do something to aid and abet the commission of a crime. After it's all over and done with, if you do something to facilitate the escape of the perpetrator, then I suggest to you you are not an aider and abetter.

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Particularly in this situation, in this case.

Now, I will be happy to tell you, and give you other examples I think we can all agree on would be aiding and abetting.

Let's suppose A, knowing what was going to happen and with criminal intent, supplies B, the murderer, with a weapon, but A never comes within a thousand miles of the actual homicide. A is an aider and abettor, probably a conspirator, too, he is at least an aider and abettor, he supplies the weapon with knowledge and criminal intent.

Let's suppose A is a lookout; B is in somewhere trying to kill somebody, trying to kill C, and A is outside making sure that nobody interrupts B killing C.

He is an aider and abettor. He is facilitating; he is helping out in the commission of the crime.

You can be an aider and abettor by words alone, exhorting the words of a crime, "Go, team, go, hit 'em again," without picking up a weapon or without touching anybody.

Or you can even be an aider and abettor if you lend your moral support to the criminal act, assuming you have knowledge, and have criminal intent.

I am always assuming that in my example.

I would like to place in these terms, aiding and abetting in these terms, if you aid and abet -- let me use A, B and C again.

A alds and abets B in the commission of a crime, if he does something affirmative to make B's job easier, that is the way I like to put it.

But if you are just standing around doing nothing, that doesn't make B's job any easier.

If you are standing there, urging B on, say, stand there doing that (indicating), that gives him moral support, that may be supplies additional courage, and that is all right, I will accept that.

But when you are just present doing nothing, and that is all we know here that Leslie Van Houten was doing, that doesn't make anybody's job easier to kill anybody, and we can't speculate, we have to draw these inferences from the evidence. Now, all we know about Leslie Van Houten, assuming you want to believe Dianne Lake, a former mental patient, is that she stabbed somebody after they were dead.

Does that make whoever the perpetrator was, does that make his job any easier? She did not help them; the deed already was done.

And wiping off fingerprints did not help in any way in the commission -- the commission, mind you, of the homicide.

To be sure, to be sure it aids the perpetrator's possibly in escaping detection, assuming that is what happened.

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But it does not make the perpetrator's job any easier. It might make it harder, for all I know, instead of exhorting someone to do the job you are running around wiping fingerprints off, which doesn't do a thing, it's not aiding and abetting, it doesn't lend any moral support.

And this is serious, I'm not trying to be abusing or funny or facetious. To me this is a valid theory of defense, and you are faced with a question of whether that evidence plus any other evidence against or involving Leslie Van Houten corroborates Linda Kasabian.

Now -- and there is some other evidence -the burning of the rope, we have discussed that. That had
to be at some other time, some other occasion. It cannot
have anything to do with this.

There would have been evidence of the credit cards — these coins, either Mr. Bugliosi said there is no proof that the coins came from the La Bianca coin collection, in his argument, and Mr. Bugliosi will correct me if I am wrong, but my recollection of the evidence was the coin collection was not disarranged, or did not appear that any coins were missing.

I am a little bit unclear in that area, but my recollection of the testimony was, of course you are the triers of the fact, you determine what the evidence is, the La Bianca house was not ransacked; that the coin collection did not appear to have been disarranged or any amount of

coins stolen --

And Canadian coins, my gosh, I go to Canada all the time, there are lots of Canadian coins, I don't see what that proves.

We have discussed hiding under the bed. That doesn't prove anything. The reasonable inference you draw there is you are hiding from some intruder.

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25 26 But I told you we were going to discuss Dianne Lake's testimony with relation to issues.

One, the corroboration issue which I have been discussing and, secondly, what inferences we can draw from Miss Lake's testimony.

Can we draw a reasonable inference pointing towards innocence? If we can, that is the end of the game.

Even if you can draw a reasonable inference pointing towards guilt, you have to accept the inference that points to the innocence.

And it would appear to me, ladies and gentlemen, that Dianne Lake's testimony, if you believe it -- and remember, I am not conceding this is so, we are only discussing this evidence assuming it to be so for the purpose of argument, because I don't know what you are going to believe in this case.

You are the judges of the facts. I don't know what you are going to believe and I cannot take a chance.

I've got to meet these issues headon. We've got to talk about it at its worst.

And the issue is, can you draw a reasonable inference from Dianne Lake's testimony pointing to innocence? We pretty well have got the answer as far as the conspiracy is concerned. It does not show she did anything, that she agreed to do anything.

As far as alding and abetting is concerned, we

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can draw an inference, after my recent discussion with you, that she did not aid and abet with criminal knowledge and criminal intent, but she did something else not very pleasant, but she did something else that did not aid and abet the commission of these homicides.

You remember that excerpt from the case I read to you, once the people are dead, that is it, anything that happens after that may be other crimes, I cannot go into that with you. I'm sure desecrating somebody that is dead is a crime in this state, but she is not charged with that.

And incidentally, while I am on that rather unpleasant subject, I want to allude before I forget to the Coroner's testimony that the buttocks of Mrs. La Bianca showed 13 stab wounds occurring after death.

How about that?

And I don't think any of those stab wounds could have been fatal, if I understand this testimony correctly, even if inflicted during life.

I am trying to convince you ladies and gentlemen that any participation on behalf of Miss Van Houten was, i not in aid of the commission of any homicide.

There is no evidence that she didone thing to facilitate the homicide of the La Biancas, at the La Bianca home.

There is no evidence in this record that she urged anybody to kill anybody else.

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There is no evidence that she encouraged anybody to commit a crime. There is no evidence that she went into the La Bianca residence, if she ever did, with a weapon.

There is no evidence she even knew there were any weapons in the car; you remember they were under the front seat and Leslie was in the back scat.

We are met, to be sure, with the statements
Manson is purported to have made outside of the La Bianca
residence which are sinister and ominous, but remember my
other discussion about each fact essential to complete a
set of circumstances to establish the defendants guilt,
has to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Please remember that Mrs. Kasabian prefaced her testimony regarding these conversations with "I think," and "I'm not positive."

I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, it is very unfair to find that those conversations -- those statements were made beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty when the witness, herself, is unsure that they were made.

But even if they were made, we don't know, even if they were made, we don't know Leslie's reaction to them. We don't know what her state of mind was.

We don't know whether she agreed to do anything.

We don't know whether she planned or did aid
and abet the homicides in any manner.

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As a matter of fact, the reasonable inference is, as we have been discussing, appear to the contrary, even though she was there. Her state of mind was not to aid and abet, not to facilitate the commission of any crimes, not to make it easier to commit the crime, but possibly to do something that would concent the identity of the perpetrator after it is all over, which is not murder.

I submit to you it is not murder.

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The other evidence I find in the record involving Leslie Van Houten was she was a member of the Family.

What does that prove? There were a lot of people who were members of the Family. That she was a convert of Mr. Manson's. We discussed that and we discussed the robot theory of murder and, for gosh sakes, don't forget my argument in that connection.

It is just as important to me, and I hope it will be to you, as other areas of my talk with you.

Oh, yes, she used some aliases, she called herself Leslie Owens on August 16th at the Spahn Ranch when / the Sheriff's deputies swarmed over the place.

She also called herself Luella Alexandria when the gendarmos arrived at the Barker Ranch.

Juan Flynn, as a matter of fact, knew her as Lulu, which appears to be or could well be a contraction of Luella.

I don't see how that evidence could be sufficient to -- obviously it was not sufficient to convict anybody of anything, but even added to all the other evidence, you can draw a reasonable inference pointing to innocence.

Just because you used different names, Mr. Fitzgerald covered that subject very eloquently, I thought. They were harrassed by the police from time to time.

They all used nicknames, and they were alleven

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more important in effect changing their identities.

They left their families -- by leaving their families, I mean their parents.

I suggest to you that these aliases, that all these girls used, have little probative value, miniscule probative value in this case.

Something I wanted to mention to you, it affects the whole case and it is something I never could really understand. It never made any sense to me, and it's been alluded to by other counsel. I thought it interested me enough to re-mention it, to reiterate it.

There was no money or things of any value, any particular value, taken from either the residence of Miss Tate or the La Bianca residence.

And Mr. Bugliosi argues that money was not involved, if any property was taken it was an afterthought.

I never could understand why, if any of these people were involved in these homicides, things of value which were present on the premises were not taken.

And the reason I could never understand why is this: It has been testified to, or was testified to more than once, I believe, that at or about this time Mr. Manson intended to move to the desert because Helter Skelter was coming down.

We won't go into the reasons for moving to the desert; we all know that. But the point is because he

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planned to move to the desert he needed money, and supplies togo to the desert.

At this very time nothing was taken from these places. How do you square that with an inference pointing towards guilt?

It is reasonable to infer because of what we know about Manson's plans that Manson, if he were involved, would have directed his people to steal everything they could lay their hands on and carry it away.

Yet nothing was taken. Therefore, we make the deduction that it was somebody other than these people who were responsible.

This is one of the interesting areas of thought that may be significant, and that I think you ought to consider.

There are other things like Helter Skelter was coming down so fast, and if they all believed it was, what is the necessity of going out to kill people to expedite it?

They didn't have to expedite it, according to their theory it was coming down fast.

Why kill anybody to make it come down faster, particularly when robbery or theft was not the motive?

There is a lot of things like that I think you ought to consider, and I think these matters have been amply gone into by my brother counsel.

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And they really don't relate specifically to Leslie's case. They do, they very much do, but not as specifically as I have been analyzing the testimony against her.

They are broader conceptions, in other words, that you can consider, not only when you consider her case but the case of all the defendants.

Now, getting back to the testimony of Dianne Lake briefly.

I am almost through, you will be happy to hear.

Mr. Bugliosi characterized her purported statement to Dianne Lake about killing somebody after they are dead, stabbing somebody after they are dead, and wiping off fingerprints, as a confession. Now, I am going to read to you what a confession is. His Honor will so instruct you.

"A confession is a statement by a defendant which discloses his intentional participation in the criminal act for which he is on trial and which discloses his guilt of that crime."

Now, I have also discussed with you that evidence of an oral admission or an oral confession of a defendant ought to be viewed with caution, and I am glad I have had an opportunity to reiterate that rule of law, because any statement Leslie Van Houten is purported to

have made to Dianne Lake ought to be viewed by you with caution, and we have discussed this, and I am just re-emphasizing it.

But getting back to Mr. Bugliosi's contention that what she is supposed to have told Dianne Lake is a confession, I submit to you that it is not.

It is not a confession to intentionally participa in the criminal act for which she is on trial.

It may be a confession to something else, but it isn't a confession to murder. It isn't a confession to conspiracy to commit murder.

I won't go into what it might be a confession of, but it is not that, I tell you.

It is not even an admission.

Now, I am going to recapitulate briefly. And this is the next to the last chapter of my argument.

I have lost track of chapter numbers. I have got this listed as seven. It may be something else. It may be six. But be that as it may, I entitled this chapter: The Hurdles You Have to Overcome in Order to Convict Leslie / Van Houten.

And there are a great many of them, believe me.

It sounds to me like an impossible feat if you are going to follow the evidence and follow the rules of law which apply to the evidence.

First, you have to believe Linda Kasabian, and U

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you already know that her testimony must be viewed with distrust, or ought to be viewed with distrust, because she is an accomplice as a matter of law.

Then, if you decide, after your deliberations on her credibility, to believe Linda Kasabian as far as any participation of Leslie Van Houten, then you have got to believe Dianne Lake.

And really, the basic evidence that Dianne Lake offers against Leslie, Dianne Lake has already lied to the Grand Jury -- and I am not going through all that -- but you have got to view these statements that Leslie is supposed to make to Dianne Lake with caution -- but if, after cogitating, you decide to believe Dianne Lake, decide to believe that Miss Van Houten actually made the statements that she is purported to have made to Dianne Lake, then you have got to determine whether the testimony of Dianne Lake corroborates Linda Kasabian's testimony.

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And as we have talked about practically ad nauseam now, the corroboration must tend to connect Leslie with the commission of the offenses with which she is charged.

Mr. Bugliosi is going to tell you, because it is the law, that the evidence of corroboration need not be great, it need not carry the convincing force required by law to convict, it need only be slight.

Well, we have already discussed, and I think we must realize now, or I hope we realize, that even if you want to believe Dianne Lake, the girl who was in a mental institution, who was a victim, a willing victim, of drug abuse and all the other things, her memory wasn't so good for this area of time, even if you want to believe her, her testimony standing alone is insufficient to corroborate Linda Kasabian's testimony on the question of conspiracy.

It doesn't show or even tend to show or even slightly tend to show Miss Van Houten joined in the conspiracy.

Then you have got to determine whether it is corroborative of Linda Kasabian's testimony on the issue of aiding and abetting.

I have discussed that with you at length. And it doesn't. I submit to you, it doesn't.

Then, here is the next hurdle you have got to overcome.

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- Even if you find corroboration of Linda Kasabian -- and I submit you should not on this evidence -- then you have got to analyze both girls' testimony and any other evidence in the case against Leslie Van Houten to determine whether you can draw a reasonable inference from all the evidence that we have discussed pointing towards innocence:

And even if you can draw a reasonable inference from all the evidence concerning Leslie Van Houten pointing toward guilt, if you can draw a reasonable inference pointing towards innocence, that is it, you have got to acquit.

Even though you find corroboration, even though you believe Dianne Lake, believe Linda Kasabian, you still have to further analyze that, and I mean analyze it, and determine what inferences, what deductions you can make.

And if you deduce, if it is reasonable to deduce that the evidence doesn't point towards Leslie being a conspirator or an aider and abettor, or a murderer, whatever you want, what she is charged with, then you have to return a verdict of not guilty.

Then you have got another hurdle to overcome, and that, of course, is the most basic principle of criminal jurisprudence of all: Presumption of innocence and beyond a reasonable doubt.

You still have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty of the truth of

these charges.

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After everything else is over and done with and everything looks bad for my client, you still have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty. That is the next hurdle.

And if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, then you are going to have to convict her, I am afraid. But I don't see how you can do it when you have to go through all this analysis, all these drawing of inferences, how you cannot help but acquit her.

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There are simply too many hurdles to overcome, ladies and gentlemen, too little evidence to permit a finding of guilt against Leslie Van Houten.

I am going to conclude. Here we go.

This case has been described, ladies and gentlemen, as the crime of the century.

It is not. It is a bad case. My God, to characterize it as the crime of the century is really absurd when you consider two World Wars and the tragedy that has befallen mankind in this century.

I am not saying that this isn't a very serious or is not a horrendous matter, but to characterize this as the crime of the century is untrue.

Don't do that, ladies and gentlemen.

What is going to happen is, if you think this is the crime of the century -- I know you have been under pressure, locked up in the hotel for month after month -- you are going to thrash out at somebody, you are going to try to get them, you are going to try to convict them.

You are going to say to yourself that somebody ought to be convicted, this is the crime of the century and I am on the jury, and here are these people as defendants. I have got to convict somebody.

I think you have got more courage, more guts than that. You must have or you wouldn't be on this jury.

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But don't do it. Don't do it.

Consider the evidence and draw reasonable inferences from it, and maintain your own individual opinion, your own individual integrity.

Don't be swayed just because a majority may be against you, may have a different viewpoint.

Discuss the case freely, of course, but don't go into the majority, join the majority, just because they are a majority.

I am sure you all promised to do this during your voir dire examination, and I don't have to go into it. But don't give up your opinions, if you are confident that your opinion, that your judgment, that your conclusions, that your findings of fact are correct.

Now, not too many years ago, back in the middle or late fifties -- would this be a good stopping point, may it please the Court?

I have got about ten minutes right at the very end.

I will go on if the Court wants.

THE COURT: Go on and finish.

MR. KEITH: Some years ago -- and I am sure the town is still there -- it was a place called Appalachian in the State of New York, and lived in Appalachian a man called Joseph Barbera.

In November of 1967, he gave a party, and there

were some 40 odd people there at the party. They all happened to be males.

After the party, everyone of them was arrested and charged with conspiracy, and it became a very notorious case in this country.

Maybe some of you recall it. I am sure you do.

Simply because every single man at that party
was supposed to be a member of the Mafia and he was supposed
to be there at a summit meeting to decide what they were
going to do in the ensuing fiscal year, or whatever.

That was the assumption.

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They had a conspiracy trial, and everyone of them was convicted.

This case had national notoriety. Everyone of them was convicted for conspiracy to obstruct justice and to commit perjury, and all types of crimes.

The case went up on appeal to the United States Circuit Court, the court next to the Supreme Court, federal jurisdiction, and the case was called United States vs. Buffalino.

Why it isn't called the United States vs.

Barbera, I don't know.

Buffalino was one of the people at the party and one of the people convicted.

I am not going to relate the facts of the case that led to their conviction because they are not analogous to this case at all, but I want to read to you, in closing, the words of the chief Circuit Justice who wrote the opinion in the United States vs. Buffalino. The citation is 285 Federal 2d 408, and I am reading from page 419.

"The administration of our system of criminal justice and our basic concepts of fair dealing are centered on the requirement that in each case we reach a result based solely on the charges made in the particular indictment and upon the evidence which appears on the record with regard to those charges.

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"Doubtless many of Barbera's visitors are bad people, and it is surely a matter of public concern that more is not known about their activities. But bad as many of these alleged conspirators may be, their conviction for a crime which the government could not prove on inferences no more valid than others equally supported by reason and experience and on evidence which a jury could not properly assess cannot be permitted to stand.

"Reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the conspiracy count of the indictment."

This ringing language, ladies and gentlemen, tells you how to approach your task.

You decide this case, and I know you will, on the charges, on the evidence in the record.

Don't speculate. You may not think some of these defendants are very nice people. You might even think they are bad people. But as the Chief Justice of this Circuit Court says, don't convict them because you may not agree with the manner in which they lived and the manner in which they conduct themselves.

On the basis of this evidence, ladies and gentlemen, I say to you: You must acquit Leslie Van Houten.

I thank you for your indulgence.

THE COURT: We will adjourn at this time, ladies and gentlemen.

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Do not converse with anyone or form or express any opinion regarding the case until it is finally submitted to you. 3 The court will adjourn until 9:00 o'clock tomorrow morning. (Whereupon at 4:30 o'clock p.m. the court was in recess.) 9. 10 Ì1 12 **13** ₹1**4**. Įģ. 16. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 25. 26