## SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT NO. 104

HON. CHARLES H. OLDER, JUDGE

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.

Plaintiff.

CHARLES MANSON, SUSAN ATKINS, LESLIE VAN HOUTEN, PATRICIA KRENWINKEL,

Vs.

Defendants.

No. A253156

REPORTERS' DAILY TRANSCRIPT

Friday, January 15, 1971 Monday, January 18, 1971

APPEARANCES:

For the People:

VINCENT T. BUGLIOSI, DONALD A. MUSICH, STEPHEN RUSSELL KAY. DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS

For Deft. Manson:

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For Deft. Atkins:

DAYE SHINN, Esq.

For Deft. Van Houten:

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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, FRIDAY, JANUARY 15, 1971 9:05 A.M.

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(The following proceedings were had in open court in the presence and hearing of the jury, all counsel with the exception of Mr. Hughes being present, the defendants not being physically present:)

THE COURT: All counsel and jurors are present.

You may continue, Mr. Bugliosi.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Thank you, your Honor.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen of the jury.

When we left off yesterday I was discussing the many faces of Charles Manson and the fact that he himself has not shown his face of murder in this courtroom, but the evidence that came from that witness stand has shown it for you.

Some of you folks may say to yourself that there was testimony in this case that Manson loved animals.

You recall, he did not want De Carlo to shoot at the bird.

He got very angry at Hannum for killing that rattlesnake.

You might say to yourself, well, if he loved animals how in the world could he have ordered seven savage murders of human beings? Is there any inconsistency to this?

Well, at first blush one would think yes, there is an inconsistency, at first blush. But when you to stop

By way of illustration, by way of illustration, a classic example is Adolph Hitler, the little Corporal's Third Reich wrote one of the darkest, ugliest chapters in human history, yet Adolph Hitler frequently said the more

he got to know human beings the more he loved animals.

While his ovens were spitting out fire and operating at optimum capacity around the clock, at Auschwitz further and flesh formula, Buchtenwild, Belsen horrible smell burning human flesh pervading the countryside for miles around, Adolph Hitler, esconced in the green, rarefied, serene atmosphere of firefaction, high in the Alps, was very solicitous over the health of his dog, Blondie, and

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historians say even the health of the pets belonging to his symphontic coterie of bootlickers, Goering, Goebbels and Himmler.

When most people die, the effect that they had on mankind, for the most part, dies with them. A quarter of a century after Hitler's death, Europe, in fact the entire world, is still cleaning up the debris after him.

So when Charles Manson loves animals but thinks nothing of snuffing out the lives of seven precious human beings, he is in good company, I Adolph Hitler.

What evidence did we offer that proves Manson's guilt for these murders beyond a reasonable doubt?

No. 1, I have already gone over the testimony of Linda Kasabian in considerable depth.

Her testimony clearly and equivocally proves that Charles Manson masterminded and ordered these seven murders.

Linda was with Manson on both nights, ladies and gentlemen.

that no one can see him, but on these two nights of murder, he was within plain view of Linda Kasabian. She saw his conduct, she heard his words. She took the witness stand and she told you everything that Manson did and said in her presence in sending his robots out on his mission of murder on the first night, and everything he

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did and said when they returned from his mission of murder.

She also told you everything he did and said on the second night when Manson accompanied his robet on his second mission of murder.

Since we know, since we know -- and I repeat that -- we know that Linda Kasabian told the truth, we thereby know that Charles Manson ordered these seven murders.

Eesides Linda Kasabian's testimony, what other testimony do we have against Charles Manson?

Ladies and gentlemen, this trial literally overflowed -- overflowed -- with evidence against Charles Manson.

If it is possible, even though there is a tremendous amount of evidence against his co-defendants, if it is possible, there is even more evidence against Manson.

Let's very briefly discuss this other evidence, evidence which is totally independent of Linda Kasabian's testimony.

No. 2, the rope,

Danny DeCarlo testified that in June of 1969, as you recall, Manson bought a hundred and fifty feet of white three-strand nylon rope at the Jack Frost store in Santa Monica.

DeCarlo identified this rope -- and this is the

Tate- Sebring rope -- identified this rope as looking just Ί like the rope that Manson bought. 2 This is the Tate-Sebring rope, the rope that was tied around Sharon and Jay's neck. 4 In fact, DeCarlo used this precise type of rope in the Coast Guard on his PT boat. DeCarlo testific that Hanson used to keep 7 the rope behind the front scat of his dune buggy depicted 8 in Poople's 38. Ruby Pearl also testified that the Tate-Sebring 1Ò rope was the same rope that Hanson brought to the ranch 11 in early summer of 1959. 12 She recalls holding the rope in his hands, 13 and she recalls that Hanson showed the rope to George 14 Spahn, the proprietor of the ranch. 15 She also testified that Manson kept the rope 16 behind the front seat of his dune buggy. 17. Juan Flynn also identified the Tate-Sebring 18 rope, or the rope that Charles Mangon brought to the Spahn 19 Ranch. 20 Flynn even recalled using the rope to tow a 21 dune buggy to Olancha. 22. Flynn also said that Manson used to keep this 23 rope behind the front seat of his dune buggy. 24 Flynn said he used this exact type of rope .25

when he went mountain climbing.

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The defense says this rope, People's 41, is basically like any other rope.

Well, obviously, there are other ropes like that, but it is not that common a rope.

No. 1, witnesses testify that that is not the type of rope that was used out at Spahn Ranch for regular ranch work. It is just too expensive.

Moreover, nylon rope certainly is not the most common type of rope. I believe hemp is the most common type of rope.

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Also, this rope, inasmuch as it was used by the Coast Guard on their PT boats, and it is used for mountain climbing, obviously is much stronger than the average rope.

Also keep this in mind, this is very important:
De Carlo, Pearl and Flynn all testified that the rope they
saw out at Spahn Ranch that Manson brought to the Ranch was
white, three-strand, nylon rope, right down to the number
of strands.

And it turns out that the Tate-Sebring rope also has three strands, and of course is white and nylon.

All three witnesses, especially Pearl and Flynn, felt very strongly that that rope, People's 41, was the rope they saw out at Spahn Ranch.

Keep one further point in mind, all three of these witnesses are much more familiar with ropes than the average person.

Ruby Pearl works at a ranch where, of course, ropes are common; and Flynn, as I said, used this rope in mountain climbing, and De Carlo used it on his PT boat.

now, we obviously cannot be sure that this rope, right here, is a rope that Manson brought to the Spahn Ranch. We cannot prove that beyond a reasonable doubt obviously, we don't have to. We have got so much other evidence proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

There is no way of proving for sure that this is the rope, but the likelihood is certainly great that this Ì

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is the rope inasmuch as there is so much other evidence irresistably pointing to Charles Manson's guilt.

You can almost say that if this is not the rope that Manson brought to the Spahn Ranch, it is a coincidence.

You can almost say it is a coincidence if the Tate-Sebring rope was not the rope that Manson brought to the Spahn Ranch.

Number three, the revolver.

As we have already discussed in great depth, we have conclusively proven that, number one, this is the revolver that was used to murder Steven Parent and Voityck Frykowski and Jay Sebring. We have proven that beyond a reasonable doubt and, number two, by the shell casings analysis we have proven that this revolver came from Spahn Ranch.

Now, the question is, to whom did it belong?

Well, the defense argues that many people used this firearm at the Spahn Ranch, even Tex Watson.

Well, that might be true, but apparently the revolver belongs to Charles Manson.

Mr. Kanarek said that the only evidence there is to connect Mr. Manson with this revolver is the fact that he fired it.

Well, there is a little more evidence than that.

You recall Thomas Walleman identified this
revolver as looking like the revolver that Manson had on

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his person when he, Walleman, went up to Franklin Boulevard in early July, 1969, to that apartment house.

Juan Flynn testified that he saw Manson fire this revolver.

Flynn further testified, and this is important, that it was his understanding that Manson got this revolver on a trade -- that was Flynn's testimony.

Danny De Carlo testified that this .22 caliber revolver was kept in the bunk house.

He testified that Manson fired several of the firearms, but the one that he fired the most, the one that was his favorite firearm is People's 40, the murder weapon.

And, as you know, De Carlo knew this revolver so well that in November of '69, before the Tate detectives even came into possession of this revolver, De Carlo drew a sketch of the revolver and, of course, it matches People's 40 to a T.

In June of 1969 Manson told De Carlo that he, Manson, had got this revolver on a trade for Danny De Carlo's truck.

So Flynn and De Carlo both testified that Manson had gotten this revolver on a trade. In other words, it apparently belonged to Charles Manson.

The fact that other people used the revolver certainly does not mean that it didn't belong to Charles Manson.

He got the revolver on a trade. It was his favorite firearm, and furthermore, De Carlo testified that not only did Manson used to fire this firearm, De Carlo testified that Manson used to carry this revolver around with him in a holster at Spahn Ranch.

Now, the defense argued that even if the rope and revolver came from Spahn Ranch, they did not belong to Manson because everyone in the Family used and shared everything.

Well, everyone may have used and shared other people's things at the ranch, in a communal type existence. But this does not mean that items of personal property could not belong to different members of the Family.

There was no evidence that came from that witness stand that there was some rule in the Family that no one could own personal property.

Can you imagine Manson living up to such a rule?

The head man, the boss; he couldn't own an item of personal property! That is ridiculous.

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You recall that Linda testified for instance, that the girls in the Family made Manson a long, black cape and gave it to him. So certainly he owned that cape.

And this dune buggy here, many witnesses -many witnesses -- DeCarlo himself came right out and said
that this was Charles Manson's dune buggy; he did not say
it was the dune buggy of the Family; he said "This is
Charles Manson's dune buggy."

Juan Flynn testified that he heard Manson tell Tex Watson that he wanted Watson to make him a dune buggy; it was going to be his dune buggy and no one else could use it; if they wanted a dune buggy they would have to get their own.

You could own personal property out at Spahn Ranch. The fact that other people used it and shared it does not negate the fact that someone could own the property.

Several witnesses testified that this particular sword, right here, the sword that is shown at the side of the dune buggy, belonged to Charles Manson, at least he always kept it at the side of his dune buggy.

And this rope right here he always kept behind the front seat of his dune buggy -- his dune buggy.

Now, what is the significance of the fact that the Tate-Sebring rope and that revolver most likely belonged to Charles Manson?

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Well, since Manson was the dictatorial ruler of the Family, ladies and gentlemen, it is not too likely that three of his slaves, Tex Watson, Susan Atkins and Patricia Krenwinkel would take the revolver and the rope without, No. 1, Manson knowing about it, and, No. 2, knowing the purpose for which it was going to be used.

After all, they certainly must have known that Charles Manson, if they did not get his consent, would not be too happy if they used this revolver and then threw it away over the side of a hill, and left 43 feet of expensive rope of his at the Tate residence.

So the clear inference is that besides Charles
Manson sending these people out on a mission of murder which
we have proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the probability
is certainly great that he also furnished them with that
rope and that revolver.

The rope is corroborative evidence, the revolver is corroborative evidence, if you want to think in terms of corroboration.

No. 4, on the night of the Tate murders you recall Barbara Hoyt testified that after dinner Charles Manson called Sadie, and either Katie or Linda out of the back house, we don't know what he said to them, but it's obvious that this was the night he was sending them off on his mission of murder. He undoubtedly gave them instructions.

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A half hour or so later, you recall, Barbara Hoyt went up to the front of the ranch, this is the night of the Tate murders.

She had those three sets of dark clothing; she had those three sets of dark clothing; she saw Manson on the boardwalk and Manson said "The group has already left." This is Darbara Hoyt's testimony.

Of course it is totally consistent with Linda Kasabian's testimony.

No. 5, John Swartz testified that somewhere around a week and a half or so before the raid, August 16, 1969, he did not know the exact time, but unquestionably it was around the time of the Tate-La Bianca murders, somewhere around that time, one night, Manson asked him to use his 1959 Ford.

Do you recall that? This is Johnny Swartz's testimony now.

He said Manson came up to him and asked him to use the '59 Ford, and he got the '59 Ford.

This is right around the time of the Tate-La Bianca murders.

Swartz further testified that around the same time, the same time, around the same time, one morning, Manson told him that the previous night, the '59 Ford had been taken without asking him because Manson did not want to wake him up.

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What other inference can there be, of course, but that these two particular nights about which Johnny Swartz was testifying are the nights of the Tate-La Bianca murders. I mean, Linda Kasabian testified that Swartz's car was taken on those two nights.

No. 6, Juan Flynn testified of course that one night, one week before August 16th, he sees Manson, Tex, Clem, Sadie, Katie, Leslic and Linda drive off from Spahn Ranch in Swartz's car, Manson is the driver.

Linda testified that on the night of the La Bianca murders, which undoubtedly this was, those seven people drove off in Swartz's car and she said that Manson was the driver.

Here we have Juan Flynn's testimony totally consistent with Linda Kasabian's testimony.

Now, Mr. Kanarek says that Flynn told Sartuche that the car was a Plymouth, and that is all that Mr. Kanarek said, and he went on to some other point.

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Well, that is not completely true. It is a truncated version, an abbreviated version of that conversation.

I am going to give you the rest of that conversation.

The testimony that came from that stand is that Juan Flynn at first said it was a Plymouth, but immediately thereafter Sergeant Sartuche asked him this question:

"Do you remember whose car that was?"

In other words, talking about the Plymouth, apparently.

And Juan Flynn answered -- listen to this -"A Plymouth or a yellow Ford. There was the yellow Ford
there at the time. That was Johnny Swartz's car."

And Juan candidly admitted on the witness stand that it was an error on his part when he first said Plymouth. But obviously, he corrected it almost immediately and mentioned the '59 Ford.

Juan Flynn is a human being, he is not a computer. Human beings make mistakes. That is why they put erasers on pencils.

But Mr. Kanarek would not accept any mistakes from any witnesses that were called to that witness stand.

Juan Flynn testified that he is positive now, looking back, thinking about it, that it was a '59 Ford.

And we know it was a 159 Ford because

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Linda Kasabian testified that the '59 Ford was used on these two nights.

And Swartz's testimony also confirms the fact that it was the '59 yellow Ford that was used on these two nights.

Number seven. Manson used to wear leather thongs around his neck identical to the thongs tied around Leno La Bianca's wrists.

Danny De Carlo and Ruby Pearl both testified that the thongs found around Leno's wrists — we showed them the thongs — were the same type of thongs that Manson used to wear around his neck out at Spahn Ranch.

And the leather thongs found on Manson's clothing up in Independence in November of '69, People's 75 and 95, are identical to the thongs found around Leno La Bianca's wrists.

Mr. Kanarek argued that there are thousands upon thousands of thongs just like this in Los Angeles County.

Well, I still say: Thongs come in different colors and thicknesses. But apart from that, and much more important than that — that is almost an irrelevant point — apart from that, you can't look at this thong evidence in a vacuum. You have to look at it in conjunction with all of the other evidence.

And I repeat that. When you go back to that Jury

room, you have got to look at all of the evidence. You can't single out one particular particle of evidence and say: Does this prove something beyond a reasonable doubt?

It doesn't have to, Although there are many items of evidence in this case that all by themselves prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The People have no burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with every speck of evidence we offer. If that were the case, the trial would be over after the first hour.

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We can't help it if there is so much evidence proving the guilt of these defendants.

It is not our fault. We put on all of the evidence.

Here we have a situation where there is a massive amount of direct and circumstantial evidence pointing toward the guilt of Charles Manson. Lo and behold, one of the victims, Leno La Bianca, has leather thongs tied around his wrists. And wouldn't you know that the very person against whom there is this massive amount of evidence, used to wear leather thongs around his neck just like those leather thongs.

That is the important point. I grant Mr. Kanarek, if you look at the thong evidence in a vacuum, it is not that important. But when you look at it in conjunction with all of the other evidence, it has considerable circumstantial evidence of guilt.

No. 8. Here in court Hanson made a slitting of the throat motion to Linda Kasabian at the start of her testimony concerning these two nights of murder.

Obviously, he wanted to silence her by threatening her.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, if I may, I will object to that on the ground -- this is the basis of my objection-- that Officer Gutierrez testified --

THE COURT: I don't want the argument, Mr. Kanarck.

Just state the objection.

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MR. KANAREK: The objection is, your Honor, that Mr. Bugliosi is not stating what the record reflects that Officer Gutierrez answered when Mr. Bugliosi first asked him the question.

The record does not show a slitting of the throat movement. It shows a movement across the chin.

THE COURT: The objection is overruled.

You may proceed.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Why did Charles Manson want to silence Linda Kasabian?

Because Manson knew that Linda knew exactly what happened on these two nights, and he didn't want her to tell you folks about it.

You 12 people are the last people in the world that Charles Manson wants to know about these two nights of murder.

In other words, Charles Manson attempted to suppress evidence against himself by intimidating a witness. And his Honor, Judge Older, will give you an instruction that evidence that a defendant attempted to suppress evidence against himself by intimidating a witness can be considered by you as circumstantial evidence showing a consciousness of guilt.

Points 9, 10 and 11.

All of them, when considered in conjunction with each other, show a conscioueness of guilt.

No. 9.

Dianne Lake testified that at some time before the Grand Jury in this case, Charles Manson told her not to say anything to the authorities.

No. 10. On August the 16th, 1969, just one week after the Tate-La Blanca murders, just one week later, six in the morning, there is the raid at Spahn Ranch.

And it wasn't the Normandie invasion that Mr. Kanarek spoke about. There is this raid at Spahn Ranch.

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Where is Charles Manson? He is hiding beneath one of the buildings there. They had to flush him out by pulling him by his hair.

Where were the other people? Well, the other people were sleeping at the ranch; or those that were up, were up and around. But Charlie Manson is hiding underneath that building.

Now, Mr. Kanarek feels that, well, this was the Normandie Invasion and it was normal for Charlie to hide under the building.

How come the other people weren't hiding like that?

It wasn't because Charlie was afraid of police per se. It wasn't because of that. Because on July the 28th, 1969, before these murders, he didn't hide from Deputies Grap and Olmstead at Santa Susana Pass Road. He didn't hide from them then. But that was before the murders.

His conduct on August the 16th arguably shows a consciousness of guilt.

Humber seven. Even Hanson's dramatic change in demeanor after these murders is evidence against him.

Gregg Jakobson saw Manson two or three weeks after the Tate-La Bianca murders.

Jakobson observed: "The only thing I can compare it to, that I have seen cats that have been caught in cages,

like bobcats, and that is what I can compare it to. The electricity was almost pouring out of him. His hair was on end. His eyes were wild. He was like an animal in a cage."

Something happened. Something happened. Something happened to make Manson  $\overline{b}$  looking and acting like that.

It wasn't because any waitress gave him a strawberry rather than a chocolate milkshake at some Dairy
Queen, ladies and gentlemen, that he was acting like that.

Something happened. Something happened. Something happened
to make Charlie Manson be acting like that, for Gregg
Jakobson to notice this dramatic change in his demeanor.

And if Linda Kasabian's testimony, and all this other evidence against Manson, wasn't enough, Manson actually confessed to all these murders to Juan Flynn.

Point number 12. In a reckless moment, when he temporarily forgot to watch his words, he put that knife at Juan Flynn's throat and he says, "You SOB, don't you know I am the one that is doing all these killings?"

Of course, Mr. Kanarek said that maybe Manson was talking about the killings of Viet-Nam.

I am not going to exalt or dignify that by even answering that.

Please don't forget, please don't forget, that on December the 19th, 1969, in Shoshone, California,

Juan Flynn told Officer Dave Steuber of the California Highway Patrol out of Fresno the same identical thing that Juan Flynn testified to on that witness stand. 4c-1

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We played the tape recording in court. You remember that.

Now, at the time Officer Steuber played the tape recording of Mr. Flynn's statement to him about Manson's confession, Judge Older gave you the following instruction.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I believe your Honor is covering that by a jury instruction. I think this is improper.

THE COURT: If you are making an objection, state it, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: Yes.

THE COURT: What is the objection?

IR. KANAREK: The objection is that I believe that your Honor is covering that by a jury instruction, and it would be improper for Mr. Bugliosi to read that instruction.

THE COURT: I don't know what he is going to do yet, Mr. Kanarek.

IR. KANAREK: I believe he is going to read the instruction that your Honor gave at that time, and I believe we discussed this, and it is going to be covered by a jury instruction.

THE COURT: There is an instruction on that subject.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Judge Older gave you an instruction, ladies and gentlemen, that you could only consider Juan Flynn's testimony, or Juan Flynn's statement to Dave Steuber,

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for a limited purpose.

Judge Older, after I conclude my argument to you, will give you the following instructions:

"The Court has previously admonished you to consider the tape recorded statement of Juan Flynn introduced through the testimony of Officer Dave Steuber for a limited purpose only. You are now instructed to disregard that previous instruction."

That is the instruction that his Honor will give you after I conclude my argument.

In other words, you are now free to consider the statement as evidence of the truth of the matters contained within the statement.

Now, Charlie Manson wasn't only referring, ladies and gentlemen, to the Tate murders when he made that statement of Juan Flynn.

He was also referring to the La Bianca murders, because Juan Flynn testified that Manson made that statement to him two or three days after the night that he saw the seven people drive off from Spahn Ranch.

Of course, that would be after the La Bianca murders.

So, when Manson confessed, he was confessing after the Tate murders, but also after the La Bianca murders.

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You know, Charlie really didn't have to tell

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us. He really didn't have to tell us by his confession to Juan Flynn that he was behind these murders. There is so much evidence that he is the one that masterminded these murders that that confession was just like icing on the cake.

It couldn't possibly be any clearer, even without that confession, that he and he alone ordered these seven murders.

Of course, Manson's confession, all by itself, without any other evidence, is enough to convict him of all seven counts of murder.

Point No. 13. The population of Los Angeles County, I believe, is over 7 million people. I don't know how many homes there are in this vast metropolis, but with 7 million people it would seem that 1 million homes would be a fair estimate. Talking in round figures now. 1 million homes, 7 million people.

You folks can ask yourself: Out of all the years you have lived in Los Angeles -- some of you have probably lived here 25 or 30 years, some of you are probably native Angelenos -- out of all the years that you have lived in Los Angeles, how many homes in all that time have you been to?

It is not that many. A hundred and fifty, 200, 300, 400, 450, 500?

Probably not that many, when you really stop to think about it.

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Other than door-to-door salesmen, of course, who enter literally thousands of homes, must of us have a rather small circle of friends with whom we socialize.

I have lived in Los Angeles for 13 years. I don't think I have been in more than a hundred homes in Los Angeles.

Let's talk about Charlie Manson. Paul Watkins testified that Manson got out of prison in 1967, went up to Maight-Asbury, started the embryo of his Family up in Haight-Asbury, got a bus and started traveling up and down the State.

Now, we don't know when Manson arrived in Los Angeles, but it appears it was some time around the Spring of 1968 when he spent two weeks at Dennis Wilson's home.

You recall Brooks Posten testified to that.

In early summer, 1969, Manson and his Family moved to -- the early summer of '68 -- Manson and his Family moved to Spahn Ranch where they remained until late August and early September, 1969, and then they went up to Barker Ranch in Death Valley.

So, it appears that Manson probably was in Los Angeles County for a year or a little more than a year. It is not very long.

And during that period of time, most of it was spent living a communal type existence out at Spahn Ranch.

Now, during that one-year period, is it likely -just drawing inferences -- is it likely that Charles Manson
was at the homes or on the premises of more than five, ten,
15 people, or residences?

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Let's be generous with Charlie; 20, 25; let's say 50 in one year. Even though he is living at Spahn Ranch, let's say he had been on the premises or visited friends at 50 homes.

A handful anyway. Just a handful when you are talking about a million homes.

On the evenings of August the 9th and 10th, 1969, the Tate-La Bianca murders took place at two out of those 1,000,000 homes. Wouldn't you know, ladies and gentlemen, that along with all the other evidence against Charles lianson, out of the 1,000,000 or so homes in Los Angeles County, of the two homes where these murders took place, Charles lianson just happened to have been to the Tate residence on two occasions, and right next door to the La Bianca residence on several occasions.

With Charles Manson probably only having been to a handful out of a million or so homes in Los Angeles County, the probabilities against it being a coincidence — I repeat — the probabilities against it being a coincidence that these murders occurred at two of the residences that he was either directly or indirectly connected with are so astronomically high as to be totally unworthy of your

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consideration,

It is not a coincidence, ladies and gentlemen, that Manson had previously been on the Tate premises on two occasions and right next door to the La Bianca residence on several occasions.

It is not a just one of those things type of a coincidence. Charles Manson only wants you to believe that it is a coincidence.

Point No. 13: Motive.

Mr. Kanarek said "Whatever Manson's philosophy is, he is not on trial for it. He is on trial for murder." Also Mr. Kanarek says "What does Mr. Manson's philosophy of life have to do with connecting Manson to these murders?"

Mr. Fitzgerald said essentially the same thing as Mr. Kanarek, saying there was no connection between Manson's philosophies and these murders.

Well, I would agree with Mr. Kanarek and Mr. Fitzgerald if Manson's philosophies on life were totally unrelated to these murders.

But it just so happens that Charles Manson's philosophies on life and the very motives for these murders are inextricably interwoven with each other, in fact, they are one and the same.

Manson's motives for these murders, including the motive of Helter Skelter, is very strong evidence of his guilt.

Judge Older will give you this instruction on

motive:

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"Motive is not an element of the crime charged and need not be shown.

"However, you may consider motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in this case.

"Presence of motive may tend to establish guilt. Absence of motive may tend to establish innocence.

"You will therefore give its presence or absence, as the case may be, the weight to which you find it to be entitled."

Now, as you can see, the prosecution does not have the burden of offering one single solitary speck of evidence as to the motive these defendants had in committing these murders. We only have the burden of proving that they committed these murders. We do not have the burden of proving why they committed these murders.

Legally speaking, motive is never a part of the People's case. What I am trying to say is this, ladies and gentlemen, we offered considerable evidence of Manson's motives for these murders, hat a just assume for the sake of argument that you never believed any of the motive evidence or even if you did believe it to a cortain extent, you were not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that we proved Manson's motives for these murders.

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That would not mean that Manson was entitled to a not guilty verdict, for the simple reason that we never had any reason to prove motive in the first place.

Even if you never believed any of our evidence on motive, because there is such an overwhelming amount of other evidence proving guilt, we are still entitled to a guilty verdict.

In other words, we only have the burden of proving guttey beyond a reasonable doubt; we do not have the burden of proving motive beyond a reasonable doubt.

If we don't have this burden, why put on evidence of motive? For the simple reason that evidence of Manson's motives for these murders just strong additional evidence of his guilt, it's just additional evidence of his guilt.

I want you folks to keep one thing in mind, now, when I discuss Manson's philosophies on life, which Mr. Kanarek and Mr. Fitzgerald say have nothing to do with these murders.

These murders were incredibly bizarre.

Now, I hate to keep using that word, bizarre, but it little these murders to a T. They were bizarre, strange.

Since these murders were very bizarre, the man who masterminded them, Charles Manson, likewise had a strange and bizarre mind. It was Manson's strange and

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25 26 bizarre mind. It was Manson's strange and bizarre mind and his strange and bizarre philosophy on life that led him irresistibly to these murders.

Helter Skelter -- Helter Skelter.

Gregg Jakobson and Brooks Poston said before the Beatles white album came out Charlie used to say the "Blank is coming down," using the gutter vernacular in the said before

Then when the album came out he said "Helter Skelter is coming down," as the testimony in this trial showed, ladies and gentlemen, Manson had a fanatical obsession and mania with Helter Skelter.

It was an integral part of his vocabulary; wherever he went he said "Helter Skelter is coming down."

He spoke of it constantly, as Paul Watkins said, listen to this, Paul Watkins, an intimate of Charlie Manson, he thought Charlie was God, he was a hard-core member of the Family, one of Manson's lieutenants, and look at what Paul Watkins said:

"Helter Skelter seemed to be the main topic with Charlie!"

"Helter Skelter seemed to be the main topic with Charlie!"

Now, as I have stated in my opening argument,
Manson only got the term, Helter Skelter, from the Beatles.
He did not get the idea. The lyrics of the songs in the
Beatles album merely provided Manson with some type of

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 support for philosophies he already had. It gave him ammunition. It gave him cannon fodder when he spoke to his sheep.

Can't you just hear Charlie Manson, ladies and gentlemen, trying to get someone to join his nomadic tribe?

First on the combined testimony of Gregg Jakobson, Bruce

Poston and Paul Watkins and other witnesses, Testint

probably something like this:

"See here" -- he is trying to proselyte someone -- "in this song Helter Skelter the Beatles are saying that Helter Skelter is going to come down fast," in the song, Blackbird, well, you know, the Beatles are talking about blackie, and he is saying that blackie should rise up against the white piggies.

And in this song piggies here now, you know, the Beatles are talking about the establishment and the Beatles say that the black man should rise up and give those piggies a damn good whacking.

"The Beatles are tuned in guys, are talking right to me when they are saying those words, and the song, Revolution 9, now, you know the Beatles are talking about Revelation 9. You all know about Revelation 9, that is Armageddon, the last final destructive war."

"Helter Skelter is coming down fast, man; get with it; Thetter be in the bottomless pit when it comes

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down because when Helter Skelter comes down, it's going to come down fast, and if you are not in the desert with us, blackie is going to get you too, brother."

Can't you just hear him, ladies and gentlemen? The white man's karma, man. Blackie is going to kill every white man alive, except you and me, brother. We are going to be at the bottom of that pit.

"J. C. says there is a pit out in the desert. Read Revelation 9. and J. C. doesn't lie.

"The is What is going to happen when blackie takes over this country!

"Well, man, he ain't going to know how to run Zala og no how; blackie only knows what the white man told him and the white man never told blackie how to run this piggie country. He only told blackie how to clean the streets and pick cotton. So blackie is going to have to turn to us, brother, to bail him out.

"We will be the only ones left after Helter Skelter; he's got to, brother, blackie will have to turn to us and when he does, you know, we will just pat blackle on his kinky hair and kick blackie on his black rear end and send him on his way, cleaning streets and picking cotton. We can't let blackie stay with us? meking love to him; if we did that, we would eventually end up making love to ourselves; that would be our karma.

send blackie on his way and we will have it

all to ourselves.

way."

"Helter Skelter is coming down. Open your eyes and look around, and the is going to come down, like going to come down, like going to come down fast.

"Come along with me, brother, it's the only

It probably went something like that.

Of course, Charlie can say it a lot better than

I can. I am not an actor and I wasn't there, but it

probably went something like that.

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Charles Manson is a mediate, who had delusions of greatness and hungered for great power.

In his warped, frenzied mind, helter skelter was going to be the vehicle of death by which he rost to unlimited power. Jakobson testified that to prepare for helter skelter, in the early summer of 1969, Manson actually started to accumulate firearms, vehicles and money, so he and his Family could escape to the desert, so that when helter skelter was taking place on the streets of every American city, he and his Family were going to be safe.

Charles Manson was literally dry washing his hands for helter skelter to start. He could not wait for it to start because in his twisted, warped mind, his Family and particularly he were going to be the ultimate beneficiaries of a black-white war.

But as we learned from Paul Watkins and Juan Flynn, as spring wore into summer, 1969, Charlie became impatient with the black man. They were not starting helter skelter as he had constantly predicted, so Charles Manson, in his feverish egomania and megalomania, in his insatiable thirst for power, fortified by his deep-seated anti-establishment hatred and his intense obsession with violent death, said, "I've got to show blackie how to do it."

Going back just a little bit, Manson told Gregg Jakobson that helter skelter would start by the black man ripping off some white families by cutting them up badly. I.

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Posten testified that in February of 1969
Manson told the Family that helter skelter would start
when "the real blacks would come out of the ghettos and
do an atrocious crime in the richer sections of
Los Angeles. They would do an atrocious murder, stabbing,
killing, cutting bodies to pieces, smearing blood on the
walls, writing the words "pigs" on the wall."

And I asked him what the word pigs would be written in and he said that Manson said with the victims! blood.

So in February of 1969 Manson spoke of atrocious murders being committed in the richer sections of Los Angeles by stabbing and cutting the victims to pieces.

This is exactly and precisely what Manson ordered his zombies to do in August of 1969.

Manson went even further, not just the cutting and the stabbing, but he said the word "pig" was going to be written in blood on the walls.

Pig was written on the front door of the Tate residence, at the La Bianca residence it was written on the wall, the living room wall, "Death to pigs."

In early 1969 Manson told Paul Watkins that helter skelter would start when some spade -- he said spades, he meant black people, some spade from Watts would come up into the rich piggy district of Beverly-Hills or Bel-Air and wipe some white families off by

cutting in blood that the

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cutting up their bodies and writing some things on the wall in blood.

He said the murders would be so super-atrocious that they would make the white man really mad.

Note that the Tate residence on Cielo Drive is located between Beverly Hills and Bel-Air.

Manson told Watkins that Helter Skelter would start, in other words, these things would happen, in the summer of 1969.

Well, ladies and gentlemen, in the summer of 1969, what Manson told Watkins is exactly, is precisely what happened, with just one exception, blackie did not commit these murders; Charlie did.

And Manson even provided for that one exception, because in late May and early June of 1969 Watkins testi-fied that Manson told him that he was going to have to commit these atrocious murders for the black man.

In other words, he was going to have to go into the rich piggy district to commit these murders for the black man;

Now, Watkins knew that Manson intended to do exactly what he said he was going to do; he knew that helter skelter was in the wind out at Spahn Ranch.

and he loved Charles Manson, he took off like a big fat bird, a day or two later, he didn't want to be around when

these atrocious murders were being committed by Manson and the Family.

the whole bunch of f-u-c-k-i-n-g pigs.

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Juan Flynn testified that in July, 1969, Just one month before these murders, Manson told him, Bruce Davis and Clem Tufts on the boardwalk at Spahn Ranch that he had come down to it, and the only way he could show the black man and the pigs was to go down there and kill

Dianne Lake testified that in late July and early August, right around the time of these murders, she testified that Manson spoke to the entire family several times, including Tex Watson and these three female defendants, and said, "We have to be willing to kill pigs to help the black man start helter skelter."

And around this period of time Dianne Lake testified that Manson said several times, "I am going to have to start the revolution."

Again, as I say, it would be nice if the could take shorthand.

I will try to slow down a little bit.

Just two months, just two months after Manson told Watkins that he, Charles Manson, was going to have to commit these -- he told Watkins that he, Charles Manson, was going to have to commit these atrocious murders for the black man, just one month after he told Juan Flynn that he had come down to it, and the only way he same show the black

man and the pigs was to go down there and kill some pigs, ŀ Just a week or so after he told Dianne Lake and the other members of the Family, "We are going to have to kill pigs to show the black man how to do it, to help the black man start helter skelter, "and he also said, "I am 5. going to have to start the revolution," ĬÒ 

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Charles Manson ordered the seven Tate-La Bianca murders, and these seven murders, ladies and gentlemen, were committed in the exact, precise fashion that Manson told Posten and Watkins they would be committed, right down to the word "pigs" being written in blood at the scene of these murders.

It just couldn't possibly be any clearer that Charles Manson masterminded these murders.

when Linda Kasabian testified, and based on the strength of her testimony, there is no reason to distible believe anything that she said, and on the very afternoon of the Tate murders Manson said, "Now is the time for helter skelter."

Seven precious human beings were brutally and savagely murdered by Manson's robots, just to carry out Charles Manson's mad and wild dream of helter skelter.

Charlie told everyone he just had to show blackie how to do it.

In fact, those are the exact words he used when he was driving away from the La Bianca residence on the freeway, he told Linda:

"We've got to show blackie how to do it."

"Helter skelter is coming down fast; the piggles, Revelation 9, the bottomless pit."

Crazy? Far out? Strange? Bizarre? I will stipulate to that,

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But look at these murders, look at these murders.

Perhaps the most bizarre murders ever committed.

Not just a man, Tex Watson, but three young women, Susan Atkins, Patricia Krenwinkel, Leslie Van Houten, dressed in black, armed with sharp knives, entering the residence of total strangers in the middle of the night and brutally and savagely butchering them to death, and then proceeding to write pig. death to pigs, rise? helter skelter in the victims! blood on the door, the walls, the refrigerator.

Sure the helter skelter motive is far out and bizarre. Of course it is, but it just happens to have been the principal motive for these murders, and keep this further point in mind:

These murders, as incredibly bizarre as these murders are and were, certainly are not likely to have the garden variety type of motive that one would expect to find contained within the pages of a conventional text book on police science.

In all sincerity, you can almost say that if the motive for these murders had been something like robbery, that motive would have been even more bizarre than helter skelter.

I mean, why murder seven people for their money? Why would murder be necessary? There are literally hundreds of armed robberies every day in Los Angeles.

yet the percentage in which killings take place is very low.

And even if murders were necessary, why the overkill? Why did Voityck Frykowski have to be stabbed 51 times? Rosemary La Bianca 41 times?

And then writing on the walls, the door and refrigerator in the victims' blood!

of I am trying to say, ladies and gentlemen, that for murders as strange and bizarre as these, one would almost expect, one would almost expect that the motive is going to be equally bizarre.

absurd. I agree with them in the abstract, they happen to

Furthermore, helter skelter is printed in blood on the refrigerator door of the La Bianca residence. I mean, what could possibly be any clearer? It's right on the refrigerator door. I told you that as part of my closing argument I was going to state the obvious, which human beings don't want to concern themselves with. I am stating the obvious now.

We did not pick this helter skelter theory out of the air and arbitrarily attach it to these defendants. Don't forget that obvious fact.

Witnesses took that stand and told you about this helter skelter philosophy of Manson's. Now, if you

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want to think in terms of corroboration; if you want to think in those terms, again, Manson's motives in these murders — I am not through talking about the motive yet — there are other motives — his motives for these murders was independent of Linda Kasabian's testimony, it connected Manson with these murders and therefore corroborated Linda Kasabian's testimony.

The defense contend that there is no evidence that Manson wanted to frame the black people for these murders. Again, I say they are simply not looking at that evidence.

On the night of the La Bianca murders, Manson gives Rosemary La Bianca's wallet to Linda Kasabian, tells her to leave it in that gasoline station, he says he hopes a black man picks it up, uses the credit card and therefore, of course, gets caught, and the white community will think black people committed these murders.

The wallet incident alone, that incident alone, proves that Manson was trying to frame the black people for these murders.

Although we know that there were many items of personal property inside that La Bianca residence which were easily accessible, they were valuable, which Manson could easily have taken, Linda Kasabian testified that the only item of personal property she saw Manson bring back to that car was that wallet, which, of course;

contained credit cards Rosemary La Bianca's identification by way of her driver's license.

Manson obviously knew if he were going to pin these murders on the black man, he was going to have to put them in possession of some items of personal property that was traceable back to the victims.

Credit cards were ideal for that purpose. Jewelry would not be.

The defense argues that proof that Manson wasn't trying to frame the black people was he had Linda leave the wallet in the gas station in Sylmar.

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Mr. Kanarek argued that Sylmar was a white

The fact that Sylmar is a white area came out on Ronald Hughes' cross-examination of Charles Koenig.

You remember, Mr. Hughes asked Koenig: Isn't it true that Sylmar is a predominantly white area? And Mr. Koenig said yes.

In other words, why didn't Manson leave the wallet in Watts or, as the defense counsel said, drive down Venice Boulevard and near the ocean leave the wallet in a black area down there?

Well, let's look at that closely now.

Manson obviously realized that he had to get rid of that wallet immediately since if he were caught with the wallet on his person or in the car, that would have been the end of the ball game for him that night -- immediately.

Driving to a place like Watts, ladies and gentlemen -- try to follow me closely on this -- driving to a place like Watts, or way out towards Venice near the ocean, and leaving the wallet there, in other words, driving there and then leaving the wallet as opposed to dropping off the wallet earlier, would have necessitated Charles Manson driving on the surface streets of this city, because I don't believe -- I don't know -- but I don't think any freeway leads directly to Watts or Venice. I am

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pretty sure about that.

Now, taking surface streets would immeasurably increase the likelihood of being stopped by the police.

Now, there are freeways which go, of course, in the vicinity of Watts or Venice, but you have got to get off the freeway and drive for a considerable distance on the surface streets also.

The chances of being stopped by the police, ladies and gentlemen, on a freeway is nowhere near as great as being stopped on the surface streets of this city.

On the surface streets, apart from traffic violations, the police could have pulled up next to Manson and the other three people at a stop light, at a stop sign, thought they looked suspicious, pulled them aside, and searched the car.

So, what does Manson do?

This freeway vis-a-vis surface streets comparison. He immediately gets on the first freeway available near the La Bianca residence, the Golden State Freeway. He gets on a freeway right away and disposes of the wallet the first available place once he gets off the freeway, the gasoline station in Sylmar.

He gets on the first freeway available, and as soon as he gets off the freeway he leaves the wallet.

I think this showed that Manson had no desire

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to be driving around with stop lights and stop signs on the streets of this city.

Furthermore, even forgetting about the surface streets as opposed to driving on the freeways, forgetting about that, who said that Charles Manson knew that Sylmar was a predominantly white area? Who said that?

The fact that it was a predominantly white area is totally irrelevant. We are only concerned with Charles Manson's state of mind.

He told Linda that he hoped a black man would 1 find that wallet. 3 So, obviously, he thought Sylmar was in a black 4 area. Probably he either thought it was in a totally black area, or a combined black-white area. If he thought it was in a combined black-white 7 area, Manson's estimation of black people was so low he probably thought that only they would stop to look in hidden places in a rest-room. 10 Whether Sylmar is black or white is totally 11 irrelevant. We are only concerned with Charles Manson's 12 state of mind. And he tells Linda that he wants a black 13 person to find it. 14 So, obviously, he thought it was in a black 15 area. 16 THE COURT: We will take our recess at this time, Mr. Bugliosi. 18 Ladies and gentiemen, do not converse with 19. anyone or form or express any opinion regarding the case 20 until it is finally submitted to you. 21: The court will recess for 15 minutes. (Recess.) 23 THE COURT: All counsel and jurors are present. You may continue, lir. Bugliosi. 25 MR. BUGLIOSI: Thank you, your Honor. .26 We were talking about Charlie Manson's low

estimation of black people, that only they would look into a hidden place in a rest-room.

Not only that, Charles Manson very, very probably believed that the person who cleaned -- who cleaned that rest-room -- cleaned that rest-room, scrubbed the dirt, was going to be a Negro.

And don't forget, of course, that Sylmar is right next to Pacoima, and Sergeant Patchett testified that Pacoima is a Negro community of the San Fernando Valley.

Pacoima is immediately south of Sylmar.

So, as Manson was driving northbound on the Golden State Freeway, he would have had to have passed the Pacoima off-ramps. The Pacoima off-ramps would have been right before where Manson actually got off the freeway.

Having just been in Los Angeles, probably for a year or so, he probably never even heard of Sylmar. Pacoima is much more well known than Sylmar. There is a very strong likelihood that he thought he was in Pacoima. He probably thought Sylmar was some street off-ramp for Pacoima.

Keep one further point in mind. Planting the wallet for a black person to find it was more likely not the only way that Charles Manson intended to frame the black man for these murders.

Manson probably felt that even leaving the words "Pig," "Rise," and, "Helter Skelter," at the murder scene

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would lead the white man to believe that black people had committed these murders.

I say that for this reason: Those words, ladies and gentlemen, meant one thing and one thing only to Charles Manson: That the black man was going to rise up and murder the white pigs.

It is rather common, of course, for human beings to be so caught up and so engrossed in something, as Charles Manson obviously was with Helter Skelter, that they unconsciously think that everyone else feels the same way they do and everyone else is keeping time with the same drummer they are. So, Manson, because of his fanatical obsession with Helter Skelter may have believed that when the police and the authorities saw these words at the scene they would automatically think the killers were black people.

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To Charles Manson, those words, which he literally lived with, were synonymous with blacks killing whites. He may have unconsciously assumed that the mere placing of those words at the scene would be tantamount to saying the killers are black people.

Now, mind you -- mind you -- it is obvious that Charles Manson's belief that he could actually start a black-white war by killing these seven white Caucasians is ridiculous. It is absurd.

It is equally obvious that even assuming that the white community thought that black people committed these murders, the likelihood of their turning against the black man is extremely remote.

However, even though these things are obvious, it is totally immaterial. We are only concerned, ladies and gentlemen, with Charles Manson's state of mind.

No matter how unwarranted the basis for his beliefs were, if he did, in fact, have these beliefs -- which the evidence clearly and unequivocally shows he did have -- that is all that we are concerned with. We are not concerned with reality in the abstract. We are concerned with Charles Manson's reality.

Now, you may say to yourself that even if Manson did have these strange beliefs, couldn't he have found a better way to attempt to start a black-white civil war?

Well, we are not here, ladies and gentlemen, to

give Charles Manson an A, B, C or D on the quality of his vertical.

Anyone who would order these murders is not a rational person. They might be cunning and devious, but they are not rational.

Since these murders were not rational and the man who masterminded them was not rational, why should we expect that the method Charles Manson selected to frame the black man would be rational?

We are dealing with a man with a crazed, frenzied, warped, twisted mind. To expect such a man to act in a reasonable fashion is itself an unreasonable expectation.

Moreover, when you really stop to think about it, if you were trying to frame black people for these murders, what could you do? Leave a note or a letter at the scene that black people committed these murders? Or as Mr. Kanarek and Mr. Fitzgerald suggested, a picture of Cassius Clay or Martin Luther King, or a copy of the Los Angeles Sentinel?

Why, even a two-year-old would recognize that ploy. That would be a ploy that would be so obvious that even a two-year-old could see it was a frameup.

Keep one final point in mind. We never said Manson felt positive he could start any black-white war. We only said he made an effort to do so.

By way of footnote, since we are dealing with the

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strange and the unusual and the bizarre in these murders, let me make this passing observation for whatever it is worth.

Mr. Kanarek says that this sword right here had nothing to do with these murders. He said: What connection does this sword have to do with these murders?

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Let me make this passing observation, and keep in mind that when I make this observation, look at it in the context of the fact that these are incredibly bizarre murders and we are dealing with a man who is incredibly bizarre himself.

We know that Charles Manson was very familiar with the Book of Revelations. Not just Revelations 9, the 9th chapter of Revelations, but also Revelations 7, the seventh chapter.

How do we know that? Because Revelations 7 refers to the 12 Tribes of Israel consisting of 144,000 people. And Charles Hanson told Brooks Posten that during helter skelter, when he and his Family would be in the bottomless pit, the Family would grow to 144,000 people.

Not only Revelations 9 now, but Revelations 7.

The Book of Revelations is also called the Apocalypse, which means the last final war between men on the face of this earth.

You have all heard of the four horsemen of the Apocalypse, war, strife, famine and pestilence, the four horsemen of the Apocalypse.

In Revelations 6, the sixth chapter of Revelations, let's look at this now. Besides the word "war," which is the first horseman of the Apocalypse, besides the word "war" being carved on Leno La Bianca's stomach -- this is the first horseman -- under the second

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horseman "strife" there is this language in the Bible:

"And there went forth another horse, a red one, and to him
who was sitting on it, it was given to take peace from
this earth, and that men should kill one another, and
there was given him a great sword."

Of course, Manson's concept of helter skelter involved men killing one another in a great civil war, and on the night of the La Bianca murders, ladies and gentlemen, Charlie Manson had this large sword with him.

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Now, I don't know how common it is to wear leather thongs in our society, but you just don't walk around with a pirate sword nowadays.

Under the horseman, pestilence, there is this language in Revelation 6:

"I saw and beheld a pale green horse, and he who was sitting on it, his name was death, and hell was following him and there was given him power over the four parts of the earth to kill with a sword, with famine and with death and with the beasts of the earth."

Now, although Charles Manson never used the word, Apocalypse, in his conversations with Gregg Jakobson, as I said, the Book of Revelations is also called the Apocalypse, and Charles Manson did use the word Armageddon, which is another Biblical term for the last final war, the last destructive war between man on the face of this earth, Armageddon and Apocalypse are synonomous with each other, and the war, ladies and gentlemen, is contained within Revelations 16, the 16th Chapter of Revelations.

I believe there are 72 books in the Bible, so I am talking about chapters. This is just chapters within one book.

So Revelations 6, 7, 9 and 16 are within a few pages of each other.

In view of the incredibly strange, unusual,

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 bizarre nature of these murders, it is not unreasonable to believe that in Charles Manson's twisted mind his Helter Skelter was the Bible's apocalypse.

That is, the last final war and bloodshed among men on the face of this earth.

and that Charles Manson thought in terms of the apocalypse or Armageddon being of his own Family's making. There is a further point which is extremely powerful evidence against Charles Manson and these defendants, and which although related to the motive, the question of motive really does not even have to be considered.

I keep going back to these words, I have to go back to them because that is the evidence in this case, the word pig is printed in blood at the Tate residence and also at the La Bianca residence.

Death to pigs, Helter Skelter, rise were printed in blood at the La Bianca residence.

War was carved on Leno's stomach at the La Bianca residence.

Mr. Kanarek said "None of the words which were printed in blood are tied in with Mr. Manson or any of these defendants."

Now, I ask you this: Where on the face of this earth, be it Cleveland, Ohio, Auckland, New Zealand, Portugue, Iceland, Hamburg, Germany -- I don't care where you want to go where do you think you can find another person or group of

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persons who, like these defendants, have a fanatical obsession with not just one of these words but all four?

Let's look at the four words, pig, Helter Skelter-and I want to consider Helter Skelter just one word -- pig, Helter Skelter, rise and war.

Let's look at these four words, ladies and gentlemen, because the killers somehow associated those words with murder; because the killers obviously are the ones who left those words at the scene.

The killers did not leave the scene of the murders and then some blue bird come through the window and arine those words.

It is the People's contention that these defendants and only these defendants would have left those four words at the murder scene.

We know what those four words meant to Charles
Manson and these defendants:

Pigs: the white establishment who deserved a damn good whacking.

Helter Skelter: the black-white revolution, the black-white war, and of course when Manson spoke of Helter Skelter he said the black man was going to rise up against the white man.

with respect to the word, war, of course, part of Manson's every-day speech was the black-white war.

Let's look at the word, pig, printed in blood

at the Tate and La Bianca residences.

The Tate-La Bianca murders were not the first murders in history, and unfortunately, they are not going to be the last. There have been thousands upon thousands of other murders prior to the Tate-La Bianca murders.

But just using your good old fashioned common sense, at the scene of how many of those murders would you imagine that the word, pig, would be printed in the victim's blood at the scene?

Maybe you have heard of it before; I never have.

But there possibly has been another murder in
history where the word "pig" was printed in blood at the
scene of a murder. I say that because the word, pig,
expresses contempt, hatred, detestation, and obviously
killers normally hatetheir victims.

So even though the word, pig, being found printed in blood at the scene of a murder is extremely unusual, extremely bizarre, perhaps unprecedented, perhaps possibly it has happened before because, as I say, the word pig is associated with hatred? hatred? murder.

So possibly, just possibly, there is a killer or group of killers other than these defendants who would murder seven people and leave the word "pig" printed in blood at the murder scene.

Let's look at the word "war."

It was carved on Mr. La Bianca's stomach. It

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would seem that word would be even less likely than the word, pig, to be found at the scene of a murder. The like-lihood that it has ever happened before is very remote.

War refers to killings, of course, but certainly it refers to conflicts between nations when thousands of people are killed.

I believe in the Second World War some estimates say 50 million people. The word "war" certainly has no applicability to the killing of two civilians inside their residence during poace time.

But since war is associated with violence, maybe -- just maybe -- there is a person or group of persons other than these defendants who would commit a murder and leave the word "war" at the scene of the murder.

I guess it's possible.

So let us assume there is a group of persons somewhere who would not only leave the word "pig" at the scene, but the word "war."

But, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I ask you, what in the world do the words "rise" and "Helter Skelter" have to do with murder?

Do you really think there has ever been another murder in history where those words were left at the scene?

The word "rise" has as much to do with murder as "basketball" or "dandelion."

The word "rise" has absolutely nothing to do with

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murder, except to Charles Manson and these defendants.

To Manson the word rise meant the black man rising up against the white man and murdering the entire white race.

According to Jakobson and Poston and Watkins, Manson himself used the word "rise."

That was one of Charlie's words, "rise."

When Manson used to play the Beatles song,
Revolution 9, which incidentally has no lyrics, I don't know
if you want to play it back in the jury room; it is the
most horrendous sound I ever heard in my life.

If you want to play the song I'm sure Judge Older will get you some type of a machine back there to play it on.

Poston testified that when the Family used to play the song, Revolution 9, which has no words, Charlie Manson used to say "I hear the word 'rise' in the back-ground."

else could hear it but Charlie could. He said "Can't you hear that word 'rise' back there amidst the machinegum fire?"

The word "rise" has an immense significance to Charles Manson, and it is very obvious why it was printed in blood at the La Bianca residence.

What in the world do the words Helter Skelter and rise have to do with brutal, senseless murders other

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than what Charles Hanson and Charles Manson alone was obsessed with?

The words "pig", "war", "rise" and "Helter Skelter" and the particular unique significance that Charles Manson placed on them, were an integral part of the daily life of Manson and his Family.

It was so much a part of their life that the words, Helter Skelter, were printed on a jug at Spahn Ranch, on a cabinet door at Spahn Ranch, on a mirror on the wall at Spahn Ranch.

"Fig, war, rise, Helter Skelter" were a part of their religion, a religion of death, blood, murder.

These are the same words that were left at the scene of these murders.

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In summary, on this point: When these defendants printed those four words at these murder scenes, not only did they leave their motive, they left their identification for the world to see.

Even if we never had Linda Kasabian's testimony throw her testimony out of the window; throw the confessions out of the window; the revolver, the shell
casings, the rope, the fingerprints -- throw all of that
out of the window.

When you find four incredibly bizarre words
like this printed in blood at the murder scene and you
come across a group of people whose way of life, whose
religion is composed of those words, and it is so obvious
that no other person or group of persons on the face of
this earth, number one, ran obsession with all four of these
words and, number two, associate these four words with
murder, person

group has to be, absolutely has to be responsible for these murders.

Charles Manson gave the religion of helter skelter to his Family. They did not give it to him.

Certainly none of you folks believe that these three female defendants or Tex Watson, the dune buggy mechanic, gave this religion of helter skelter to Charles Manson.

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Brooks Posten testified that he had never heard that word used in the Family until Charlie Manson introduced the term.

Manson not only was the undisputed leader and ruler of the Family, he was the lecturer, the teacher, the educator, the instructor.

He was the one that held court at dinnertime every night, and the Family listened quietly and intently to everything he said, never uttering a word.

The members of his Family, including Tex Watson and these three female defendants, were his pupils, his students.

Helter Skelter was a philosophy of violence and death that he preached to them.

When Watson, Atkins and Arenwinkel left the word "pig" at the Tate residence, and the following night when Watson, Arenwinkel and Van Houten left the words 'death to pigs, rise, helter skelter," and "war" at the La Bianca residence, they left the fingerprints of their master, Charles Eanson, at the scene.

all I've got left (indicating); we are at the end of the tunnel. If I finish by noon, I believe Judge Older probably will instruct you this afternoon.

Helter Skelter was Manson's main motive for these murders, but I con't believe it was the only one.

Another motive was Manson's extreme antiestablishment hatred state of mind, He was against wealthy people, churches, education, our system of government.

He was against the establishment for a very personal reason also, ladies and gentlemen.

You see, Charles Manson is a frustrated singer-guitarist, The evidence showed that he wanted to record his songs commercially.

Charlie even wanted to make a movie; Charlie went Hollywood.

In fact, Ruby Pearl said when the group pulled in at the Spahn Ranch in 1968 there was "Hollywood Productions" on the bus, or something like that.

Mr. Kanarek said Gregg Jakobson testified that he did record Manson, but Jakobson went on to testify that he did not record Manson commercially.

Apparently there were just tapes of Manson in a recording studio.

Terry Melcher, the former ecoupents of the Tate residence rejected Charles Manson's efforts to have him record him commercially.

Manson did his level best to impress Terry, but Terry was not interested. He did not record Manson.

All Terry did was give Manson \$50, tell him all about the obstacles there were to recording, did an about-face and took off, leaving Charlie where he was before, with Squeaky, Snake, Gypsy and the rest of the Family.

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Ï 2 before Sharon flew to Rome. З 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11. Melcher?" 12 13 14 15 Melcher's home in Malibu. 16

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Again, in a less subtle fashion, Hatami literally booted Manson off the Tate premises on March 23, 1969, the day

Hatami's confrontation with Manson was an unfriendly, abrasive confrontation.

Since the former occupant of the Tate residence had subtly rejected him and since Hatami had treated him shabbily and brusquely, Manson could not help but feel that the Tate residence was symbolic of the establishment to him, particularly the establishment's rejection of him.

Mr. Fitzgerald said, "Why didn't Manson kill

Mr. Kanarek argued that Manson knew that Melcher lived in Malibu, so why wash t the murders committed at

Manson's primary motive for these murders was helter skelter. A supplementary motive was to strike back at the Establishment.

Manson said Helter Skelter was to start with the atrocious murders of white families in the Beyerly Hills area, and killing Melcher alone by himself in his home in Malibu at the beach certainly would not serve to start helter skelter, at least not in Charlie's mind.

On August 8th, there is no evidence that Manson knew who lived at the Tate residence or how many people lived there, but he did know one thing, he did know that it

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was in a rather exclusive area of town, and that the home 'was an expensive home.

So Manson knew that whoever lived there most likely were people of easy circumstances who were members of the establishment.

If three people happened to be at the Tate residence that night, three people would have been murdered; if eight people were there, eight people would have been murdered.

In fact, Susan Atkins told Virginia Graham it didn't make any difference who was at the Tate residence that night, they were all going to be killed.

Not only was Manson striking back at the establishment on the night of the Tatemurders, but indirectly he was striking back at Terry Melcher personally.

By ordering a mass murder at Melcher's former residence, Manson obviously knew that Melcher's realization that these murders took place at a residence in which he lived just a couple of months earlier would literally paralyze Melcher with fear,

Manson was being charged with these murders. The recall on cross-examination of Melcher he was asked the question:

"When you left Charlie for the last time In May at the Spahn Ranch did you think Charlie was your friend?" I

And Melcher answered:

"I thought so."

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By italicizing the word "thought," the obvious inference being that his original impression was an erroneous one in light of the subsequent murders.

Again, on the evening of August 9, 1969, Charles Manson probably never knew who lived at the residence located at 3301 Maverly Drive, there is no evidence he knew these people or how many people were going to be inside until after he, himself, went in thore.

tense also, of course, were members of the establishment.

Leno La Bianca was the Gresidence and chief stockholder of the Gateway Markets.

Manson knew that the residence was in a very nice area of town, in fact, right next door to the La Bianca residence is this very large walled-in estate.

So he knew that whoever lived there most likely were members of the establishment.

Contrary to what Mr. Keith said, Manson wasn't only searching for millionaires, Manson considered many people to be members of the establishment. They didn't have to be millionaires or wealthy or rich people, but certainly people am easy circumstances.

the can look at the prospective victims that night, the two homes in Pasadena. You saw a photograph of one of them, a very nice home; the church in Pasadena.

The Will Rogers area of Los Angeles is in a very fashionable area of town. The driver of the white sports car.

Even the actor in Venice, you remember Manson said to Linda, what about that actor, isn't hea piggy?

To Manson "piggy" meant establishment.

Charlie didn't go down to Skid Row, ladies and gentlemen, looking for his victims.

Why did he select these two particular residences? Well, with an incredibly bizarre and wild over-all motive of helter skelter, it didn't make any particular difference to Charles Nanson who the precise victims were. That was irrelevant.

They qualified, as it were, if they were white people and members of the establishment.

Since these were his only requirements, choosing residences he was familiar with-he had been to the Tate residence and right next door to the La Bianca residence-coviously it seemed the easiest thing for him to do.

Particularly, when one of the residence, the Tate residence, was a residence where he had been treated rather shabbily and whose former occupant had rejected him.

We know that Charles Manson hated the establishment. He hated their showy, ornate nomes; he hated their luxurious, affluent life style.

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If the expensive and plush Tate residence did not classically represent to Charles Manson the establishment and all of the obstacles to success he had dreamed of, no residence ever would.

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25 26 Helter Skelter and Manson's desire to strike out at the establishment was not the only motive Manson had for these murders. There was also his hatred for human beings and his lust and passion for violent death.

You don't order the brutal, savage murder of human beings because you love them or like them or even we neutral toward them.

Manson knows how horrible death is, ladies and gentlemen. That is why he is fighting for his life right now.

If he thought death was as beautiful as he preached to his Family, he wouldn't be fighting for his life right now.

He knows that death is the ultimate harm.

He knows that a violent death and being brutally murdered is the worst crime that can befall any human being.

So, in order to have ordered these murders, he had to have hated the victims. Not by name, but because they were human beings.

Manson conned his followers into believing that he was a man of peace and love.

He has got to be one of the biggest phonies ever to come down the plank, and he knows it.

What does the word "love" mean to Charles Manson?

He proved what he meant by the word "love."

He proved it to the world. He meant death, hatred, murder.

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As you know, the dictionary has secondary meanings of many words.

(Pause.)

Î don't blame them for coming in, but it is somewhat distracting.

The dictionary has secondary definitions of many words, and now and then the secondary definition, paradoxically enough, is the antonym, that is, the complete opposite, of the primary definition.

One word that comes to my mind is the word "peculiar."

The primary definition of the word peculiar is: odd, uncommon.

There is a secondary definition of the word peculiar, and that means common.

For example: That is a figure of speech that is common or peculiar to Texans.

Perhaps these murders and this trial will give birth to a new and additional definition of the word love, Charles Manson's meaning, which, of course, is the exact opposite of how you and I and the present dictionaries define the word love.

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You know something, ladies and gentlemen.
Charles Manson's reverse definition of love is totally
consistent with everything else he preached to his Family.

You remember: When you kill someone, you are actually killing yourself. And other similar riddles.

Charles Manson preached love, but so tragically for the seven victims in this case, to Charles Manson, the word love meant murder.

The seven victims in this case, as I said in my opening argument, could have lived very well without Charles Manson's type of love.

Another motive related to Manson's hatred for human beings was his insatiable passion for weath.

No human being could have ordered these seven murders without a passion for death. Death.

Manson's whole life style was caught up in the concept of death.

He told Danny De Carlo that one shouldn't be afraid to die, and death meant nothing.

He told De Carlo that he would rather kill a human being than a bird.

He told Hannum he would rather kill people than animals.

He told Posten to kill the sheriff in Shoshone. He was always threatening to kill Juan Flynn.

He told Dianne Lake he was going to kill her.

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He was constantly telling Posten and Watkins and other members of the Family: Die, die.

Manson told Jakobson that there was no such thing as good or bad, right or wrong.

He went on to say that death was beautiful and it was not wrong to kill a fellow human being.

He told Watkins: Every one has got to die sooner or later because death is peace, and in order for the world's karma to be complete, everyone has got to die. So, you are actually doing someone a favor by knocking them off, by killing them. One way or the other, everyone has to die. You either have to do it in your head or out in the street.

He also told Watkins: In order to love someone, you must be willing to kill them, and you must be willing to have them kill you.

An every day part of his vocabulary was the word helter skelter, which referred to violent death -- of other human beings.

So, on a day-to-day, week-to-week, month-to-month basis, when Charlie Manson spoke of helter skelter, he was talking about death.

Even the hideout from civilization where he went after these murders was on the shadowy perimeters of Death Valley.

He had a preoccupation with Revelations 9, which

is a tale of violent mass death and destruction. ·i You recall Manson told others that Revelations 9 laid down the whole trip, the destiny of the world. In other words, Manson adopted, clung to and cited that story of mankind which spoke of death. Ŝ As Faul Watkins said, ladies and gentlemen, "Death is Charlie's trip." "Death is Charlie's trip." 13: 

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It took someone with a sick and morbid lust and passion and preoccupation with death to order these seven savage murders.

Charles Manson's morbid state of mind, his extreme anti-establishment hatred, his philosophy of Helter Skelter, were the precise ingredients which caused him to commit these murders.

These seven murders and the circumstances surrounding them are completely consistent with Charles Manson and his philosophy on life.

If one were to scour the face of this globe for a human being with a state of mind that was more tailormade for these murders, one would come upon Charles Manson.

Charles Manson and the seven Tate-La Bianca murders are synonomous.

Manson probably slept very well, ladies and gentlemen, on the nights of August the 9th and 10th, 1969.

After all, he knew that even if the murders did not start Helter Skelter, as he hoped they would, the mission of murder he had sent his robots out on was not a wasted mission. After all, in his mind, he had at least viciously struck out at the establishment and he had gotten himself seven pigs. And to Charles Manson, that wasn't bad for two nights work.

The final piece of evidence against Charles
Manson, and one of the very, very most powerful blocks of

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evidence against him at this trial, was his total and complete domination of his Family, including the actual killers, Tex, Susan, Patricia and Leslie.

Manson's total domination over Tex Watson,
Susan Atkins, Patricia Krenwinkel and Leslie Van Houten,
the people who the evidence shows were the actual killers,
is powerful circumstantial evidence that on the two nights
in question he was also dominating and directing everything,
they did.

Therefore, if you want to think in terms of corroboration, Manson's domination over the actual killers is evidence, which is independent of Linda's testimony, which certainly connects him with these murders, since he dominated the actual killers, and, therefore, corroborates Linda's testimony.

Mr. Kanarek said this: These three female defendants are a pretty independent lot, and Watson was his own man, and whenever he did something it was because he had the desire to do so. Watson had a lot of influence and he acted freely and voluntarily. Where is the evidence to prove that Manson dominated Watson or these defendants to the point where they were robots?

Where is the evidence? Well, I counted 238 places in the transcript -- don't worry, I am not going to give you these 238 places -- I counted 238 places in the transcript where witnesses testified to Manson's

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domination over the Family, including Tex Watson and these three female defendants.

Not once -- not once -- did any witness testify to anything which even remotely suggested that someone other than Charles Manson was the leader of this Family, or that there was no leader and everyone was equal.

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25 26 I will just give you a very few of these 238 examples, and most of these came from people who actually lived with Charles Manson and were members of his Family.

Linda testified at Page 4,839:

"Well, we lived together as one family, as a family who lives together, a mother and a father and child, but we were just all one and Charlie was the head."

Elsewhere, Linda testified to the sex orgy and to Manson having the young girl in the center of the circle and taking off her clothes and kicking her and hitting her in the face.

Then Linda testified that Charlie told Bobby Beausoleil to make love to her. And he told everybody to touch her and kiss her and make love to her. And everybody did.

"Did anyone who was present touch this girl before Charlie told them to do it?
"No."

Then after, Charlie told them to touch the girl.
"Then Charlie told everybody to make love
to everybody."

Linda testified that all three female defendants and Tex Watson were present and participated in the orgy.

Elsewhere this question was asked of Linda: "Did you ever see or observe any member of

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"the Family refuse to do anything that Manson told him or her to do?

"No, nobody did. We always wanted to do anything and everything for him."

Page 5,547. Linda referred to the Family as Manson's family.

Page 5,600. Linda said, "We never questioned Charlie. The girls used to always tell me, 'We never question Charlie. We know that what he is doing is right.'"

"Also, the girls worshiped him, you know. They just would die to do anything for him."

In discussing why she went along on the second night, she testified:

"Charlie told me to, and you never tell."
Charlie no. You do it."

Several witnesses, including Linda and Danny testified that at dinnertime Manson did almost all the talking, and no one would say anything unless he spoke to them first.

John Swartz testified that when he referred to the Family, he would say Charlie and the girls, or Charlie and the boys.

De Carlo testified that these three female defendants told him that Charlie knew all and saw all.

When I asked De Carlo when the Family would eat

at night, he answered:

"Well, Charlie would get us all together and sit down and eat chow.

"Do you ever recall the Family eating before he got the group together?

"No."

Several witnesses, including De Carlo, testified that Tex Watson always obeyed Manson.

Sergeant Olmstead testified to the July 28th incident.

"Manson told me that the people had scattered into the hills around us and that, at that time, there were guns trained on us from the hills around us, and on his command we could be wiped out."

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Barbara Hoyt testified that at Meyers Ranch in September of '69 Manson angrily woke her, Kitty Lutesinger and Tex Watson up and bawled them out for going to sleep before him. He even struck Kitty Lutesinger in the face.

Juan Flynn said that Manson told him "Go down to the creek and make love to my girls."

A question of Gregg Jakobson: "Did he ever say whose Family it was?

"Yes, it was his Family."

Jakobson also testified that Charlie was the obvious head of the Family, and of course you would have to give yourself up to him if you were a member of the Family.

Jakobson testified to the dinner down by the campfire, and said Charlie would sit on a rock in the center of the assemblage and everyone else would be seated around him in a circle.

Up on a rock all by himself.

Melcher testified that when he went to the ranch, "I was impressed by Charlie's strength and the obvious leadership he had over these people. It was an obvious thing."

Poston testified that when Charlie would be around, things would be like when a school teacher comes back to class. People would have to snap back into the

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part that they were playing.

Poston also testified -- so did Barbara Hoyt and Stephanie Schram -- that whenever the Family moved anywhere. Manson made the decision to move.

I asked Paul Watkins how one could become a member of the Family?

"You just give everything completely up.

"To whom?

"To Charlie."

Watkins also testified:

"Everything that I did in the Family, every action I made, every thought I thought, was towards giving up to Charlie, was submitting my will to Charlie's."

Poston and Watkins testified, and so did Linda, that they thought Charlie was Jesus Christ.

Dianne Lake testified that every morning Manson would get the entire Family together in a circle and tell the girls and the men, including Watson and these three female defendants, what he wanted each of them to do that day, including where to do and where to stay out of.

I can go on and on, but I am not going to go any further. These are just illustrative examples of the 238 places in the transcript.

Even here in court, right before your eyes, one day Manson comes into court with an X on his forehead,

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and the next day the three female defendants have X's on their foreheads.

Call Manson what you want, ladies and gentlemen, but there is no question but he was the leader, the patriarch, the overlord, the commander in chief, the king, the dictatorial ruler and maharajah of a bootlicking band of nomadic vagabonds who call themselves the Family.

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Spahn Ranch, or wherever the Family happened to be, was Charles Manson's domain. He ruled his Family in a fashion much more totally and completely than the kings of history was, the kings of history ruled their kingdoms or the head of a household today governs his family.

And the throne upon which Charles Manson sat was not a crowded throne. Only he occupied that throne.

And there were no heir apparents. After all, in the minds of his subjects, who could ever succeed Jesus Christ?

Now, Linda's testimony was direct evidence that Charles Manson masterminded these murders. So, we have conclusive evidence of Manson's masterminding them by the eyewitness testimony of someone who was actually there both nights, Linda Kasabian.

But even if Linda Kasabian never testified, there still would be no question that Charles Manson directed these murders.

Why do I say this? For the simple reason, ladies and gentlemen, that it is totally inconceivable that Tex Watson, Susan Atkins, Patricia Krenwinkel and Leslie Van Houten, all of whom were living with Charles Manson as members of his Family and were his followers and were slavishly obedient to him, would get together behind his back and go out and commit these seven savage murders without his being behind them.

To believe that they would commit these
murders without Manson's directions would be to totally
reject common sense and our human experiences. Especially
in view of the fact that on the first night they go to the
Tate residence where Manson had been, and the second night
they go to the La Bianca residence, which is right next
door to where Manson had also been.

Inasmuch as he was the total, complete ruler of his Family, not only is it unrealistic, it is totally unthinkable that Watson, Atkins, Krenwinkel and Van Houten, living totally under his total domination, slaves of Manson in every sense of the word, would get together and murder the seven human beings without his guidance, directions and orders.

Watson, the simple-minded dune buggy mechanic whom Gregg Jakobson called a puppydog, an automaton, Danny DeCarlo, who no one weekld ever accuse of being a mental glant, said Tex Watson never even had an opinion on anything; why, Manson wouldn't even let Tex Watson go to sleep at night before him, much less go outrand commit seven of the most horrendous murders imaginable.

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What I am saying is that with respect to
Manson ordering these murders, we idn't need Linda
Kasabian's testimony. It was nice to have, but it wasn't
necessary.

Certain things are so clear and obvious in life that a child can see and understand them.

One of them is that based on these evidence?

Manson ordered the seven Tate-La Bianca murders.

Linda Kasabian only articulated on that witness stand and gave direct evidence of something that was already unmistakably clear.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, although the law only requires, as you know, that the testimony of an accomplice be corroborated by slight evidence, we offered an enormous, overwhelming amount of evidence corroborating Linda Kasabian's testimony.

But much more importantly -- much more importantly -- we offered a massive amount of evidence against each defendant, and that evidence proves, beyond all doubt, to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt, that these defendants committed these murders.

Finally, I will make some closing observations, and we can go out to lunch and come back and Judge Older will instruct you on the law.

The defendants and their attorneys may be hoping for miracles, but I tell them that 12 reasonable

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men and women chosen from this community heard the evidence in this case, and they are not going to base their verdict on a Perry Mason script. They are going to base their verdict on the cold, hard, ugly facts that came from that witness stand under oath.

Earle Stanley Gardner isn't here to help Paul Fitzgerald, Irving Kanarek, Daye Shinn and Maxwell Keith.

There is not one tiny grain of evidence, not one microscopic speck of evidence, that anyone had any reason to mercilessly slaughter these seven victims, other than the incredibly bizarre reasons that Charles Manson and his subjects had.

With respect to the prosecution witnesses in this case, ladies and gentlemen, keep this in mind. Other than Linda Kasabian, no prosecution witness got anything out of taking that witness stand and testifying.

And with respect to Linda Kasabian, we have already discussed in great depth how we know that she told the truth.

And also keep in mind that all of the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses was 100 percent consistent with each other. I have already given you countless examples of that.

These prosecution witnesses, people like Gregg Jakobson, Paul Watkins, Brooks Poston, Dianne Lake, Danny DeCarlo, Juan Flynn, had no reason under the stars

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to take for taking that witness stand and offering damaging evidence against Manson and his co-defendants other than a moral obligation to tell the truth.

They took that witness stand because they had the courage -- and I use the word advisedly -- they had to courage to get up there and tall the truth.

The truth, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the truth is very, very difficult to smother and suppress.

You can call on your own human experience for that. The truth has a way about it of seeping to the The chemistry of the truth is to emerge for a surface. breath of fresh air.

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The prosecution witnesses had the courage to get up there and tell the truth.

People like Juan Flynn are in fear of their lives at the hands of Charles Manson.

He testified that Manson threatened him with his life many times. Even now he testified that he fears Manson's "reach."

Being in fear of his life at the hands of Charles Manson, the very last thing in the world he would do would be to get up there and lie about Charles Manson.

To believe that someone like Juan Flynn would take that stand and testify falsely against a man whom he is in deathly fear of when he has absolutely nothing to gain by it, is simply inconceivable.

Charles Manson, ladies and gentlemen, a manwho has had the infinite humility, if you will, to-refer
to himself as Jesus Christ, said that he had the power to
give life. On the nights of the Tate-La Bianca murders,
he thought he had the concomitant right to take human life.

He never had the right, but he did it anyway.

On the hot summer night of August the 8th, 1969, Charles Manson, the Mephistophalian guru who raped and bastardized the minds of all those who gave themselves so totally to him, sent out from the fires of hell at Spahn Ranch three heartless, blood-thirsty robots and, unfortunately; one human being, the little hippie girl,

Linda Kasabian.

The photographs of the victims show how very well Watson, Atkins and Krenwinkel carried out their master's, Charles Manson's, mission of murder.

Movie director Roman Folanski, Sharon Tate's husband, himself could never have conceived a more monstrous, macabre, nightmarish scene of human terror and masacre.

To do what they did, Watson, Atkins and Krenwinkel had the minds and the hearts of the wildest animals in the jungle. They had an insatiable hunger for the merciless and berbaric death of human beings, an unquenchable thirst for their lifets blood.

What they did was perhaps the most inhuman, nightmarish, horror-filled hour of savage murder and human slaughter in the recorded annals of crime.

As the helpless, defenseless victims begged and screamed out into the night for their lives, their life blood gushed out of their bodies, forming rivers of gore.

Ladies and gentlemen, if they could have,

I am sure that Watson, Atkins and Krenwinkel would gladly
have swum in that river of blood, with present eastasy on
their faces.

Susan Atkins, the Vampira, actually tasted Sharon's blood.

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Because Charles Manson made a mistake and sent
out one human being, Linda Kasabian, on this mission of
murder, we all sat here and listened in this courtroom to
Linda tell us in her own words about the unbelievable
horror that she witnessed, and because she is a human
being and not a savage, she cried, and she cried hard
when she told you of the brutal murders that she saw with
her own eyes.

The very next night, Leslie Van Houten joined the group of murderers, and it was poor Leno and Rosemary La Bianca who were brutally butchered to death to satisfy Charles Manson's homicidal madness.

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As I said in my opening argument, the laws of this State and nation these defendants were entitled to have their day in court, they have got that.

They are also entitled to be tried by a fair and impartial jury, and have a fair trial. They got that, too. That is all that they are entitled to.

Since they committed these seven savage, senseless murders, the People of the State of California are entitled to a guilty verdict.

The defendants did everything possible, ladies and gentlemen, to escape liability for these ghastly murders

Among other things they employed the ink bag of the octopus.

But the evidence that came from that witness stand under oath during this very long trial focused a very bright, penetrating spotlight on these two dark, black nights of murder, and what we saw, ladies and gentlemen, was a street horrifying, monstrous, almost unearthly conspiracy to commit a wanton orgy of murder.

A conspiracy whose participants, Charles Manson and his co-defendants, were blinded by the glare of the spotlight, and who sought to cover their eyes, and scurry off into the sanctuary of other dark places.

But our system of law, ladies and gentlemen, is predicated on the concept of justice which means that when you violate the law you have to pay for your crime.

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 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, we have beheld the form of the retreating octopus. The have brought these defendants back to face justice.

You folks are 12 reasonable men and women. This is why we selected you as jurors on this case, for that very reason.

Not only was this an exceedingly strong case of direct evidence against these defendants, but the prosecution's case literally overflowed with circumstantial evidence against them.

Based on the evidence that came from that witness stand, not only isn't there any reasonable doubt of their guilt, which is our only burden, there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever of their guilt.

The prosecution put on a monumental amount of evidence against these defendants, much of it scientific, all of it conclusively proving that these defendants committed these murders.

As sure as night follows day, as sure as I am standing here, these defendants are guilty. I turn you over to your good common sense in evaluating the testimony and the evidence that you heard in this case.

did its job in gathering and presenting the evidence.

The witnesses did their job by taking that witness stand and testifying under oath.

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Now you folks are the last link in the chain of

I respectfully ask that you come back into this courtroom after your deliberations and say, "We, the jury in the above-entitled action, find the defendants Charles Manson, Susan Atkins and Patricia Krenwinkel guilty of murder as charged in Counts I through VII of the indictment, and we find it to be murder in the first degree.

And we find defendant Leslie Van Houten to be guilty of murder as charged in Counts VI and VII of the indictment, and we find it to be murder in the first degree.

And we further find defendants Charles Manson,
Susan Atkins, Patricia Krenwinkel and Leslie Van Houten fully of the crime of conspiracy to commit murder as charged in Count number VIII of the indictment.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, Sharon Tate,
Abigail Folger, Voityck Frykowski, Jay Sebring, Steven
Parent, Leno La Bianca, Rosemary La Bianca are not here
with us now in this courtroom, but from their graves they
cry out for justice. Justice can only be served by coming
back to this courtroom with a verdict of guilty.

It has been a very, very long trial; I don't have to tell you that, who know it just as well or better than I.

This trial has been an enormous imposition on all of your personal, private lives.

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On behalf of the People of the State of California

I want to thank you very much for the patience and

attention you have shown throughout these entire

proceedings.

You have been an exemplary Jury. The plaintiff at this trial is the People of the State of California. I have all the confidence in the world that you won't let them down.

Thank you very much.

THE COURT: We will recess at this time until 1:45 this afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, remember the admonition.

I will see counsel in chambers, please.

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presence.

(The following proceedings were had in the chambers of the court outside the presence of the jury, all counsel with the exception of Mr. Hughes being present.)

THE GOURT: Let the record show all counsel are present.

MR. KAY: We received no copies of the requested instructions.

(Mr. Fitzgerald gives copies to all attorneys.)

MR. FITZGERALD: Three is a blizzard?

THE COURT: What was the last requested instruction?

MR. KAY: A last minute blizzard of instructions.

MR. KAY: 129, Mr. Keith's instruction on mere

THE CLERK: The last one was 129, your Honor.

THE COURT: The special requested instruction starts out:

"Either the presence of the defendant," et cetera, will be Defendants' Special Instruction 130.

The next one cites People vs. Hill and starts out "Mere presence."

It will be 131.

The requested instruction again cites People vs. Hill and starts out "Evidence that the person was in the company," will be numbered 132.

And the fourth requested instruction, starting out "A confession is an intended acknowledgement of guilt,"

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Do the People have any comments?

MR. KAY: We have just received them.

THE COURT: Let's take them up in chronological and numerical order.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Shall we discuss 130 first?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Our position on that is that if the Court was not going to give the mere presence instruction, a fortiori, this instruction should not be given. I think it is an a fortiori situation.

I think instructions on aiding and abetting adequately cover the situation, and I particularly am not pleased with an instruction coming in after argument which prevents me from addressing myself to it during argument.

I would have objected to this instruction even before argument, but certainly now -- certainly now. I have already concluded my argument. I never had an opportunity to address myself to it.

In any event, aiding and abetting covers the situation, I mean, the instructions that the Court is presently going to give adequately covers the situation.

THE COURT: Does anyone want to be heard?

MR. KANAREK: Join in the requested instruction, your Honor.

MR. FITZGERALD: They were drawn up in the name of

everybody. 1 THE COURT: The subject is adquately covered by the 2 instructions I propose to give, and 130 will be refused. 3 131, any comment? 4 MR. BUGLIOSI: That is the same, mere presence instruc-5 tion, your Honor. 6 Again, the Court rejected it before argument, 7 a fortiori, after argument I could not address myself to 8 it, I certainly would ask the Court to reject it. It is adequately covered by the present aiding 10 and abetting instruction. 11 THE COURT: Does anyone wish to be heard other than 12 Mr. Bugliosi? 13 131 will be refused. 14 132, any comment? 15 MR. KANAREK: Also submit that. 16 THE COURT: I assume all of these are being requested 17 by all defendants. 18 MR. FITZGERALD: I just told Mr. Kanarek that three 19 times, your Honor. 20 MR. KANAREK: That's correct. 21 THE COURT: I had assumed that. 22 MR. KANAREK: That's correct. 23 THE COURT: Although it doesn't state so. 24 MR. KANAREK: I was responding to the Court. Your 25 Honor said --26

THE COURT: I asked if you had any comment. ľ MR. KANAREK: Submit it, that is my comment. 2 MR. FITZGERALD: Please be quiet. Ź THE COURT: I think it is adequately covered. 4 talking about 132 now, and I also think that this is 5 ambiguous, I don't know what "associated" means. 6 I suppose you can associate with a person so 7 as to be an aider and abettor, or a conspirator, or not 8 guilty. 9 I don't know what it means. 10 In any event, it is covered by other instruc-11 tions, and it will be refused. 12 133. Any comment? 13 MR. BUGLIOSI: It is covered elsewhere, your Honor. 14 with particularity in the other instructions the Court is 15 going to give. 16 MR. KAWAREK: It is not, your Honor, it is not covered; 17 that is the point. 18 The instructions do not --19 MR. BUGLIOSI: It is confusing, too. 20 MR. KANAREK: It is not confusing. 21 It is confusing: "In all its elements," 22 what does "In all its elements" mean? 23 Because Mr. Kanarek said one thing in his. 24 argument and Mr. Bugliosi said another, I think this 25 would serve to completely confuse the jury. 26

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Also we have the instructions already covering confessions and admissions.

MR. KANAREK: Not so, your Honor, that is the point.

The one that is purportedly defining a confession, where the admission and the confession are supposedly defined in the same piece of paper, does not specify what is the law.

In other words, there is a difference between second degree murder and first degree murder, and therefore a confession to second degree might and is in fact different than first degree because the elements are different.

Otherwise the jury does not have that sophisticated point, and that is what the prosecution wants, they want these -- what we as lawyers would agree -- are admissions; they want them to be considered confessions.

Well, maybe they should be considered confessions, if all of the elements are present, but we are entitled, and we allege it is a fundamental denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and equal protection clause under the Fourteenth Amendment when state action is involved, this is state action, the District Attorney's office, to argue that these are confessions.

We should at least have the intellectual discipline in the jury room where they would have to go through and determine if each element is present.

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25 26 THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek, the instructions I propose to give set out in meticulous and precise detail all of the elements of all of the offenses and the definitions the jury has to know.

They have to find those things before they can make a finding of guilty in any particular offense.

MR. KANAREK: In the area of confessions that is not done, your Honor.

THE COURT: I believe it is done.

MR. KANAREK: Pardon?

THE COURT: I believe it is done. In analyzing a statement made by the defendant, or alleged to have been made by a defense they will have to apply the rules as given to them by the Court and decide whether or not it is a confession, and if it is a confession, a confession of what.

MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, I respectfully -THE COURT: It is no different from all of the other
decisions they have to make in arriving at their findings,
if they are able to.

MR. KANAREK: As I say your Honor is the one to decide, but clearly we allege this is a violation and a denial of a fair trial because of the large place in this trial of confessions.

I think they should be told so they would go through the discipline, I think it is incumbent in

connection with a fair trial that they go through the discipline of analyzing a statement and saying, "Where is the premeditation? Where is the malice aforethought?" Everything that is required that we know when a police officer, for instance, takes the confession, they go through and they get the ingredients, the facts from which the legal conclusion could be made.

Therefore, this jury being a jury of lay people, the instructions do not include the discipline, we are suggesting. It does not require the jury to go through the discipline of determining that all elements are present.

For instance, that one they are basing on Mr. Manson, where he supposedly said, "Who do you think is responsible for these killings?"

If we were going to test this by first-degree murder, where is the premeditation? Is that in that state-ment?

Where is the malice aforethought? Where are the ascertained people?

Now, if the jury doesn't do that, they cannot possibly, your Honor, analyze that statement and determine, say, the difference between first-degree murder and second-degree murder, and an admission.

That would not be done; it will be done in just a cavalier way, is what the prosecution wants. In other words, they want these things to be considered confessions

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so they can get the result that they want.

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But we think that a fair trial requires that the jury go through that discipline and all that this says is exactly that.

THE COURT: I think the instructions would require them to go through that discipline as I have already indicated.

All of the things they are required to do are fully covered by the instructions.

133 will be refused. 133 is ambiguous, but in any event it will be refused.

All right, gentlemen?

MR. KAY: Your Honor, we have one point here about an instruction, No. 65 in the instructions, CALJIC 6.20.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The one on withdrawal, your Honor.

The Court, when we were discussing instructions, said it was not going to give the withdrawal instruction because there is no evidence anyone intended to withdraw.

We notice that it is still there.

I remember the Court's discussion, that the Court was not going to give it because there simply was no evidence that anyone tried to get out of the conspiracy; yet it is still in the group of papers there.

THE COURT: Well, I am going to give it. I know we had lengthy discussions about it.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I thought the Court had concluded since

no one had --

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THE COURT: I have changed my mind several times in several instances. I don't remember what the last change was except it is obvious I intended to give it because I included it in the proposed instructions.

I know there are arguments pro and con, but I think viewing all of the evidence that it should be given.

MR, FITZGERALD: I have a matter I wanted to bring to the attention of the Court. I realize it is a late date, and I certainly realize it is a late hour, but for the last two days I have been trying to draft an instruction that would cover some sort of instruction to the jury in regard to the photographs they are going to receive of the decedents.

Now, there is a jury instruction, a standard CALJIC jury instruction of a general nature, your Honor, that refers to duties of the jury, and it says they are not to be influenced by passion or prejudice against them, nor by pity for them.

THE COURT: That is 1.00.

MR. FITZGERALD: Of course, during the course of the prosecution's argument, I think on two occasions there was reference to looking at the photographs to see the defendants' handiwork which, in essence, for the purposes of these discussions anyway, is an appeal, sort of, to passion or prejudice.

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It would be one thing if they first determined guilt, and then in the penalty phase they decide to look at the pictures in aggravation of the offense.

The point of all this is, I wonder if your Honor could just say a few words to the jury about the legitimate uses of the gruesome or inflamatory photographs?

You let them in because you feel they are proper, and I take it you feel that there are proper inferences that can be drawn from them.

I wonder if you would just make a comment somehow -- I cannot phrase it or draft it properly. I tried about 14 times to do it.

You might say some words about the photographs.

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THE COURT: I appreciate your expression of confidence in my ability to do what you say you cannot do, Mr. Fitzgerald. It seems to me it's already covered by the first instruction I will give them.

MR. FITZGERALD: Mr. Shinn actually put in an instruction on the photograph thing, requested instruction No. 98. It was rejected. I tried his. I didn't have too much luck there either.

THE COURT: The photographs were objected to, the objections were overruled and they were received as evidence in the case because I felt that they are relevant, material probative evidence.

Now, the fact that they also happen in addition to contain evidence of blood and wounds, and so forth, is unfortunate, but I don't see how you can get around that in a case of this kind. That is why we have an old fashioned prejudice type of instruction.

I cannot instruct them not to look at the photographs during the guilt phase. If I believed that, I would not have let them in.

MR. FITZGERALD: I understand that.

THE COURT: So I don't know what the ; answer is.

In this kind of a case there is going to be some gruesome evidence, no question about it, or there may be some gruesome evidence.

But my finding that the probative value outweighs

any possible prejudicial effect, I believe that, I don't think there is any answer to your question other than the instructions already being given.

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MR. KAY: Your Honor, I have one suggestion to make which your Honor probably has already thought of, but I know it was employed in the Sirhan case, and I think it would be proper in this case, to keep decorum in the courtroom, that is to have the Sheriff's personnel advised, the press and the spectators, that nobody is to leave the courtroom, so they don't stumble all over each other and run to their phones until after the verdicts have been given by the jury, until after the jury is polled.

That way they will all have an even chance and won't turn the courtroom into a circus.

THE COURT: I have been giving some consideration to that.

I will give further consideration to it in view of the fact there are so many possible verdicts and verdict forms.

I may actually want to leave the bench and come in here with these forms and look them over before they are read by the Clerk, just to make sure that they all are in proper form and signed and dated, and I might overlook semething up there at the bench, going through verdicts for eight counts and for four defendants.

I want to make sure they are organized in some

intelligible form for the Clerk if he has to read them.

But I agree, I don't want spectators, counsel, Sheriff's representatives or the media representatives to stand up on masse and create a sea of confusion when the first verdict is read, whatever it may be.

MR. KAY: And, your Honor, it is also the position of the People, we would want the defendants to be present.

THE COURT: Well, that is another -- ...

MR. FITZGERALD: We do too.

THE COURT: That is another point I have considered carefully. I think they certainly should be present, and I am going to have them present when we come in.

An aspect of that problem is whether they should be brought in singly and the verdict as to individual defendants be read, or whether they should all be there at the same time.

I don't suppose it really makes any difference, but I think probably they all should be present, and as long as they don't disrupt the proceedings they will remain.

MR. FITZGERALD: Thank you.

THE COURT: Rut if there is a disruption, after all the disruption we have had so far it isn't going to take much to convince me that is what they intend to do, then they are going to have to be removed, and of course they will be put back in their rooms again where they can hear.

I certainly would prefer to have them present, and

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that is the way we will start out. 1 MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, in connection with the 2 contempt concerning me, I would welcome your Honor to 3 read the several pages prior to that, because I think your 4 Honor will see rather than being disruptive at all. Mr. 5 Bugliosi made an allegation to certain arguments that Mr. б Keith and I made and he did not include marijuana, only 7 LSD. 8 He attributed/certain argument to me. I think 9 it will show I was respectful to the Court. 10 The Court told me to do something; I said 11 "Very well, your Honor." 12 But I would like to have counsel also, your 13 Honor, in connection with that. 14 THE COURT: Do you have the page citation? 15 MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, I think it is around 16 187, 21187 or something like that. 17 THE COURT: I'm not going to do it right now. 18 MR. KANAREK: I would welcome knowing your Honor's 19 intent in connection with that contempt because I certainly 20 did not intend to disrupt at all, but I refer your Honor 21 to the Gallagher case, and the Hallinan case where lawyers 22 actually --23 THE COURT: What you said was: 24 "Your Honor, may he include marijuana in that 25 26 issue?"

MR. KANAREK: Yes, right, your Honor, and if your 1, Honor will see, he attributed to Mr. Keith and me language in the several pages preceding, your Honor, wherein this 4 was not so. 5 We did not limit our argument to LSD. 6 I find that difficult to construe as an THE COURT: objection, Mr. Kanarek. 8 MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, I would take the 9 witness stand and testify under oath, your Honor, that that 10 is so, because if you look at it --· II THE COURT: I am looking at it. 12 The last thing that Mr. Bugliosi said before your 13 remark was -- I'm reading just the latter part of the 14 sentence: 15 "And inasmuch as one or more of you folks 16 might be concerned about the fact that the star 17 witness for the prosecution did ingest a considerable 18 amount of LSD, I will briefly address myself to 19 the LSD issue." 20 MR . KAMARCK: Yes. "MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may be include 21 THE COURT: 22 marijuana in that issue?" 23 24 .25

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MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, what I had in mind were his utterances just before that, he spoke and attributed to Mr. Keith and me arguments wherein we only spoke of LSD, but we didn't, we spoke of both marijuana and LSD.

THE COURT: I will consider this further and I will go back and read several pages preceding this exchange.

MR. KANAREK: May I inquire as to your Honor's intent in connection to that?

THE COURT: I haven't made up my mind yet. You asked me to go back and read it. I said I would do it.

MR, KANAREK: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. KEITH: Before we adjourn, out of an abundance of caution I think I have done this before, but I would like the record to show that I object very strongly to the second paragraph of CALJIC 33.34 which is Page 55 of the instructions referring to, "You must assume that each of the defendants was of sound mind for the purposes of the case on trial."

I think we took it up before, but it isn't quite clear; it doesn't help me at all.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The problem is I have already told that to the jury; then if the Court doesn't give that instruction it's going to look kind of bad.

MR. KEITH: I think it's very bad law in the light of present day evolution of the law.

THE COURT: Maybe the jury won't believe it.

MR. KEITH: I don't want to argue the matter.

MR. KANAREK: May I join in Mr. Keith's comments?

THE COURT: You may all join in the objection.

HR. FITZGERALD: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: The objection is overruled.

All right, 145, gentlemen, I don't think it's going to take more than about 40 minutes to read these instructions. Some of them are quite short.

One other thing, while you are here, now, when the jury once retires, I know you gentlemen don't want to hang around here; you have other things to do. But you must recognize that there is a good possibility that the jury — I guess there is a good possibility of anything. They can arrive at a verdict quickly or they can take a long time.

There is a possibility they may want evidence read back. They may have questions of some kind which I will require them through their foremen to give to the bailiff in writing.

But in any event, obviously I have to be able to have you available back in the courtroom on fairly short notice and I would think about 30 minutes would be not unreasonable.

I realize this poses some problems, but on the other hand, let's face it, the case is not over just because it has been submitted to the jury.

MR. FITZGERALD: In that connection we wonder if it is

possible or if your Honor would consider not bringing the Ţ female defendants here to the Hall of Justice every day. 2 3 If you would leave them at Sybil Brand on the same 4 sort of call system? THE COURT: I think so, yes. I don't see any necessity -5 6 to bring them here every day. MR. FITZGERALD: It is our request that they be over 7 8 there, if possible. 9 THE COURT: Certainly until something happens there is 10 ' no need for them to be here. MR. FITZGERALD: Right. Frequently where when juries 11 12 deliberate --13 THE COURT: Do any of you have any comment about the 14 30-minutes on-call status? 15 MR. KAY: Does that go for Saturday also? 16 THE COURT: I don't think on Saturday. I think every-17 body is entitled to a little more -- I'm going to have them 18 deliberate on Saturday. 19. · MR. KEITH: Not Sunday, though. THE COURT: Not Sunday. 20 21 MR. BUGLIOSI: Are they going to come here to 22 deliberate, or at the hotel? 23 Yes, here. THE COURT: 24 MR. FITZGERALD: Here, we object to their deliberating 25 at the hotel. THE COURT: They won't deliberate anywhere else but in 26

the jury room with all the security protection.

But on Saturday if they have a question they will just have to wait until Monday, or a verdict.

MR. FITZGERALD: In reply to your inquiry, I think that 30 minutes is certainly reasonable from one point of view, it's unreasonable from another point of view.

I won't have any problem, I don't think, getting here. My office is not that far away.

Shinn's office is at 3860 South Crenshaw Boulevard and Mr. Kanarek is out in the middle of the San Fernando Valley, 1721 Van Nuys Boulevard.

I am simply talking about transportation.

45 minutes is probably a little more realistic. I think
you are going to have trouble getting us here in 30 minutes.

MR, BUGLIOSI: I will be at my home in Glendale.

THE COURT: You are retiring?

MR. BUGLIOSI: I have a lot of other work to do and I cannot ever get any of it done down here.

But I probably can get here in 30 minutes. It takes quite a while to drive in from Glendale.

THE COURT: Let's make it 45 minutes, but if we make it any longer than that we are going to waste a whole day just getting people together.

MR. KAY: Does that go for Saturday or for every day? THE COURT: Every day.

Saturday I just won't count on being able to get

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MR. SHINN: I was thinking sometimes if I am not available, can I send my associate down?

I think we probably should have an THE COURT: exception. If they have a verdict on Saturday perhaps we should.

MR. FITZGERALD: You might not want them to deliberate next Saturday. You might feel by next Saturday if they are still deliberating and they deliberated six days in a row, you might decide to give them two days off next week.

The only Saturday we are dealing with immediately is tomorrow.

THE COURT: I would do this, I think if you gentlemen will check in by telephone the first thing every morning, it could save a great deal of time.

If the clerk has to go looking for you, that poses kind of a problem, no telling where you may be.

If you will check in with him, say between a quarter to 9:00 and a quarter after 9:00, that is a halfhour period, then if we do have a request, if we do have a verdict, or something that requires your attention, you will know about it at the beginning of the day.

So, I will put that in the form of an order, 10-1 1 and counsel will check in by telephone every day, except 2 Sunday, between 8:45 a.m. and 9:15 a.m., by telephone 3 with the Clerk. 4 THE CLERK: Your Honor, Saturday? 5 Will the Clerk be here tomorrow? MR. KEITH: б MR. KAY: The jury will be deliberating. 7 I think we are going to have to. 8 THE COURT: But until further notice, check in every day, .9 except Sunday, between 8:45 a.m. and 9:15 a.m. 10 Is the switchboard open in the courthouse? 11 MR. KEITE: THE COURT: And on Monday through --12 Is it? 13 14 I will find out. 15 THE COURT: Do you have a direct line? 16 THE CLERK: I will have to check. 17 MR. KEITH: We can send a carrier pigeon. 18 THE COURT: Let's forget about Saturday. 19 too many problems. 20 21 22

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THE CLERK: I don't know. They have a direct number. It poses Monday through Friday, make your telephone check, and be on no more than 45 minutes call. That is, getting to the courtroom within 45 minutes. MR. KAY: So, if the jury has a verdict on Saturday, we will hold it over to Monday? I think you will call us in that event. MR. MUSICH:

1 In any event, I want the Clerk to have THE COURT: .2 your telephone numbers where you can be reached during 3 all daylight hours. MR. BUGLIOSI: I was thinking, your Honor, in a case 5 of immeasurably less magnitude, when a jury reaches a 6 verdict on Saturday, everybody comes down on Saturday. 7 THE COURT: I would prefer to do it that way. 8 The fact that we don't have a telephone check-in 9 doesn't preclude us from taking the verdict. 10 As long as the Clerk has your numbers, if we 11 have a verdict on Saturday, you will be called. 12 MR. BUGLICSI: Yes. 13 I think so. 14 THE COURT: Is there any doubt about what has just 15 been said? 16 MR. KANAREK: Furnish Mr. Darrow with the numbers? 17 Is that it? 18 Furnish Mr. Darrow with our number where we can 19 be reached at any time? 20 MR. MUSICH: What about the motions pending for 21 Monday? 22 THE COURT: We still have the motions pending on 23 Monday at 9:00 o'clock. 24 Could we reconvene at 2:00 instead of MR. KEITH: 25 1:45? 26 THE COURT: Since you have another one on file, I

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will probably have to put that over because no one has
  had a chance to prepare anything in opposition.
        MR. FITZGERALD:
                          Right.
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               I should have changed the date on that, but
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  because they were so similar, I didn't.
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               They didn't really have much notice.
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               You can put them both over.
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        THE COURT: You can appear on Monday and we can
  continue them down the week sometime.
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        MR. FITZGERALD:
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               As a matter of fact, as the one most familiar
  with the motion, I prepared them in most respects, if these
  gentlemen don't want to appear on Monday, I will be happy
  to appear for you for the purpose of continuing it to some
  convenient date.
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        THE COURT:
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                     It is agreeable with me.
                                                Is it agreeable
17
  with you?
        MR. SHINN:
                     Yes.
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        MR. KEITH:
                     Agreeable.
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        MR. KANAREK:
                       Yes.
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                     May we reconvene at 2:00 instead of
        MR. KEITH:
22
  1:45?
                     All right. 2:00 o'clock.
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        THE COURT:
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               (Whereupon at 12:30 o'clock p.m. the court
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               was in recess.)
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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, FRIDAY, JANUARY 15, 1971 2:05 P.M.

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(The following proceedings were had in open court, all counsel with the exception of Mr. Hughes being present; all members of the jury are in the box; the defendants are not physically present in the courtroom:)

THE COURT: All counsel and jurors are present.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury:

It is my duty to instruct you in the law that applies to this case and you must follow the law as I state it to you.

As jurors it is your exclusive duty to decide all questions of facts submitted to you and for that purpose to determine the effect and value of the evidence.

In performing this duty you must not be influenced by pity for a defendant or by passion or prejudice against them.

You must not be biased against a defendant because he has been arrested for this offense or because a charge has been filed against him, or because he has been brought to trial. None of these facts is evidence of his guilt and you must not infer or speculate from any or all of them that he is more likely to be guilty than innocent.

In determining whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, you must be governed solely by the evidence received in this trial and the law as stated to you by the

Court. You must not be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling. Both the People and the defendant have a right to expect that you will conscientiously consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, and that you will reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such a verdict may be.

If the court has repeated any rule, direction or idea, or stated the same in varying ways; no emphasis was intended and you must not draw any inference therefrom. You are not to single out any certain sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others. You areto consider all the instructions as a whole and are to regard each in the light of all the others. The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance.

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You must not consider as evidence any statement of counsel made during the trial; however, if counsel for the parties have stipulated to any fact, or any fact has been admitted by counsel, you will regard that fact as being conclusively proved as to the party or parties making the stipulation or admission.

A "stipulation" is an agreement between attorneys as to matters relating to the trial.

As to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must not speculate as to what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the objection.

You must never speculate to be true any. insituation suggested by a question asked a witness. A question is not evidence and may be considered only as it supplies meaning to the answer.

You must not consider for any purpose any offer of evidence that was rejected, or any evidence that was stricken out by the court; such matter is to be treated as though you had never heard of it.

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The masculine form as used in these instructions applies equally to a female person. .8 · · · · · · · · · · · · 10' · 11. \* **15**· 18. . 21 

The word "defendant" as used in these instructions, applies equally to each defendant in this case except as you may be otherwise instructed.

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The testimony of a witness, a writing, a material object, or anything presented to the senses offered to prove the existence or nonexistence of a fact is either direct or circumstantial evidence.

Direct evidence means evidence that directly proves a fact, without an inference, and which in itself, if true, conclusively establishes that fact.

Circumstantial evidence means evidence that proves a fact from which an inference of the existence of another fact may be drawn.

An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group offacts established by the evidence.

It is not necessary that facts be proved by direct evidence. They may be proved also by circumstantial evidence or by a combination of direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. Both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are acceptable as a means of proof.

Neither is entitled to any greater weight than the other.

You are not permitted to find a defendant guilty of any crime charged against him based on circumstantial evidence unless the proved circumstances are not only consistent with the theory that that defendant is guilty of the crime, but cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion, and each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish that defendant's guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Also, if the evidence as to any particular count is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to a defendant's guilt and the other to his innocence, it is your duty to adopt that interpretation which points to his innocence, and reject the other which points to his guilt.

You will notice that the second paragraph of this instruction applies only when both of the interpretations appear to you to be reasonable. If, on the other hand, one of the interpretations appears to you to be reasonable and the other to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to adopt the reasonable interpretation and to reject the unreasonable interpretation.

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Evidence that a defendant attempted to suppress evidence against himself in any manner, such as by the intimidation of a witness, may be considered by you as a circumstanstance tending to show a consciousness of guilt. However, such evidence is not sufficient in itself to prove guilt and its weight and significance, if any, are matters for your consideration.

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It is permissible to prove that the defendant Patricia Krenwinkel was ordered by the Court to make certain handwriting exemplars during the trial and that she failed to make such exemplars. Defendant Patricia Krenwinkel stated to the Court that her refusal to make such exemplars was based upon the advice of her attorney. The Court advised her in open court outside the jury's presence that she had no legal right to refuse, that she had an absolute right to make such exemplars notwithstanding her attorney's advice to the contrary, and that her failure to make such exemplars might be the subject of argument to the jury by the presecution and an instruction to the jury by the Court. The fact that she failed to comply with the order to make such exemplars is not sufficient standing alone and by itself to establish the guilt of Patricia Krenwinkel, but is a fact which if proven may be considered by you in the light of all other proven facts in deciding the question of guilt or innocence in accordance with all of the Court's instructions to you. Whether or not such conduct shows a consciousness of guilt and the significance to be attached to such a circumstance are matters for your determination.

You are not to consider such circumstance in connection with any defendant other than Patricia Krenwinkel.

Evidence has been admitted as against one or more of the defendants, but denied admission as against the others.

At the time this evidence was admitted you were admonished that it could not be considered by you as against the other defendants.

You are again instructed that you must not consider such evidence as against the other defendants.

Your verdict as to each defendant must be rendered as it he were being tried separately.

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Certain evidence was admitted for a limited e.

At the time this evidence was admitted you were admonished that it could not be considered by you for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it was admitted.

You are again instructed that you must not consider such evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for which it was admitted.

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The Court has previously admonished you to consider the tape recorded statement of Juan Flynn, introduced through the testimony of Officer Dave Steuber, for a limited purpose only.

You are now instructed to disregard that previous instruction.

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Juan Flynn, a witness in this case, has testified about an incident that allegedly took place prior to his testifying here in court in which he received two notes: Note No. 1 began "How many changes does it take to make one big change, or does it take ten little changes to make one big change..." And Note No. 2 began "This is an indictment on your life because it is coming down, and when in the course of human events..."

At the time this alleged incident was testified to, you were admonished that it was to be considered by you only in determining the state of mind of the witness Juan Flynn if you determined that such an incident took place.

You are instructed that you may not consider this evidence for any other purpose.

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Linda Kasabian, a witness in this case, has testified to a statement allegedly made by 'Cypsy", also known a Catherine Share, about the character and personality of Charles Manson as well as life in the Family.

You are hereby instructed that you may consider such evidence only in determining the state of mind of Linda Kasabian at the time "Gypsy" allegedly made such statement and for no other purpose.

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Linda Kasabian, a witness in this case, has testified to statements made by her to two young hitch-hikers on or about August 12 to August 15, 1969.

This evidence has been received for the sole purpose of determining, if necessary, the state of mind of witness

Linda Kasabian at the time the statements were made.

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Neither side is required to call as witnesses all person who may have been present at any of the events disclosed by the evidence or who may appear to have some knowledge of these events, or to produce all objects or documents mentioned or suggested by the evidence.

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Every person who testifies under oath is a witness. You are the sole and exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses who have testified in this case. In determining the credibility of a witness you may consider any matter that has a tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his testimony, including but not limited to the following:

His demeanor while testifying and the manner in which he testifies:

The character of his testimony;

The extent of his capacity to perceive, to recollect, or to communicate any matterabout which he testifies:

The extent of his opportunity to perceive any matter about which he testifies;

His character for honesty or veracity or their opposites;

The existence or non-existence of a bias, interest, or other motive;

A statement previously made by him that is consistent with his testimony;

A statement made by him that is inconsistent with any part of his testimony.

The existence or non-existence of any facts testified to by him;

His attitude toward the action in which he

testifies or towards the giving of testimony;

His admission of untruthfulness;

His prior conviction of a felony.

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A witness willfully false in one material part of his testimony is to be distrusted in others. You may reject the whole testimony of a witness who willfully has testified falsely as to a material point, unless from all the evidence you shall believe the probability of truth favors his testimony in other particulars.

However, discrepancies in a witness' testimony or between his testimony and that of others, if there were any, do not necessarily mean that the witness should be discredited. Failure of recollection is a common experience; and innocent misrecollection is not uncommon. It is a fact, also, that two persons witnessing an incident or a transaction often will see or hear it differently. Whether a discrepancy pertains to a fact of importance or only to a trivial detail should be considered in weighing its significance.

You are not bound to decide in conformity with the testimony of a number of witnesses, which does not produce conviction in your mind, as against the testimony of a lesser number or other evidence, which appeals to your mind with more convincing force.

This does not mean that you are at liberty to disregard the testimony of the greater number of witnesses from caprice or prejudice, or from a desire to favor one side as against the other. It does mean that you are not to decide an issue by the simple process of counting the number of witnesses who have testified on the opposing sides. It means that the final test is not in the relative number of witnesses, but in the relative convincing force of the evidence.

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The fact that a witness had been convicted of a felony, if such be a fact, may be considered by you only for the purpose of determining the credibility of that witness. The fact of such a conviction does not necessarily destroy or impair the vitnesses' credibility. It is one of the circumstances that you may take into consideration in weighing the testimony of such a witness.

Motive is not an element of the crime charged and need not be shown. However, you may consider motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in this case. Presence of motive may tend to establish guilt.

Absence of motive may tend to establish innocence. You will therefore give its presence or absence, as the case may be, the weight to which you find it to be entitled.

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A statement by a defendant other than at his trial may be either an admission or a confession.

An admission is a statement by a defendant, which by itself is not sufficient to warrant an inference of guilt, but which tends to prove guilt when considered with the rest of the evidence.

A confession is a statement by a defendant which discloses his intentional participation in the criminal act for which he is on trial and which discloses his guilt of that crime.

You are the exclusive judges as to whether an admission or a confession was made by any defendant and if the statement is true in whole or in part. If you should find that such statement is entirely untrue, you must reject it. If you find it is true in part, you may consider that part which you find to be true.

Evidence of an oral admission or an oral confession of a defendant ought to be viewed with caution.

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No person may be convicted of a criminal offense unless there is some proof of each element of the crime independent of any confession or admission made by him outside of this trial.

The identity of the person who is alleged to have committed a crime is not an element of the crime.

Such identity may be established by an admission or a confession.

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A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates.

Duly qualified experts may give their opinions on questions in controvery at a trial.

To assist you in deciding such questions, you may consider the opinion with the reasons given for it, if any, by the expert who gives the opinion.

You may also consider the qualifications and the credibility of the expert.

In resolving any conflict that may exist in the testimony of expert witnesses, you should weigh the opinion of one expert against that of another. In doing this, you should consider the relative qualifications and credibility of the expert witnesses, as well as the reasons for each opinion and the facts and other matters upon which it was based.

You are not bound to accept an expert opinion as conclusive, but should give to it the weight to which you find it to be entitled. You may disregard any such opinion if you find it to be unreasonable.

In determining the weight to be given to an opinion expressed by any witness who did not testify as an expert witness, you should consider his credibility, the extent of his opportunity to perceive the matters upon which his opinion is based and the reasons, if any, given for it. You are not required to accept such an opinion but should give it the weight, if any, to which you find it entitled.

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In examining an expert witness, counsel may propound to him a type of question known in the law as a hypothetical question. By such a question the witness is asked to assume to be true a hypothetical state of facts, and to give an opinion based on that assumption.

In permitting such a question, the Court does not rule, and does not necessarily find that all the assumed facts have been proved. It only determines that those assumed facts are within the probable or possible range of the evidence. It is for you, the jury, to find from all the evidence whether or not the facts assumed in a hypothetical question have been proved, and if you should find that any assumption in such a question has not been proved, you areto determine the effect of that failure of proof on the value and weight of the expert opinion based on the assumption.

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A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal. This presumption places upon the State the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Reasonably doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.

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Evidence that on some former occasion a witness made a statement or statements that were consistent or inconsistent with his testimony in this trial may be considered by you as evidence of the truth of the facts as stated by the witness on such former occasion.

However, you are not bound to accept such statement or statements to be truthful in whole or in part, but you should give to them the weight to which you find them to be entitled.

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It is a constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal trial that he may not be compelled to testify. Thus the decision as to whether he should testify is left to the defendant, acting with the advice and the assistance of his attorney. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that he does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any way.

In deciding whether or not to testify, the defendant may choose to rely on the state of the evidence and upon the failure, if any, of the People to prove every essential element of the charge against him, and no lack of testimony on defendant's part will supply a failure of proof by the People so as to support by itself a finding against him on any such essential element.

All persons concerned in the commission of a crime who either directly and actively commit the act constituting the offense or who knowingly and with criminal intent aid and abet in its commission or, whether present or not, who advise and encourage its commission, are regarded by the law as principals in the crime thus committed and are equally guilty thereof.

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A person aids and abets the commission of a crime if he knowingly and with criminal intent aids, promotes, encourages or institutes by act or advice, or by act and advice, the commission of such crime.

A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it is corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.

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Corroborative evidence is evidence of some act or fact related to the offense which, if believed, by itself and without any aid, interpretation or direction from the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense charged.

However, it is not necessary that the corroborative evidence be sufficient in itself to establish every element of the offense charged, or that it corroborate every fact to which the accomplice testifies. The evidence required to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice is sufficient if it tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way as may reasonably satisfy the jury that the witness who must be corroborated is telling the truth.

It is not necessary that the evidence used to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice prove independently that the defendant is guilty of the offense.

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Evidence corroborating the testimony of an accomplice need not connect the defendant with the commission of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

In determining whether an accomplice has been corroborated, you must first assume the testimony of the accomplice has been removed from the case. You must then determine whether there is any remaining evidence standing by itself or in conjunction with any other remaining evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.

If there is not such independent evidence which tends to connect defendant with the commission of the offense, the testimony of the accomplice is not corroborated

If there is such independent evidence which you believe, then the testimony of the accomplice is corroborated.

If the crimes of murder or conspiracy to commit murder, the commission of which is charged against the defendants, were committed by anyone, the witness Linda Kasabian was an accomplice as a matter of law and her testimony is subject to the rule requiring corroboration.

The testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust. This does not mean that you may arbitrarily disregard such testimony, but you should give to it the weight to which you find it to be entitled after examining it with care and caution and in the light of all the evidence in the case.

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You are instructed that evidence sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice may be slight and entitled to little consideration when standing alone.

The evidence is sufficient even though slight if it tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime.

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You are instructed that the evidence required to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice may be either circumstantial or direct.

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Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought.

"Malice" may be either express or implied.

Malice is express when there is manifested
an intention unlawfully to kill a human being.

Malice is implied when the killing results from an act involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death, which act is done for a base, antisocial purpose and with a wanton disregard for human life or when the killing is a direct causal result of the perpetration or the attempt to perpetrate a felony inherently dangerous to human life.

The mental state constituting malice aforethought does not necessarily require any ill will or hatred of the person killed.

"Aforethought" does not imply deliberation or the lapse of considerable time. It only means that the required mental state must precede rather than follow the act.

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All murder which is perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing with malice aforethought is murder of the first degree.

The word "deliberate" means formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action. The word "premeditated" means considered beforehand.

If you find that the killing was preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to kill, which was the result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation, it is murder of the first degree.

The law does not undertake to measure in units of time the length of the period during which the thought must be pondered before it can ripen into an intent to kill which is truly deliberate and premeditated. The time will vary with different individuals and under varying circumstances. The true test is not the duration of time, but rather the extent of the reflection. A cold, calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in a short period of time, but a mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it include an intent to kill, is not such deliberation and premeditation as will fix

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an unlawful killing as murder of the first degree.

To constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing and the reasons for and against such a choice and, having in mind the consequences, he decides to and does kill.

The unlawful killing of a human being, whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs as the result of the commission or attempt to commit the crime of burglary or robbery, and where there was in the mind of the perpetrator the specific intent to commit such crime or crimes, is murder of the first degree.

The specific intent to commit burglary or robbery and the commission or attempt to commit such crime or crimes must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

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Every person who enters any house with the specific intent to steal, take and carry away the personal property of another of any value with the specific intent to deprive the owner permanently of his personal /property is guilty of burglary.

The essence of a burglary is entering such a place with such specific intent, and the crime of burglary is complete as soon as the entry is made, regardless of whether the intent thereafter is carried out.

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Robbery is the taking of personal property of any value in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear and with the specific intent permanently to deprive the owner of his property.

persons engaged in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, the crime of burglary or robbery, all persons who either directly and actively commit the act constituting such crime or who knowingly and with criminal intent aid and abet in its commission or, whether present or not, who advise and encourage its commission, are guilty of murder of the first degree, whether the killing is intentional, unintentional, or accidental.

Under the Court's instructions to you a finding that any defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree as to Counts I through VII, inclusive, must be based upon either a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing with malice aforethought, or a killing which occurred as the result of the commission or attempt to commit the crime of burglary or robbery, as these types of murder are defined elsewhere in these instructions. The jury must be unanimous as to the degree of murder if you find any defendant guilty of murder. The jury need not be unanimous as to which of those two types of murder a finding of murder in the first degree is based upon.

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Murder of the second degree is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human being but the evidence is insufficient to establish deliberation and premeditation.

In the crimes charged in Counts I through VII, inclusive, of the indictment, there must exist a union or joint operation of act or conduct and a certain specific intent.

In the crime of murder, there must exist in the mind of the perpetrator the requisite specific intent for each type of murder as set forth in the definitions of those offenses elsewhere in these instructions, and unless such intent so exists that crime is not committed.

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The specific intent with which an act is done may be manifested by the circumstances surrounding its commission. But you may not find a defendant guilt of a willful, deliberate, premeditated murder of the first degree unless the proved circumstances not only are consistent with the hypothesis that he had the specific intent to kill a human being with malice aforethought which was the result of deliberation and premeditation as those terms are defined elsewhere in these instructions but are irreconcilable with any other rational conclusion.

Also, if the evidence as to such specific intent is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the existence thereof and the other to the absence thereof, you must adopt that interpretation which points to its absence. If, on the other hand, one interpretation of the evidence as to such specific intent appears to you to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to accept the reasonable interpretation and to reject the unreasonable.

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The specific intent with which an act is done may be manifested by the circumstances surrounding its commission. But you may not find any defendant guilty of any of the offenses charged in Counts I through VII, inclusive, based upon the unlawful killing of a human being occurring as a result of the commission or attempt to commit the crime of burglary or robbery, as distinguished from wilful, deliberate and premeditated murder of the first degree or unpremeditated murder of the second degree. as those types of murder are defined elsewhere in these instructions, unless the proved circumstances not only are consistent with the hypothesis that he had the specific intent to steal, take and carry away the personal property of another of any value with the specific intent to deprive the owner permanently of his property, but are irreconcilable with any other rational conclusion.

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Also, if the evidence as to such specific intent is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the existence thereof and the other to the absence thereof, you must adopt that interpretation which points to its absence.

If, on the other hand, one interpretation of the evidence as to such specific intent appears to you to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to accept the reasonable interpretation and to reject the unreasonable.

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may be manifested by the circumstances surrounding its commission. But you may not find a defendant guilty of murder in the second degree unless the proof circumstances not only are consistent with the hypothesis that he had the specific intent to kill a human being with malice forethought but are irreconcilable with any other rational conclusion.

Also, if the evidence as to such specific intent is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the existence thereof and the other to the absence thereof, you must adopt that interpretation which points to its absence.

If, on the other hand, one interpretation of the evidence as to such specific intent appears to you to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to accept the reasonable interpretation and to reject the unreasonable.

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Murder is classified into two degrees, and if you should find any defendant guilty of murder, it will be your duty to determine and state in your verdict whether you find the murder to be of the first or second degree.

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If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder has been committed by a defendant, but you have a reasonable doubt whether such murder was of the first or the second degree, you must give to such defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict fixing the murder as of the second degree.

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Before you may return a verdict in this case, you must agree unanimously not only as to whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty, but also, if you should find him guilty of an unlawful killing you must agree unanimously as to whether he is guilty of murder of the first degree or murder of the second degree.

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The intent with which an act is done is shown by the circumstances attending the act, the manner in which it is done, the means used and the soundness of mind and discretion of the person cormitting the act.

must assume that each of the defendants was of sound mind at the time of his alleged conduct which, it is charged, constituted the crimes described in the indictment.

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.  A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to commit any crime, and with the specific intent to commit such crime, followed by an overt act committed in this state by one or more of the parties for the purpose of accomplishing the object of the agreement. Conspiracy is a crime.

In order to find a defendant guilty of conspiracy, in addition to proof of the unlawful agreement, there must be proof of the commission of at least one of the overt acts alleged in the indictments. It is not necessary to the guilt of any particular defendant that he himself committed the overt act, if he was one of the conspirators when such an act was committed.

The term "overt act" means any step taken or act committed by one or more of the conspirators which goes beyond mere planning or agreement to commit a public offense and which step or act is done in furtherance of the accomplishment of the object of the conspiracy.

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Each member of a conspiracy is liable for each act and bound by each declaration of every other member of the conspiracy if said act or said declaration is in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy.

The act of one conspirator pursuant to or in furtherance of the common design of the conspiracy is the act of all conspirators. Every conspirator is legally responsible for an act of a co-conspirator that follows as one of the probable and natural consequences of the object of the conspiracy even though it was not intended as a part of the original plan and even though he was not present at the time of the commission of such act.

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To be an overt act, the step taken or act committed need not, in and of itself, constitute the crime or even an intent to commit the crime which is the ultimate object of the conspiracy. Nor is it required that such step or act, in and of itself, be a criminal or an unlawful act.

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It is not necessary in proving a conspiracy to show a meeting of the alleged conspirators or the making of an express or formal agreement. The formation and existence of a conspiracy may be inferred from all circumstances tending to show the common intent and may be proved in the same way as any other fact may be proved, either by direct testimony of the fact or by circumstantial evidence. or by both direct and circumstantial evidence.

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Evidence that a person was in the company of or associated with one or more other persons alleged or proved to have been members of a conspiracy is not, in itself, sufficient to prove that such person was a member of the alleged conspiracy.

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No act or declaration of a conspirator that is an independent product of his own mind and is outside the common design and not a furtherance of that design is binding upon his co-conspirators, and they are not criminally liable for any such act.

Where a conspirator commits an act which is neither in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy nor the natural and probable consequence of an attempt to attain that object, he alone is responsible for and is bound by that act, and no responsibility therefor attaches to any of his confederates.

The act or declaration of a person who is not a member of a conspiracy is not binding upon the members of the conspiracy, if any, even though it is an act which tended to promote the object of the alleged conspiracy. , **1**: 2 4 Ź, 7 10 11 12. 13 ĮŞ 18 20· 21 ·22 23 .24.

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Evidence of the commission of an act which furthered the purpose of an alleged conspiracy is not, in itself, sufficient to prove that the person committing the act was a member of such conspiracy.

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Every person who joins a criminal conspiracy after its formation and who adopts its purposes and objects, is liable for and bound by the acts and declarations of other members of the conspiracy done and made during the time that he is a member and in pursuance of furtherance of the conspiracy.

A person who joins a conspiracy after its formation is not liable or bound by the acts of the co-conspirators or for any crime committed by the co-conspirators before such person joins and becomes a member of the conspiracy.

Evidence of any acts or declarations of other conspirators prior to the time such person becomes a member of the conspiracy may be considered by you in determining the nature, objectives and purposes of the conspiracy, but for no other purpose.

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Any member of a conspiracy may withdraw from and cease to be a party to the conspiracy, but his liability for the acts of his conconspirators continues until he effectively withdraws from the conspiracy.

In order to effectively withdraw from a conspiracy, there must be an affirmative and bona fide rejection or repudiation of the conspiracy which must be communicated to the other conspirators of whom he has knowledge?

If a member of a conspiracy has effectively withdraw from the conspiracy has is not thereafter liable for any act of the coconspirators committed subsequent to his withdrawal from the conspiracy, but he is not relieved of responsibility for the acts of his co-conspirators committed while he was a member.

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In Count VIII the defendants are charged with conspiracy to commit murder in violation of Sections 182.1 and 187, Penal Code of California, a felony, as follows:

August, 1969, at and in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, Charles Manson, Charles Watson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Linda Masabian, and Leslie Sankston (whose true name is Leslie Van Houten), the said defendants, did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly conspire, combine, confederate and agree together to commit the crime of murder, a violation of Section 187, Penal Code of California, a felony.

It is alleged that the following were overt acts which were committed in this state by one or more of the defendants for the purpose of furthering the object of the conspiracy:

### OVERT ACT NO. 1

That on or about August 8, 1969, the said defendants, Charles Watson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins and Linda Kasabian did travel to the vicinity of 10050 Cielo Drive in the City and County of Los Angeles.

### OVERT ACT NO. II

That on or about August 8, 1969, the defendants, Charles Watson, Patricia Krenwinkel and Susan Atkins did enter the reidence at 10050 Cielo Drive, City and County of Los Angeles.

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# OVERT ACT NO. III

That on or about August 10, 1959, the defendants, Charles Manson, Charles Watson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Linda Kasabian and Leslie Sankston (whose true name is Leslie Van Houten) did travel to the vicinity of 3301 Waverly Drive, City and County of Los Angeles.

## OVERT ACT NO. IV

That on or about August 10, 1969, the defendants, Charles Manson, Charles Watson, Patricia Krenwinkel and Leslie Sankston (whose true name is Leslie Van Houten) did enter the residence at 3301 Waverly Drive, City and County of Los Angeles.

The defendants are also charged with the commission of the following public offenses:

### COUNT I

That on or about the 9th day of August, 1969, at and in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, the said defendants, Charles Manson, Charles Watson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, and Linda Kasabian did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with malice aforethought murder Abigail Anne Folger, a human being.

#### COUNT II

and in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, the said defendants, Charles Manson, Charles Watson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins and Linda Kasabian did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with malice aforethought murder Voityck Frykowski, a human being.

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Count III. That on or about the 9th day of August, 1969, at and in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, the said defendants, Charles Manson, Charles Watson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins and Linda Kasabian did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with malice aforethought murder Steven Earl Parent, a human being.

Count IV. That on or about the 9th day of August, 1969, at and in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, the said defendants, Charles Manson, Charles Watson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins and Linda Kasabian did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with malice aforethought murder Sharon Marie Polanski, a human being.

Count V. That on or about the 9th day of August, 1969, at and in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, the said defendants, Charles Manson, Charles Watson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins and Linda Kasabian did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with malice aforethought murder Thomas John Sebring, a human being.

Count VI. That on or about the 10th day of August, 1969, at and in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, the said defendants, Charles Manson, Charles Watson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Leslie Sangston (whose true name is Leslie Van Houten), Linda Kasabian and Susan

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Atkins did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with malice aforethought murder Leno  $\Lambda$ . La Bianca, a human being.

Count VII.

That on or about the 10th day of August, 1969, at and in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, the said defendants, Charles Manson, Charles Watson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Leslie Sangston (whose true name is Leslie Van Houten), Linda Kasabian and Susan Atkins did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with malice aforethought murder Rosemary La Bianca, a human being.

In the crime charged in Count VIII of the indictment, there must exist a union or joint operation of acts or conduct and a certain specific intent.

In the crime of conspiring to commit murder, there must exist in the mind of the perpetrator the specific intent to commit murder of the first degree by means of a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing with malice aforethought, as that type of murder is defined elsewhere in these instructions, and unless such intent so exists that crime is not committed.

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The specific intent with which an act is done may be manifested by the circumstances surrounding its commission. But you may not find any defendant guilty of the offense of conspiracy to commit murder charged in Count VIII unless the proved circumstances not only are consistent with the hypothesis that he had the specific intent to commit murder of the first degree by means of a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing with malice aforethought, as that type of murder is defined elsewhere in these instructions, but are irreconcilable with any other rational conclusion.

Also, if the evidence as to such specific intent is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the existence thereof and the other to the absence thereof, you must adopt that interpretation which points to its absence.

If, on the other hand, one interpretation of the evidence as to such specific intent appears to you to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to accept the reasonable interpretation and to reject the unreasonable.

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The intent with which an act is done is shown by the circumstances attending the act, the manner in which it is done, the means used, and the soundness of mind and discretion of the person committing the act.

For the purposes of the case on trial, you must assume that each defendant was of sound mind at the time of his alleged conduct which, it is charged, constituted the crime described in the indictment.

In this case, you must decide separately whether each of the several defendants is guilty or not guilty of each of the offenses charged against him. If you cannot agree upon verdicts as to all the defendants, but do agree upon a verdict as to one or more of them, you must render a verdict as to the one or more upon which you agree.

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Each count charges a separate and distinct offense. You must decide each count separately on the evidence and the law applicable to it, uninfluenced by your decision as to any other count. Each defendant may be convicted or acquitted on any or all of the offenses charged against him. Your finding as to each defendant charged on each

count must be stated in a separate verdict.

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As to Count VIII of the indictment each defendant in this case is individually entitled to, and must receive, your determination whether he was a member of the alleged conspiracy. As to each defendant you must determine whether he was a conspirator by deciding whether he wilfully, intentionally and knowingly joined with any other or others in the alleged conspiracy.

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I have not intended by anything I have said or done, or by any questions that I may have asked, to intimate or suggest what you should find to be the facts on any questions submitted to you, or that I believe or disbelieve any witness.

If anything I have done or said has seemed to so indicate, you will disregard it and form your own opinion.

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You have been instructed as to all the rules of law that may be necessary for you to reach a verdict.

Whether some of the instructions will apply will depend upon your determination of the facts. You will disregard any instruction which applies to a state of facts which you determine does not exist. You must not conclude from the fact that an instruction has been given that the court is expressing any opinion as to the facts.

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Both the People and the defendant are entitled to the individual opinion of each juror.

It is the duty of each of you to consider the evidence for the purpose of arriving at a verdict if you can do so. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but should do so only after a discussion of the evidence and instructions with the other jurors.

You should not hesitate to change an opinion if you are convinced it is erroneous. However, you should not be influenced to decide any question in a particular way because a majority of the jurors, or any of them, favor such a decision.

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The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of their deliberations are matters of considerable importance. It is rarely productive of good for a juror at the outset to make an emphatic expression of his opinion on the case or to state how he intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, his sense of pride may be aroused and he may hesitate to change his position even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates in this matter, but are judges.

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In your deliberations the subject of penalty or punishment is not to be discussed or considered by you.

If you return a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree as to any particular count or a verdict of guilty of conspiracy to commit murder as alleged in Count VIII, then the matter of punishment as to those counts will be considered and determined in a separate proceeding.

If you return a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree as to any count, the matter of penalty or punishment as to that count will be determined in the manner provided by law.

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Did you wish to approach the bench?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Yes.

THE COURT: Very well.

(Whereupon all counsel approach the bench and the following proceedings occur at the bench outside of the hearing of the jury:)

MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, I certainly apologize to the Court for this, but apparently it was an oversight on our part. But as far as I know, on reasonable doubt, isn't there supposed to be some instruction on telling the jury what "moral certainty" is?

On every jury case I ever tried, they have been told that absolute certainty is not required.

I know there is an instruction on that.

THE COURT: The old reasonable doubt instruction did contain in extra paragraph which is not in the present CALJIC instruction. It is not required.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The jury doesn't know what moral certainty is, and I would ask the Court to give it.

I really think it is crucial that they be told that absolute certainty is not required and to be told what moral certainty is.

In fact, I even argued to the jury that you would give that instruction, and I apologize, but I just assumed you would.

In the last jury case I had, they did have an

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instruction on moral certainty.

Moral certainty is such a vague term that the jury is not going to have any way of knowing what it means, if the Court tells the jury that it is simply that degree of proof which produces the conviction in an unprejudiced mind, it would be very helpful to the jury.

A brief statement that absolute certainty is not required -- I argued it to the jury -- it was an oversight on my part. I just assumed it was still necessary.

I would request that the Court give that instruction. It is crucial. It goes to the very heart of the case.

Just by the instruction alone, I don't think they will really understand what degree of proof is necessary, and they are going to be particularly confused in view of the argument that I made to them telling them that you would give them certain instructions that are not there.

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THE COURT: I don't know that that is going to bother them.

MR. FITZGERALD: I am going to object to a change.

I submitted six instructions on reasonable doubt and presumption of innocence, all of which you argued and very successfully convinced the Judge not to give an instruction which we considered to be the law, People vs. Hall.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Near certainty?

MR. FITZGERALD: Yes.

You actively participated in the discussion on the instruction of the reasonable certainty and you convinced the Judge to reject each instruction that we submitted, and you sided with the Judge in giving the CALJIC on reasonable doubt and presumption of innocence.

MR. BUGLIOSI: All I am saying is for the Judge just to define the term to the jury.

THE COURT: Of course, this does say "any possible doubt."

MR. BUGLIOSI: Moral certainty doesn't tell the jury that we don't have to prove it to an absolute certainty.

THE COURT: It does. It says reasonable doubt is not all possible or imaginary doubt.

It is just another way of saying it.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The point is, the whole name of the game is for the People to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

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 There are many cases that stand for the proposition that the jury has to be told in as clear language as possible what this means.

This instruction on absolute certainty and moral certainty is just explanatory.

I think it is incumbent upon the Court to explain to these lay people what these terms mean.

We have given them instruction after instruction, for instance, on accomplices, maybe 15 instructions, and here, on reasonable doubt, which is the whole case, there is only one instruction.

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MR. FITZGERALD: I tried to stop that.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I beg the Court to give more than one instruction on reasonable doubt.

THE COURT: Of course it's not how many; it's whether it is understood by the jury.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I agree, your Honor, but it would be much clearer to tell them this moral certainty is that degree of proof which produces conviction that unprejudiced minds --

MR. FITZGERALD: That is no more the law than People vs. Hall.

You successfully convinced this Court that People vs Hall was not the --

MR. BUGLIOSI: What is your point? I am just asking the Court to explain to the jury --

MR. FITZGERALD: I participated in a discussion about moral certainty and I argued it was vague and the Court argued that moral certainty had a definition every juror knew.

I wanted to modify that instruction.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I don't quite get it. All I am saying is he should tell the jury what moral certainty means.

I don't get your point. I am just asking for an instruction, for the Court to tell the jury what moral certainty means.

THE COURT: I don't really think they need any further instruction. I can't imagine they would not

know what moral certainty is.

MR. FITZGERALD: I will stipulate you can give the instruction on near certainty.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I can only say, your Honor, that the main issue in this case is not accomplice, but guilt, and many, many instructions are given on accomplices.

would ask that just a couple more instructions be given.
I don't see any harm.

I can't see any harm in telling the jury that absolute certainty is not required, and telling the jury what moral certainty is.

There is no way in the world that an appellate court can reverse a conviction if the Court gives that.

It is given in marijuana cases. It is given in all cases. It's been given in this case.

I don't know what moral certainty means by itself.

THE COURT: You have to read it in connection with all

of the other instructions, Mr. Bugliosi, and all the rest

with this instruction.

MR. KEITH: To do so now, there are three prosecutors over there, they have been here seven months, they come up with an additional instruction.

THE COURT: I was presented with more instructions this noon by the defendants.

MR. KEITH: Which you rejected. But now --

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MR, FITZGERALD: If there really was any question, because you denied analogous instructions --

THE COURT: That is beside the point. The point is you could hardly complain about late instructions.

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MR. BUCLIUSI: I don't see any Larm. That is the point.

MR. KAY: This is a portion of the old CALJIC instruction.

IR. BUGLICUIT IS there were some harm, I could see

MR. BUCLI II: 15 has been in there for years, your Honor.

THE SOURT: I Confe think it requires it, Mr. Eugliosi. I really don's.

I don't think the drafters on the CALJIC instructions required to up they would have put it in the new edition. It wasn't required.

IC. BUCLICLES I just assumed in was suill in there.

THE CLUPTA I want make that statement categorically.

MR. BUCLICSIE Could we look at one old CALJIC?

THE COURT IS are going to wind this up.

They is we little told by every counsel in this case od neuseen what reasonable deart is. They are told again in this instruction. They are told what ressonable certainty is.

I denot take there is ony ambiguity, and I don't think there is may necessity for it.

(whereup n old coursel return to their respective

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25 26 places at counsel table and the following proceedings occur in open court within the presence and hearing of the jury.)

THE COURT: You shall now retire and select one of your number to act as foreman who will preside over your deliberations.

In order to reach a verdict, all 12 jurors must agree to the decision. As soon as all of you have agreed upon a verdict, you shall have it dated and signed by your foreman and then shall return with it to this room.

The Clerk will swear the bailiffs.

THE CLERK: The bailiffs will please rise.

DEFENDANT MANSON: (From the holding tank.) Tell them why we couldn't put on a defense, old man.

THE CLERK: Would you raise your right hands, please.

You and each of you do solemnly swear that you will take charge of the jury and keep them together until otherwise instructed by the Court, that you will not speak to them yourselves nor allow anyone else to speak to them on matters connected with the case except upon order of the Court, and when they have agreed upon a verdict, you will return them into the courtroom, so help you God?

FIVE BAILIFFS: I do.

THE CLERK: And further, you do solemnly swear that you will take charge of the alternate jurors and keep them apart from the jury while they are deliberating on the

cause unless otherwise ordered by the Court, so help you 1 2 God? 3. FIVE BAILIFFS: I do. THE COURT: You may escort the jury to the jury room. . 5 (Whereupon at 3:20 o'clock p.m. the jury б retires for deliberations.) 21 fls. THE COURT: Counsel approach the bench, please. 10 11 12 13 14 - 15 `16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

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THE COURT: I still have this matter of Mr. Kanarek's, my finding yesterday he was in contempt, not that I need the rest of you here, but I do intend to take it up this afternoon.

Before you left, I wanted to tell you, Mr. Kanarek, that we will take a rocess at this time and then we will resume.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Is it necessary for counsel to be present?

THE COURT: Not unless you want to.

MR. KANAREK: I engaged Fr. Silver to represent me in this, your Honor. Can I have him present?

I remind you again, this is a situation, the only one I know of, I may be mistaken, but in any event it is a situation which the law permits the Court to handle in a summary manner under the Code of Civil Procedure, and that is the way I intend to do it, this being a direct contempt.

If it were an indirect contempt, then, of course, there would have to be a hearing to permit you to put on whatever defense you wanted to.

But in a direct contempt, committed in the immediate view and presence of the Court, it may be handled in a summary fashion.

MR. KANAREK: I understand. I think it is hybrid or indirect, in that --

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THE COURT: In answer to your question, he may be present in the courtroom just as anyone else can be present in the courtroom, but we are not going to turn this into some kind of an evidentiary hearing.

MR. KANAREK: The reason I asked your Honor to read it over, is so we can present to the Court, I think, argument and points and authorities, that it is indirect and/or hybrid, because of counsel's state of mind.

THE COURT: It will not be put over; it will be taken up immediately after the recess.

MR. KANAREK: Has your Honor made up his mind?

Because I don't want to -- I feel the jurors will find out

about it regardless -- I mean --

THE COURT: They won't find out about it from me.

MR. KANAREK: I know not from your Honor intentionally.

THE COURT: The jury is still sequestered. They won't find out about it any more than they found out about the other instances.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor allowed Mr. Bugliosi, where he really got into a distribe with the Court, your Honor allowed him an alternate of a fine or jail, and I think that reading the record in this matter shows that I -- your Honor said to do something and I said, "Very well, your Honor," and I sat down and I addressed the Court.

I asked the Court -- my state of mind was as I have indicated, that Mr. Bugliosi had deliberately left out

the marijuana aspect when he alluded to my previous argument.

He was deliberately deluding the jury.

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THE COURT: I have read the transcript. I went back a number of pages and I read the entire situation.

There was not a shadow of doubt in my mind as to what occurred and what you intended, and what in fact happened.

This was no impulsive, spontaneous outburst. It was a carefully calculated interruption.

It was not an objection, it was not a motion, it was a gratuitous comment.

MR. KANAREK: How would I know what he was going to argue?

THE COURT: Solely for the purpose of interrupting the argument and disrupting the jury. That is what it amounted to.

We will take the recess at this time. (Recess.)

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(The following proceedings were had in open court outside the presence of the jury and the defendants, all defense counsel being present except Mr. Hughes:)

MR. KANAREK: I wonder if I might approach the bench with the reporter?

THE COURT: I see no reason why we cannot conduct this in open court, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: Because I believe, your Honor, I have an obligation to the defendant Manson in this case, and I believe that the publicity, there is no necessity for whatever publicity has already taken place to be amplified by this at this time, your Honor, that is why I want to make an argument to the Court.

THE COURT: The jury is sequestered, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: As your Honor well know, it is our position, not only mine but co-counsel who are here, Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Daye Shinn and Mr. Keith, it is our position that the jury, although the jury is sequestered, that these matters come to their attention.

THE COURT: I am familiar with your position.

Now, if you care to state something, you may
do so.

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let the record first show that the reason we are here, that I ordered you to be here, is in connection with the finding of contempt I made

yesterday.

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MR. KANAREK: Yes, sir, I understand. I first would like to exercise the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

It is incredible of belief to me if someone is entitled to have a lawyer on a parking ticket or an infraction that doesn't even involve going to jail, it is incredible to me to believe that the law would not allow me a lawyer in the posture of this case, and these times, for me to have an attorney.

I have informed your Honor that Mr. Phil Silver is an attorney I retained in connection with this matter.

I allege it is a violation of the Sixth

Amendment right to counsel, which is protected by the

due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and as

incorporated by reference, for your Honor not to grant me

the right to counsel at the very inception, I believe a

lawyer is entitled to constitutional rights just as anyone
else.

I believe that since the Court is acting as both prosecutor and jurist, as judge in this case, it is my believe that your Honor would have the obligation to give me my constitutional rights, that I have a right to remain silent -- the rights I am sure your Honor is familiar with, because your Honor does have that function.

The way your Honor conceives this statute or

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this body of law, your Honor has the dual role which is an unenviable one of being both prosecutor and judge, and therefore it would seem that a defendant, or someone who has the potential of going into custody should be entitled to have his constitutional rights, the right to remain silent, and all of that, the right to an attorney.

THE COURT: You may remain silent if you like, Mr. Kanarek?

MR. KANAREK: Yes, I understand, your Honor, but your Honor has refused a continuance to allow -- or the time involved to allow counsel to be here, for Mr. Silver to be here.

THE COURT: It is not a question of time. As you well know, Mr. Kanarek, the Code of Givil Procedure, and I am looking now at Section 1211, states as follows:

"When a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the Court or the judge in chambers, he may be punished summarily."

That means summarily.

MR. KANAREK: I understand.

THE COURT: All right, that is the kind of proceeding we are having now.

MR. KANAREK: But, your Honor, the Constitution of the State of California and the Federal Constitution supersedes the statute, and if the statute is in conflict

THE COURT: Unfortunately the law is against you on

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that. The cases are against you.

MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor --

THE COURT: You may stop right now, Mr. Kanarek, I know what your argument is; I understand it; I don't agree with it.

MR. KANAREK: How could your Honor know it completely unless your Honor listens to it?

THE COURT: I have heard it before.

MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, I believe furthermore if I may, I believe furthermore that -- and the reason I ask for a continuance, there are a couple of reasons.

First, this is in the nature of a misdemeanor and there is a certain time period after a misdemeanor occurs, that is, after someone has been adjudicated guilty--

THE COURT: This is not a misdemeanor, it is a civil contempt.

MR. KANAREK: The punishment is certainly in the nature of a misdemeanor punishment, and there is a certain time period before which and after which — that is, there is a certain time span during which a defendant is entitled to a stay when he is convicted of disturbing the peace or jaywalking or whatever it may be, where he can go to jail.

The most minimal of penal offenses allows him in the misdemeanor court to have a stay of execution pending, so that he can do something after he has been

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found guilty, before judgment is rendered, and I think it certainly is analogous here that this should be allowed.

THE COURT: I am going to give you a short stay.

MR. KANAREK: But, your Honor, allowing me counsel, maybe counsel would convince you --

THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek, I understand your point, sir, I heard your argument, I understand it now; I heard it before; I understood it then.

The law is gainst you, sir. I don't agree with you.

MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, if I may point out another matter to the Court.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KANAREK: In connection with the case in chief, it is my belief that your Honor at this time by making this matter, bringing this to the fore, and focusing on it unnecessarily, because I am not leaving California, and I am not leaving this planet, as Mr. Bugliosi as referred to, the earth, I am not going anywhere, and I think your Honor is well aware of that.

If your Honor wishes, your Honor can even set ball to guarantee that.

But the thing that I would like to convince the Court of is in the posture of this case at this time I allege that having these contempt proceedings at this time denies Mr. Manson the right to effective counsel that he

is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.

Also it denies him the right to a fair public trial because all of this is going to create horrendous publicity, more publicity, and all of this is in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and due protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment, under People vs. Crovedi, a litigant is entitled to time to prepare.

Now, recognizing, and I'm sure as I have said before, I do not challenge the integrity of this Court, but I do believe the emotions of the Court are involved after a trial of this length, where your Honor and I have had this amount of disagreement, it is an almost impossible burden for your Honor to be objective concerning me.

Your Honor has certain attitudes concerning me that your Honor has. Therefore if we look at the administration of justice, it seems to me that an impartial magistrate, if our law does not provide for it, which it purportedly does not, according to the Gode -- it should, and failure to so provide is a violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, a fair trial and a fair hearing.

How could your Honor with the differences of opinion that we have had for six months or so, how could your Honor be objective?

Your Honor certainly agrees that he is flesh

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and blood like all of us, and therefore the way to look at this judicially, the way to go into it, and come to a fair fact-finding result is for your Honor to grant the stay, allow me to have counsel, call in the County Counsel.

The County Counsel is very very effective; they can call all the witnesses they want; they can produce all the circumstantial and direct evidence, put it before an impartial magistrate.

THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek, I have heard enough. I have heard enough, sir.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, then, is ordering me not to speak further?

THE COURT: That's right.

Yesterday, January 14th, at page 21,189 of the transcript, lines 7 and 8 you interrupted the prosecutor's closing argument to the jury with a frivolous, gratuitous comment, after you had repeatedly been instructed and warned the day before by the Court not to interrupt and disrupt his argument, unless making an objection or motion in good faith.

The Court's warnings to you are set forth in various places from page 20,898 to 20,912, and in various other places in the transcript.

For that conduct the judge adjudges you to be in direct contempt of court and sentences you to pay a fine of \$100 and, failing the payment of said fine, you are

to spend two days in the County Jail.

Payment of the fine is stayed to 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning.

You are ordered to appear tomorrow morning at 10:00 a.m. and pay this fine or surrender yourself in the custody of the Sheriff in furtherance of this sentence.

This court is now adjourned until 9:00 a.m. Monday morning.

(Whereupon an adjournment was taken until 9:00 o'clock a.m., Monday, January 18, 1971)

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LOS ANUSLLA, CALIFORNIA, AMUNE, JANUARI 16, 1971 9.00 A.M.

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Counsel's office dure?

whi sillingly. Apparently they are not soint to bondle it, the District Attorney's Office is, in Nation is nere.

Lil Count: I will call that matter first.

The PITTGENALD: Faul Fitzgerald appearing on venulf of Patricia Areasinkel and also appearing for Irving Kanures, attorney for Charles Lanson, on venulf of Days Sainn, counsel for Suzan Atkins, and for Markell Asith on Spaulf of Lealis Van Mouten.

If the Court pleasu, we would like to continue the catter until Friday.

In the event that the jury is still deliberating, we could set it ut y:45, if the Court please. In the uvent that have concluded their deliberations and the subsequent penalty phase is in process, we could set it it 3:45, or whatever the Court please.

office. Sanking Les serker for the County Counsel's

Friday it was solne to be the District Attorney.

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I		MR. MUSICH: That was my understanding.
2	,	THE COURT: Is Friday agreeable with all counsel?
3.	;	MR. MUSICH: Yes, your Honor.
4		MR. BARKER: Your Honor, we would prefer, if possible,
5	some	date later than Friday. Preferably Monday, if possible
6		MR. FITZGERALD: That is agreeable.
7		MR. MUSICH: Agreeable with the People.
8		MR. BARKER: Any time after Friday.
ð .		THE COURT: Is 9:00 o'clock agreeable?
10.		MR. FITZGERALD: Agreeable.
11		THE COURT: Monday, January 25th at 9:00 a.m.
.12	<u> </u>  -	MR. BARKER: Thank you.
13	,	MR. FITZGERALD: Thank you, your Honor.
14	, '	THE COURT: On both motions.
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(The following proceedings were had in open court in the absence of the defendants and the jury, Mr. Kay and Mr. Musich the only counsel present:)

MR. KAY: Your Honor, we have three witnesses here today we would want ordered back three weeks from today:

Katic Luteringer, Mark Arneson, John Puhek.

THE COURT: Each of you is ordered to return to this courtroom on January 25th, at 9:00 a.m. without further order, notice or subpoena.

MR. KAY: And, your Honor, may we have a bench warrant issued and held for Alan Springer. He is the fourth witness and I understand he is in custody this morning.

THE COURT: Until when?

MR. KAY: Wext Wednesday.

THE COURT: A bench warrant will be held for Alan Springer until January 25th, at 9:00 a.m.

Thank you very much.

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(The following proceedings were had in the chambers of the court at 11:40 a.m., out of the presence of the jury and the defendants, all counsel with the exception of Mr. Bugliosi and Mr. Hughes being present:)

THE COURT: All counsel are present except Mr. Bugliosi.

Is it all right if we proceed in his absence?

MR. KAY: Yes, he has our exhibit list and he is bringing it down.

He has a list of both the prosecution and defense exhibits. I understand that might be an issue.

THE COURT: Yes, we have had a request from the foreman of the jury. Mr. Tubick.

First they want a list of the exhibit identification. Apparently their notes do not completely indicate to them what each particular exhibit number is.

I imagine this refers to the photographs primarily, possibly of certain persons who were photographed who appear in certain of the photographic exhibits, perhaps the places, also.

I think perhaps the simplest way to handle it would be if counsel could just agree on a list.

It doesn't have to be anything extensive, just if the photograph happens to be of a person, the name of the person and the exhibit number.

If it/a place, just what the place is, without

going into a description or explanation.

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They also ask for a record player which I understand we have obtained.

MR. KAY: Yes, the District Attorney's Office has provided that. We have given that to Mr. Darrow.

THE COURT: That would apply, I assume, that the Beatle album. That is the only record.

MR. FITZGERALD: I've got certain problems with that, with the record player.

Mr. Bugliosi mentioned in his opening remarks to the jury that he hoped Judge Older would provide a phonograph player for them during their deliberations, yet he made no attempt during the course of the trial to have it played.

Now the jury has a list of the lyrics, but the lyrics, many of them, are almost indiscernible on the record, and the record of course contains sound effects, and things that are not contained in the written-out lyrics that the prosecution introduced into evidence.

Furthermore, we have no way of controlling their use of the record player. They may, for example, play one line of a song over and over again.

They may play one song over and over again.

In effect, I think what is happening is the jury is receiving evidence out of the courtroom, and if your Honor does decide that notwithstanding the remarks of

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maybe we ought to bring them down and have them listen to it in open court. That way we can control what they are listening to.

Otherwise the record is just completely devoid of what is going on.

MR. KAY: I can see no need to control what they are doing with the record.

The record has been introduced into evidence, and Mr. Bugliosi's remarks were not in the hope that the Court would provide them with a record player and play the record, but if they wanted to hear the record — he did not suggest they listen to the record — but if they wanted to, that they ask the Court.

The record is an exhibit. I heard no objections from defense counsel when it was introduced -- the fact they wanted them to have it played.

THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek also at one point said if they wanted to listen to the record, he was sure Judge Older would provide them with a record player, or something to that effect.

MR. KEITH: I join Mr. Fitzgerald's remarks. I do believe that the jury should hear the entire album instead of, as Mr. Fitzgerald points out, excerpts from a particular song or a particular song only.

From my understanding of the case, such as it is,

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26 26 I think it might make a difference.

MR. KANAREK: I might say this, your Honor, I object to the use of the record --

What I say is this: It is my position the People have an obligation to put on their case. The fact that I think the Court is going to let them hear the record does not mean that I approve of the procedure, and I don't approve of the procedure, the helter skelter aspect.

There is an integration of the lyric with the words. The prosecution did not put it on in their case in chief.

I will object. It is a denial to the right of effective counsel.

THE COURT: I was referring to your argument,

Nr. Kanarek, in which you took just the opposite position.

You were encouraging the jury, in effect, to ask the Court for a record player. That is the way I understood it.

MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, you see, we are on the horns of a dilemma, knowing the propensities of man, so to speak, the bare record there, I know that the jury is going to want to hear it.

But I believe the case is fatal as far as the prosecution is concerned with the emphasis they put on helter skelter.

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This is my argument to the Court, and the Court is the one to rule.

It is my position that it is a denial to the effective right of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, due process picks up the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel and equal protection -- pardon me. I'll start over.

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment picks up the Sixth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment also has an equal protection clause in it, and I allege those rights, those constitutional rights — and furthermore I allege due process under California law, in that the prosecution did not play that record in open court.

Not playing it in open court, the record is a mere exhibit, and so the prosecution has an obligation to prove their case.

They did not prove the helter skelter aspect of it. They did not put the record on in open court, and I will object to the Court --

THE COURT: How is that any different from, say, introducing a contract in a case without reading it to the jury before they go into a jury room?

MR. FITZGERALD: It is more analogous to a tape that is introduced but not played in open court, then you give them a tape recorder and allow them to play it back in the jury room.

The State of the second

If one of the defense counsel has misled the jury into thinking they are going to listen to the record, that is a very unfortunate thing.

Maybe we can solve the whole problem by simply handling it like we do the re-reading of the testimony:

Set the record player up in open court and play it, when we can all be here for the taking of the evidence, because the record itself is different from the lyrics. It contains material in addition to the lyrics. It is not simply a matter where they can simply listen to the lyrics.

(Mr. Bugliosi has entered the chambers.)

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MR. BUGLIOSI: What album do they want to hear, Revolution 9 has no lyrics.

MR. FTYZGERALD: They have gunshots.

MR. BUULIOSI: They do have lyrics to the other songs.

MR. FITZGERALD: Right.

MR. KANAREK: I did not mislead the jury.

It is my belief that this Court would allow them to do that, that is what my belief is, and that is my argument. I certainly don't foster it by stating what, for instance, Green vs. California — your Honor ruled in that direction in connection with Juan Flynn.

I still believe that Johnson is good law in California, but nevertheless your Monor is doing it. I believe the Court is going to offer them — is going to let them use the record player, but it is my belief, and the People cannot put on evidence, we rested the case, we have made argument.

The People did not put any of the Beatle album on during the course of the trial, therefore it is my belief that the Beatle album cannot be used.

MR. BUGLIOSI: We introduced it into evidence.

MR. KANAREK: You did not play the lyrics.

MR. BUGLIOSI: But the album is there.

MR. KANAREK: You are dealing with the integration of the lyrics and the music, and we have a right to cross-examine on that.

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But we would have a right, perhaps, even to put on a defense in connection with whatever -- because your helter skelter is such a big portion of your case, it is my belief that your case fails because you did not put that -- because you did not put the album into evidence and did not play it before the jury while the evidence was being taken.

It is my belief and I allege that it is a fatal defect as far as your case is concerned.

I will object to it being played. I object to the jury being given a record player.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Well, they have that revolver back there; what if they wanted to disassemble it, do you think they could do it back there even though we did not do it in court?

MR. FITZGERALD: I think so, sure,

MR. BUGLIOSI: I think they can listen to that album.

THE COURT: As I pointed out, Mr. Bugliosi, before you arrived, Mr. Kanarek during his argument encouraged the jury to ask the Court for a record player for the album.

He was not objecting at that time.

MR. KANAREK: I objected to the album going into evidence.

I only did what I believed this Court is going to do.

I don't like to take on the Court in front of the jury.

THE COURT: You were volunteering my services and

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assistance without consulting with me, Er. Kanarek, is what you were doing.

MR. KANAREK: I believed that that is what occurred.

I would ask this, also, I would ask the Court to order everybody in this courtroom not to discuss with the press anything that we are raying here because somehow, no matter what happens in chambers, it ends up in the newspaper, and I would ask the Court most respectfully to order us all not to discuss anything that happens in chambers so that the jury will —

THE COURT: That has been under the publicity order since the first day of the trial.

MR. KANAREK: I agree, your Konor, but these matters do get out to the press.

THE COURT: You let me know how that occurs, Mr. Kanarek. I will assure you I will do something about it.

MR. KANAREK: Well, I am reluctant to be a tattletale, your Honor.

THE COURT: I can only find out by finding out about it.

MR. KANAREK: My function is not to -- I don't like to be a --

THE COURT: Then why are you mentioning it?

MR. KANAREK: Because I believe it is very important.

THE COURT: What would you suggest if you are not willing to tell me who the culprit is, what do you suggest

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MR. KANAREK: I would ask your Honor to -- to use the power and prestige of the Court to inform all counsel that the publicity order is still in effect.

I have no desire to put any counsel on the spot per se.

THE COURT: You brought the subject up, Mr. Kanarek, I did not initiate it.

MR. KANAREK: I am doing it by way of emphasis.

I mean, I love my co-counsel ---

THE COURT: The order is still in effect, if there is any doubt in anybody's mind.

MR. KAY: To get back to the subject on hand, I wonder if it might not be easier for all concerned if your Honor asked the jury to specify which exhibit numbers they were confused about, and then instead of having to make up a long list of about three hundred exhibits, maybe they have only questions about two or three exhibit numbers.

THE COURT: That sounds like a reasonable suggestion.

MR. FITZGERALD: I also have a suggestion that might save counsel a tremendous amount of time.

It is unlikely we are going to be able to agree among ourselves as to a description of anything. I hope that is not the case. I hope we can agree but I don't think we will.

THE COURT: You cannot agree to a photograph showing

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MR. FITZGERALD: We will try, but we have been through this before. I mean, getting stipulations in this case has been extremely difficult.

I just wanted to point out that the clerk has a list of all of the exhibits.

THE CLERK: Thank you, Mr. Fitzgerald, but I wouldn't possibly try to tell counsel what an exhibit is when you cannot agree among yourselves.

MR. FTTZGERALD: We have a legal description of them for the purpose of the Court, which is an impartial body.

That is the reason I suggest that your offices be offered, not because I think your description is better or worse.

THE COURT: To me it is ridiculous to think that you take gentlemen cannot sit down and, say/a picture of a certain person and say this purports to represent so and so, or if it represents a piece of geography, to say this is a photograph of the vicinity or something or other.

MR. FITZGERALD: That may be true. Certainly I would agree and everybody would agree that Exhibit 1 is a picture of Sharon Tate in life. okay.

But if you think Mr. Kanarek will stipulate as to some leather thongs or anything like that, any of the problem exhibits, and there are about 78 of them, and obviously if the jury just needs a statement. "These are

leather thongs," they have got the leather thongs in front of them.

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THE COURT: We can easily ask them to segregate those exhibits that they wish to have identified.

MR. FITZGERALD: Good.

THE COURT: Have them brought here and we will find out what it is.

MR. FITZGERALD: Great.

THE COURT: Maybe it can be done in five minutes. On the other hand it may take more time.

MR. FITZGERALD: Terrific.

MR. KANAREK: If I just may make a slight point.

I do then object to any of the playing, to the sending of the record player, any playing of the record.

THE COURT: Let's do one thing at a time, Mr. Kanarek.
Now we are talking about Exhibit identification.

Will you do that, Mr. Murray, tell the foreman to set aside and segregate those exhibits on which they wish some identification.

THE BAILIFF: Shall they do it now? They will be going to lunch in about three minutes.

THE COURT: Well, they can start.

(The bailiff leaves the chambers of the court.)

THE COURT: Now, on the record player --

MR. MUSICH: Your Honor, there is testimony to the effect that records identical to that were played; there are lyrics of the songs in evidence.

THE COURT: I think Mr. Fitzgerald's suggestion is

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probably a good one, we can ask the jury what they want to hear, and then bring them down and play it for them, play it once instead of giving them the recorder.

MR. KAY: What if after they play it down here they go up and deliberate longer, and they say "We want to hear the song again"?

THE COURT: Highly unlikely. If they do, we will play it again.

MR. BUGLIOSI: It is hard to tell what the lyrics are from the record. I played some of them; it's really a hodge-podge, a wild sound. It is not a clear record.

MR. SHINN: And also, your Honor, there are rumors around that some of these Beatles' records, your Honor, you put it on a record and play it a different way and there is a message coming out, your Honor.

THE COURT: What do you mean "in a different way"?

MR. SHINN: There are rumors around, if you take it
by hand and just swing it around, there is a message
coming through. That is a rumor among the young kids,
that is what I heard.

I think they should play it in open court so they won't fool around with the record, your Honor.

THE COURT: You think what?

MR. SHINN: It is better to play itiin open court where we all will be present so they won't fool around with the record.

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THE COURT: The third request is the request to visit the Tate and La Bianca residences and areas at night.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Is that right! The jury wants to go out there!

THE COURT: I'm very much opposed to that.

MR. FITZGERALD: Well, of course we took a position on the record that I don't think any of us are willing to abrogate, that we go to the scene.

We of course at the time we made the request, we did not request that we go at night.

To go at night, of course, would more approximately duplicate the scene on the night of the nomicide.

To go during the daytime, although as my recollection is when we defense attorneys made the motion we did not specify it was at night.

In my knowledge of the law -- my knowledge of the law in the area -- is limited. I don't know if a jury can go to visit a scene after the evidence is closed.

MR. KEITH: It sounds like a reasonable request if it were made during the trial.

MR. FITZGERALD: We made it and it was denied.

MR. KANAREK: May I make a motion -- I make a motion, your Honor, No. 1, I make a motion that all of the evidence, all of the testimony that was admitted into evidence go into the jury room so that they can have the benefit of all of the evidence.

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THE COURT: What makes you think that it hasn't?

MR. KANAREK: I am talking about the transcripts,
your Honor, the transcripts.

THE COURT: Let's not waste our time.

MR. KANAREK: This shows their lack of ability to remember, your Honor, and I reiterate that motion.

Failure to do that denies a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment with a case six months long.

THE COURT: Failure to remember what? Are there things in the record they never heard?

MR. KANAREK: I am talking now about the exhibits, your Honor.

For instance, they don't remember the number of the exhibits, all kinds of things like that.

The human mind cannot possibly --

THE BAILIFF: Judge, they said it would take them quite a while, but this is an example of what they mean. They sent these two pictures down here. They assumed that this is probably where a body was, but they don't know what these letters mean.

There is another one right here, a line drawn between these two houses. They would like to know the significance of that. They don't know.

MR. BUGLIOSI: That's why I always like to write names on the exhibits, and so forth.

MR. KAY: I think those markings are described in

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the record, so the record would have to be read to them rather than counsel stipulating.

MR. FITZGERALD: We would have to rerecross-examination as to the matter as well.

MR. KEITH: We certainly cannot stipulate this is where Patricia Krenwinkel came over the wall, can we?

MR. BUGLIOSI: I know where these are; the second place Voityck Frykowski ended up.

This is Linda Kasabian; this is Abigail Folger.

This is where Frykowski was at first, then from

here he went to here, VF-2.

But this is why it is advisable to write out the exhibits.

I did not do this.

THE COURT: We are just going to have to segregate all of the exhibits, get them together and then we will have to work out a method of answering their questions.

THE BAILIFF: Would you want the photos sent down as they examine them?

THE COURT: I don't think we need all of this on the record, this is just conversation.

I don't need your comment after every sentence of mine, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: I hope your Honor recognizes --

THE COURT: Your silence can start right now. We go off the record at this point.

(Discussion off the record.)

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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, MONDAY, JANUARY 18, 1971 1:55 P.M.

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(The following proceedings were had in the chambers of the court, all counsel with the exception of Mr. Hughes being present:)

THE COURT: We can stay off the record while we have our informal discussion.

(Off-the-record discussion, after which the following proceedings were had on the record.)

THE COURT: All right, now, we will go on the record.

I will indicate what the requests have been, and you can state your respective arguments, pro and con; then we will go from there.

All counsel are present.

Continuing our discussion of this morning, gentlemen, about the request from the foreman of the jury:

The third item requested is a view of the premises, the Tate and La Bianca premises, and the area at night.

Do you wish to be heard, Mr. Fitzgerald?

MR. FITZGERALD: If it please your Honor, on behalf of all counsel, I might indicate for the record ---

MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, as to this, Mr. Fitzgerald is speaking for himself.

MR. KEITH: I am joining.

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MR. SHINN: I am joining,

THE COURT: You will be given a chance, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: Yes, as to this point he is not speaking for me, as to this point.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FITZGERALD: It has been suggested in an off-therecord discussion that for the jury to proceed to the
scene would be to receive evidence, albeit simply a view,
and assuming that is the case, for the purposes of argument,
the defendants and each of them with the exception of
Charles Manson, by Irving Kanarek, would move to reopen
so that the jury might be allowed to view the scene as
provided in the Penal Code.

All of us feel that the jury has expressed a firm desire to view the scene, and that that would be helpful in determining the factual issues.

We feel that there has been a considerable amount of evidence that has put into issue various aspects that could be determined by a physical view of the scene.

The prosecution has introduced numerous photographs, both color, and black-and-white, illustrating various aspects of both the Tate scene and the La Bianca scene.

We feel that one major aspect that could be, or apparently could be cleared up by a view of the scene would be the relative illumination at both crime scenes.

Linda Kasabian has testified that she viewed, among others, Patricia Krenwinkel chasing Abigail Folger down the lawn.

At the Tate residence she also viewed one of the decedents, Voityck Frykowski, near death as a result of stab wounds near some shrubbery.

There has been some testimony that the blood of Sharon Tate and Jay Sebring was actually found outside the house.

There had been photographs introduced of police officers pointing to various physical objects. People's Exhibit No. 8 is a scale-drawing to minute detail of the entire Tate estate.

There has been considerable controversy about the proximity of the adjoining guest house to the main house, its acoustical relationship as well as its optical relationship.

There has been testimony that Manson, in March of 1969, actually went to the Tate house on a visit and proceeded down a pathway.

Insofar as the La Bianca scene is concerned, it has been alleged that while 3301 Waverly Drive is in the City of Los Angeles on a city block, it's actually been alleged that it is a remote home, set far back from the street. It is bordered on the right by the former Earl C. Anthony estate.

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It is bordered on the left by the Harold True residence.

Danny Galindo, an LAPD officer, testified that he searched the Harold True location and the outside of the La Blanca residence, looking for marder weapons.

There has been testimony that there was a long driveway, apparently into which some of the defendants disappeared on a forgy night.

Inere was testimony about the length of time it would take the defendants to traverse the driveway and go into the house.

Linda Kasabian testified that -- one view of the evidence is that she smoked one-third of a Pall Hall cigarette; another view of the evidence is she smoked three-quarters of a Pall Hall cigarette.

There have been aerial overviews of the house and the estate, and we think it would be very helpful if the jury could go to the location and put all of these things in a frame of reference.

THE COURT: Do any other defense counsel wish to be heard on that?

MR. KAHARIK: Yes, your Honor.

MR. KEITH: No, I think Mr. Fitzgerald stated it adequately and I will join with him in his motion to reopen.

MR. KAWAREK: Now, I would like to join with Mr. Fitzgerald's comments as far as they have gone.

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The reason I did not want to join previously was because I did not know exactly what he was going to say.

But I will join in his comments as far as they have gone, and I would just like to add another point, that is, there was testimony, for instance, by Linda Kasabian that Mr. Manson was gone only several minutes.

But in addition to joining with Mr. Fitzgerald's comments I would like to include in the request and the we motion to reopen a motion that/then argue, be allowed to argue this new evidence before the jury further, and that we be allowed to interrogate Linda Kasabian at the scene.

We asked -- we asked -- when Linda Kasabian was on the stand, we made a motion to interrogate her at the scene, and I believe your Honor denied that motion, and that is why I am saying as far as it went I join in Mr. Fitzgerald's comments.

I don't believe they went far enough, and my is addition, as I have indicated,/a motion to reopen, but in addition a motion to argue the new evidence, and the new addition to interrogate Linda Kasabian at the scene, with the court reporters' presence as provided by the Penal Code.

In other words, convene the Court at the scene of the Tate and the scene of the La Bianca residences.

MR. SHINN: I wish to join in Mr. Fitzgerald's comments and motions.

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. BUGLIOSI: People object,

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The taking of evidence has come to an end.

I agree with Mr. Kanarek, actually, if we go out to the scene we just about have to call Linda back here, call other witnesses, call Altobelli to the stand, all kinds of things. We would open a bag of worms.

MR. KAY: At the La Biance house, who will know what the lighting conditions are around there except Linda Kasabian? The two La Biancas are dead; the lighting might have been changed considerably in a year and a half since the murders.

MR. KANAREK: This could be ascertained by the City Engineers, the City records.

True's house?

MR. BUGLIOSI: I think the taking of evidence is over with, your monor. We object to reopening the case, as it were, at this late date, because if we did reopen it I agree with Mr. Manarel, you would almost have to say we would have to reargue those particular issues to the jury.

It is just too late. It is one second past midnight now, and I think the photographs and the testimony adequately cover the murder scene.

It would be unprecedented to reopen the case at this late date and open up all types of unforeseen problems.

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25 26 MR. KEITH: We must remember this is at the request of the jury.

THE COURT: That's right. Let's not forget that.

MR. MUSICH: The one problem, too, the request as to both locations might seem out of curiosity. They might just want to see the scene of the crime.

THE COURT: My recollection is the state of the record is now, and this is subject to correction, as I have indicated to counsel, I am not certain this is exactly the way it happened, but my recollection is that somewhere either during or after the testimony of Linda Kasabian one or more of the parties requested a view of the premises, and the motion was denied without prejudice to renew it at some later date in the trial after the jury had heard all of the evidence.

Of course, if my statement is correct, there was no renewal by any party of their request for a view of the premises.

But entirely apart from that, now I am faced with a request from the jury for a view of the premises. It is not a request for a view of any specific portion.

The exact words are:

"Request visits to Tate-La Bianca residengs -r-e-s-i-d-e-n-t-s, and area at night."

Now, we have had extensive photographic coverage, both aerial and on the ground, both interior and exterior

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shots from a number of different angles and distances from both of these scenes, and all of the related buildings and grounds.

There have been, as I say, aerial photographs showing the scenes; there have been detailed diagrams, and there have been maps showing the streets and relative locations of the streets, houses, and so forth.

I cannot really see what possible help a visit to the scene could be for the jury, particularly in view of the fact that -- while I suppose it would be theoretical possible to duplicate the conditions existing on the night of these crimes, I know of no way we would know when that was accomplished.

MR. KANAREK: May I be excused for just a moment, your Honor?

THE COURT: So that if we took the jury to the scene at night as they requested we might very well be showing them a scene that did not exist on the night of the alleged crimes, and I think it would simply open up many many problems. It would not really be helpful.

I can understand the jury; they have been sitting here for six months listening to evidence. Unquestionably they are curious; they would like to see it; I would, too.

I have never been there either. I would like to see it just as a matter of curiosity.

But I don't think it would help me a bit if I

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were deciding the case, in view of all the testimony in the case and all of the exhibits.

So because I think it might very well be misleading and tend to confuse the jury without in any way assisting them, I am going to deny their request and your motions to reopen.

Now, we will play the record.

Did you get the request, Mr. Murray?

THE BAILIFF: Yes, your Honor, they want to hear four of them.

MR. FITZGERALD: I can give you an estimate of the time.

THE COURT: There is a possible solution to this,
I don't suppose any of us want to sit for an hour and a
half listening to the Beatles; I wouldn't want to listen
to them for 30 seconds.

MR. KANAREK: I would like to be present.

THE COURT: If you gentlemen could stipulate the record could be played through just once to the jury --

MR. KEITH: Without counsel being present?

THE COURT: Without counsel or the Court being present.

MR. KANAREK: I would welcome being present.

THE COURT: You can be present if you want to.

MR. KANAREK: I see what you mean, all right.

THE COURT: Anyone who did not want to could be

excused.

MR. KEITH: Well --

MR. SHINN: In other words, your Honor will play it in court and not upstairs, is that correct?

THE COURT: If anyone is going to be present other than the jury, it will have to be done in open court.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I do make the motion in view of your Honor's not acceding to the jury's request, the jury themselves having requested these matters, I do make a motion for a mistrial.

THE COURT: Denied.

MR. FITZGERALD: Okay now, I will add these up.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, in the interest of completion,
Mr. Murray kindly brought to our room here this morning
People's Exhibit 4, People's Exhibit 251 and People's Exhibit
100.

That is, 251 was an envelope I believe; People's Exhibit 4 and People's Exhibit 100, concerning which there was colloquy, are pictures.

Is that a fair statement, your Honor? I don't believe the record revealed what Mr. Murray did bring to us at the jury's request.

THE COURT: I don't think it makes any difference, but the jury is now segregating any of the exhibits they wish to have further identified, which would include those three.

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MR. BUGLIOSI: Are we going to handle the exhibit problem after the playing of the record, is that going to be done now or after the album?

THE COURT: They are apparently not ready yet; they are going through the exhibits now, trying to segregate them.

Is that correct, Mr. Murray?

THE BAILIFF: Yes.

MR. BUGLIOSI: We will have to come back tomorrow morning because it is 2:20 now.

MR. FITZGERALD: Eighty-three point ten minutes.

THE CLERK: That is without change of the records.

MR. FITZGERALD: I am talking about four sides, two sides of each record.

THE COURT: Can we arrive at any stipulation between counsel as to any portions of those records that you don't think have any relation or bearing to the case?

MR. KEITH: Not as far as I am concerned, you can't.

MR. FITZGERALD: I agree with Mr. Keith. The problem is, there was specific testimony to some specific songs.

There was also general testimony as to the album itself.

There was a considerable amount of general testimony, as a matter of fact, as to when the double album was released, and the fact that Manson and all the Family members listened to it repeatedly, and so on.

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It is an unusual musical experience, your Honor.

MR, BUGLIOSI: We have got five songs, I think, that
should be played only.

THE COURT: Counsel apparently cannot agree. The jury had requested all of them.

MR. KAY: Another problem is, when you play the album, either the Court or somebody is going to have to tell them which song is which, as they go down the album.

Some of those words, I understand, are pretty unintelligible.

Those can be taken off the record before, and a list made up, probably six songs on a side, say "You are now on band No. 1; this song is --

"This song, band No. 2 is this song."

Otherwise it might be confusing to them, or more confusing to them.

MR. KEITH: Also the problem with counsel not having to be present, if some counsel stay and other counsel leave, it will look to the jury as if counsel that have left are not very interested in these proceedings.

I would rather have an order that we all go or we all have to stay.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I agree. Either all of us should be here or none of us should be here.

I would make a motion that the Court excuse all of us. I don't see why we have to suffer through 83

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minutes of this horrendous album music.

What is the basic objection to having the record player going to the jury room and have them listen themselves?

MR. KAY: As long as they play the whole album, the objection before was that defense counsel did not want them to play it.

If they play it for them in open court, why not play it up in the jury room?

MR. BUGLIOSI: If they want to hear a certain song over again, they can play it over.

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MR. FITZGERALD: Right. I think contrary to some of the obligations of my fellow counsel, once they hear the whole thing in open court, if they want to rehear anything else then I think it is just like a piece of evidence.

They can replay portions of it or whatever.

But I think until we have that --

THE COURT: Have what, I don't follow you.

MR. FITZGERALD: I think there is new material here.

I think that we ought to at least hear it all played in open court.

MR. KAY: What difference does it make what they are going to hear as long as we are going to play the whole album?

MR. KEITH: I don't know.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Our hearing isn't necessary any more, Paul, we can't argue about it.

MR. FITZGERALD: Correct, I just want to be present when the jury takes evidence, that's all.

But I will do this, as Mr. Kanarek has said numerous times, I don't question the integrity of the Court:

If you all want to leave, I will leave with you and let the Court suffer through it.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Thanks a lot. I have heard it several times. The Judge maybe hasn't.

THE COURT: I can assure you I haven't, and I am not

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anxious to.

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· Let's go off the record for just a moment.

(Whereupon, there was an off-the-record discussion after which the following proceedings were had on the record:)

THE COURT: Let's go back on the record.

With respect to the request of the jury for a record player, which apparently and obviously is for the purpose of permitting them to play the Beatles album which is in evidence -- what is that exhibit?

MR. BUGLIOSI: 266 is the album and 267, the lyrics.

THE COURT: I understand that all counsel except Mr. Kanarek are willing to stipulate that the bailiff may take a record player into the jury room and play the record without any comment, conversation or anything other than playing the record.

I think he should be permitted to just read the titles of the songs from the label on the record, but without any comment or conversation about it.

Murray.

THE COURT: Just a moment, ir. Kanarek, we will let Mr. Murray worry about that.

It is my understanding that all of you except Mr. Kanarek agree that may be done providing that the bailiff plays the record through in its entirety first, and

then if the jury wants to go back and hear any particular portion, that portion will be replayed again without any comment, interpretation or conversation from the bailiff with any member of the jury regarding the record.

MR. FITZGERALD: Correct, it is so agreed.

THE COURT: So agreed, Mr. Keith?

MR. KEITH: Yes.

MR. SHINN: So agreed.

THE COURT: Do the prosecution so agree?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek, I understand you do not agree.

MR. KANAREK: That is correct, your Honor, it is my belief actually in that regard, if I may -- first of all, there is a case on point and -- there is an exact case on point and the reason it is an imposition on Mr. Murray, the case holds that the Court cannot use the bailiff to carry out its instructions in connection with the case itself.

The bailiff cannot participate in getting evidence to the jury, and I can show you — it is a case that Mr. Lavine, Morris Lavine — I forget the name of the case, it was reversed on that theory. The Court did much less than the Court is asking Mr. Murray to do, if your Honor will give me a moment, it is a case, I think, of some years ago.

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MR. BUGLIOSI: It was not Crovedi? MR. KANAREK: No. it's not. If I may --2 THE COURT: If you may what? MR. KANAREK: May I use Witkin's Criminal Procedure? MR. BUGLIOSI: You are not talking about the Sears 5 6 case, are you, Irving? . 7. MR. KANAREK: No. 8 MR. BUGLIOSI: Even if we were in open court, the bailiff would probably have to play it. Someone would have 9. 10 to spin the record. 11 MR. SHINN: Why not have the jurors play it? 12 WR. FITZGERALD: Inasmuch as they have People's 13 Exhibit 267, it is a very simple project for them to read 14 titles of the song and lyrics right along with listening to 15 it. MR. KAY: As long as they know the order of the songs 16 on the album, that is the only thing. 17 18 MR. FITZGERALD: I assume the lyrics are in order. 19 MR. KAY: I don't know. 20 (Off the record discussion.) THE COURT: Let's go back on the record now, and state 21 22 what we are going to do... 23 With respect to the playing of the Beatle album, 24 and the jury's request for a record player. I propose to 25 have the jury brought back into court and advise them that :26

they will be furnished with a record player; that the CieloDrive.com ARCHIVES

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bailiff will be instructed to play the Beatles album through once in its entirety without any comment or conversation with any of the jurors, between the bailiff and any of the jurors, and that thereafter if the jury wants any particular portion of the album played that he will then go back and play the portion that they request.

And upon completion of that, without any comment whatever with the jury he will then bring the record player out of the jury room and leave the room himself.

Do I understand that all counsel are in agreement with that except Mr. Kanarek?

Is that correct?

MR. FITZGERALD: That is correct.

MR. SHINN: That is correct.

MR. KEITH: That is correct.

MR. KANAREK: That is correct.

THE COURT: Now, Mr. Kanarek, do you wish to make an objection?

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor. I object on the grounds that the People have rested their case.

The People have made extended reference to the Beatle album, and that it was played at the Spahn Ranch a great number of times.

It is my position that your Honor allowing the record to be played at this time, that your Honor is putting before the jury evidence after the case has rested; that

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the integration of the words and the music in the Beatle album is not presentable in evidence before the jury.

It did not take place in open court. The album going into evidence was merely -- was a physical object to show the existence of the Beatle album.

As I say, there was no playing of the album in open court, therefore what your Honor is doing is, your Honor is now, while the jury is deliberating, your Honor is allowing new evidence to go before the jury.

Now, therefore, it is improper because the People have rested, for your Honor to allow this.

It is a denial of a fair trial and right to effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment which is incorporated into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it is a denial of equal protection in that counsel have not had the opportunity to argue the meaning to the jury.

We have not had the opportunity to try to convince the jury that the exhortations, or whatever is set out in musical form on the album upon which the prosecution laid such great store, all of that is not in part of our argument.

We could have made extended argument concerning it, and so could the prosecution; they could argue what the words mean and what the music means, if it had gone on while the people were putting on their case.

But they did not put that into evidence; they did not play the record.

Not having played the record, the words, the music, that which comes out of the record when you put it on a record player is not in evidence before the jury during the course of the trial and, as I say, it is a denial of a fair trial.

I would have liked very much to have argued to the jury that the words and music here are words and music that those people at the ranch could have heard independently of Mr. Manson.

With Helter Skelter all over the ranch, and I firmly believe this, it is not just a matter of argument, I believe that Mr. Watson and Susan Atkins and Patricia Krenwinkel and and Linda Kasabian, having heard the Beatles and whatever at Spahn Ranch, when Mr. Manson was not even present, acted on their own, and I sincerely believe they acted on their own, and whatever they had to do with Helter Skelter and the Beatles album came about because of what they heard.

And I had no way of arguing that to the jury.

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THE COURT: Well, Mr. Kanarek, let's get a few things straight.

First of all you had an opportunity any time you wanted to to play that record which was in evidence either by yourself or to the jury.

If you want to do that, and you certainly had the right to argue anything about the Beatles, and the testimony about the Beatles, and the lyrics which are in evidence, the album itself.

between this, as I said off the record in our discussion, between this and the very common example of a lawyer putting into evidence during the course of a trial a rather lengthy document which he does not read to the jury, simply a foundation is laid and it goes into evidence and then the jury takes it into the jury room and reads it during their deliberations.

I see no difference whatever between that and this.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor is --

THE COURT: I don't want to belabor the point. I think you have made your record and I have no desire to prolong the discussion.

MR. KANAREK: In view of your Honor's Adoing this, I would ask for a mistrial in connection with what your Honor is going to do with this record.

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THE COURT: The motion will be denied. Let's have the jury brought down.

Have they had a recess or anything this afternoon?

THE BAILIFF: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Why don't we give them a break. How long will they need?

THE BAILIFF: Ten minutes.

THE COURT: All right, then, we will have them brought back down into court.

I will tell them I am going to deny their request to visit the two premises.

I will tell them about the record playing, then we will send them back upstairs again.

MR. FITZGERALD: Why don't you also ask the jury about setting aside the problem exhibits?

THE COURT: Yes, yes, I will.

MR. BUGLIOSI: After we do that are we coming back into chambers?

THE COURT: Not unless they already have segregated the exhibits.

They won't have time to listen to the album and get to the exhibits today.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may the record reflect that your Honor did read People vs. Weatherford, a California Supreme Court case. 2g-3

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(The following proceedings were had in open court in the presence and hearing of the jury, all counsel and all jurors being present, the defendants not being physically present:)

THE COURT: All counsel and jurors are present.

MR. KANAREK: Before your Honor proceeds may we approach the bench briefly, your Honor.

THE COURT: We will take it up afterward, Mr. Kanarek.

Mr. Tubick, I have received from the bailiff your request for certain matters and I considered all of these requests and discussed them with all counsel.

With respect to the first request, a list of the exhibit identifications, if you will make a list of the exhibits to which you wish some additional information, and segregate those, and give them to the bailiff, we will then consider that.

will instruct one of the bailiffs to take a record player into the jury room and play the album in its entirety without any conversation between the bailiff and any juror; and if any of you then wish to hear any portions of it again, after it has been played through in its entirety, he will again play those portions requested, and without any conversation between any juror and the bailiff regarding the matter.

With respect to the request for visits to

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the Tate-La Bianca regidences, I have discussed that matter with counsel and I have decided to deny that request.

You may recort the jury back to the jury room, and the alternate jurors to their room.

MR. KANAREK: May we approach the bench? THE COURT: Very well.

(The following proceedings were had at the bench out of the hearing of the jury:)

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I will object -- may the record reflect that the record player is still in the courtroom and the court still has the power to rescind what I deem to be an illegal order.

THE COURT: You have already made your objection, Mr. Kanarek. I don't want to hear it again and I don't want to clutter the record with repeated objections.

Now, we spent a great deal of time both this morning and this afternoon in chambers.

This court is now in recess.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Does the Court want us back tomorrow morning then?

THE 'COURT: I think there is no need for you to stay around any further this afternoon, and instead of having the Clerk have to call you in the morning I will just ask you all to be here, say, at 9:45 in the morning.

MR. FITZGERALD: Well --

THE COURT: By then the jury should have segregated

the exhibits that they want any further information about. 1. . 2 So we will adjourn until 9:45. (Whereupon an adjournment was taken until 9:45 o'clock a.m. of the following day, Tuesday, January 19, 1971.) 9. 13. 15.