ORIGINAL

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT NO. 104

HON. CHARLES H. OLDER, JUDGE

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff,

Vs.

No. A253156

CHARLES MANSON, SUSAN ATKINS, LESLIE VAN HOUTEN, PATRICIA KRENWINKEL.

Defendants.

REPORTERS' DAILY TRANSCRIPT

APPEARANCES:

For the People:

VINCENT T. BUGLIOSI, DONALD A. MUSICH,

STEPHEN RUSSELL KAY.

DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS

For Deft. Manson:

I. A. KANAREK, Esq.

For Deft. Atkins:

DAYE SHINN, Esq.

For Deft. Van Houten: RONALD HUGHES, Esq.

For Deft. Krenwinkel: PAUL FITZGERALD, Esq.

VOLUME 207

PAGES 27, 181 to 28, 314

JOSEPH B. HOLLOMBE, C MURRAY MEHLMAN, CSR., Official Reporters JOSEPH B. HOLLOMBE, CSR.,

THE COURT: The clerk will read the verdicts.

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THE CLERK: "Superior Court of the State of 1 California for the County of Los Angeles. "The People of the State of California versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten, "Case No. A-253 156. Department 104. 6 "We, the jury in the above-entitled action, having found the defendant Charles 8 Manson guilty of murder in the first degree 9 as charged in Count I of the Indictment, do 10. now fix the penalty as death. 11 "Dated this 29th day of March, 1971, 12 signed Herman Tubick, Foreman," 13 DEFENDANT KRENWINKEL: You have just judged your-14 selves. 15 DEFENDANT ATKINS: You'd better lock your doors and 16 watch your own kids. 17 THE COURT: Remove Miss Atkins from the courtroom. 18 DEFENDANT ATKINS: You are removing yourself. You 19 are removing yourself from the face of the earth, you old 20 fools. .21 DEFENDANT KRENWINKEL: There never has been any 22 justice here. **23** Remove Miss Krenwinkel from the court-THE COURT: 24 room. 25 DEFENDANT VAN HOUTEN: Your whole system is a game. **26**

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1	THE COURT: Remove Miss Van Houten from the courtroom.
2	DEFENDANT KRENWINKEL: You judged yourselves.
3	DEFENDANT VAN HOUTEN: You blind, stupid people.
4	Your children will turn against you.
5	THE COURT: Continue reading the verdicts.
6	THE CLERK: Further, "People of the State of
7	California versus Charles Manson, Patricia
8	Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten.
9	"Case No. A-253,156, Department 104.
10	"We, the jury in the above-entitled
11	action, having found the defendant Patricia
12	Krenwinkel guilty of murder in the first degree
13	as charged in Count I of the Indictment, do now
14	fix the penalty as death.
15	"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971,
16	Herman Tubick, Foreman."
17	Further, "People of the State of California
18	versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel,
19.	Susan Atkins, and Leslie Van Houten, case No.
20	A-253,156, Department 104.
21	"We, the jury in the above-entitled
22	action, having found the defendant Susan Atkins
23	guilty of murder in the first degree as charged
24	in Count I of the Indictment, do now fix the
25	penalty as death.
26	"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971,

Herman Tubick, Foreman."

Further, "People of the State of 1 California versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins and Leslie Van Houten, 3 Case No. A-253,156, Department 104. 4 "We, the jury in the above-entitled 5 action, having found the defendant Charles 6 Manson guilty of murder in the first degree as 7. charged in Count II of the Indictment, do now 8: fix the penalty as death. 9 "Dated this 29th day of March, 1971, 10 Herman Tubick, Foreman." 11 (Off-the-record discussion between the Court 12 and the clerk.) 13 THE CLERK: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, is each 14 of these verdicts as to Count I your verdict? 15. (All jurors answer yes.) 16 THE CLERK: I repeat myself: 17 "The People of the State of California 18 versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, 19 Susan Atkins and Leslie Van Houten, case No. 20. A-253,156, Department 104. 21 "We, the jury in the above-entitled 22 action, having found the defendant Charles 23 Manson guilty of murder in the first degree as 24 charged in Count II of the Indictment, do now 25 fix the penalty as death, 26

"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971, 1 Herman Tubick, Foreman." 2. Further, "People of the State of California, 3 versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, 4 Susan Atkins and Leslie Van Houten, Case No. 5. A-253,156, Department 104. 6 "We, the jury in the above-entitled Ż action, having found the defendant Patricia 8. Krenwinkel guilty of murder in the first 9 degree as charged in Count II of the Indictment, 10 do now fix the penalty as death. 11 "Dated this 29th day of March, 1971, 12 Herman Tubick, Foreman." 13 Further, "People of the State of California 14 versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, 15 Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten, case No. 16 A-253,156, Department 104. 17 "We, the jury in the above-entitled 18 action, having found the defendant Susan Atkins 19 guilty of murder in the first degree as charged 20 in Count II of the Indictment, do now fix the 21 penalty as death. 22 "Dated this 29th day of March, 1971, 23 signed Herman Tubick, Foreman." 24 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, is each of 25 these verdicts as to Count II your verdict? 26

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(All of the jurors answer yes.)

Further, "The People of the State of California versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins and Leslie Van Houten, Case No. A-253,156, Department 104.

"We, the jury in the above-entitled action, having found the defendant Charles Manson guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in Count III of the Indictment, do now fix the penalty as death.

"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971, signed Herman Tubick, Foreman."

Further, "People of the State of California versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten, Case No. A-253,156, Department 104.

"We, the jury in the above-entitled action, having found the defendant Patricia Krenwinkel guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in Count III of the Indictment, do now fix the penalty as death.

"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971, Herman Tubick, Foreman."

Further, People of the State of California versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten, case No.

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"A-253,156, Department 104.

"We, the jury in the above-entitled action, having found the defendant Susan Atkins guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in Count III of the Indictment, do now fix the penalty as death.

"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971, signed Herman Tubick, Foreman."

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, is each of these verdicts as to Count III your verdict?

(All members of the jury indicate yes.)

THE CLERK: Further, "People of the State of
California versus Charles Manson, Patricia

Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins and Leslie Van Houten,
case No. A-253,156, Department 104.

"We, the jury in the above-entitled action, having found the defendant Charles Manson guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in Count IV of the Indictment, do now fix the penalty as death.

"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971, Herman Tubick, Foreman."

Further, "People of the State of California versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten, case No. A-253,156, Department 104.

"We, the jury in the above-entitled

"action, having found the defendant Patricia Krenwinkel guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in Count IV of the Indictment, do now 3 fix the penalty as death "Dated this 29th day of March, 1971. 5: "Signed Herman Tubick, Foreman." Further, "People of the State of California :8 versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten, case No. 9 10 A-253,156, Department 104. "We, the jury in the above-entitled 11 12. action, having found the defendant Susan Atkins guilty of murder in the first degree as charged 13 in Count IV of the Indictment, do now fix the 14 15 penalty as death. "Dated this 29th day of March, 1971, 16 signed Herman Tubick, Foreman." 17 18 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, is each of 19. these verdicts as to Count IV your verdict? **20** (All the members of the jury indicate yes.) THE CLERK: Further, "People of the State of 21 22. California versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel. 23 Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten, case No. A-253,156. Department 104. 24 25 "We, the jury in the above-entitled action, having found the defendant Charles Manson guilty 26

"of murder in the first degree as charged in Count V of the Indictment, do now fix the penalty as death.

"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971.

"Signed Herman Tubick, Foreman."

Further, "People of the State of California Versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten.

"Case No. A-253,156, Department 104.

"We, the jury in the above-entitled action, having found the defendant Patricia Krenwinkel guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in Count V of the Indictment, do now fix the penalty as death.

"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971, signed Herman Tubick, Foreman."

Further, "People of the State of California versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten, case No. A-253,156, Department 104.

"We, the jury in the above-entitled action, having found the defendant Susan Atkins guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in Count V of the Indictment, do now fix the penalty as death.

"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971.

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"Signed Herman Tubick, Foreman."

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, is each of these verdicts as to Count V your verdict?

(All the members of the jury indicate yes.)
THE CLERK: Further, "People of the State of
California versus Charles Manson, Patricia
Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten,
case No. A-253,156, Department 104.

"We, the jury in the above-entitled action, having found the defendant Charles Manson guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in Count VI of the Indictment, do now fix the penalty as death.

"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971, signed Herman Tubick, Foreman."

Further, "People of the State of California versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten, case No. A-253,156, Department 104.

"We, the jury in the above-entitled action, having found the defendant Patricia Krenwinkel guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in Count VI of the Indictment, do now fix the penalty as death.

"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971.
"Signed Herman Tubick, Foreman."

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Further, "People of the State of California versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins and Leslie Van Houten.

"Case No. A-253,156, Department 104.

"We, the jury in the above-entitled action, having found the defendant Susan Atkins guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in Count VI of the Indictment, do now fix the penalty as death.

"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971.

"Signed Herman Tubick, Foreman."

Further, "People of the State of California versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten, Case No. A-253,156, Department 104.

"We, the jury in the above-entitled action, having found the defendant Leslie Van Houten guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in Count VI of the Indictment, do now fix the penalty as death.

"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971.

"Signed Herman Tubick, Foreman."

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, is each of these verdicts as to Count VI your verdict?

(All of the members of the jury indicate yes.)
THE CLERK: Further, "People of the State of

"California versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten.

"Case No. A-253,156, Department 104.

"We, the jury in the above-entitled action having found the defendant Charles Manson guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in Count VII of the Indictment, do now fix the penalty as death.

"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971.
"Signed Herman Tubick, Foreman."

Further, People of the State of California versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten.

"Case No. A-253,156, Department 104.

"We, the jury in the above-entitled action, having found the defendant Patricia Krenwinkel guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in Count VII of the Indictment, do now fix the penalty as death.

"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971, signed Herman Tubick, Foreman."

Further, "People of the State of California versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten, case No. A-253,156, Department 104.

"We, the jury in the above-entitled action,

"having found the defendant Susan Atkins guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in Count VII of the Indictment, do now fix the penalty as death.

"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971, signed Herman Tubick, Foreman."

Further, "People of the State of California versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten, case No. A-253,156, Department 104.

"We, the jury in the above-entitled action, having found the defendant Leslie Van Houten guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in Count VII of the Indictment, do now fix the penalty as death.

"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971.
"Signed Herman Tubick, Foreman."

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, is each of these verdicts as to Count VII your verdict?

(All of the jurors answer in the affirmative.)

THE CLERK: Further, "People of the State of

California versus Charles Manson, Patricia

Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten,

case No. A-253,156, Department 104.

"We, the jury in the above-entitled action, having found the defendant Charles Manson

guilty of conspiracy to commit murder as charged in Count VIII of the Indictment, do now fix the penalty as death.

"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971.

"Signed Herman Tubick, Foreman."

Further, "People of the State of California versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten, case No. A-253,156, Department 104.

we, the jury in the above-entitled action, having found the defendant Susan Atkinsguilty of conspiracy to commit murder as charged in Count VIII of the Indictment, do now fix the penalty as death.

"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971.

"Signed Herman Tubick, Foreman."

Further, "People of the State of California versus Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten, case No. A-253,156, Department 104.

"We, the jury in the above-entitled action, having found the defendant Patricia Krenwinkel guilty of conspiracy to commit murder as charged in Count VIII of the Indictment, do now fix the penalty as death.

"Dated this 29th day of March, 1971,

1 "signed Herman Tubick, Foreman." 2 Further. "People of the State of 3 California versus Charles Manson, Patricia 4: Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins, Leslie Van Houten, 5 case No. A-253,156, Department 104. 6 "We, the jury in the above-entitled 7 action, having found the defendant. Leslie 8 Van Houten, guilty of conspiracy to commit 9 murder as charged in Count VIII of the Indictment. 10. do now fix the penalty as death. 11 "Dated this 29th day of March, 1971. 12 "Signed Herman Tubick, Foreman," 13 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, is each of these verdicts as to Count VIII your verdict? 14 15 (All the jurors indicate in the affirmative.) 16 THE COURT: The clerk will poll the jury. 17 THE CLERK: Mrs. Thelma S. McKenzie, is each of the 18. verdicts for Counts I through Count VIII your verdict? ` 19 MRS. MC KENZIE: Yes. 20 MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, if I may, I would like each 21 verdict polled separately and have the jurors say yes 22 individually to each of the counts, each of the jurors as 23 to Mr. Manson. .24 I don't know how counsel feel about it. 25 MR. FITZGERALD: I will join in that motion. 26 MR. KANAREK: I would like each one of these jurors

1	be polled as to each count.
2	THE COURT: Yes. I understand what you are saying.
3	The clerk will continue polling the jury.
4	THE CLERK: Mrs. Shirley B. Evans, is each of the
5	verdicts of counts I through VIII your verdict?
6	MRS. EVANS: Yes, it is.
 7	THE CLERK: William T. McBride, II, is each of the
8	verdicts for Counts I through VIII your verdict?
9.	MR. MC BRIDE: Yes, sir.
10	THE CLERK: Mr. Alva K. Dawson, is each of the
11	verdicts for Counts I through VIII your verdict?
12	MR. DAWSON: Yes, sir.
13	THE CLERK: Mrs. Jean K. Roseland, is each of the
14	verdicts for Counts I through VIII your verdict?
15	MRS. ROSELAND: Yes.
16	THE CLERK: Mr. Anlee L. Sisto, is each of the
17	verdicts for Counts I through VIII your verdict?
18	MR. SISTO: Yes.
19	THE CLERK: Mr. William M. Zamora, is each of the
20.	verdicts for Counts I through VIII your verdict?
21	MR. ZAMORA: Yes, it is.
22	THE CLERK: Miss Mary M. Mesmer, is each of the
23	verdicts for Counts I through VIII your verdict?
24	MISS MESMER: Yes, it is.
25	THE CLERK: Mr. John M. Baer, is each of the
26	verdicts for Counts I through VIII your verdict?

1	MR. BAER: Yes, it is.
2	THE CLERK: Mrs. Evelyn J. Hines, is each of the
3,	verdicts for Counts I through VIII your verdict?
4	MRS. HINES: Yes, it is.
~ 5 ~.	THE CLERK: Mr. Larry D. Sheeley, is each of the
6	verdicts for Counts I through VIII your verdict?
7	MR, SHEELEY: Yes.
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9 .	verdicts for Counts I through VIII your verdict?
10	MR. TUBICK: Yes.
41	THE CLERK: All answer in the affirmative, your
12	Honor.
13	THE COURT: The date for sentencing will be April
14	19th at 9:00 a.m.
15 :	MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may we approach the bench
16	briefly?
17.	THE COURT: All trial motions will be heard April
18	19th at 9:00 a.m., to precede the sentencing.
19	MR. KANAREK: May I approach the bench on a very
20	important matter before the jury is discharged, your
21	Honor?
22	THE COURT: Is this the same motion you made after
23:	the last verdict, Mr. Kanarek?
24	MR. KANAREK: No, it isn't, your Honor, no, it is
25	not.
26	THE COURT: All right, counsel may approach the

bench.

(The following proceedings were had at the bench out of the hearing of the jury:)

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, there is extant at the present time a publicity order.

Jurors a copy of the publicity order and order the jurors not to discuss this case with anyone, because they may well be witnesses at the motion for new trial.

That is my motion, your Honor.

THE COURT: The motion is denied.

MR. FITZGERALD: Maybe it is not necessary, but I would like the record to indicate that we will at that time move for a motion for new trial, and, in lieu of the motion for new trial, that the penalties be reduced.

THE COURT: I will deem that all defendants have made a motion for new trial, and to reduce the penalties, all motions to be heard preceding the sentencing on April 19th at 9:00 a.m.

MR. KANAREK: We will waive time and ask that it go further than that time because it is going to take more than that time to prepare for a motion for a new trial.

. THE COURT: That is the date, sir.

MR. KANAREK: I make a motion it be extended under People vs. Crovedi. We have a right to prepare --

THE COURT: The motion is denied.

MR. KANAREK: Very well.

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(The following proceedings were had in open court in the presence and hearing of the jury:)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the People of the State of California owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to each of the jurors, in this most difficult case, for your unswerving devotion to duty throughout the long, arduous months of this trial, and for the personal sacrifices that each of you improve in being away from your families, your friends and your occupations.

To my knowledge no jury in history has ever been sequestered for so long a period, or subjected to such a trying ordeal. I hope that it is never necessary again.

After you are discharged today from further service, you are free to discuss this case and your service as jurors with anyone you please.

However, you are under no obligation to discuss it with anyone. That is entirely within your discretion.

When you talk to your families and friends about the case, and review the newspaper accounts of the trial during the period that you were sequestered, you will learn for the first time what was kept from you concerning the trial and the many incidents relating to it. Perhaps this knowledge will give you a better insight into the reasons why sequestration of the jury was believed necessary in this case.

For your devotion above and beyond the call of
duty the People of the State of California thank you.
If it were within the power of a trial judge
to award a medal of honor to jurors, believe me I would
bestow such an award on each of you.
Before we adjourn I want to extend my personal
thanks to each of you, and I want to personally shake the
hand of each of you.
(Whereupon, Judge Older shakes the hands of
each juror,)
THE COURT: Thank you very much. The Court is now
adjourned.
(Whereupon, an adjournment was had to
reconvene Monday, April 19, 1971, at 9:00 a.m.)
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LOS	ANGÈLES	, CALIFORNIA	MO:	NDAY.	APRIL	19,	1971
	* .	•	9:00	A.M.			

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(The following proceedings were had in the chambers of the Court, in the absence of the defendants, all counsel being present:)

THE COURT: All counsel are present. Before we take up any other matters, apparently one of the exhibits -MR. KAY: People's Exhibit 87.

THE COURT: -- People's 87 was misplaced or taken at . some time, either during or after the jury's deliberations.

A copy has been made so it may be substituted and placed in the record. If anyone wants to look at it, to refresh his recollection as to what it is, he may do so.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, we cannot agree to stipulate to that. It is our belief a felony has been committed --

THE COURT: Then you can report that to the proper authorities.

MR. KANAREK: I understand that.

THE COURT: The only thing I am interested in is making sure that that record is complete.

MR. KANAREK: We cannot agree. We cannot stipulate to that.

I have spoken to Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Shinn about it, and we are not going to stipulate that this

go into evidence. 1 THE COURT: I am going to order it be substituted for 2 the missing photograph. 3 MR. KANAREK: It is our position --THE COURT: Just a moment, sir, don't interrupt me. MR. KANAREK: I'm sorry, your Honor. It is a copy of 87. It is simply a dupli-THE COURT: cate copy of a photograph, and it will be substituted for 87. MR. KANAREK: We cannot accept that. We ask for a .9 hearing, an evidentiary hearing. 10 We claim it is a violation of the due process 11 and due protection clauses under the 14th Amendment, for 12 your Honor to order summarily some document into evidence. 13 It is our belief, your Honor, there should be a 14 complete hearing on this. I have not spoken to Mr. Keith; * 15. I have spoken to Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Shinn; we ask for 16 an evidentiary hearing. 17 THE COURT: Are you contending that this copy is not 18 a duplicate copy of Exhibit 87? Is that what you are saying? 19 MR. KANAREK: I am contending, your Honor, there **20** should be a hearing. I don't know; I don't know. 21 THE COURT: You certainly looked at the photograph 22 often enough during the trial, Mr. Kanarek. Do you have some 23 doubt about it? 24 MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor. 25. THE COURT: All right, then, I will tell you what we 26

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will do, just to settle that.

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Mr. Bugliosi, will you prepare a declaration, if such is the fact, that this photograph is an exact duplicate copy of People's 87?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Very well.

THE COURT: And then if you have any doubt about it, Mr. Kanarek, you may file a counter declaration and I will resolve the point at that time.

MR. KANAREK: I was going to tell your Honor once again --

THE COURT: You are obviously wasting time. This is another disruptive matter --

MR. KANAREK: I am trying to convince the Court -THE COURT: Just a moment, I have not finished,
Mr. Kanarek, I am groping for the right words to describe
your obstructionism with regard to what is such an
obvious point that it hardly needs elaboration.

All right, now, have you discussed with your clients whether they wish to come into the courtroom and conduct themselves in a proper manner, during the hearing of motions for new trial, or any other motions, and the sentencing?

MR. KEITH: No, your Honor, I have not.

MR. FITZGERALD: No, I haven't, either.

MR. SHINN: I haven't either.

MR. KANAREK: Nor have I.

1	THE COURT: I will ask you to do that then; then you
2	can come back in here and let me know on the record before
3 :	we proceed.
4	MR. KAY: Your Honor, I would like to point out at
5	this time that while Mr. Keith, Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Shinn
6	were very diligent in filing their briefs so that the
7.	prosecution may have a chance to read them on Friday,
8	Mr. Kanarek apparently filed his after everybody went home
بر وبر	at 5:00 o'clock Friday night.
10	We just received it now, and it looks like it's
11	a couple of hundred pages. We have not had a chance to reach
12	it.
13	THE COURT: Well, I can tell you, Mr. Kay, Mr. Kanarel
14	points and authorities are the exact duplicate, as far as
15	I can see, of those filed by Mr. Fitzgerald.
‡ 6	I don't know if he copied/or what procedure
17	was followed. To my knowledge there is very little new, if
18	anything, in his points and authorities. The great bulk of
19	the 200 pages consists of apparently Xerox copies of news-
20	paper clippings pertaining to the trial.
21	MR. KANAREK: Well, if your Honor reads the points
22	and authorities
23	THE COURT: I did read them, Mr. Kanarek.
24	MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, you would see
25	THE COURT: Incidentally, I would like an explanation
26	as to why you failed to comply with the Court's order to

MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, because of the 2 problems involved in getting the duplication for the 214 3 exhibits. 4 There are Xerox machines all over THE COURT: Los Angeles. 6. MR. KANAREK: I know, your Honor, but I had to go --7 I went to a printing place in order to attempt to make the 8 Court's deadline. 9 I understand Mr. Keith also did not make the 10 Court's deadline. I called Mr. Darrow; I offered to bring 11 them to your Honor's house. 12 Mr. Darrow told me that Mr. Keith had -- because 13 he was late also -- had asked to come to your Honor's house, - 14 and your Honor had declined, indicating your Honor was not 15 going to be here over the weekend, or something to that 16 effect. 17. So he declined my request. 18 THE COURT: In any event, I don't find it a sufficient 19 excuse. Mr. Kanarek. You are also Tate this morning. 20 would like an explanation for that. 21 MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, I think I was about 22 12 minutes late. .23 THE COURT: No, you were 15 minutes late. 24 MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, I will tell your .25 Honor what happened. 26

them by noon on Friday.

At Pass Avenue and the Ventura Freeway I left 1 the freeway to get gasoline because I was afraid I might not have enough to get to court. I went to Pass Avenue; I got gasoline at a gas station off Pass Avenue offramp. At the intersection, or the transition road between the Golden State Freeway and Pasadena Freeway, where the two come together there was a horrendous traffic jam, inching inch by inch --THE COURT: What time did you get off the freeway? 10 . MR. KANAREK: What time, your Honor? 11 THE COURT: Yes. 1.2. MR. KANAREK: Probably about twenty minutes to 9:00. 13 your Honor. 14 THE COURT: And then the traffic jam occurred after 15 you got back on the freeway? 16 MR. KANAREK: No, the traffic jam was at the 17 transition road between the Golden State Freeway and the 18 Pasadena Freeway. 19 THE COURT: What time was that? 20 MR. KANAREK: Just before I got to the courthouse, 21 your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Perhaps you can explain to me why at 8:15 23. this morning your office called and told the clerk you 24 were going to be late. 25 MR. KANAREK: As an abundance of caution, your Honor, 26

out of consideration for the Court, I wanted to indicate I 1 would possibly be a few minutes late, yes, your Honor. 2 3 THE COURT: I see: I see! That is a very interesting 4 explanation, Mr. Kanarek. 5. MR. KANAREK: Because I certainly -- because of your Honor's feelings towards me, I tried to -- I tried to make 6 7 this 9:00 o'clock --,8. THE COURT: I have no personal feelings about you. 9. Mr. Kanarek. I have some professional feelings about you. **FO**. I think that you are lacking in professional responsibility; that you don't give a good deal of thought 11 12 or effort to carrying out your responsibility as a lawyer 13. in many respects. But I have no personal feelings against you. 14 15. MR. KANAREK: There is no such thing as contempt of 16. lawyer; there is contempt of court. I would not wish to 17. take on the Court. 18 But I would welcome going through this record 19 in connection with matters that I feel, wherein the Court 20 has been erroneous in its rulings, I would welcome doing 21 that on a professional basis with the Court. 22 THE COURT: What does this have to do with it? **.23** MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, because --24 If you are talking about legal error you THE COURT: 25 will have an opportunity to argue your motion for new trial, Let's not get off into collateral matters. 26.

ŀ	Is there anything else, gentlemen, before you
2	inquire of your clients as to whether or not they intend to
- 3	conduct themselves in a proper manner? If not, I would ask
4	you to each interview your clients and then come back into
5	chambers before we commence.
6	(Whereupon, the various defense counsel go to
7	consult with their clients and return.)
8.	MR. KANAREK: Mr. Manson did not indicate he wanted
9	to come back into the courtroom.
10	THE COURT: The question I want answered, Mr. Kanarek
11	is whether Mr. Manson will conduct himself in a proper
12	manner, not whether he wishes to return to court.
13	MR. KANAREK: I will re-ask the question.
14	MR. KEITH: Leslie Van Houten said she would be good,
15	and wanted to come back, but I wouldn't go any farther than
16	that, your Honor.
17	THE COURT: I don't expect counsel to underwrite
18 .	their client's representations in that regard, in view of
19	what has happened during this trial.
20	Well, I am going to have all of the defendants
21	brought into the courtroom then. I hope that they have the
22	good sense to conduct themselves in a proper manner.
23	On the other hand, if they don't, they will
24	promptly be removed and we will proceed from there.
25	Is thereanything else before we commence?
26	MR. BUGLIOSI: Do you want the jurors in court while

the defendants are making their argument as to whether they should be brought to the witness stand? 2 Do you want them in court? 3 THE COURT: - I don't think it makes any difference. 4 MR. KANAREK: I make a motion to exclude the witnesses. 5. THE COURT: The motion is denied. Did you subpoena 6. them here? 7. MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor. 8 THE COURT: The motion is denied. 'n All right, let's proceed, gentlemen. 10 11 (Whereupon, at 9:35 a.m. the following 12 proceedings were had in open court, all defendants and all 13 14 counsel being present:) THE COURT: All parties and counsel are present. 15 I believe the first order of business, Mr. Fitzgerald, 16 would be your motion for a continuance or, in the alter-17 native, to be relieved as counsel for Miss Krenwinkel. 18 Do you wish to be heard on that? 19 MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, just very briefly. 20: I think the affidavit attached to the motion 2 Î: adequately sets out the grounds for my motion. 22 Very simply and essentially there just is not 23 enough time to adequately and professionally, in a competent 24 fashion, prepare the motion for new trial for Patricia 25 Krenwinkel, due to the complexity of the case, the length 26

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of the case and the number of witnesses that were called, and the enormous overriding importance of the motion.

For that reason I would respectfully request that the motion be continued for ten days in order that I might prepare additional materials, and argue additional points.

as the Court knows. I did file a motion for a new trial, but I don't in any respect consider that to be an adequate motion. I think it is adequate as far as it goes, but it just does not go far enough. It is not comprehensive and it does not cover the nature, the points of law concerned in the case that may very well convince your Honor to grant a motion for new trial.

THE COURT: Do you wish to be heard, Mr. Bugliosi?

MR. BUGLIOSI: People oppose the motion for continuance, your Honor.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, if I may, I also make a motion for continuance.

People vs.. Crovedi --

THE COURT: Then that motion should have been filed in writing on Friday as the Court directed, Mr. Kanarek, and it should have been supported by showing of good cause which you have not done, so I will not entertain it.

MR. KANAREK: It was physically impossible.

THE COURT: As for Mr. Fitzgerald's motion, I have given it careful consideration.

1	I believe three weeks is ample time to prepare
. 2 :	adequately for the motion and, in fact, it appears without
3	question that he has done so.
4	He has filed a written notice of motion, and
<i>5</i> : `	motion, and points and authorities, including declarations
-6	of some 43 pages, which I have read and considered, and
7	certainly I would permit Mr. Fitzgerald to argue additional
8	points not included in his written supporting papers, if
9	he has such other points that he wishes to argue.
10.	I find no sufficient showing of good cause for
11	granting the motion for continuance, and that motion is
12	denied.
13	The motion to be relieved as counsel for
14	Miss Krenwinkel is also denied.
15	In what order do you gentlemen wish to argue
16	your motion for new trial?
17	MR. MANSON: I would like to put on a defense of
18	some sort.
19	MR. FITZGERALD: May we have just a very brief
20	moment, your Honor?
21	(Off the record consultation among defense
22	counsel.)
23	MR. FITZGERALD: I will begin, your Honor, if the
24	Court pleases.
25	THE COURT: Very well, Mr. Fitzgerald.
26.	MR. FITZGERALD: In support of the written notice of

motion for a new trial there is attached a declaration by --DEFENDANT MANSON: Your Honor --2. THE COURT: Mr. Manson, as I have told you many 3 times during the course of this trial, you must conduct 4 yourself in a proper manner while you are in the courtroom 5 or you will be removed; the same applies today, sir. 6 This is your last warning. 7 DEFENDANT MANSON: This is your last warning, too. 8 THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Fitzgerald. 9 DEFENDANT MANSON: Better pay heed to it. 10 MR. FITZGERALD: There is attached to the notice of 11 motion two declarations, one a declaration in affidavit form; 12 the other a declaration on information and belief. 13 In the declaration, the actual affidavit, and 14 in the declaration on information and belief, I think that 15 I have established a prima facie case for calling one or 16 more of the jurors in the case to the witness stand in 17 order that all counsel, although I am making the motion I 18 am anticipating all counsel will join in the motion to 19 interrogate the jurors in about five separate and distinct 20 21 areas, if the Court please. One is to determine their exposure to 22 prejudicial trial publicity. 23

The other is to determine whether or not the jurors were approached by persons other than other jurors, and the case was discussed prior to deliberations and

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The third area is that perhaps the jury engaged in improper deliberations, particularly in regard to the Morse instruction, CALJIC 8.82.

The fourth area is the jurors' state of mind in regard to the death penalty, and the affidavit attached to the Notice of Motion.

There is a statement of one regular juror that his state of mind was such that the death penalty did not mean the death penalty, and life imprisonment did not mean lifeimprisonment.

interrogate members of the jury concerning their financial arrangement with regard to the sale of their story. Although we have not established by way of affidavit or declaration that these jurors improperly engaged in any financial arrangements, that is to say, we have not established that they did so prior to any deliberations or verdict, nor have we established that there is any patent illegality in their conduct.

Certainly it is a highly unusual and peculiar situation, and the jurors are naturally reluctant to speak with defense counsel concerning these matters. Consequently, the absence of affidavits on the part of jurors themselves.

We would, therefore, request that we be allowed to briefly interrogate the members of the jury that are

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present here today to determine the existence or nonexistence of the five factors I have mentioned.

Now, I can continue on or we can handle this point by point, whatever the Court prefers.

THE COURT: I think this matter should be resolved at this time, Mr. Fitzgerald.

MR. FITZGERALD: I think other counsel want to be heard on this very limited issue as well.

THE COURT: All right, very well.

MR. KEITH: May the Court please, I will join in Mr. Fitzgerald's motion to examine the jurors under oath.

My points and authorities only show one instance where there may have been impropriety, not on the part of the jurors, but on the part of someone not a member of the jury or a member of the Court's staff, namely a member of Life magazine.

Letters were addressed to them; whether they received the letters or not is unknown to me.

This is a matter that can be considered by the Court under People vs. Hutchinson.

As I understand that case and the Evidence Code, the Court is not allowed to -- or let me put it this way:

Questions concerning their subjective deliberations may not be asked on the grounds it is incompetent under the Evidence Code and People vs. Hutchinson.

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But any outside influences, pressures and the like, may be, and is the subject of proper inquiry.

Under the circumstances in this case, I did not approach any of the jurors. I don't know what pressures or influences, such as the publicity they may have been exposed to were.

I do believe that inquiry is appropriate in this case, particularly in view of its magnitude and also under the statutory and case law of this State.

THE COURT: Does anyone else wish to be heard?

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, as your Honor knows,

and as I believe it has been reflected in the public press,

the colored picture -- I think it is People's 87 -- of

Sharon Tate has disappeared.

There are people who say that someone on the jury stole that picture. The clerk has told me that the picture disappeared in a way, that it would mean the last place it was was in the jury room.

Now, stealing a picture of that type is a felony because it is a file, it is part of a court file, and obviously we all know that such theft is a felony, no matter by whom it is committed.

So, therefore, I would ask your Honor to instruct the jurors that if they take the witness stand they may incriminate themselves and perhaps they want counsel, or some juror may want counsel.

Now, I am not suggesting anything except what

has been presented to me. This picture of Sharon Tate has been focused on by the press throughout the world as well as in Southern California.

It is a felony, and we would hope that the District Attorney's office would prosecute that felony as well as any other felony.

And so that is a point that we wish to interrogate on.

Now, perhaps the People on the jury wish to have counsel in connection with this, or maybe they wish to waive counsel, but I would ask your Honor to -- I would move, your Honor, to inform them that when they take the witness stand, and if they are interrogated in connection with this disappearance of this picture of Sharon Tate, that she or he may incriminate herself or himself.

That is my motion at this instant, your Honor.

As your Honor knows, this picture has dis
appeared.

What I am saying is merely what has been related to me.

I make that motion.

THE COURT: All right. Did you wish to be heard, Mr. Shinn?

MR. SHINN: Yes, your Honor.

Where the facts in support of a motion do not appear on the record or were not taken by testimony during

the trial, your Honor, I believe the Court has a discretion-1: . 2 ary power to allow an evidentiary hearing. I believe Mr. Fitzgerald's motion and his 3 affidavit does not reveal that these are the facts that we 4 5 want that are in the trial, but these are outside the trial. I cite People vs. Tucker, 117 Cal. 221. 6 (Not-clearly heard-interruption by Mr. Manson.) 7 MR. SHINN: In People versus Ferguson, 124 Cal. Ap. 8: 221, which states a court has discretionary power to allow 9 an evidentiary hearing at a motion for a new trial. 10. 11 And I believe this is a proper case where we should be allowed to take evidentiary hearing. 12 13 DEFENDANT MANSON: And I can prove it. THE COURT: Any opposition, Mr. Bugliosi? 14 15 MR. BUGLIOSI: Has the defense completely argued 16 their motion to have an impeachment hearing on the verdict? 17 If they have I have a couple of comments in reply. 18 MR. KANAREK: No. your Honor, I have not. I ask for 19 a ruling, on my motion that the Court instruct the jurors they have a right not to incriminate themselves. 20 THE COURT: Let's not waste any more time on that 21 22 point. You have made your point. Is that motion denied? 23 MR. KANAREK: 24 THE COURT: Yes, that motion is denied. 25 Go ahead, Mr. Bugliosi. MR. BUGLIOSI: As I understand it, prior to People 26 vs. Hutchinson, 71 Cal. 2d 342 there was a general rule

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adopted and gleaned from the common law prohibiting impeachment of a jury verdict.

Section 1181, subdivision 4, of the Penal Code apparently provided an exception to that general rule against impeachment of a jury verdict, and the exception came into play where, number one, a juror concealed his bias during questioning during voir dire.

Number two, the defense did not discover this bias or concealment of the bias prior to the rendering of the verdict by the jury.

People vs. Hutchinson abrogated the general rule against impeachment of a jury verdict, holding impeachment of a jury verdict is permissible.

However, the point that I want to make is that all cases, even those prior to Hutchinson, where Section 1181, Subdivision 4, was involved, People vs. Castaldia, 51 Cal. Ap. 2d 569, People vs. Sherman, 97 Cal. Ap. 2d 245; People vs. Sanchez, 232 Cal. Ap. 2d, 812.

All of those cases, as well as the Hutchinson case itself never permitted an impeachment hearing unless the defense first filed with the Court the affidavit of one or more jurors showing grounds for the impeachment.

In other words, your Honor, there has to be some basis upon which the hearing can be predicated. The hearing has to be predicated upon affidavits filed with the Court, not upon pure conjecture and speculation.

Perhaps Mr. Fitzgerald has something to say ŀ 2 first. MR. FITZGERALD: Well, in respect to Juror Sisto, I did file an affidavit. I concede, of course, that Mr. Sisto did not 5 execute an affidavit but I think under the circumstances he 6. 7 does not need to execute an affidavit. I actually saw and heard Mr. Sisto make a public :8: statement to a Mr. Stan Atkinson, a newscaster on Channel 4 10 television, the day after the verdict, on the 5:30 p.m. news, 11 that people had in fact contacted him and talked to him in 12 regard to the case. That is, people approached him and people 13 14 actually talked to him about the case; that people --15 during the penalty phase of the trial -- that people came 16 up to him, when he was not sequestered, people came up to 17 him and said, "Get them, get them!" 18 The obvious inference meaning that the juror, Mr. Sisto, was to get the defendants, Charles Manson, 19 20 Leslie Van Houten, Patricia Krenwinkel and Susan Atkins, 21 by returning a verdict of death. I think that is a little different situation. 22 I think the Sisto situation is a different 23 24 situation than when we are probing the subjective state of 25 mind of one or more of the jurors. 26 As Witkin indicates in his California Criminal

Procedure, it is highly improper for a juror to communicate with or receive communications from others concerning the case, either during its presentation or after its submission.

Penal Code Section 1182 provides that the juror may not discuss with other people, or not permit other people to discuss with him, the facts or circumstances surrounding the case unless and until those persons are regular jurors themselves and it takes place during the deliberation portion of the trial.

Now, Hutchinson himself, the case that changed the law, involved an analogous situation.

It is not/precise situation, certainly, but it involved an analogous situation.

In Hutchinson my recollection is that a bailiff illegally and improperly communicated with a juror while the juror was on jury duty, but prior to deliberations and prior to verdict.

The Court in that case, the Supreme Court, ruled that an affidavit by that juror as to the communication to him from the Deputy Sheriff would be sufficient, and that it should be considered by the Court in evaluating the motion for a new trial.

That is all we are asking here is that -- I think with Sisto there is a prima facie case, but for the short length of time between the verdict and this hearing today, I probably could have secured the filmed, tape-

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recorded interview of Mr. Sisto that would in effect, out of his own mouth, establish the fact.

But I don't think that anybody would strenuously contest the facts that are contained in the affidavit as to Sisto.

As to the others, as to the other allegations that I have made, improper deliberations in regard to Morse and the death penalty meaning not a death penalty, and the impermissible financial arrangements, I think, as Mr. Shinn pointed out to the Court, the Court does have discretion and that is all we are asking for is an opportunity to inquire of them in as brief a manner as possible, and in as germane a manner as possible whether or not these things influenced them.

Certainly, engaging in improper financial arrangements with regard to the sale of their story is such an outside influence that it does not come within the traditional rule.

MR. KEITH: I would adopt Mr. Fitzgerald's arguments.

I have no intention of going on a fishing expedition as intimated by Mr. Bugliosi. There are certain appropriate areas to cover, and I know that I will, if permitted to inquire of certain of the jurors, stay within those proper limits of discovery, if you want to put it that way, in determining whether there were any outside pressures brought upon any of the jurors.

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Now, as far as failure to submit the declarations or affidavits, from some or all of the trial jurors, I think the Court might give counsel a little leeway in this case, at least in waiving that requirement if it is a requirement.

There does not appear to be an absolute jurisdictional requirement. Apparently the Court does have discretion, but in this case, and in view of the length of time the jurors were sequestered and were a captive audience in this case, and because of the notoriety and publicity, I personally was very loath to contact any of the jurors.

I did not know how to get ahold of them anyway, and seek a declaration.

Perhaps I should have, and I should be criticized for not doing so, but I didn't. I thought that their privacy probably had been intruded upon enough, and they would not welcome any visits from me for the purpose of obtaining declarations from them, and they probably would not have talked to me anyway.

So I feel under these circumstances, because of the uniqueness of the situation, that brief inquiry in the areas outlined by Mr. Fitzgerald should be permitted by the Court.

Thank you.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, in terms of -- there is

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process out for the Sheriff, and the Sheriff has only returned, as I understand it, the only process that has been returned is that as to Juror Roseland, so your Honor's not granting a continuance is, we allege, a denial of due process and equal protection in view of the fact that the Sheriff does have the subpoenas as to all of the jurors, including Victoria Kampman, who we have alleged was discharged erroneously and who, in fact, was a regular juror.

And so we would like to point that out to the Court.

Perhaps the Court will reconsider its decision not to grant a continuance. On that type of showing — and I do move your Honor to continue, so we can have those jurors here, because the Sheriff does have the subpoenas.

THE COURT: Does that complete your argument, Mr. Kanarek?

MR. KANAREK: No, your Honor. May I have a ruling on that, your Honor?

THE COURT: You will get a ruling when you complete your argument.

MR. KANAREK: Very well, your Honor, just a couple of points.

If, your Honor, if this case were not a publicized case, the jury would not have been sequestered and these problems would not have -- some of these problems would not have arisen.

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The District Attorney, as we know from this record, has chosen to publicize this case long before there was any proceeding whatsoever in your Honor's courtroom.

And so it is with the greatest of reluctance that I point out a couple of other matters which we think are such that -- especially in view of the fact that the prosecution is asking for the death sentence, and death verdicts have been returned -- the juror, Zamora, on television stated that the jurors were promiscuous.

Now, that may be true or it may be untrue.

The only way we can find out, and the only way we can find what the facts are from which the Court can base its determination is by taking testimony.

We did not manufacture that. Mr. Zamora went on a program and so stated.

Now, how can we allow people, knowing the propensities of man and how people are influenced by their friendships and liaisons, and so forth, with the opposite sex, how can we allow people to go to the gas chamber when a juror makes that statement? The only way we can ferret out if this is truth or not is by taking evidence.

Furthermore, your Honor, Juror Roseland, and this was on the front page of the Los Angeles -- or it was a front-page story, I don't know if this particular part -- I think it was about on Page 16 of that issue of the Times which I believe was a week ago today, Juror Roseland, as we

set out in our affidavit, stated:

"When we first heard the nature of the crimes that were involved, I think we all realized that our decision in the case would influence young people all over the world."

Now, your Honor has cases before him every day where justice is administered without the evil eye of publicity, and the jurors and the Court — the decision is rendered based upon evidence, based upon law, not based upon what the outside world is going to think, and when a juror is under this kind of an influence, it is unfair to the juror — it is unfair to all of these jurors to have to realize this kind of a fact, that this case would influence young people all over the world.

Certainly this is in the minds of these jurors, when they are deciding this case, how can they, how can they, even if they were an Oliver Wendell Holmes or God himself, how could they possibly — how could they possibly render a decision that would not be influenced by knowing that the world is looking at them.

Then we go on to the next statement of Mrs. Roseland, "After realizing that --"

THE COURT: What are you reading from, Mr. Kanarek? MR. KANAREK: My declaration, your Honor.

THE COURT: Your declaration?

MR. KANAREK: This is under penalty of perjury of

what was in the Los Angeles Times, your Honor. THE COURT: Go ahead. ' . 2 MR. KANAREK: It is on information and belief. 3 I am not -- I was not percipient, but it was in the Los 4 5 Angeles Times. THE COURT: All right, go ahead. 6 MR. KANAREK: "After realizing that I tried to keep the 7 social implications of the trial out of my mind completely 8 and just look no further than the evidence being presented." 9 Juror Roseland did what she could do, she said 10 here, she tried. It is an impossible task because let's 11 look at her next statement. Her next statement is: 12° "But I thank God there was overwhelming evidence 13 enough to convict them." That is a most unusual statement, thanking God 15 that there was enough evidence to convict Mr. Manson. 16 I would think that a juror would thank God there 17 isn't enough evidence to find people guilty of murder 18 rather than thanking God that there is enough to convict 19 him of murder. 20 That is certainly not consonant with what this 21 country was founded upon and was predicated upon, your Honor! 22 We have the further facts of, during this trial, **2**3 of during this trial certain matters being brought to the 24 Court's attention that are in the record. These are 25 matters that we did not foster, we only heard about them. 26:

They were brought to our attention.

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For instance, the Juror Hines, her husband saying she developed a drinking problem after she went on the jury. I did not manufacture that. It was on Baxter Ward's program.

The only way we can ferret it out -- can we send people to the gas chamber? The jurors themselves may want to exonerate themselves. They have become in a way public figures, judges.

This is an opportunity not only for us to get at the facts but also -- also for the jurors to let the Court and everybody know that maybe some of these things are not true.

Court of Appeal decision from the Fifth Circuit, Marion vs.

Beato, I think is the case, wherein the Court of Appeals in the Fifth Circuit which is not our Ninth Circuit and it is not the California Supreme Court, but I think it is persuasive, that if there is error in connection with one juror in a death sentence case, just one juror, that is prejudicial because obviously without that unanimity there cannot be death.

And so we ask your Honor to allow this evidentiary hearing so that we let the evidence come out, whatever it may be, and your Honor will then be able to make a decision based upon evidence.

There is, for instance, Mr. Sheeley's statement that they should all stick together which, your Honor, I am sure, has been apprised of.

Mr. Tubick mentioned it at his press conference, which is most unusual for a jury foreman in any event to have a press conference at the Ambassador Hotel, in which Mr. Sheeley supposedly said, "Let's all stick together," and then something about \$200,000.

perhaps, because if there is a mistrial or something like that, or there is not unanimity, the story may be worth less, because the next jury would be coming here, and we would then have—we would then have the lack of focus upon this jury and their story may not be worth as much, unless there is death.

We also have, we also have the fact that in the deliberations -- we have -- these things would be in the minds of the jurors.

Were the minds of the jurors on dollars or were the minds of the jurors on assessing the evidence?

These are the things that we have to determine.

The only way we could determine them would be -- to see if
there is any error -- is by taking evidence, your Honor.

These are some of them; I have others, but I think that this -- why should we allow this case to be a case wherein people like, for instance, this book that has

been written, Witness To Evil, a man has already written a book, Mr. Bishop has written a book.

He has in that book, which is already released,
I saw a book review of it, in the Sacramento Bee, I think it
was, over the weekend, in which he speaks of things.

They speak of matters wherein clearly the gag order was violated.

He is talking of matters that occurred at the bench and occurred in chambers. These are the types of things that have occurred.

Somebody violated the gag order there. I have my ideas of who it was, but what I am getting at is --

THE COURT: Confine your argument to the point under consideration.

MR. KANAREK: I am doing it by way of illustration, that we must put some of the matters that we have brought to the Court's attention — not only in the interest of justice for the defendants, but also to vindicate our system of justice, because these matters will go on and on and on, and people will conjecture, and maybe make up their minds concerning matters that did not even occur.

The only way we can tell is by taking evidence.

THE COURT: Anything further?

MR. KANAREK: And I join with Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Keith and Mr. Shinn's comments, your Honor, in this request to take evidence.

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THE COURT: Of course, one of the reasons that the Court required counsel to file last Friday their motions in writing, supported in addition by the statement of the statutory grounds of the precise matters relied on with reference to this case, was just so that you gentlemen would have the opportunity, and the Court would have the opportunity, to consider all matters in connection with these motions.

I believe Mr. Fitzgerald was the only one who filed declarations.

In any event, I read all of the motion papers.

Mr. Fitzgerald's declaration is hearsay; his second

declaration on information and belief is hearsay on hearsay.

It is clear that neither of those declarations can be considered by the Court in connection with this. I have given this matter careful consideration and there had been rumors to the effect that the jury would be subpoensed in for the hearing on motion for new trial, so I have had three weeks to consider this question and whether or not it is desirable or necessary for the jury to be interrogated and I have concluded that there is no such necessity, nor is it desirable for the jury to be interrogated, and that motion will be denied.

Do you wish to argue your motion for a new trial, Mr. Fitzgerald?

MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Incidentally, at this time if any of the jurors who are here under subpoena wish to leave, they will be excused. They are, of course, free to stay if they want to stay, but insofar as any requirement is concerned, they are free to leave.

MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, may we make the record MR. FITZGERALD: On Page 3 of my Notice of Motion I set out various points in regard to the motion for a new trial.

Item number one, the matter relating to a jury from outside of the County, I would submit on the basis of the points and authorities, and the argument I made at the time that the motion was made.

Rather than reiterate all the comments I made to your Honor during the course of the trial as these various points came up, I don't think that is necessary on the motion for new trial. I think your Honor has them in mind.

I will submit item number one.

Item number two, I will submit.

Item number three.

Item four, item five, item six, item seven, item eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen and nineteen we have just covered, your Honor.

Your Honor did indicate that, just briefly,

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that you would give me leave to raise additional items.

I did not anticipate that, but I do have one additional item which I would like to raise. It is not included in the motion for new trial, and that is that the Court erred in a matter of law in giving to the jury CALJIC instruction 8.82. That is the so-called Morse instruction.

We argued about this at the time it was given. We had a conference with regard to the instructions in chambers.

But I think it is helpful to reiterate, particularly in light of the hearsay statements of Mr. McBride, that this Morse instruction actually tells the jury that at some time the defendants can be paroled.

It actually calls their attention to the fact that parole is obviously in the future of anybody they are about to convict and sentence.

It tells them that they can be released at some future date.

Then the instruction in the last paragraph goes on to tell them that now that the scheme of parole in California has been explained to them, they are to disregard it.

referred to that type of instruction or admonition to the jury as telling a little boy to go into the corner and not think of a white elephant.

Once you tell this jury that the defendants are 1 going to be paroled at some future date or are likely to be 2 paroled at some future date they are obviously -- it is Ì. obviously difficult for them to remove that idea from their mind. . 5 Now, jurors who spent any amount of time in California, and all of these jurors are registered voters so they have been here for some amount of time, they have been 9 deluged by the matters in the popular press concerning 10 Adult Authority and parole in California. Most people feel persons charged with crimes 11 in this country today, much less California, are released far 12 too soon with the liability actually incurred by the populace 13 in general. 14 Now, in California they believe that people are 15 automatically, ipso facto, paroled at the end of seven 16 years. 17 Obviously in California the statutory scheme is 18 such that people are eligible for parole at the end of seven 19 years, but it is an unlikely situation where anybody is 20 actually paroled at the end of seven years. 21 Now, the instruction asks the jury to put trust 22 and confidence in public officials. It asks them to trust **.23** in and believe in the public officials appointed to the 24

Adult Authority by the Governor.

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It strikes me that telling the jury to put

confidence in public officials is something that traditionally Americans have been loathe to do.

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Your Honor, on the other hand, has tried a number of cases and your Honor has been assigned criminal departments for some extended period of time and your Honor is familiar with the conduct of the Adult Authority and your Honor is familiar, I am sure, with the conscientious manner in which members of the Adult Authority dispatch their duties and obligations to the citizenry, and I am sure your Honor is well convinced that the Adult Authority in California is not going to release persons convicted of murder until it is safe to do so, and certainly defendants in this kind of posture.

Now, as a matter of common practical knowledge we all know that the more publicity there is attending a case, the longer somebody is going to remain in prison before they are released on parole, and we have some notorious examples in America.

I think Leopold remained in prison some 40 years.

Persons convicted of -- Spade Cooley in California remained in prison and was released just before his death. I believe he spent an extraordinary length of time in jail.

I am sure that had this instruction not been given, I feel there would have been a probability of a

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different result.

THE COURT: There certainly would have been. On appeal you would have raised that point and the case would have been reversed, wouldn't it?

MR. FITZGERALD: Well, I'm not sure that I would have raised it on appeal. I am sure some lawyer would have raised it on appeal. If it wasn't I, somebody would say you did not give --

THE COURT: You would have a duty to raise it on appeal, Mr. Fitzgerald.

MR. FITZGERALD: I would concede that some other attorney certainly would raise it on appeal because it is an instruction that was offered actually by the former Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, Roger Traynor.

It is a mandatory instruction, but what is frequently done in the guise of helping the defendants actually hurts them.

I think this is the situation with the Morse instruction.

THE COURT: That may be true, and of course you can reargue the matter on appeal, but so far as this Court is concerned there was no choice, it was a mandatory instruction.

(Interruption by Mr. Manson, not heard clearly by the reporter.)

THE COURT: I certainly would not have been justified under any circumstances in refusing to give that instruction. 2 I have been told by the Supreme Court of this State that it is a mandatory instruction. MR. FITZGERALD: Now, actually these remarks conclude my argument on the motion for new trial. Obviously, in the event this motion is denied I would like to be heard on a motion to reduce the penalty, but this business about the Morse instruction actually dovetails with the motion to reduce the penalty. We have a very, very unfortunate state of affairs in America today where there is a so-called mora-12 torium on the death penalty. 13 THE COURT: Are you now arguing the other motions? 14 I would like to hear all the motions on new trial before 15 we get into other motions, Mr. Fitzgerald. 16 MR. FITZGERALD: I will defer to other counsel. 17 THE COURT: Mr. Keith. 18 MR. KEITH: May the Court please, with respect to 19. strictly the motion for a new trial I have nothing really 20 germane to add beyond the points that I made in my 21: declaration and points and authorities as submitted to the 22 Court. 23 I would like to expand, perhaps, on the denial 24 to my client of a fair trial on the grounds that she was not 2Ŝ. severed from the other defendants. 26.

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Now, I may be on somewhat thin grounds. I don't feel I am on thin ground as far as the justice of the situation is concerned, but I am not sure because I was not here, of the state of the record with respect to a motion for severance having been made by then counsel in her behalf.

I understand Mr. Reiner did make such a motion. Whether it was before your Honor or not, I don't know, and it may be that the motion in midstream, at the hearing, in other words, was withdrawn.

I pointed that out in my declaration, and in all honesty I am not sure precisely what happened to that motion, whether it was actually ruled upon and denied by your Honor or one of the other Superior Court judges that handled pretrial matters in this case.

Be that as it may, by reason of the matters and things that I show in my points and authorities and declarations, I feel very strongly because Defendant Van Houten was only charged in effect with two homicides, and although she was accused as a conspirator, it was never contended that she joined the conspiracy prior to the Tate homicides; that she has been and was severely prejudiced by the evidence, the voluminous evidence of the Tate homicides plus the voluminous evidence of Mr. Manson's beliefs, philosophies, activities and so forth, when she herself was only the subject of evidence and testimony on two counts of

murder and, to be sure, the conspiracy.

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But then, she did not join any conspiracy, cassuming there was one for the sake of argument, until after it had already commenced, and after the first night.

Therefore, she could not have been liable for the homicides that took place at the Tate residence.

I believe that in her behalf the jury could not help but have been prejudiced against her because of all of the evidence that went in against the other defendants on other counts in which she was not charged.

This is the guilt by association motive that was strongly urged in the Massey case, and adopted by the Court in Massey.

Guilt by association was one of the factors in Massey, and that appears to me to be the leading authority on severance, that caused our Supreme Court to overturn the conviction and to return the case for a new trial.

Not only was there an Aranda problem in that case, but, just as significant, the Court said the overwhelming guilt of Massey could not have helped but prejudice Vetter. The case against Vetter was not that strong, and as a result, in all probability — they used a probability test, the prejudiced result — in other words, without the presence of Massey at that trial, and in all probability a more favorable result would have been obtained for Mr. Vetter.

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I feel that in this case the same thinking and logic and reasoning of the Supreme Court should apply, that without the evidence of the Tate homicides, without all of the evidence brought in against Mr. Manson and Leslie Van Houten's female defendants, in all probability a more favorable result would have been obtained for her.

As a result she has been deprived of a fair trial.

I don't wish your Honor to consider the points
I raised in isolation. I think all of the points that are
raised should be considered as a whole and altogether.

I hope the Court may be convinced that because of the combination of facts and circumstances and things and matters, one of which is the failure of Leslie to be separated from the rest of her co-defendants, that she did not receive justice in this case.

Another point I raised in my motion was the failure of the Court to give instructions on diminished capacity, although requested by all counsel for the defendants.

It is true that no psychiatrist testified in behalf of Miss Van Houten or any of the defendants.

However, as I read the cases, I don't find that an absolute requirement.

particularly as applies to Mr. Bugliosi's argument, and the

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jury as a result was deprived of the presentation of an important issue in this case and that was the extent of my client's ability to premeditate.

And premeditate means, as the Court knows, the extent of her ability to maturely and meaningfully reflect upon the gravity and enormity of the evil contemplated.

If the jury had had the benefit of that instruction of diminished capacity, I believe that in Leslie's case a different result also may well have been reached.

I well realize no psychiatrist took the stand and advised the Court she did not have the ability to premeditate, or that the extent of her ability was impaired.

But the evidence put on by the prosecution, showing how she regarded Mr. Manson, showing that — this is the prosecution evidence — that she apparently slavishly followed him; that he thought, Mr. Manson, according to the prosecution evidence, he believed that killing was right, good and just and that — further evidence — that her influence — his influence over her, bearing in mind Mr. Bugliosi's argument that the female defendants were robots, automatons, zombies, was enough in and of itself to justify the instruction.

Not having the benefit of that instruction means the jury was deprived of an important issue that I

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certainly argued to the jury in the guilt phase, that is, the issue of the extent of her ability to premeditate, and as a result she was again deprived of a fair trial.

But I don't want to isolate things. It is that failure, the failure of a severance, the pretrial publicity, not that this jury may have formed expressions of opinion concerning it, but the mere fact that the jury knew that this was a case of great notoriety and national interest, in and of itself, under Sheppard and under Estes, is an important consideration.

As a matter of fact, in Estes vs. Texas, it doesn't appear as if the jury was subjected or exposed to anything more in that case than they were in this case.

in that case. There were many members of the news media in the audience in this case.

THE COURT: If you are suggesting there were any cameras in the courtroom, of course there weren't.

MR. KEITH: No, there were not.

THE COURT: There is a vast difference.

MR. KEITH: In essence there were television cameras although they were not on during the trial

In this case there were no cameras. I am sorry if I implied that there were.

DEFENDANT MANSON: Lucky there wasn't,

MR. KEITH: There were many members of the news media

which, in my mind, was the equivalent of cameras, which the jury knew what was happening here was being reported in the news media throughout the country and, as pointed out in Sheppard and in Estes, although nobody can prove it, certainly subtle pressures may have been exerted upon the jury.

For these reasons, may the Court please, I do believe very strongly and very earnestly that Miss Van Houten is entitled to a new trial.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Shinn, do you wish to argue?
MR. SHINN: Yes, your Honor, very briefly.

One of the points I submitted on my written motion for new trial, one of the grounds was that when the Court found out that one of the jurors had read the head-lines in the newspaper of August 4th, I think, the Los Angeles Times which stated, "Manson Guilty Nixon Declares," and I believe that defense made a motion for a mistrial and I believe that the Court should have at that time granted the motion because I believe that anyone in the jury reading this article would be influenced.

Because here is the President of the United States, and we all respect him, making a statement that Manson was guilty.

Now, I believe that that juror would have been influenced to a certain extent, we don't know how much.

We all felt at that point the Court should have

1 granted this motion for mistrial. 2 THE COURT: Is that what you had in mind when you placed the newspaper on the counsel table, Mr. Shinn? 4 MR. SHINN: Well, your Honor, is your Honor implying 5. that I intentionally placed this --6 THE COURT: That issue has already been decided. 7 MR. SHINN: Your Honor implied that I intentionally knew that that was in the batch of papers I put on the counsel table. -10 Your Honor, I am not arguing that point now. 11 THE COURT: Go on with your argument. Mr. Shinn. 12 MR. SHINN: The second point is there was misconduct 13 by Juror Zamora. 14 We did call to the Court's attention that -15 Mr. Zamora in the corner was drawing pictures, and not 16 paying attention to the evidence. 17 DEFENDANT MANSON: He didn't bring his homework, 18 either. 19 MR. SHINN: The Court had a duty at that point at 20 least to inform the juror that this was a very serious 21 case; that it is a question of life and death, and he should 22 pay more attention. 23 Your Honor did nothing about it. 24 DEFENDANT MANSON: He played hookey three times. 25 MR. SHINN: I believe that denies the defendant an 26:

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impartial trial.

Now, the next point I brought in my motion for new trial was that ineffective deletion of Roni Howard and Virginia Graham's statements which were made to Susan Atkins in the women's jail.

Now, Roni Howard and Virginia Graham both testified --

(Interruption by Mr. Manson, not heard clearly by the reporter.)

MR. SHINN: -- that they did talk to Miss Atkins sometime in October, 1969, and I believe they testified on the stand about a year later.

Now, they both stated that they had read articles about this case, and they saw on TV facts concerning this case, and their testimony and, according to their original statement to the police, it was vastly different, and I believe although Aranda and Bruton state that the statement of a co-defendant could be deleted, it must be an effective deletion.

Here I believe there was not an effective deletion. I believe it was prejudicial to Susan Atkins.

I believe I did make a motion to strike the testimony of either Roni Howard or Virginia Graham, and I believe the Court denied that motion.

Now, the next point I brought up in my written motion was a change of venue. I don't have to elaborate on

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the change of venue. The Court is fully aware of the mass publicity in this case, and other counsel have discussed this matter already.

Also, I believe I made a motion to suppress the letters of Susan Atkins to Walker, Fletcher, and Roni Howard.

I at that time stated that the Sheriff's

Department here violated Susan Atkins' Fourth Amendment

rights by photographing all her letters going in and coming

out, and I believe the Court denied my motion at that time,

too.

Now also, my next point I brought up in my written motion was that the Court erred when the Court dismissed Juror Sheeley.

Now, Juror Sheeley wanted to be excused because his wife was in an accident. I believe your Honor indicated that your Honor did in fact dismiss Juror Sheeley.

The Court thanked Mr. Sheeley and he walked out and I believe in the process of swearing in the new juror, I believe she had taken the oath and then she fainted, and I believe your Honor then decided to unsequester the jury and then asked Juror Sheeley whether or not, if he could go home, he would stay on the jury panel.

And I believe he stated yes, and then your Honor vacated the proceedings in which he dismissed Juror Sheeley, and reinstated him.

Now, there is no case authority, or there is no

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statutory positions for this, where once a juror has been excused, it is final, and the Court cannot again bring him back in the seat of an original juror.

Now, the next point -- the next point that I brought up was the fact that after being incarcerated for three days, after each day I requested a continuance, a short continuance, indicating that I had no rest; I didn't have any sleep, and I was unprepared mentally and physically to go ahead with the trial.

I believe the Court after the first, second and third day denied my motion for a short continuance, and I cited the case where the Courts have held that when an attorney has been incarcerated and is not prepared to go ahead either physically or mentally, the Court should grant at least a short continuance, in order that he may prepare adequately in the interests of his client.

Even the last day I begged the Court to give me a half day continuance after I had not gotten any sleep for three days, and the Court denied that motion.

I think that was error.

DEFENDANT MANSON: Everybody had a hard time, huh?

MR. SHINN: I also cited my motion that the Court

should not allow colored photographs of the victims -
(Interrupted by Mr. Manson.)

MR. SHINN: -- I also cited that the Court made an error when they forced Susan Atkins to take the stand before

Mr. Bugliosi, although I submit that the Court does have 1 discretionary power --2 (Interruption by Mr. Manson.) MR. SHINN: The Court could exceed this power. -4 believe the Court did exceed his power in this case in 5 telling the defense in what order to put the witnesses on, 6 because there may be a strategy in which we wanted to put 7 Mr. Bugliosi on first and then Susan Atkins. 8 The Court has forced me to put on Miss Atkins 9` first and then Mr. Bugliosi. 10 "I believe that was error. 11. The Court made an error when he restricted my 12 examination of Roni Howard and Virginia Graham. I tried to 13: elicit questions regarding original statements which Miss 14 Atkins made at the County Jail. 15 Your Honor made me approach the bench and asked 16 what I was doing and made me restrict my questions in that 17 area, which I felt was prejudicial. 18 I believe all these points I stated, and which 19 I have in my written motions, your Honor, I do feel some of 20: these errors the Court, I believe, should take into consider-21 ation and grant the new trial. **22**. Submitted. 23 THE COURT: We will take a 15-minute recess at this 24 time and then resume with the arguments. 25 (Recess.) 26

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THE COURT: All parties and counsel are present.

(10:58 a.m.)

Mr. Kanarek, do you wish to argue your motion?
MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor.

I am sure your Honor and I will agree that there is case law that indicates that the motion for new trial may be made or must be made orally.

In order that there not be any question about it I would ask that all of what I filed be deemed to be oral or to at least, to at least accommodate that rule of law because we are cognizant of it.

I am sure it does not mean you cannot have points and authorities, but I don't believe -- I believe in this particular case for some reason the law does provide, and your Honor, I am sure is aware of it, the law provides that the motion for new trial must be made orally.

In that connection, in connection with the points and authorities we would like to direct the Court's attention to some 214 exhibits which we have called A-1 through A-214, which are copies of what has occurred in the local press, primarily the Los Angeles Times and the Herald Express (sic), in connection with this case.

These 214 pages, and there is the Valley News also, but -- and perhaps a couple of other outlying news-papers, but the point is that these 214 exhibits encompass only a very small portion of the time duration of the trial,

and really these 214 exhibits are by way of illustration only in connection with our point about the pretrial -- about the in-trial publicity.

There is no question about it, there has been constant daily coverage by the mass media other than the newspapers, radio, television.

The Court has accommodated the press, so that, as the Court faces the courtroom, the entire -- essentially the right-hand section of the courtroom was made available to the press.

Out in the hallway there are numerous phones,
I don't know, some 25 or 30 phones which are there on a
permanent basis, pending during this trial for the benefit
of the press.

So there is no question about the coverage, the publicity coverage in this case.

We think that there is an ironic -- an ironic similarity in President Nixon's action in the Calley case.

In the Calley case the man was convicted and it shows how public opinion -- how public pressure has an effect on the administration of justice.

Mr. Calley --

DEFENDANT MANSON: He did a damned good job.

MR. KANAREK: Mr. Calley has been given -- I don't know the merits of his case or the demerits of his case -- but the President has injected himself to the point that

instead of going to Leavenworth. Now, the public opinion in this case, this is 3 the other side of the coin, in this case public opinion has .4 lynched Mr. Manson. 5 6 The District Attorney's office by their conduct and what they have done, they have lynched Mr. Manson just . 7 8 as much as if he were taken out by some band of vigilantes 9 in the old West and hung. The fact of the matter is that when this case 10 11 broke, when this case broke, Chief Davis, as we all know, 12 had his press conference saying the case is solved, the 13 District Attorney's office did what your Honor has been 14 apprised of what they have done in this case, they have used this case -- they have used this case for political pur-15 16 poses. 17 They have used the public press, the mass media 18 for purposes of getting a conviction. 19 And so these cases that we have cited are in point. I am sure your Honor has read them: 20 21 Sheppard vs. Maxwell, the Estes case, Heuvel vs. Louisiana. 22 23 In those cases -- in those cases there wasn't 24 there was not the focus on the defendant being quilty the 25 way this case has. In those cases there was -- sure, the 26 defendant was put in a bad light, but in this instance it is

Mr. Calley, as we all know, is restricted to quarters only

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an a fortiori situation, your Honor, in this case Mr. Manson was dammed from the very beginning.

He was a Svengali, a monster, so we get these jurors saying the very things they are now saying at the present time.

(Interruption by Mr. Manson.)

MR. KANAREK: And so we have, just by way of illustration, we have the effect of public opinion, even, your Honor, upon the President of the United States, and he candidly said so in his press interview.

He said that public opinion made him act.

If public opinion made the President of the United States act, how can we expect 12 people, 12 ordinary lay people, not to be subservient to that public opinion?

(Interruption by Mr. Manson.)

MR. KANAREK: And so, your Honor, these facts cry out that your Honor grant the motion for new trial.

To get to some other points that we would like to emphasize, it is our belief, your Honor, that reversible error was committed.

We tried to forestall it by asking the Court in a timely manner to grant Linda Kasabian her immunity in the way that our law provides.

She is supposed to take the witness stand; if she does, if she does exercise the privilege against self-incrimination she is granted her immunity.

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That was never done. The law was walked over in that regard.

Due process, and there is a reason for that as in People vs. Walther, in that case the Court points out that if you grant the immunity at the very earliest time, whatever feeling there may be in the -- or in the witness' mind, whatever affection she may have towards the prosecution or whatever ways she may be biased toward the prosecution would tend to be attenuated if she knows that right now she has that immunity.

But for reasons best known to the Court, the Court would not grant this request. We made a motion for an election, actually it was a motion that the Court forced the District Attorney to elect, either she is a defendant or she is going to be a prosecution witness.

That was done in a timely manner, but I don't know how much of her testimony had transpired, perhaps seven-eighths of it -- anyway, a very large fraction of her testimony had already occurred before she was granted the immunity, and of course the immunity papers themselves do not speak the facts.

The immunity papers purport to say she was called to the witness stand, she refused to testify and immunity was granted.

We all know that that did not happen and the reason -- the reason for that is, as we have stated, in

order to keep her as honest as possible, and that was not done.

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on that basis alone, since she has such a key position in the prosecution case, on that basis alone your Honor should grant a motion for new trial because of the fact that that was an error of law in a decision of law, and it almost — we think it's reversible error even if it is not requested, but we requested it timely.

Furthermore, when she was called to the witness stand she was a defendant, and there is case law to the effect that calling a defendant to the witness stand is reversible error. She was actually a defendant when she was called.

In connection with the prosecution's what we allege is a deliberate, malicious attempt, failure to make discovery in connection with the testimony of California Highway Patrolman Steuber.

That is a very important point.

We asked the Court timely for an evidentiary hearing. We asked the Court that we conduct an evidentiary hearing because of the fact we made discovery, this was law enforcement tape.

And all of a sudden the prosecution came up with this tape. Your Honor refused the evidentiary hearing; your Honor allowed the tape to be used where, purportedly, certain statements were not made.

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I am convinced that each and every one back in the jury room felt that they had a commitment and an

I am sure your Honor will recall that we did in chambers make that timely request which was denied.

And so it is our -- it may be deemed that our other points have been made or really, we beg the Court to grant a motion for new trial and -- so that we may, perhaps, have a fair trial in this case and allow the defendants to be tried in an atmosphere wherein we will have some kind of objectivity.

The present result, your Honor, is not based upon a deliberative approach. It is not based upon objective analysis. It is based upon rank emotion.

(Interruption by Mr. Manson.)

THE COURT: Do the People wish to respond?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Very briefly, your Honor.

Each and every contention argued by the four defense attorneys, your Honor, have been previously raised by them and resolved by this Court, so I see no need to address myself to each and every one of the issues they have now raised for a second, third and fourth time.

Your Honor, the 12 jurors who heard this case conscientiously and diligently listened to and evaluated all of the evidence during this very long trial, and they labored very, very long and hard during their deliberations. There is no question in my mind that they were an exemplary jury.

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obligation not only to our system of justice, but to themselves, to render a just and a proper verdict.

Through their unanimous verdicts they said that these defendants were guilty of first-degree murder.

Inasmuch as this was a jury trial, and inasmuch as this jury consisted of 12 people from this community, chosen not only by the prosecution but by the defense, and inasmuch as each of these four defendants unquestionably has received a fair trial, and inasmuch as the jury, after hearing and considering all of the evidence, has spoken through their verdict, and inasmuch as, your Honor, there appears to be no valid, legitimate reason whatsoever for modifying or changing these jury verdicts, the People of the State of California respectfully and strenuously urge the Court to ratify, as it were, these jury verdicts and not disturb them and to deny the defense motions for a new trial.

The People of the State of California, your Honor, beseech this Court to not disturb these verdicts.

Submit the matter, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything further, gentlemen?

MR. FITZGERALD: Not on the motion for new trial.

MR. KEITH: Submit on behalf of Leslie Van Houten.

THE COURT: Yery well.

MR. KANAREK: Except for the aspect of modification, I submit, your Honor.

MR. FITZGERALD: I think the record should be clear,

I know in my discussions with the other attorneys, and I 1 know it is true certainly with me, we are moving as well under 1181; Subdivision 6, as well as for a new trial, to .3· reduce the offenses from murder in the first degree to 4. murder in the second degree or manslaughter, as Mr. Keith 5 suggested. -6 THE COURT: I so understand your motions, gentlemen. 7 8. MR. KANAREK: I join in those comments, your Honor. THE COURT: In considering these motions I have 9 independently reviewed and weighed the evidence. 10 I have read and considered all of the documents 11 that you gentlemen have filed in support of your motions, and 12 13 I have carefully considered your arguments. I find no basis for granting a new trial and, 14 15 accordingly, the motions for a new trial will be denied as 16 to each defendant. Do you wish to argue your further motion, .17 18 Mr. Fitzgerald? 19 MR. FITZGERALD: Yes. We would appeal to the Court's 20 inherent power to reduce the penalty from death to life. I will be very brief; your Honor sat here for 21 as long as we sat here. 22 Your Honor is familiar with the background of 23 the defendants, as we produced them on the witness stand; 24 25 your Honor also has the benefit, I am sure, of an individual

evaluation of your own.

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28,258 Now I think -- obviously I am not going to burden the Court with my argument to the jury, but during my argument to the jury in the penalty phase of the trial I referred to the death penalty as a relic of savagery, some sort of medieval relic of savagery and I believe that. I sincerely believe that, as I think the body of scholarly opinion in this country believes that the death penalty actually serves no useful purpose, and that in an enlightened society, certainly the penalty ought to be the lowest penalty consistent with public safety.

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And I submit that while the jury may have some problem determining whether or not the defendants will ever be released on parole, when it is unsafe to do so, that your Honor does not have those problems.

Now, as I alluded to earlier in my motion for new trial, there is an unfortunate state of affairs existing in America with respect to the death penalty, that jurors, being human beings, and certainly being laymen, must have taken into consideration.

Perhaps it did not rise to the dignity of influencing their deliberations, but certainly subconsciously it affected the jurors, and that is the proposition that the death penalty does not mean the death penalty.

There has not been an execution in California since April of 1967 when Aaron Mitchell was executed, and there are some 90-odd persons awaiting the death sentence

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in California, many of whom have been there since the '50's, since the end of the '50's or the early '60's.

Throughout America there are 500 people on Death Rows around the country awaiting execution.

There is currently before the United States Supreme Court the combined class action of these persons awaiting the death penalty throughout America.

The United States Supreme Court recently put a determination of that very, very serious issue off at least until the Fall of 1971, and perhaps even to the Spring of 1972.

Many of people, however, and certainly those of the popular press, feel that the death penalty is a dead letter.

Now obviously, if these defendants were going to be executed, really going to be executed and they were going to be executed say, for example, next Monday morning, and the jurors were appraised of this, and the jurors knew it; that would be one set of circumstances and fact.

On the other hand, where the jurors realize that there is a possibility — many of them feel a probability — that the defendants will never be executed, that governors from time to time exercise their power of clemency, they must feel that in returning a verdict of death that it really does not mean death.

Now, I suggest that any death penalty verdict

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returned now means death. I think there is a substantial body of respectable opinion in this country that argues that the United States Supreme Court is not going to hold the death penalty to be a cruel and unusual punishment within the purview of the Eighth Amendment.

Nor is it going to find that it lacks standards sufficient to deprive persons of due process. There is a responsible body of attorneys in this country who cogently argue that this is the last substantial attack on the death penalty, and once this is decided by the United States Supreme Court, we will resume executions in this country, and I think these certainly for the purposes of this argument to the Court, your Honor must assume that these defendants are actually going to be executed, if your Honor allows the penalty of death to stand.

Now, as I mentioned just a few minutes ago, I think the only appropriate penalty is the lowest penalty consistent with public safety and, I think, as I mentioned earlier, with your Honor's experience with the Adult Authority, and certainly I am sure it is your Honor's opinion that they consciously dispatch their duties to the People of the State of California, these defendants will not be released until it is safe to be released.

To execute them over and beyond protection of society, I think, would be something that, as an enlightened society, we don't want to stand for.

It just smacks of convenience and retribution, and it serves no useful purpose.

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More importantly, it seems to me that there has not been any evidence presented that these defendants, and certainly my client, Patricia Krenwinkel, there has been no evidence presented that she cannot be rehabilitated and as the Courts in California and elsewhere have pointed out for a number of years, rehabilitation is the only, and, certainly, the salutory function of our penal system.

It isn't to punish; it isn't wreak vengeance or retaliation on the person of anybody. And as you look at Patricia Krenwinkel, and I reviewed her probation report, here is a girl who has a very, very minimal prior involvement with the law, and that involvement did not take place until 1968. It did not take place until she was, well — it did not take place until she was 19 or 20 years of age.

I am sure your Honor has had numbers of people appear before you under a minor offense, say possession of marijuana or possession of dangerous drugs, who had far more serious, far worse criminal records than Patricia Krenwinkel.

I mention this — and I mention it certainly in mitigation of the punishment in the abstract, but I mention it more specifically to demonstrate that here is a person who can obviously be rehabilitated or, from the face of it, could obviously be rehabilitated.

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She had the benefit of a good family, a good education. She is an intelligent girl. There is no indication whatever that she cannot profit substantially from the therapeutic services available in the Department of Corrections.

(Interruption by Mr. Manson.)

MR. FITZGERALD: I think that in determining whether this penalty ought to be reduced, your Honor ought to take into consideration the personal culpability of the various defendants and whether they personally killed, and if so, whether they personally killed as the result of her own impetus or as the result of the impetus of someone else.

I would also ask your Honor to take into consideration the use, the substantial, prolonged, chronic use of mind-altering drugs. It certainly would have an influence on someone in terms of premeditation and deliberation, and certainly would have an influence on my client and the other defendants here with respect to the quantum of mental wherewithal that obviously we must find if we are going to impose such a drastically severe penalty.

THE COURT: Mr. Keith.

MR. KEITH: Thank you, your Honor.

I would like to echo and adopt Mr. Fitzgerald's arguments to you on the subject of reducing the penalty in this case, and I would like to discuss something with the Court that neither counsel, neither Mr. Bugliosi or any

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of the defense counsel could discuss before the jury at the time of their arguments, yet it appears, if I read newspaper accounts correctly, to be a substantial factor in the jury's decision to return verdicts of death in this case.

Some of the jurors indicated to the press that they wished to set an example to other young people, and that this was one of the vital reasons why they returned the verdicts that they did.

This, of course, means the jurors considered the deterrent aspects of the death penalty.

As we well know, neither Mr. Bugliosi nor defense counsel nor counsel in any other capital case, by reason of Supreme Court decisions, may argue deterrence or lack of it to a jury during their summations regarding the capital punishment, or the imposition of capital punishment or life imprisonment.

The reason for the Supreme Court's opinion is certainly cogent; simply, as I understand it, there is insufficient data by which counsel can argue, or should be permitted to argue deterrence or lack of it; that it is a very dubious assumption at best, and certainly scholars, officers and statisticians and sociologists are very much divided on the question of whether capital punishment does offer deterrence.

There are arguments and data both ways. Suffice it to say no one has reached a germane or a conclusion

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substantiated by facts one way or another. Therefore counsel are precluded from arguing the issue.

However, inasmuch as there is no guidelines to channel the jurors' deliberations on the question of capital punishment, they, of course, are not precluded from considering deterrence, or, as they or some of them have put it, making an example of the defendants.

That this is one of the vices, may it please the Court, of a lack of guideposts and of permitting the jurors to have their untrammeled discretion in deciding the issue of life or death.

Nonetheless, I don't believe that if counsel cannot argue it for either side that the jurors should be permitted to consider it.

Nonetheless, in their absolute discretion there is nothing to prevent them from considering it, and since the subject has been brought up by the jurors themselves, and since we are in court without a jury being present, I have grave doubts as to whether making an example of these defendants or any of them would in any way prevent or deter or give young people second thoughts about committing the sort of misdeeds that have been committed in this case.

Indeed, I suggest to the Court that anyone so deranged who would consider committing the type of bizarre and singular homicides as committed in this case, would surely not be expected to be deterred by thinking of what

1 happened to the people in the Manson case.

It is highly unlikely that the thought would ever occur to them in the first place, and I have often taken the position in other capital cases that the deterrence aspect is absolutely of no value in deterring the commission of murder.

Certainly I would go further, in a case of this nature, if contemplated by others -- what I am saying is if others contemplated similar acts, certainly they would be of a state of mind that what happened to Mr. Manson and the three female defendants in this case would offer no deterrence, would give them so second thoughts whatsoever.

They would go ahead and do it, and I would make that argument in virtually any case. I know of no evidence that indicates making an example of people in a particular case is going to reduce the crime rate in this country.

I should not say crime rate, I should say the homicide rate; I think that would be more accurate.

argument and add to it, I see no social benefit to be derived from the imposition of the death penalty in this case as to Defendant Van Houten or any of the other defendants for that matter.

You examine your conscience; you examine your experience and try to come up with some reason why

Leslie Van Houten's death would benefit you or me or any of

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the people in this courtroom or anybody in the community. It is an act of pure retribution, the death penalty in this case, and if I thought that the death penalty might deter someone from committing another crime of this nature, I would say so, but I don't think so.

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The jurors seem to have a different viewpoint, or at least some of them, if their accounts to the media are accurate.

I would like to incorporate what I said to the jury in both opening and closing arguments regarding whether or not Leslie should receive the death penalty.

She was only 19 at the time of the La Bianca homicides. I don't know of any other 19-year-old girl in modern times that has been put to death in this country.

I sincerely and seriously doubt there ever has been a 19-year-old girl put to death, no matter what the crime may have been.

In addition, as I argued to the jury, I strongly believe that Leslie's mental and emotional makeup, her state of mind, belies her chronological age. I don't believe that she is mentally and emotionally 21 now. She is more like 10 or 12 to me, and I stress again the psychiatric testimony in this case which indicates to me that Leslie was not acting entirely with the free will that might be more excuse for the imposition of thedeath penalty in this case.

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I think she was under tremendous pressures from other sources.

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I do believe that her mind through the chronic use of LSD had deteriorated so that her social values were altered completely, albeit she voluntarily took the drug, nonetheless her judgment and her values and her morals must have been seriously impaired, if not destroyed.

This plus the setting she found herself in along with Mr. Manson and his influence, I suggest to the Court, made her activities an extension of his, and that she was not acting freely and voluntarily at the time even though, to be sure, if she stabbed anybody she was the one that had to propel the knife, I will grant you that, physically she had to.

Mentally I have grave doubts that it was her own mind that acted when she committed the wrongdoing she has been convicted of committing in this case.

I do feel very strongly and sincerely that this is a medical and a psychiatric case.

For reasons unfortunately that were somewhat beyond my control it was never presented as such to the fullest extent of human endeavor. I believe that Leslie should be examined or should have been examined extensively, not just for two or three or four hours but week after week after week.

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This was impossible in this case. Leslie is partly to blame.

Apparently she was not interested in that type of defense until relatively recently, if you can call it a defense — it is a defense, not only mitigation but actually it could have been a defense on the merits, but it was never used as such.

As a result I think a grave miscarriage of justice might be committed in this case, more than "might", it would be committed, and will be committed if this death penalty as to her is allowed to stand.

There are intimations in the record that she is capable of being rehabilitated. I don't think it could be of course this is impossible with a death sentence pending. This is the purpose of — one of the main purposes of incarceration, as Mr. Fitzgerald points out, certainly one of the purposes and the major purpose of incarceration is to protect the public.

I suggest to the Court that life imprisonment adequately protects the public from any future misdeeds, if ever there ever would be any on the part of Leslie Van Houten.

Furthermore, as I believe very strongly, and I have gotten to know her quite well, that she can be rehabilitated.

As I told the jury, I think it would be a long and painful process, but it can be done. It would be

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totally unfair to send a girl, a young girl like this to her death when there is that possibility, if not strong probability in existence.

Although the offenses with which she has been charged were characterized as brutal, bloody, atrocious, horrible, and so on and so forth, almost ad infinitum, I think we should look at the girl more than these offenses themselves in assessing the validity of the death penalty in this case.

This is a girl that went terribly wrong and I don't think it is her own fault entirely.

As a matter of fact I think that if extensive psychiatric studies were made under the proper circumstances I think her fault, although it would not be minimal, there would be a considerable body of authoritative opinion that this girl was not capable of premeditating in the sense that premeditation is defined in our Penal Code and in the instructions and in the case law.

I do believe very strongly that she was -- that the extent of her ability to realize, to understand the enormity of the evil that she was contemplating, was impaired and, again, if not destroyed.

And by reason thereof her acts at the La Bianca residence were not those of a normal and normally intelligent young girl, but those of a very mentally and emotionally deficient person.

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I would again invite the Court's attention to the Bassett case which I cited in my points and authorities and asked the Court to give that case the consideration I believe it merits, and reduce the sentence in this case in the interest of justice to life imprisonment.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Shinn.

MR. SHINN: Yes, your Honor.

On behalf of Susan Atkins, your Honor, I think the Court should take into consideration her cooperation in this matter.

Now -- although the District Attorney does not have a conscience. I believe the Court has a conscience. It was brought out in this case that Miss Atkins did in fact cooperate with the police and the District Attorney's Office. In fact, she broke the case of the century.

announcement that the Los Angeles Police Department solved the case of the century. This was after the police and the District Attorney heard the Tate statements made by Susan Atkins inMr. Caballero's office.

Now, the Court in sentencing should take into consideration the defendant's cooperation, whether or not the defendant has pleaded guilty. I believe the courts take all of these facts into consideration when they sentence a defendant.

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Now, here Miss Atkins was put in a position by her own attorney, Mr. Caballero, and also Mr. Caruso, where they made an agreement with the District Attorney's Office.

Now, the agreement as interpreted -- I mean, if you look at it in an objective way, the agreement was such that if she testifies and secures her indictment against the defendants in this case, that they would not seek the death penalty.

Now, Mr. Bugliosi, Mr. Stovitz, Mr. Younger, got on the stand and tried to say, well, she did not tell the 100 per cent truth or she did not tell the complete truth and they also stated that they were going to determine whether or not she was telling the truth.

And we all know that the Grand Jury determines whether or not a witness tells the truth at a Grand Jury hearing.

if
Now,/the Grand Jury did not believe Miss
Atkins I doubt very much whether or not they would have
brought an indictment against Manson and the other defendants.

Now, I believe the courts do have somewhat of a moral obligation toward Miss Atkins.

Now, the District Attorney has kept all of the benefits, yet Miss Atkins was put in the same position as the other defendants in this case, and I think the Court

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should strongly consider the fact that she has somewhat cooperated with the authorities and take that into consideration in our motion to reduce the penalty.

Now, the District Attorney will say, well, she lied in the Grand Jury; she later recanted by her declarations, and if they believed this to be true, then they had a duty at that time to dismiss the indictment and get a new indictment. This was never done.

Now, they keep the benefits they received from Miss Atkins and in the same breath say because of the fact she filed a declaration indicating she lied to the Grand Jury, now the deal was off, yet they use all of the benefits that they have received from Miss Atkins.

So I feel that in view of the fact Miss Atkins did cooperate to a certain extent, that the Court should take this into consideration, in our motion to reduce penalty.

Submit it.

THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor.

I submit on the basis that Mr. Manson is completely innocent of these matters. I submit further on the basis of my argument to the Court previously this morning and my argument to the jury.

I submit also, your Honor, with this point:
Juror Tubick, who was the foreman of the

jury, says if Linda Kasabian were sitting where these defendants were, he would have brought in the death sentence.

If that doesn't cry out for a certain result as far as this Court is concerned, I don't know what does, your Honor.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Bugliosi.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Very briefly, your Honor.

previously, I will say it again:

perhaps the most savage, barbaric, nightmarish murders in the courtroom annals of crime.

I am not an uncompromising, rigid, inflexible exponent of the death penalty.

I do not believe the death penalty should be imposed in all cases. I think each case has to be examined and evaluated separately.

Although I am a prosecutor, your Honor, there have been cases where I actually urged the jury to return verdicts of life imprisonment.

But in view of the incredible brutality, savagery and senselessness of these seven murders, if any case justifies the imposition of the death penalty, this surely was a proper case.

The 12 jurors who heard this case felt that in

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view of the extremely aggravated nature of these murders and the total, complete lack and absence of any mitigating circumstances, the death penalty was a proper verdict and I see no reason whatsoever to change that verdict and I would remind the defense attorneys that not only did the prosecution select these 12 jurors, but the defense did.

Again, the People of the State of California respectfully and strenuously urge the Court not to disturb these verdicts.

We ask the Court to affirm the jury verdict of the death penalty.

Thank you, your Honor,

THE COURT: Does anyone wish to respond to Mr.

Bugliosi?

MR. FITZGERALD: No. Your Honor.

MR. KEITH: - Submit, your Honor.

MR. KANAREK: Submit, your Honor.

MR. SHINN: Submit, your Honor.

DEFENDANT MANSON: May I respond?

THE COURT: In considering this motion to reduce the penalty, gentlemen, I have read and considered all of the pre-sentence investigation reports.

In addition I have independently reviewed and weighed the evidence in determining the motion, and of course I have considered carefully the arguments on both sides for and against the motion.

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After nine and a half months of trial all of the superlatives have been used, all of the hyperbole has been indulged in by counsel, by the press, and all that remains are the bare, stark facts of seven senseless murders, seven people whose lives were snuffed out by total strangers for motives which may remain known only to them.

I have carefully looked, in considering this motion for mitigating circumstances, and I have been unable to find any.

I have considered the arguments of counsel regarding the legitimate ends of sentence and punishment which are usually considered to be deterrence, rehabilitation, protection of the public, and it is also fashionable these days not to mention the fourth which I think also is a legitimate element and that is retribution -- not an eye for an eye -- but punishment for acts voluntarily and deliberately engaged in which are contrary to our law.

It is important that any sentence and any punishment dealt out by the Court represent an emphatic denunciation by the community of the type of conduct being engaged in.

It is also important that any sentence show the revulsion of the community for the conduct engaged in.

And in this case it is my considered judgment that not only is the death penalty appropriate, but it is almost compelled by the circumstances.

The Legislature in this State has given the jury and the Court alternatives. Certainly the Legislature must have considered that the death penalty would be an appropriate penalty in some kind of first-degree murder case, and I must agree with the prosecutor on the point where he asks the question, if this is not a proper case for the death penalty, what would be?

I have been unable to resolve that question in any other way than by affirmatively finding that this is an appropriate case for the death penalty.

Accordingly, the motion to reduce the penalty on each of the defendants is denied.

Is there any legal cause why judgment should not now be pronounced?

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, I make a motion in arrest of judgment.

THE COURT: Very well, you may be heard.

MR. KANAREK: As your Honor knows, the motion in arrest of judgment lies normally -- normally where a demurrer has been filed.

Mr. Manson was deprived of his right to file a demurrer, as the record will reveal in this case.

I don't want to belabor it, I'm sure your Honor has read that portion of the record.

THE COURT: Why was he deprived?

MR. KANAREK: Well, because of colloquy which

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occurred wherein there was colloguy between himself and the Court.

THE COURT: Of course you were counsel of record,
Mr. Kanarek, at the time the pretrial motions were heard
in this case.

MR. KANAREK: No, I was not, your Honor, this was before I was of record in this case.

THE COURT: Yes, but you did not hear what I said, sir.

MR. KANAREK: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: On June 1st you were counsel. The Court at that time set the pretrial motions for June 10th, and you had until June 5th to file all of your supporting papers.

Go ahead.

MR. KANAREK: But the demurrer must be made prior to plea. Plea had already been made, your Honor.

But in any event, and that is clear, I am sure your Honor will agree that a demurrer -- the code specifically provides, I think it is 1004 or 1005 -- it must be made prior to plea.

But in any event, it is our position that the Court must arrest judgment because of the invasion of Mr. Manson's constitutional rights which have been guaranteed him by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which grants him the right to a fair public

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This horrendous publicity is represented in A-1 to A-214 which we filed here. It clearly shows he was not granted a fair public trial, a little bit of the iceberg, your Honor, over and above the fact that we made a motion to quash based on the Grand Jury -- the Grand Jury, no question in this case, that that was erroneously denied, and also the petit jury.

We challenged the petit jury, and that is before this Court.

It is our belief that the Court, because of these violations of Mr. Manson's constitutional rights, we incorporate by reference the other motions we have made.

It is our belief and our motion that your Honor arrest judgment.

THE COURT: The motion will be denied.

DEFENDANT MANSON: Your Honor, may I put a foot in the door?

THE COURT: I will give you an opportunity to speak,
Mr. Manson. Do you wish to be heard now?

DEFENDANT MANSON: Yes, sir, I do.

THE COURT: All right.

DEFENDANT MANSON: In your infinite self --

THE COURT: But before I hear you I want to hear from counsel.

Is there any legal cause why judgment should

not now be pronounced?

MR. FITZGERALD: There than what has heretofore been stated, your Honor, there is no legal cause why sentence should not now be imposed on behalf of Patricia Krenwinkel.

MR. KEITH: There is no legal cause on behalf of Leslie Van Houten.

MR. SHINN: There is no legal cause, your Honor, on behalf of Susan Atkins.

MR. KANAREK: No legal cause, your Honor, except what has been stated.

THE COURT: You may speak, Mr. Manson.

Please stand.

DEFENDANT MANSON: (Referring to the microphone)
This is all right, I have a voice.

In your infinite self you know as well as I know that all of the proceedings that have went before your Honor and all of the words, the numbers that are written in your books, all of the things that you learn in school to do, and act as grownups — in my mind as a child my mother brought me to you and she left me with you and I have always lived with the truth of this courtroom.

I have always stood within your light, sir.

I have always stood to my father and said, "Yes, I have
done what I have been told to do."

If I did something I would go to my father and say, "Yes; I did; now do what you want to do to me."

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But, sir, I am dead in this thought, and that is true. I accept this court as my father. I have always done the best in my life to uphold the laws of my father and I accept my father's judgment.

Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: Do any of the other defendants wish to say anything?

(No response.)

THE COURT: Mr. Manson and his counsel will please rise.

On December 8th, 1969, the Grand Jury of
Los Angeles County duly returned indictment No. A-253, 156
charging Charles Manson and others with seven counts of
murder in violation of Section 187 of the Penal Code of the
State of California, and one count of conspiracy to commit
murder in violation of Section 182.1 and 187 of the Penal
Code of the State of California. The counts were
described as follows:

Count II, the murder of Abigail Anne Folger.

Count III, the murder of Voityck Frykowski.

Count III, the murder of Steven Earl Parent.

Count IV, the murder of Sharon Marie Polanski.

Count V, the murder of Thomas John Sebring.

Count VI, the murder of Leno A. La Bianca.

Count VIII, the murder of Rosemary La Bianca.

And Count VIII, conspiracy to commit murder.

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On December 11, 1969 Charles Manson appeared in Department 100 of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, at which time the Public Defender was appointed to represent him.

on December 22, 1969 the Public Defender was relieved, and on December 24, 1969 the defendant's motion to represent himself in propria persona was granted.

Thereafter, on January 28th, 1970 Charles
Manson was duly arraigned on Indictment No. A-253 156,
and on this date pleas of not guilty to all charges were
entered by the Court on behalf of the defendant, pursuant
to Section 1024 of the Penal Code.

On March 6, 1970, the defendant's right to represent himself in propria persona was revoked and Attorney Charles Hollopeter was appointed to represent the defendant.

On March 19, 1970, Attorney Ronald Hughes was substituted for Charles Hollopeter as counsel of record, representing the defendant.

On June 1, 1970, Attorney I. A. Kanarek was substituted for Attorney Ronald Hughes as counsel of record to represent the defendant.

Between December 11, 1969 and June 15, 1970 this case was continued from time to time on behalf of the defendant for good cause and for the hearing of certain motions.

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On June 15, 1970 in Department 104 of the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Los Angeles, trial by jury on the issue of guilt was commenced.

On January 25, 1971 the jury returned verdicts finding the said Charles Manson guilty as charged on all eight counts of the indictment, and fixing the degree of murder in Counts I through VII as murder in the first degree.

Thereafter, on January 28th, 1971, the penalty phase of the trial commenced, and on March 29, 1971 the jury returned verdicts of death against the said Charles Manson as to each of the eight counts of which the defendant had been convicted.

The case was continued to April 19, 1971 for a hearing on motions for a new trial and to reduce the penalty from death to imprisonment for life, and for the pronouncement of judgment and sentence.

On April 19, 1971, the defendant through his counsel argued his motions for a new trial and to reduce the penalty and to arrest the judgment.

After due consideration of the arguments presented by the parties, the motions for a new trial and reduction of the penalty from death to imprisonment for life, and the motions in arrest of judgment were denied.

The Court now merges Counts I through VIII for

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the purpose of sentence only, and sentences the defendant Charles Manson as follows:

It is the judgment and sentence of this Court that for the crimes of Murder in the First Degree in Counts I through VII, and Conspiracy To Commit Murder in Count VIII of which you, Charles Manson, have been convicted, and the penalty having been fixed as death, that you be delivered by the Sheriff of Los Angeles County to the warden of the State Prison of the State of California at San Quentin to be by him put to death in the manner prescribed by law of the State of California on the date hereafter to be fixed.

Execution on Count VIII is stayed pending the determination of any appeal on the other counts, such stay to become permanent when the sentence as to any one of the counts, I through VII, has been completed.

You may be seated, Mr. Manson and Mr. Kanarek.

Mr. Shinn, will you stand with your client,
please.

MR. SHINN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: On December 8, 1969, the Grand Jury of
Los Angeles County duly returned Indictment No. A-253 156,
charging Susan Atkins and others with seven counts of murder
in violation of Section 187 of the Penal Code of the State
of California, and one count of conspiracy to commit murder
in violation of Section 182:1, and 187 of the Penal Code of

the State of California.

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The counts were described as follows:

Count I, the murder of Abigail Folger.

Count II, the murder of Voityck Frykowski.

Count III, the murder of Steven Earl Parent.

Count IV, the murder of Sharon Marie Polanski.

Count V, the murder of Thomas John Sebring.

Count VI, the murder of Leno A. La Bianca.

Count VIII, the murder of Rosemary La Bianca.

Count VIII, conspiracy to commit murder.

On December 16, 1969, Susan Atkins appeared in Department 100 of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles with her attorney, Richard Caballero, at which time she was duly arraigned on Indictment No. A-253 156.

At the time of her arraignment Susan Atkins entered pleas of not guilty to all eight counts of the Indictment.

Thereafter, on March 11, 1970, Attorney Daye Shinn was substituted for Richard Caballero as attorney of record representing the defendant.

Between December 16th, 1969 and June 15th, 1970 this case was continued from time to time on behalf of the defendant for good cause, and for the hearing of certain motions.

On June 15, 1970 in Department 104 of the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the

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County of Los Angeles, trial by jury on the issue of guilt commenced.

On January 25, 1971 the jury returned verdicts finding the said Susan Atkins guilty as charged in all eight counts of the Indictment and fixing the degree of murder on Counts I through VII as murder in the first degree.

Thereafter, on January 28, 1971 the penalty phase of the trial commenced, and on March 29, 1971 the jury returned verdicts of death against the said Susan Atkins as to each of the eight counts of which the defendant had been convicted.

The case was continued to April 19th, 1971 for a hearing on motions for a new trial and to reduce the penalty from death to imprisonment for life, and for the pronouncement of judgment and sentence.

On April 19, 1971, the defendant through her counsel argued her motion for a new trial, and to reduce the penalty from death to imprisonment for life.

After due consideration of the arguments presented by the parties, the motions for a new trial and the reduction of the penalty from death to life imprisonment were denied.

At this time the Court merges Counts I through VIII as one count for the purpose of sentence only, and sentences the defendant Susan Atkins as follows:

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It is the judgment and sentence of this Court that for the crimes of murder in the first degree in Counts I through VII and conspiracy to commit murder in Count VIII of which you, Susan Atkins, have been convicted, and the penalty having been fixed as death, that you be delivered by the Sheriff of Los Angeles County to the Superintendent of the California Institution For Women at Frontera, to be held at that facility pending further order of the Court.

Upon affirmance of this judgment on appeal, this Court will set a date for your execution.

Thereafter, the Department of Corrections is ordered to deliver you to the custody of the Warden of the State Prison of the State of California at San Quentin to be by him put to death in the manner prescribed by law of the State of California.

Execution on Count VIII is stayed pending the determination of any appeal on the other counts, such stay to become permanent when the sentence as to any one of Counts I through VII has been completed.

Mr. Fitzgerald, will you stand with Miss Krenwinkel.

On December 8th, 1969, the Grand Jury of
Los Angeles County duly returned Indictment No. A-253 156,
charging Patricia Krenwinkel and others with seven counts
of murder in violation of Section 187 of the Penal Code of

the State of California, and one count of Conspiracy To Commit Murder in violation of 182.1 and 187 of the Penal Code of the State of California.

The counts were described as follows:

Count I, the murder of Abigail Anne Folger.

Count II, the murder of Voityck Frykowski.

Count III, the murder of Steven Earl Parent.

Count IV, the murder of Sharon Marie Polanski.

Count V, the murder of Thomas John Sebring.

Count VI, the murder of Leno A. La Bianca.

Count VII, the murder of Rosemary La Bianca.

Count VIII, conspiracy to commit murder.

On February 24, 1970, Patricia Krenwinkel

appeared in Department 100 of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles at which time Attorney Paul Fitzgerald was appointed to represent her.

Thereafter, on March 3, 1970 Patricia

Krenwinkel was duly arraigned on Indictment No. A-253 156,
and entered pleas of not guilty to all charges.

Eetween February 24, 1970 and June 15, 1970 this case was continued from time to time on behalf of the defendant for good cause and for the hearing of certain motions.

On June 15, 1970 in Department 104 of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, trial by jury on the issue of guilt commenced.

On January 25, 1971 the jury returned verdicts finding the said Patricia Krenwinkel guilty as charged on all eight counts of the Indictment, and fixing the degree of murder in Counts I through VII as Murder in the First Degree.

Thereafter, on January 28, 1971 the penalty phase of the trial commenced, and on March 29, 1971, the jury returned verdicts of death against the said Patricia Krenwinkel as to each of the eight counts of which the defendant had been convicted.

The case was continued to April 19, 1971 for a hearing on motions for a new trial and to reduce the penalty from death to imprisonment for life and for the pronouncement of judgment and sentence.

On April 19, 1971, the defendant through her counsel argued her motions for a new trial, and to reduce the penalty from death to imprisonment for life.

After due consideration of the arguments presented by the parties, the motions for a new trial and the reduction of the penalty from death to imprisonment for life were denied.

At this time the Court merges Counts I through
VIII as one count for the purpose of sentence only and
sentences the defendant Patricia Krenwinkel as follows:

It is the judgment and sentence of this Court that for the crimes of Murder in the First Degree in

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Counts I through VII and Conspiracy To Commit Murder in Count VIII of which you, Patricia Krenwinkel, have been convicted, and the penalty having been fixed as death, that you be delivered by the Sheriff of Los Angeles County to the Superintendent of the California Institution For Women at Frontera, to be held at that facility pending further order of the Court.

Upon affirmance of this judgment on appeal this Court will set a date for your execution.

Thereafter the Department of Corrections is ordered to deliver you to the custody of the Warden at the State Prison of the State of California at San Quentin to be by him put to death in the manner prescribed by law of the State of California.

Execution on Count VIII is stayed pending the determination of any appeal on the other counts, such stay to become permanent when the sentence to any one of Counts I through VII is completed.

MR. FITZGERALD: If the Court please, is your Honor suspending execution of the sentence to Count VIII to meet the standards of People vs. Niles, the multiple-punishment situation, or is your Honor suspending sentence to retain jurisdiction of some sort?

THE COURT: Under the multiple-punishment provision,
Mr. Fitzgerald.

MR. FITZGERALD: I have no objection.

THE COURT: And in accordance with People versus Niles.

Mr. Keith, will you please rise with Miss Van Houten.
On December 8th, 1969, the Grand Jury of Los
Angeles County duly returned Indictment No. A-253 156,
charging Leslie Van Houten and others with the crimes of
Murder in Violation of Section 187 of the Penal Code of the
State of California, and one count of Conspiracy To Commit
Murder in Violation of Section 182.1 and 187 of the Penal
Code of the State of California.

The counts against Leslie Van Houten were described as follows:

Count VI, murder of Leno A, La Bianca.

Count VII, murder of Rosemary La Bianca.

Count VIII, conspiracy to commit murder.

On December 19th, 1969 Leslie Van Houten

appeared in Department 100 of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles at which time Attorney Marvin Part was appointed by the Court to represent her.

Thereafter, on December 22, 1969 Leslie
Van Houten was duly arraigned on Indictment No. A-253 156.

At the time of her arraignment Leslie Van Houten entered pleas of not guilty to all charges against her in the Indictment.

On February 6, 1970 Attorney Ira Reiner was substituted for Marvin Part as attorney of record

representing the defendant

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Between December 19, 1969 and June 15, 1970 this case was continued from time to time on behalf of the defendant for good cause, and for the hearing of certain motions.

On June 15, 1970, in Department 104 of the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Los Angeles, trial by jury on the issue of guilt commenced.

On July 17, 1970 attorney Ronald Hughes was substituted for Ira Reiner as attorney of record representing the defendant.

On December 3, 1970 Attorney Maxwell Keith was appointed co-counsel to assist Attorney Ronald Hughes in the representation of the defendant.

On January 25, 1971 the jury returned verdicts finding the said Leslie Van Houten guilty as charged on Counts VI through VIII of the Indictment and fixing the degree of murder in Counts VI and VII as murder in the First Degree.

Thereafter on January 28, 1971 the penalty phase of the trial commenced, and on March 29, 1971 the jury returned verdicts of death against the said Leslie Van Houten as to each of the three counts of which the defendant had been convicted.

The case was continued to April 19, 1971 for a

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hearing on motions for a new trial and to reduce the penalty from death to imprisonment for life and for pronouncement of judgment and sentence.

On April 19, 1971 the defendant through her counsel argued her motions for a new trial and to reduce the penalty from death to imprisonment for life.

After due consideration of the argument presented by the parties, the motions for new trial and a reduction of the penalty from death to imprisonment for life were denied.

At this time the Court merges Counts VI through VIII as one count for the purpose of sentence only and sentences the defendant Leslie Van Houten as follows:

It is the judgment and setence of this Court that for the crimes of Murder in the First Degree in Counts VI and VII, and Conspiracy To Commit Murder in Count VIII of which you, Leslie Van Houten, have been convicted, and the penalty having been fixed as death, that you be delivered by the Sheriff of Los Angeles County to the Superintendent of the California Institution For Women at Frontera to be held at that facility pending further order of the Court.

Upon affirmance of this judgment on appeal this Court will set a date for your execution.

Thereafter the Department of Corrections is ordered to deliver you to the custody of the Warden of the

State Prison of the State of California at San Quentin to be by him put to death in the manner prescribed by the law of the State of California.

Execution on Count VIII is stayed pending the determination of any appeal on the other counts, such stay to become permanent when the sentence as to any one of Counts VI and VII have been completed.

The defendants are remanded into the custody of the Sheriff in accordance with the judgment and sentence.

This court is now adjourned.

MR. FITZGERALD: Your Honor, there is a matter on tomorrow morning's calendar to correct the record.

I have discussed it with Mr. Hollombe.

I also discussed it with the prosecution. I have no objection to the changes, neither does Mr. Shinn. I understand Mr. Kanarek and Mr. Keith don't either.

I wonder if our presence would be necessary at that time. it has been noticed for tomorrow morning at 9:00 o'clock.

THE COURT: Well, I have not seen the notice.

MR. BUGLIOSI: That would be very fine if they would stipulate to anything.

The corrections are very small and nominal.

THE COURT: Do you all acknowledge receiving service of the copy of the notice set for tomorrow morning?

MR. FITZGERALD: Yes.

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1 MR. KANAREK: Yes. 2 MR. SHINN: Yes. 3 MR. KEITH: Yes. 4 THE COURT: Correction of the transcript? 5 MR. FITZGERALD: Correction of the transcript. Most 6 of the corrections relate to Mr. Bugliosi's argument. 7 THE COURT: Do you all stipulate that the transcript 8 may be corrected in accordance with the request made by the 9 prosecution? 10 MR. KANAREK: Yes, I understand based upon Mr. 11 Hollombe's representation --12 THE COURT: I don't want any conditions. 13 MR. KANAREK: So stipulated. MR. FITZGERALD: So stipulated. 15 MR. SHINN: So sipulated. 16 MR. KEITH: So sipulated. 17 THE COURT: Without conditions, is that understood? 18 MR. FITZGERALD: It's understood. 19 MR. KANAREK: It's understood. 20 MR. SHINN: It's understood. 21 MR. KEITH: It's understood. 22 THE COURT: Very well. 23 MR. KAY: Your Honor, before we leave we have a 24 problem of People's 87. 25 Your Honor wanted the prosecution to file a 26 declaration. Now, if counsel is not going to be here

tomorrow morning, when can this issue be settled? THE COURT: It can be served by mail. I think you should notice it for hearing before the Court. 3, MR. KAY: Does the Court want the prosecution here tomorrow morning? THE COURT: Not necessarily. If your notice sets out the corrections that are there. MR. BUGLIOSI: It does not, so we would have to be here tomorrow morning. 18. 5

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, TUESDAY, APRIL 20, 1971
9:06 A.M.

(The following proceedings were had in the chambers of the Court, Mr. Kay and Mr. Bugliosi being the only ones present:)

MR. BUGLIOSI: I understand the defense is going to stipulate to these changes.

THE COURT: Well, they did stipulate yesterday.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I want Joe to know I am very happy with the transcript. Every day they were excellent, but in the nature of things, the way I speak, I speak so quickly you just cannot pick up every word, so I have some corrections, Judge. There are quite a few but they are small; they are minor; they are not like a whole line missing or anything like that.

If Joe could just look at the corrections and either insert on the Court copy the changes or type up a new page, it would be up to the Court as to what the Court wants Joe to do on this.

THE COURT: Have you listed these in some form?

MR. BUGLIOSI: The reason I haven't, it is almost
on a page-to-page basis, your Honor.

I will give you an example, you see, it would be almost too big a job. It's almost on a page-to-page basis, so he can almost go page-by-page.

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differently.

THE COURT: How many volumes are you talking about?

MR. BUGLIOSI: The main part of my opening argument,

for three volumes, I just forgot about.

So we are talking about Volume 26, which is my opening statement, and then starting with my opening argument, the first couple of pages where I discuss the law.

That is in Volume 153, and then from that on to 156 I have ignored, and then continuing on, 156 for a couple of pages to the end of my opening argument.

Then I've got my entire closing argument; I made corrections during my entire closing argument.

THE COURT: Well, are these things you said or wished you said?

MR. BUGLIOSI: No, no, these are things I said.

THE COURT: We all say things sometimes, which
upon re-reading it, where we wish we had phrased

MR. BUGLIOSI: The reason I know I said them is
I made the tape recording, and I also have notes. I think
you have seen them on the dais; these are actual statements
by me.

The reason I am so concerned, Judge, is in the Milton Floyd case I never made corrections, and on appeal they quoted me for about four pages and they got things in there where I sounded like an idiot.

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I wish now I made those changes. Sometimes one word changes the complete context.

Just to give you an example, near the end of my closing argument, and I listened to the tape so I know I said this, I said words to the effect that Manson from the fires of hell sent out three bloodthirsty robots, and I said, "Unfortunately for him, one human being, Linda Kasabian," the words "for him" are not in here, so it would read he sent out three bloodthirsty robots and unfortunately Linda Kasabian, just things like that, little changes.

I anticipate that the Appellate Court will quote certain parts of my argument, that is why I am so concerned, otherwise I would correct my copy and let it go at that, but if these words are going to be in some volume throughout history, I think that it is important that we have it as accurate as possible, so I played the entire opening and closing arguments on tape, and made these corrections.

But I repeat again, I have had so many cases where I looked at the transcript, and there are almost paragraphs missing -- have you ever had that, almost a whole paragraph?

MR. KAY: Once.

MR. BUGLIOSI: And sentences missing; that is very common. Whereas i find none of that in here. It is a

very good job, Joe, it's just that you cannot possibly get down every word. I don't think any human being can do it.

THE COURT: Well, how do you propose to proceed then?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Well, as I say, I have set forth the included pages, and it is for the most part almost on a page-to-page basis.

Now, Joe can do one of two things: He can either, on the copy that is going to go up to the Appellate Court, he can either insert in that court copy the changes, or he can type out a few pages.

Court would want to do on that.

Whatever the Court would want to do on that.

THE COURT: I understood yesterday, of course without really knowing, when you made your motion to correct the transcript, that you had prepared some kind of a list of proposed corrections. For the record we need something like that, otherwise there is no way of telling what has been corrected, in case the question ever comes up again.

Something can be corrected, and no one would ever know it was corrected, even if there is a correction where there should not have been a correction, I think we would have to have a record of it. It just cannot be done

with no record.

I realize it may be a big job, but I don't see any other way around it. Otherwise the defendants would never be protected.

You can change anything, and they would never know it was changed.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Of course the defense has stipulated.

THE COURT: But they are stipulating to it blind.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I see the Court's point on this.

I am trying to find out if there is some way to avoid setting all this down.

THE COURT: You will just have to list page and line.

I wouldn't ever consent to just a blanket correction of the transcript without any record of what was done. I don't think it would be fair to either side, and there could very well be mistakes made, innocent mistakes; there could be not innocent mistakes made -- you know.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Right.

THE COURT: I am not suggesting that you would do anything improper, but nevertheless the possibility is always there.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Right.

THE COURT: Without a record we have no way of knowing.

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MR. BUGLIOSI: Right. Well, then, I will have a secretary set forth -- do you want it by way of a brief?

THE COURT: Well, I think perhaps if you would make a motion to correct the transcript and list by volume number, page number, line number, the precise corrections you wish made, change this word to that, or inserting this word where it was left out, so anyone can look at that and tell exactly what was done, and compare that with the transcript to see if it was done.

MR. KAY: Maybe we should just make an addendum to the motion, since we already made the motion, just make an addendum to that rather than make a new motion, mailing it out again and setting it down for a time to come in, because the defense has already waived it.

What you really want is a list for the record.

THE COURT: That's right. I think it should be in
the form of a motion. The record will show the defendants
have stipulated these corrections may be made.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Okay. Is there any time problem? (Off-the-record discussion.)

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 28, 1971 1 10:00 A.M. 2 ---0---3 (The following proceedings were had in open court, 4 Vincent T. Bugliosi and Stephen Kay, Deputies District 5 Attorney, appearing for the People; I. A. Kanarek and 6. Daye Shinn, attorneys for the defendants, being present:) THE COURT: People versus Charles Manson, et al. 8 MR. KANAREK: May I address the Court, your Honor? 9 THE COURT: Just a moment. 10 MR. KANAREK: Just for appearances, that is what I 11 wanted to say. 12 THE COURT: Yes, you may state your appearances, 13 Counsel. 14 MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I am appearing for myself, 15 I.A. Kanarek on behalf of Mr. Manson; and I am also 16. appearing for Paul Fitzgerald on behalf of Patricia 17 Krenwinkel, your Honor. 18 Mr. Fitzgerald asked me to appear for him. 19 THE COURT: The record will show Mr. Shinn is 20 present. Is anyone appearing for Mr. Keith? 21 MR. KANAREK: I have not spoken to Mr. Keith, your 22 23 24 THE COURT: Now, with respect to the motion for replace-25 ment of the missing exhibit, there is a declaration of

service, showing service on Mr. Shinn, Mr. Kanarek,

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Mr. Fitzgerald, and Mr. Keith.

Has the clerk heard anything from Mr. Keith? THE CLERK: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well.

Do you wish to be heard?

MR. KANAREK: Yes, if I may, your Honor, I make a motion, your Honor to strike the declaration.

There is no foundation; there is no showing that this exhibit, or this purported picture that the People wish to introduce — actually I don't even know what the picture is that they intend to introduce, may I see it?

THE COURT: Are you serious, Mr. Kanarek?

MR. KANAREK: Yes, I am serious, your Honor, I am serious, in this case, your Honor --

THE COURT: You were advised of this in chambers before the trial ended; you have been served with a copy of the motion with the exhibit number. I assume you kept a record of the exhibits during the course of the trial. You have handled this exhibit; I have seen you show it to witnesses.

MR. KANAREK: I know, your Honor, but I don't purport to memorize --

I don't know what they intend to offer. What is the exhibit they intend to offer? Where is the picture that they intend to --

THE COURT: If you want to see the Court's copy, you

may do so. I find it difficult to believe that you are really serious, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: I am serious, your Honor. I believe that one or more of the jurors have committed a felony and I think it is most unusual -- I know that if I --

THE COURT: That has nothing to do with what we are talking about.

The only thing before the Court now is the fact, that apparently a photograph was missing at the close of the trial. The People wish to substitute a copy, an exact copy of that photograph made from the same negative.

If you have any objection to that I would like to hear your objection.

MR. KANAREK: I would like -- I move to take evidence first of all, it is my belief that the Court has no jurisdiction at this time to proceed. There is no statutory provision.

The Court has lost jurisdiction. The Court did not make any probationary sentence; the Court is without jurisdiction. It is a violation of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment for the Court to proceed.

There is no statutory provision for what the District Attorney is purporting to attempt here.

This should be done before the Court lost jurisdiction. The Court is without power, without any

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power.

Now, the Court can use the naked power that it has and place this physically in some particular place, but it is our belief that the Court has no such power because there is no provision in law for it.

THE COURT: The Court does have the power to correct the record, to augment the record under certain circumstances and to make the record speak the truth.

MR. KANAREK: That has to be done in the appellate court, augmentation.

THE COURT: Look at Rule 35 of the Rules on Appeal, Mr. Kanarek, and you will see otherwise.

MR, KANAREK: Well, your Honor, it is our belief that this particular procedure is a procedure, and we have indicated it, where the Court is without jurisdiction to proceed.

THE COURT: Do you have anything, Mr. Shinn?
MR. SHINN: Yes, your Honor.

MR. KANAREK: Furthermore, if I may, your Honor, if I may --

MR. SHINN: Oh!

MR. KANAREK: I don't know, I'm sure, your Honor, without being able to substantiate it because I don't have all of the records, that many pictures of Sharon Tate were taken. We don't know that particular picture, that this particular picture is in fact the picture, a

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duplicate of the picture that was used in court, used here in court.

I am sure that more than one picture was shot.

I don't know, I have not been able and I cannot represent to the Court because I have not been able to ascertain whether there were any markings.

I know from time to time Mr. Bugliosi made markings on some of the exhibits, as did I with the Court's permission in court by writing letters, A, B, C, D, that type of thing.

My perusal of the 30,000 pages of transcript has not been able to -- has not been able to determine whether or not there were any such markings. I cannot represent that to the Court, but I believe it is possible that that did occur.

In any event, your Honor, I move we have an evidentiary hearing, if your Honor overrules the jurisdictional grounds that we are alleging, because I don't know that this picture is in fact a copy of what was had here in court.

THE COURT: I would like to hear from Mr. Shinn.

MR. KANAREK: There is no --

MR. SHINN: I join in Mr. Kanarek's arguments.

Also I searched the Penal Code and the Government Code, Government Code Section 6201 pertains to a document which is missing or stolen but it does not provide

I did not see anywhere in the Code section where it provides the Court could replace the missing or stolen exhibit or the document.

That is why I will join with Mr. Kanarek and object to this motion and move that the Court does strike the motion to file by the District Attorney's Office.

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, and I move for an evidentiary hearing --

THE COURT: You made your argument, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: I haven't finished.

THE COURT: Yes, you have.

The motion will be granted. The exhibit will be substituted. There is no question about the fact that it is an exact copy, an identical copy made from the same negative as the original exhibit.

MR. KANAREK: What I was going to suggest, that the -THE COURT: Now, as to the proposed corrections to
the transcript, I think that is premature.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules on Appeal there is a procedure set up after the transcripts have been prepared, and that would include both any corrections to the Clerk's transcript as well as the reporters' transcript.

So I think we are actually premature at this time. So that motion will go off calendar.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Thank you, your Honor.

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1	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2	YOR THE COURTY OF LAW ANGELES
3	BEPARTHERT NO. 104 HOS. CHARLES N. BLDER, JULES
4	
5	THE PLOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.
6	Plaintiff,
7	v*. 40.A-253 156
8	CHARLES MANGON, SUSAN ATMINE.) LEGLIE VAN NOUTEN. PATRICIA KARNWIRKEL.)
9) Soivadante.
10	10 Miles and produced the september of the production of the contract of the c
11	STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
12	county of los linguages)
13	. I, J. HOLLOWEL, Official Reporter of the Separtor
14	Court of the state of California, in and for the County of
15	Low Angeles, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages 1
16	through 18,307 comprise a full, true and correct transcript
17	of the proceedings and and the testimony taken in the
18	matter of the above entitled cause.
19	Dated this Jota day of April, 1971.
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22	J. Mollowse, Official Mayorter
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1	Superior court of the State of California
2	FUR THE COURTY OF LOS ANGELES
3	department no. 104 nom. Charles n. Older, Judge
4	
5	THE PLOPES OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
6	Planelit.
7	vs
8	Charles Maadod, Subab Atalbo, Leblie var houtem, Patricia Brrhwinkel,
9	Defendants. }
10	Compared to the contract of th
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12	STATE OF CRLIFORNIA)
13	COUNTY OF LOS INSLIGUED)
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15	Court of the State of California, in and for the County of
16	Los Angeles, do nareny costily that the foregoing pages i
17	tarough 18,100 congrise a full, thee and correct transcript
18	of the proceedings had and the tostimony taken in the
19	matear of the above-entities cause.
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BUPLATOR COURT OF THE CYMPL OF CALIFORNIA 1 WOR THE COLUMN OF NOS ARGELLS 2 militations at 104 MON. CARROLL H. OLUER, JUSTIE Ά. 4 and ecoure of any expert ar collegings. 5 Pluinvice. 6: A-255 **156** V. 7. halidition individue, which highlides, 8 licited van hoeten, paratera aankaraken. 9 Defendants. 10 11 union of chemometr 12 BE. CULLIY OF LOW ANGILLS 13 I, lake it, dualities, destaulat happener of the paparion 14. Court of the Lante of californie, in my for the County of 15 Los impelies. Co hereby cortify that the fercyclos pages 16 is, and through it, the inclination, comprise a full, true and 17 correct transpriet of the proposition and and the testimony 18 token in the conter of the eleve-engicled cause on 19 teteber 1 and 1. 1970. 20 dated tale of autil, 1971. 21 22. Indian air Shieranishing 150 23 wis a. Johnson, Difficial Reporter 24

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1 production court of any place of cultivative 2 YOR THE COURTY OF LOW MIGHLES 3 DEPARTMENT NO. 104 wol. Christa E. Clork, Judge 4 5 THE PEOPLE OF THE STADE OF CARROTHIA. 6 Plainties. 7 TANK A HO. A-253 156 8 California Manipal, allaba attituia, licultic var lootest, proprocia exchilibrel. 9 DEFENDANCE. 10 11 12. With the Control of t 13. COULTY OF LOW ANDLESS 14 I. CHRISTIAN II. GLOCK, Julys of the outerior court of 15 the Uters of California, in and for the County of Los Angeles, 16 and being the godde who bresided at the trial in the space-17 antition orinital cause, do nercoy corries that no 18 epiecation and rown cours to the mithin transcript by without 19 the december of tools artorders, or the pintrice 20 Accorney, which the close allowed by law, and the ware is 21 men, therefore, approved by the time ____ any of 22 1971. 23 24

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